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The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century

BY M. LONGWORTH DAMES

IN his paper *L'Arrivée des Portugais en Chine*, published in *T'oung Pao* in 1912, M. Cordier, before giving a more detailed account of the events in the Further East following on the taking of Malacca in 1511, gave a lucid sketch of the events accompanying the first establishment of Portuguese power in Eastern seas. I consider that these events require to be further set forth, for as far as I am aware the existing histories do not give any adequate and consecutive account of the struggle for the mastery of the Arabian Sea carried out by the Portuguese against the Muḥammadan states, and more especially against the Turks, who in the sixteenth century were the most powerful military state in the world. In this paper I propose to deal with this subject to the best of my ability.

When the brilliant period of marine exploration and discovery inaugurated by the great organizer known as Prince Henry the Navigator came to its culmination in the closing years of the fifteenth century with the discovery of the sea passage to the East, Portugal had opened a new page in

history. The greatness of this exploit has been universally recognized, and the names of Bartholomeu Diaz and Vasco da Gama have long been inscribed on the roll of fame with those of the great explorers and sailors of all nations. Yet it may be doubted whether the true nature of the task which Portugal then undertook to achieve as the pioneer and forerunner of Europe has been fully realized. It is generally taken for granted that the Eastern trade, once the route by the Cape of Good Hope had been made known, fell of itself, and as it were automatically, into the hands of the bold adventurers who "were the first who ever burst" into the Indian Ocean without the toils and dangers of the land passage, and that the wealth of the Indies thenceforward flowed in a smooth and uninterrupted stream to Portugal and to all Europe. But it is seldom recognized that in order to secure these benefits Portugal was embarking on a naval war of unprecedented length and difficulty against the greatest military power then existing. It is probable that the Portuguese leaders did not themselves realize it, for Turkey had not as yet, in 1498, made her way to the shores of the Indian Ocean. They did realize, however, that they would have to fight many powerful enemies before they could obtain control of the trade routes, and they prepared deliberately for the struggle. Selim Yawuz (or the Grim), a man of extraordinary vigour and ability, was not content with the grip he had obtained over Europe; he contemplated nothing short of universal empire. India was at this time going through one of its periods of anarchy and weakness. The great Salṭanat of Delhi had declined into decrepitude, and although some able Afghan adventurers, the Lōdīs, had inspired it with some signs of life, it was incapable of recovering its old dominions in the Deccan. Most of the Musulmān kingdoms which had arisen on its ruins were themselves in decay. The Bahmanī kingdom of the Deccan had split up into five small realms, two of which reached to the sea-coast and held the region in which Bombay and Goa afterwards arose. Further north

the coast was held by the strongest still surviving of the kingdoms which had succeeded that of Delhi, Gujarāt, the only one of them with any naval power, and the possessor of the famous ports of Kambāyat, Sūrat, and Diu. Mesopotamia, the Shatt-al-‘Arab, and the northern coasts of the Persian Gulf were in the hands of the newly founded kingdom of Shāh Isma‘il, Safavī, who had established the Shi‘a sect of Islām in Persia and was the principal object of the hatred of Selim, who regarded him as a detestable heretic as well as a dangerous rival, and, moreover, as the possessor of the only route by which access could be obtained to the Persian Gulf, the shortest way to India. The actual issue from the Gulf was held by the small mercantile principality of Hurmuz, which from its barren and torrid rocky island in the Straits controlled both the Persian and Arabian coasts, and grew wealthy on the tolls levied on the trade which passed through.

On the other side of Arabia lay the Egyptian kingdom of the Mamlūks, still apparently strong, ruling not only Egypt but Syria, and controlling the Red Sea and the sacred places of Islām.

