

the present reviewer's opinion, whenever it comes, a theory of the origin of inhibition quite as much as a theory of excess functions. The presence and importance of the latter, the excess functions, Professor Baldwin has, indeed done well to recognize; but the theory as he leaves it is essentially incomplete, for the lack of any genuine explanation of the selective process everywhere presupposed by the whole discussion. Despite this essential gap in this theory, the volume before us is so full of ingenious observation and of courageous speculation, as to leave no enlightened reader in doubt of its author's power both to see and to think, and doubtless, ere long, to lead us further into the world where he has already done such admirable work. Agreeing fully, as the present writer does, with the prominence given in this book to the value of imitation for the whole of the higher mental processes, rejoiced as Prof. Baldwin's reviewer is to find in many pages doctrines as to the psychology both of imitation itself, and of the intelligence generally which he would have been glad, indeed, to have been able to express himself, one can only regret, in closing, that the foregoing comments have often been as negative as they have been. But it is by temporary disagreement that our common interests often find themselves in the end best furthered.

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*Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling.* HIRAM M. STANLEY. London, Sonnenschein; New York, Macmillan. 1895. Pp. VIII+392. \$2.25 net.

Mr. Stanley's book is, in my opinion, an interesting and important contribution to genetic psychology. It takes up the Spencerian formulation of the problem of mental development—the interpretation of the functions of the individual consciousness in the light of race-utility—and attempts to throw light on this question by the introspective method. As far as such a problem can be approached by such a method, Mr. Stanley approaches it; but he cannot, I think, discover in the adult mind a science of mental embryology. With this essential limitation of method—a limitation which is not accidental, but which Mr. Stanley defends—his results are rich in suggestiveness, and mark the author as entitled to a high place among contemporary authors in developmental psychology. This the more because his results are peculiarly his own, as his method necessarily makes them. With this general appreciation of the book, which I do not intend the criticisms which follow in any way to impair, I may set out a few

points of the more essential results which the author reaches, and speak to them from my own point of view.

Mr. Stanley makes pain-consciousness primitive—what he calls ‘pure pain.’ It is accommodation agent through the ‘will-effort’ which it leads the animal to make in order to rid itself of the pain. Pleasure consciousness is a later state arising between want-pain and excess-pain. The derivative character of pleasure is argued at some length, but with arguments of an introspective character; although here as elsewhere Mr. Stanley deserts his method by appealing to the child consciousness and hints at biological facts. I think that all the points made can be met by facts from biology and child-psychology; but this is not necessary, since Mr. Stanley says in another place (28) in answer to points made by Mr. Marshall that he is not concerned to maintain this thesis and is quite willing to believe that pleasure and pain are equally primitive. This is generous, certainly, but it shows the essential weakness of the author’s method. The point at issue here, I venture to think, is one of the most fundamental in all the theory of development. A number of Mr. Stanley’s own later doctrines rest upon the probable truth of the claim that pain alone is primitive accommodation agent. And the admission made here that it is not, weakens the ground theory of the book all the way through.

The second element of Mr. Stanley’s conception of the fundamental reaction, *i. e.*, ‘will-effort,’ finds no analysis or discussion that I can see anywhere in the work. It seems to be assumed along with pain as an ultimate characteristic of mental life. But even then we ought to have some notion of how it works to bring about the adaptations of the organism. This great defect is what I referred to above in defining Mr. Stanley’s problem as the problem of race development. The parallel question of individual development—the ontogenetic question—seems not to have occurred to him. And yet, is not that just the question for which the introspective method is available? Here it seems to me Mr. Stanley shows a little want of touch with the discussions of current psychology—a sort of personal isolation, as it were. Why does he not bring in some reference to the recent discussions of motor phenomena, kinæsthetic doctrines of voluntary action, reduction of will-effort to a sensational basis, etc. Surely these theories are the most formidable opposites to the vague postulate of will-effort, which he fails even to define. The resource of child-psychology, which Mr. Stanley ranks next in importance to simple introspection, should give him an inkling of the need of settling this great problem. Spencer saw the necessity for a theory of the individual’s

adaptations—the more, perhaps, because of his Lamarckism in the doctrine of heredity; but there, in heredity, is another question the importance of which Mr. Stanley seems not to have appreciated. I do not mean these things as criticisms of a positive kind, in the face of Mr. Stanley's modest assurance that the book is only a series of studies. But yet when he uses phrases equivalent to 'will-effort' so freely, it can not fail to occur to the reader that it is a bridge of thin ice over these yawning caverns.

