

"Transcendental Idealism," he explains that "my idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which however constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) *since it never came into my head to doubt them*, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things." I do not see how Mr. Caird can hold that Kant when he wrote these passages regarded as "meaningless" the question whether "there is an existence of things in themselves independent of consciousness"; nor how he can say that there is here any "uncertainty in Kant's language"; and I do not understand him to hold with some German writers that Kant changed his opinion on this fundamental point between 1781 and 1783, or misrepresented his real conviction out of a base regard for his reputation.

But secondly, if any one, with the passages above quoted from the *Prolegomena* before him, will consider carefully the 'Refutation of Idealism' in the second edition of the *Kritik*, I hardly see how he can avoid the conclusion that Kant in the latter passage does confound "the idea of externality to consciousness" and the "idea of externality in the sense of existence in space". He states as the 'Theorem' to be proved—"The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space"; and then proceeds with the proof, as follows:—

"I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something in me, because my very existence in time can only be determined through this permanent something. Therefore the perception of this permanent is only possible through a *thing without me*, and not through the mere *representation* of a thing without me. It follows that the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things which I perceive without me."

It is evident that the "Ding ausser mir" in the third sentence of this 'proof,' contrasted as it is with the "blosse Vorstellung eines Dinges ausser mir" is identical with the "unbekannter aber nichts desto weniger wirklicher Gegenstand" of the passage from the *Prolegomena*—i.e., it is a thing external to consciousness: while again it must be identical with the "Gegenstand in Raum ausser mir" of the 'Theorem'. The two notions of 'externality in space' and 'externality to consciousness' have here run into one in Kant's mind—however true it may be that he has elsewhere "expressly and clearly distinguished them".

HENRY SIDGWICK.

ALLEGED SUICIDE OF A DOG.

AN account of the great grief shown by a chimpanzee at the death of its female companion, which has recently gone the round of the newspapers, has been the occasion of speculations concerning the very human passions of some animals, and of stories of actual suicide by them in certain instances. One Journal believes there is a well-authenticated story of a cat which, having had its kittens drowned,

was so grief-stricken at its bereavement that it deliberately committed suicide by strangling itself in the fork of the branch of a tree. The writer's experience of life in the country cannot have been very great, or he would have heard of other instances in which cats running up trees after birds had slipped and, being caught in a forked branch, had been strangled. Had he extended his inquiries he might even have become acquainted with instances in which the same fate had overtaken human beings. Stories of the kind require to be severely sifted, and ought not to be accepted unless the narrator either shows by his narrative that he has taken every pains to avoid the common fallacies of observation and inference, or has been strictly cross-examined by some one who, being more apt to doubt than to believe, is alive to, and on his guard against, these fallacies.

Some years ago a very striking story of suicide by a dog went the round of the newspapers. It was of this kind:—The dog had been taken from its home to another home where it was exceedingly unhappy; it returned after a time to its old home, whining piteously for admission, but was driven away; thereupon it went to a river which was close by, was seen to enter the water and to deliberately lay itself down in it, and was drowned. Having expressed to Dr. Lauder Lindsay of Perth, who has been engaged for some years upon a work on the subject of *Animal Intelligence*, my disbelief that there was any suicide in the case, if it was strictly inquired into, he was kind enough to put me in communication with Dr. Brown of Rochester, who was in a position to throw light upon it. Dr. Brown, with great courtesy, gave me the following account of the matter:—

7th April, 1875.

"Case of 'Bruce' the Upnor dog that drowned itself about eight years ago in March or April.

"The owner was Mr. Home of the King's Arms, Upnor, afterwards of Frindsburg. Mr. Home had the puppy whilst residing at Upnor. The dog did not like its master's removal to Frindsburg and always appeared to be attached to the old house. The mistress was extremely fond of the dog.

"The dog's mother was a spotted brown and white bitch used for hunting rabbits; the father was a water-dog—a retriever or something of that sort. 'Bruce' usually disliked water, for it was thrown into the water when very young. It had a white body with silvery long hair and brown head and ears. The eyes were red and the character was somewhat ferocious, for it would not allow any one to touch it except its mistress.

"The mode of death was as follows:—There was a supper given and a sucking-pig was eaten. The dog had some of it, and appeared to have got a bone into its throat or to have been poisoned; but it was not known for certain what had happened. It was ill for eight days, eating nothing, and vomiting. The mistress fed it with gruel in a spoon. Several times the dog would put its head into a pail of water and let the water get into its throat and run out again: it would not drink properly. At the end of eight days the mistress sat up all night with it, and at five in the morning she let it out of doors: she sat up with it to prevent it from tearing the paint-work. The dog at once proceeded to Upnor to the old house. The master's mother who was residing in this house heard it, but would not open the door and let it in, being afraid of it because of its illness, for people said that it was mad and ought to be drowned. The dog went to the river at

six a.m. and walked into the water, and lay down in the water, and so was drowned. The witnesses were Hobb, a waterman at Upnor, now alive, and Tanner, now dead. They were in a lighter close by.

"The mistress does not believe that the dog committed suicide. She thinks that it went into the water to cool its throat, as it was accustomed to do in the pail of water. She related these facts to me on April 7th, 1875.

"FREDK. J. BROWN, M.D.

"The dog got nearly blind during its illness."

Such is an accurate account of what happened, and it evidently does not warrant the conclusion of suicide. The owner of the dog, as Dr. Brown informed me in a subsequent letter, had no doubt that the death was due to exhaustion from disease and want of food; and that was Dr. Brown's own opinion. He had known other instances in which animals suffering from disease and dying in consequence of it, or with the concurrence of some accident in their exhausted state, were popularly supposed to have put an end purposely to their sufferings. When he was a boy he resided near the Medway. The sheep fed on the marshes suffered occasionally from staggers, a disease of brain produced by the presence of a hydatid cyst in it; and they were sometimes found drowned in a ditch which surrounded the field, having staggered about and fallen into it in their vertigo. A far more probable explanation than suicide—indeed the explanation which the shepherd gave of the matter.

It is quite possible that an animal in a state of excitement or delirium from pain and illness may make a frantic rush which issues in its death, just as a human being may do; but that is quite a different thing from a distinctly conceived and deliberately perpetrated suicide. Of such an act by any animal below man we are yet in want of satisfactory evidence.

HENRY MAUDSLEY.

Since the foregoing was written I have met with the following story in a newly published book on *The Relations of Mind and Brain* (p. 140), by Professor Calderwood:—

"I have known two very striking cases of the speedy death of a dog under grief. In one case narrated to me by the owner of the animal, a dog had occupied itself, when the family were at church, with pursuing and killing the poultry belonging to the household. After having killed them it carefully buried them one by one in different parts of the garden in which the pursuit and slaughter had taken place. Shortly after the return of the family, the absence of the hens was remarked. Search was made, but no trace of them could be found either about the premises or in the neighbourhood. At length the attention of some one was arrested by evidence of the ground in some parts of the garden having been disturbed. The soil was turned up, and the hens' bodies were found. The dog was taken to the garden, and immediately confessed his guilt. His master took him to the library, and, having shut the door, began a reprimand after this fashion:—'What a wicked thing you have done in murdering the hens! You are a minister's dog, and should have been an example to other dogs, instead of doing such a thing as this. Then, this is Sabbath-day, and the deed is all the worse on account of the day on which it has been done.' Thus admonished, the dog was put out at the door, and the door