To enable Selim to carry out his ambitious schemes, the control of the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, or both, was necessary, and to obtain this control he must conquer either Persia or Egypt. Could he but obtain control of the sea-route to India, conquest of that country in its distracted condition would be easy for a Turkish army constituted and disciplined as those armies then were. India had long been the coveted object for the men of Turkish race, not Ottoman Turks, it is true, but of the same stock and speaking the same language. Maḥmūd of Ghaznī and Tīmūr were Turks, and Bābur, who, six years after Selim’s death, overthrew the Delhi kingdom and established the so-called Mughal Empire, was also a Turkish adventurer. Ottoman Turks abounded in India, they were employed to form their body-guards by many of the Muḥammadan rulers, and were

universally found as artillerymen; in fact, all the gunners in India seem to have been Turks.¹ They also held many of the official posts of importance. As a step to opening the way to these vast projects, Persia was first attacked. Shāh Isma'īl was defeated and crippled at the battle of Chāldīrān in 1514. Kurdistān fell into the hands of Selim, but Persia was still able to retain her hold on Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, so that the scheme so far was a failure. Selim then turned his arms against the Mamlūks, and in 1517 succeeded in destroying their Government and annexing both Syria and Egypt. This gave him control over the Red Sea and the sacred places, and the sea-route to India for the first time became accessible to the Turks. But the Portuguese now stood in his way, and to understand the position it is necessary to go back a few years and consider what had been happening in the Indian Ocean.

At the extreme south of Western India lies the country of Malabar, a fertile strip between the Ghats and the sea. Here were some small Hindu states as yet untouched by the flood of Musalmān invasion. The principal of these was Calicut, and it was here that the Portuguese adventurers first touched Indian soil. They soon discovered that the Raja of that country looked on them with unfriendly eyes, for although he was a Hindu he was dependent for his revenues on the trade carried on by the Arab merchants with the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and East Africa. All attempts on the part of the Portuguese to obtain trade were resisted, and their leaders therefore made friends with two minor states, Cochin and

¹ No less than three out of the kingdoms which were formed out of the Bahmanī State were ruled over by men of Turkish origin, viz. Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh, founder of the 'Ādilshāhīs of Bijāpur, Kāsim Barid (often called Kāsim Turk), founder of the Baridshāhīs of Bidar, and Sulṭān Kuli Kuṭb Shāh, founder of the Kuṭbshāhīs of Golkonda. All three probably belonged to the Turkish tribes of Ādarbajjān. The claim afterwards made that Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh was a son of Sulṭān Murād II of Turkey is probably baseless. I have dealt with this question in my note to my edition of the Book of Duarte Barbosa (Hakluyt Society), vol. i, p. 72, n. 1.

Cananor, which were jealous of their more powerful neighbour. Trading stations or factories were soon established at these places, and a fort built at Cochin in 1506. The Portuguese were also on fairly amicable terms with the great Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar, which held the divided Muḥammadan states at bay over the remainder of South India, and came down to the coast north of Malabar and south of Goa. The Raja of this country hoped to get a supply of horses for his cavalry from the Portuguese, and to be freed from dependence on the Arab dealers. The principal Arab settlements in East Africa, Mozambique, Kilwa, and Mombasa, were taken and occupied by the Portuguese, and a settlement made in 1507 on the island of Socotra, near the entrance to the Red Sea. Thus a strong position was secured, and the fleets coming round the Cape were provided with harbours and means of obtaining supplies. Yet their trials and difficulties were enormous. Provisions were bad, and scurvy raged, crews were decimated, and the tiny ships frequently perished in the gales of the South Atlantic. Meanwhile, all the Muḥammadan powers surrounding the Arabian Sea were up in arms against the insolent intruders on their ancient monopoly in the lucrative traffic of the East, and before Turkey came on the scene they had combined to make one great effort to crush them. The leaders in this movement were the Mamlūks of Egypt and the Sulṭāns of Gujarāt, and active assistance was given by the rulers of Bijāpur and Aḥmadnagar, two of the smaller kingdoms which had arisen on the ruins of the Bahmanī kingdom, which, as has already been noticed, were interested in the maintenance of the Arab trade. Egypt, especially, found herself faced with the loss of the great revenues she derived from the trade which came by the Red Sea to Suez, and thence by caravans to Alexandria, where the Venetian and Genoese merchants paid heavily for the privilege of monopolizing the trade of Europe. Kambāya or Cambay, one of the principal emporiums of India, was in Gujarāt; Chāul in Aḥmadnagar, and Dābhōl

in Bijāpur, were both very important trade centres. It was arranged that a fleet should be equipped at Suez and sent to India to co-operate with the light coasting craft of Gujarāt; assistance and co-operation was to be given by the other states, and information as to Portuguese movements obtained from Calicut. The Egyptian fleet was placed under the command of Mir Husain, Governor of Jedda, a Kurd by race, while the Gujarāt forces were organized by Malik Ayyāz, a Russian renegade taken prisoner by the Turks in his youth and sold into slavery in India, where he rose by his ability to be governor of the town and island of Diu.¹