Again I think Mr. Stanley's free—I almost said indiscriminate—use of the principle of 'variations with natural selection' leads to little new truth. Cognition is a variation (6173) under which sensation, perception, memory, etc., are all variations. Attention, self-sense, and so on everywhere—all are variations. And then Mr. Stanley seems to think, that his problem is solved when he has pointed out some introspective or speculative utility which, in the mind of the psychologist, should justify this or that variation—*after the fact*. This gives a set of small unimportant problems which each one can settle for himself, as he thinks the facts 'most likely' were. But it is as if the biologist should say: The law of variations with utility solves the question of life; and for this organ or that, its utility assumed, its use was probably this or that. The biologist, on the contrary, goes to paleontology and morphology, and those are the fields where the real facts are found to justify the theory of evolution. The psychologist has his paleontology in the animals around him and his morphology in the nursery. And while, of course, we have immeasurable difficulties to deal with, yet the real emphasis is thus thrown on the problem of individual or ontogenetic development, where the actual utilities may be seen in operation. It is not a mere question of surmise as to this utility or that. I do not insist on this here because it is a matter of personal conviction which I have recently urged at length in my book on *Mental Development*. The principle of circular reaction which I became convinced was of the first importance in the development of the individual development seemed applicable then in race development as well. Whatever may be thought of such a particular sort of formulation, I am yet more than ever convinced, by this able book of Mr. Stanley's, that no mere introspective or descriptive surmises about race-utilities can take the place of some such principle of unity arrived at first by way of the ontogenetic problem.

This point of criticism holds, in my view, all the way through the book. The chapter on the 'self-feeling' is full of keen verbal distinctions, most of them true to introspection as matters of description,

most of them requiring a general appeal to the law of variations, and many of them important for general psychology. But Mr. Stanley draws inferences for race-development on such grounds; and whether we agree with him or not depends largely upon whether we follow his distinctions and accept his definitions—and then what is the outcome? Why this: that so, and so, was probably the utility which the animal found in becoming self-conscious! But let us once turn to the field of morphology, the nursery, and enquire into the actual conditions under which the sense of personality arises, and I think one of the two most compelling and conspicuous factors in the whole group of phenomena, is just a factor which introspection has not revealed to Mr. Stanley at all—though even by that method I think he should have got glimpses of it—the fact, namely, that the sense of self—using the term in Mr. Stanley's sense 'as a reflection of experience upon itself'—'by which the individual becomes aware of its own activities as its own' (254)—comes by way of the progressive social consciousness. And if this be true would not the variation in the race series which the self-sense supposes (254) involve this differentia as well as that deduced from the direct interpretation of the private pleasures and pains of the organism? And so be a much later thing than his introspection suggests? This I do not mean to argue; but only to say that in the one case we are in the domain of live concrete facts, sufficiently objective to have positive verification; and moreover we are at a stage of the individual's development at which the elementary facts which we want to observe are likely to be found. To speak again of my personal views, I find with Professor Royce that the sense of self may be treated with some degree of explaining force by the principle of 'circular' or 'imitative' reaction, drawn from ontogenetic observations.

The chapter on attention is, from the point of view of the criticism made above, the most inadequate in the book. Mr. Stanley makes attention the great vehicle of 'will-effort'; thus throwing it in any case, I suppose, on the active side, the motor side, in the process of development. But as for 'will-effort,' so *a fortiori* for attention, we must ask: how does it work? What apparatus does it use? How does it effect organic or ideal accommodation? To these and the almost innumerable questions besides which come irresistibly up when one thinks of the attention genetically, Mr. Stanley has no answer, because he does not ask them. Certainly the bare phrase 'will-effort,' with its equivalents, is not at all illuminating.