The Portuguese were under the Viceroy Francisco D'Almeida, one of the great leaders of the time, who was ably seconded by his gallant and popular son Lourenço, the darling of the troops and sailors. Lourenço's exploits, as described by contemporary chroniclers, resemble those of a hero of ancient romance. Gaspar Correa says in his account of a fight at Cochin² that Dom Lourenço, who had just been wounded in the hand by an arrow, "threw himself upon them with great fury, whirling his battle-axe round, and felled two of them so that they could not rise, and one javelin-man he dealt such a blow with his axe that he split him through the shoulder into two pieces, and another wielding a short sword he cut through both legs at the knees, and another he ran through with the spike of the battle-axe so that he fell dead. The rest, seeing these strokes, were seized with great terror, nevertheless they did not yield, but strove to wound him in the heels, no other part being uncovered, for he went all armed in white armour gilded in parts, and the darts they hurled at the vizor of his helm, but they could do him no hurt, and when they struck him with their soft iron swords they broke or twisted, whereupon they fled and took refuge

¹ This is the account given by De Barros (Dac. II, ii, 9), and is the most trustworthy. Correa calls him a Jão, or Javanese. Firishta says simply that he was the private slave of the Sultān of Gujarāt. Castanheda (i, 252) says he was a Tartar by nation.

² *Lendas da India*, vol. i, p. 612.

in the mosques, and were no more willing to display their valour." Such was the young leader whose deeds have furnished the subject of the excellent historical novel of Pinheiro Chagas, *The Viceroy's Jewel*,¹ which adheres closely to the narratives of the chroniclers. He was the first Portuguese leader to visit Ceylon and open up friendly communications with the rulers of that country. In 1507 the Viceroy sent him north with a squadron to explore the coast as far as Gujarāt, to attack and scatter pirates and local hostile gatherings, but no rumour of the approaching storm from Egypt seems to have reached him. As he lay in the estuary leading to the then famous port of Chāul (a little way south of where Bombay stands now), into which he had run to escape the force of the monsoon gales, news was brought to him by a Hindu that a great Moorish (i.e. Muḥammadan) fleet had arrived at Diu, and had been joined by Malik Ayyāz with his light craft. The joint fleet was on its way to Chāul, and it would be well for the small Portuguese fleet to put to sea at once, and not to be caught in the river by a much stronger force. This was also Dom Lourenço's opinion, but he was overborne by the views of the majority of the captains, who thought the whole story a stratagem to tempt them out to sea, and unfortunately for him the squadron remained in the estuary. Even when the Egyptian fleet arrived off the bar the Portuguese sailors at first believed it to be that of Afonso D'Albuquerque, for the ships were of the European style such as had not been met with in India before. They were soon undeceived. The fleet came in over the bar and attacked the Portuguese vessels. In spite of their bad position the latter were able to beat them off, and the Egyptian fleet withdrew to a distance after severe losses. The next morning the Gujarāt light vessels, sixty *fustas*, came in over the bar, and the fight was renewed, lasting through the day and night. On the following day came

¹ *A Joia do Visorey.*

the disaster. D. Lourenço's ship, in turning to go downstream, became entangled in a line of fishermen's stakes, and was for a time isolated among a swarm of *justas*. There was still an opportunity of escaping in a small boat to the other ships, but the leader refused to leave any of his men behind, and they would not go without him. In the end a shot broke both D. Lourenço's legs, and he shortly afterwards died, telling the remainder of his men to surrender to Malik Ayyāz, who had promised to keep them as prisoners of the King of Gujarāt, and not to make them over to the Egyptian fleet. This they did, after first letting down the body of their commander into the swift current through a hole in the ship with all his arms and belongings, so that nothing of his should fall into the hands of the enemy. Part of the squadron escaped, but the blow to the Portuguese was a severe one, and thus the first serious fight in the long war was a triumph for the enemy. This battle took place at the end of April, 1507,¹ and it was not till the end of the next year that the Viceroy was able to collect a fleet of sufficient strength to avenge his loss. During this period Albuquerque, who had come out from Portugal with another fleet under Tristão D'Acunha, and had jointly with him taken the island of Socotra, made his first attempt (during 1508) to take possession of the island of Hurmuz, and so to seal up the entrance of the Persian Gulf. This attempt, successful at first, ended in a partial failure, owing to the mutinous conduct of some of his captains, who deserted him at the most critical time, and sailed away to India to traduce him to the Viceroy. It is evident that the lack of discipline in the Portuguese fleet, as in other fleets at the same period, was a source of great danger. There was no royal fleet; some ships were fitted out by the king, and others by private adventurers, and these always claimed liberty of action and held themselves free to disobey

¹ De Barros, dec. II, vii, f. 41; Correa, i, 762-71; Firishta, i, 204. Mirāt-i-Sikandarī in Bayley's *History of Gujarat*, p. 322 (Fazlu'llāh's trans., p. 75), gives the date as 913 H., which year began on May 13, 1507. Castanheda, i, 254, places these events in 1508.

orders unless they approved of them. Albuquerque himself did much to reform this abuse at a later time, but it long remained a dangerous defect in the fleets sent out from Lisbon. Yet they were superior to their adversaries in seamanship and gunnery, and in a naval engagement under equal conditions they seldom failed to assert this superiority. This was shown most forcibly in February, 1509, when Almeida with his fleet sailed up the west coast of India, and after taking his revenge at Dābhōl for the assistance which had been given there to the Egyptian fleet, arrived at Diu, where he found the Egyptian fleet and the Gujarāt *fustas*, with a contingent from Calicut, assembled in the strait between the island of Diu and the mainland, where they were under the guns of the fort. The attack was made in the morning, with the sea breeze bringing in the Portuguese fleet. The fight was a desperate one; there was much grappling and boarding. Many ships were sunk, and the Egyptian fleet was completely broken up. How far it escaped absolute destruction is not certain. It is remarkable, however, that the native historians of Gujarāt, while laying great stress on the victory of Chāul, do not say a word as to the defeat at Diu. Mir Ḥusain and his fleet are never mentioned again after their victorious return to Diu either by Firishta or by the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*.

The Sulṭān of Rūm, who was the enemy of the European unbelievers (*Kāffār-i-Firang*), sent many ships to the coast of Hind for a holy war (*ghaza*) and protection, and many ships arrived near Gujarāt. Sulṭān Maḥmūd, eager to take part in the holy war, started towards the ports of Basi (Bassain) Daman (Dāmān) and Mahāim (Mahim), and when he arrived in the region of Daman he ordered his own private slave, Ayyāz Sulṭān, who was *Amīra'l-umarā* and *sipah-sālār*, to go from Dīb (Diu) with several picked ships to attack the Firangis, and ten large ships of the Rūmīs, who were come from the *Khūnkār* of Rūm for purposes of holy war, accompanied Ayyāz, and Ayyāz, having gone to Chēwal (Chāul), fought with the Christians, and one great ship of the Firang, worth one *Karor*, and in which was their leader, was battered and sunk by the cannon of the Musulmāns, and Ayyāz was victorious and slew very many.

Although he lost four hundred of his own men, who drank the *sharbat* of martyrdom, yet two or three thousand of the Firang unbelievers were despatched to hell. (*Tārīkh-i-Firishta*, Newal Kishor Press, Lucknow, vol. i, p. 204.)

For the *Khūnkār-i-Rūm*, Briggs in his translation (vol. iv, p. 74) has the "Grand Seignior of Constantinople". Possibly *Firishta* himself did not know that the fleet was Egyptian and not Turkish.