I have left for the last the treatment of the Emotions, in many re-

spects the most interesting and valuable parts of the book. This is so, I think, because in this field there are many introspective distinctions to be made, and also because the expressive characteristics of the grosser emotional qualities are so well differentiated objectively as to suggest interesting race utilities. Fear and anger are treated in detail with subtlety and profit. Fear is primitive emotion, and emotion is fundamentally 'pain at pain.' This formula means that emotional pain is due to revival of painful object with consciousness that it is painful (67), (98). This latter element is essential and constitutes the difference between emotion-pain and pure-pain. In this discussion Mr. Stanley lays all the emphasis on pain, none on pleasure, except to point out the contrast of the two qualities of emotion. The duality here, I suppose, is possible because emotion as revival-state does not occur until after pure-pain has differentiated itself into pain and pleasure states. And yet the organic evidence, to my mind, points the other way, namely, to the conclusion that the contrast of pleasurable with painful emotions points to the original presence of a distinction between pleasure and pain. Furthermore, I do not think that Mr. Stanley makes out his point that emotion-pain is 'pain at pain.' The consideration of the evolution of emotional attitudes in recent discussion has tended to show that less rather than more stress is to be laid upon the representative element in emotion; and more on the reflex element. The pain of emotion is largely immediate pain due to function of an hereditary kind. And even when the emotion is one learned by the animal in his own experience I think the pain of it is rather pain from the incipient revival of the reflex consequences of the cognition than from the cognition of 'pain-quality' in the object. So of pleasure, in emotion. As far as there is a new pain or pleasure of revival, it comes from direct accommodation to present experience of object. Of course, in our high reflective lives we have plenty of 'pain at pain.' But Mr. Stanley commits the psychologist's fallacy, I think, in reading the complex formula of 'pain at pain' down into the genetic origins of emotion states. It seems to me that the postulate of simple revival pain, either of direct stimulation or of a reflex kind, would do greater credit to the principle of natural selection and is altogether 'most likely.' The same considerations also apply to emotion-pleasure; we would have to have a formula calling for pleasure at pleasure. Why not say that the revival of cognition pleasure is not always necessary when the object is revived, but that the object-revival tends directly to stimulate the same pleasure that the cognition did?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Stanley admits a direct lack-pain (pain of unreality, or non-presence)

This requirement is so real, however, that it determines Mr. Stanley's account of desire. He argues for the old hedonistic view, coming now to lay all the emphasis on pleasure (193f). The avoidance of pain is, in the realm of desire, always the pursuit of pleasure.

The complexity that this gives may be pointed out. When a man desires to avoid a painful thing, what he does is this: he pictures the thing, the painfulness of the thing, has 'pain from the pain' of the thing, pictures pleasure from the removal of the 'pain from the pain' of the thing (or would it be the pleasure of the removal simply of the pain of the thing? The former, I think), and, finally, has 'pleasure from the pleasure' of the pictured removal of the 'pain from the pain.' This, to me, is the outcome, in sober truth, of the hedonistic theory when complicated by Mr. Stanley's theory of 'pain from pain' and 'pleasure from pleasure.'<sup>2</sup> And we must add to this the fact, as Mr. Stanley says, that the desire itself is painful. To take a concrete case. Suppose a child crying at the prospect of a cold bath and pleading to be let off. Does he picture the bath in revival, the pain of former baths also in revival, get pain from this pain, picture pleasure from the removal of this pain from the presented or revived pain, and then get sense of pleasure from this pleasure, to prompt his desire?—this last being the end which justifies the hedonistic postulate? Surely all this, or anything like it, is not there. The child has revived symbols of the bath-act, and reflex and associated pain states with them; these latter revive the associated shunning movement and speech tendencies, etc., and the consciousness of these latter is the desire. The *end is* the symbolic bath-act, pure and simple; that fills the child's consciousness up so full and its hedonic quality (not *recognized* mainly but *refelt*) is so utterly unbearable that he bursts out in the associated movements—in this case movements indicating negative, so to speak, rather than positive, desire.

In this difference from Mr. Stanley I have no intention of minimizing the factors involved nor of discounting the real complexity of these higher evolutionary products. It is possible—or, as Mr. Stanley says so often from his introspective points of view, it may be 'most likely'—that the process of genetic acquisition of desire has been more complex than the simple scheme which I have indicated. But we all

in lower organisms. Why should there not be a direct lack-pain at the higher representation level—pain of unreality of object without cognition of 'pleasurableness' of the lacking object?

<sup>2</sup>This on the view that desire is emotion (193); and I have not introduced certain other elements included in Mr. Stanley's scheme of eight factors (208).

recognize the abbreviating processes of evolution and expect the lapsing of links which a chronological order would seem to require; and, on the whole, it seems much simpler to make the original tendencies of action terminate on objects, clinging to the functional or 'index' view of pleasure-pain, and then to keep this object-consciousness forward all the way up the genetic scale. Then in the interpretation of the higher consciousness one may accept the outcome of the overwhelming current of criticism of hedonism. Certainly it is something to avoid the remarkable shifting of emphasis from pain in the original and lower stages, to pleasure in the higher, to which Mr. Stanley has to resort.

There are many interesting topics in the book on which it would be profitable to dwell; but I may only cite summarily certain special teachings of Mr. Stanley which are confirmatory or corrective of views of others, and important: 1. Pain is declared to be 'purely monitory (14)'; this I think contradicts Mr. Stanley's own view that pain is the direct stimulant to 'will-effort'; for if the latter, then the pain must be, as the author seems to teach elsewhere, index of benefit-from-stimulus, which is actual, not prospective only. It has a 'monitory' meaning also, of course. 2. The emphasis of the fact that all mental development is an achievement, 'never a given.' Everything is achieved by struggle, action, effort (23, 29, *et al.*). 3. Confusion arises from the use of the word 'feeling' in three senses: namely, as equal to 'consciousness,' as 'pure' pleasure and pain, and as qualitative emotion. 4. Confusing use of the expression 'quantity of consciousness' to mean area or *Umfang* (55). 5. Very interesting theory of the phylogenetic origin and value of 'unreality-feeling' (85). It is directly confirmed in the life of the infant, as I have argued elsewhere. 6. Unhappy use of the word 'representation' to include recognition (86). 7. Mr. Stanley makes the animal's going-out reactions—*i. e.*, for food, etc.—a late accomplishment, dependent on representation with recognition of object as pleasure-giving. Why is this necessary when the opposite—*i. e.*, the struggle away from the pain-giving object—is organic and primitive? The argument for the latter from natural selection will secure as well an immediate reaction for pleasure-giving stimulations. I have used the same argument for the primitive character of both sorts of reaction (*Mental Development*, p. 173f). 8. Mr. Stanley follows Spencer in making the utility of touch lie largely in the 'circular reaction' function which it exemplifies (193). Why does not natural selection secure this state of things more primitively, so that it is true earlier that 'the edible is no longer fortuitously hit

upon?' 9. The doctrine that all attention is volitional and that all intensity quality in sensation is in its origin volitionally achieved, would be much better expressed by maintaining the current distinction between 'reflex' and voluntary attention, and then adopting some general term like the current 'motor-process' to express the active process of 'achieving' all the way through (228). The confusions into which Wundt has fallen in his doctrines of attention by this same procedure might be a warning against calling the struggle of the amœba away from pain-conditions 'volitional.' 10. Object and subject-cognition are 'coincident in their origin' (252); and since sensation is cognition, all sensation involves self-sense. Mr. Stanley here seems to confuse pleasure and pain values with sense of their value for a self. He is led into it by his doctrine (criticised above) that pleasure-pain is represented as conscious end. 11. The insistence that emotion is *genetically stimulant* to useful activities and not result of them is justified (360); but only on Mr. Stanley's view that emotion is intrinsically pleasure-pain. I can not see any way to avoid this claim that pleasure-pain-feeling is the dynamogenic factor all the way through. 12. Interesting discussion of play (364ff).

I have no space to speak of the author's interesting chapters on *Æsthetic* and *Ethical Emotion*.  
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## ETHICAL.

*Studies in Character.* S. BRYANT. New York, Macmillan, 1894.  
(\$1.50.)

*Hedonistic Theories from Antippos to Spencer.* JOHN WATSON.  
New York, Macmillan, 1895. (\$1.75.)

Mrs. Bryant's Essays are grouped under the heads 'Ethical' and 'Educational.' None the less there is a decided unity of method and point of view running through all of them. The ethical essays carry educational implications throughout, and it is the ethical side of education which commands Mrs. Bryant's attention. It is to be hoped that the book will attain a wide reading in the educational community. It is a book that does not shock one's intellectual self-respect, which is more than can be said of many professedly pedagogical treatises; and it utilizes in an unobtrusive, but none the less effective, way very much that is best in current ethical and psychological writings. Mrs. Bryant is at home in what is being said and discovered in the vital places of current discussions—another mark of emi-