The passage corresponding in the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari* (Bayley's *Hist. of Gujārat*, p. 322), is as follows :—

The Sultān (i.e. Maḥmūd Bigarha) marched with his army to Chēwal, and in consequence of the disturbances caused by Europeans he marched towards Basai and Mahaim. On arriving at Diu he learnt that Malik Ayyāz, the Sultān's slave, and the ruler of Diu, had obtained a body of Turks and ten Turkish ships. With these he sailed to the port of Chēwal and fought with the disorderly Europeans. He killed a great many of them and with his guns sunk one large ship heavily laden. Malik Ayyāz lost 440 men, Turks and others, but he returned to Diu in triumph.

Neither of these authors even mentions the fight off Diu in 1509.

Mir Ḥusain is heard of in the Red Sea as building fortifications at Jeddah,¹ but never seems to have commanded a fleet again. Before the time of the Turkish conquest of Egypt by the Turks he was superseded by a corsair from the Mediterranean, a Greek renegade from Mitylene, named Rais Sulaimān, and Mir Ḥusain seems to have served under him in an unsuccessful attack on Aden.² Ultimately, according to De Barros, Mir Ḥusain was thrown overboard and drowned by his successor's orders. At Gujārāt Malik Ayyāz hastened to make peace with the Portuguese by supplying the fleet with provisions and surrendering the Portuguese prisoners taken at Chāul. If Almeida had not been opposed to the policy

¹ See De Barros, dec. III, i, 6, f. 6, verso ; Book of Duarte Barbosa, i, 47-50.

² *Ibid.* III, i, 6, f. 8, and IV, i, 8, p. 24.

of land acquisitions it is probable that Diu would have been surrendered to the Portuguese. As it was they did not obtain it till 1535.

Thus ended the first concerted attempt to expel the Portuguese from the Indian seas. It is to be noted that many historians, both Portuguese and Indian, speak of the Egyptian fleet as one sent out by the Sultān of Rūm or Constantinople. No doubt, even before the annexation of Egypt, the Turkish element was very strong in that country, and the composition of the fleet was like that of the Turkish fleets ; a fighting element of Turks, mixed with Kurds and Circassians, sailors of all kinds from the Levant, mostly Christians by birth, and prisoners in the galleys under Turkish taskmasters. The native Egyptians had no voice in the matter. The confusion was therefore natural, especially as all the histories were composed after the Turks were in possession of the Red Sea.

From 1509 till the end of 1515 Afonso D'Albuquerque was the Portuguese Governor, a man of great ability and extraordinary energy. He did not share Francisco D'Almeida's objection to land settlements. He saw clearly that to maintain the struggle at such a distance from home it was absolutely necessary for Portugal to have a foothold of her own, secure from the caprices of native rulers. The first was Goa, on an island between two creeks, a secure harbour separated from the mainland by a shallow but easily defended channel. This had belonged to the Bijāpur kingdom. It was taken, lost, and retaken in 1510, and has been held ever since by Portugal. The second was Hurmuz, which held the key of the Persian Gulf. The ruler of this island had accepted Portuguese suzerainty in 1508, but, as described above, Albuquerque was prevented from completing his schemes. The last act of his rule and his life was the completion of the strong fort which still stands on the deserted and sun-parched rock as a memento of departed greatness. Portugal held this extraordinary island, by nature one of the most desolate places in the world, but important and wealthy by its position, till

1622, and its loss was one of the principal causes of her downfall. After taking Goa in 1510, the indefatigable governor in 1511 conducted a most adventurous expedition to Malacca, one of the most important points for controlling the trade from China and the Spice Islands. This, too, became a Portuguese possession, and filled the position now occupied by Singapur and Hong-Kong combined. The fourth of the key-points aimed at was one which should discharge for the Red Sea the same function as Hurmuz did for the Persian Gulf. Aden was the only place that in any way corresponded with Hurmuz. Even Aden, however, could not perfectly seal up the Red Sea. Alboquerque made a bold attempt in 1513 to take by escalade this strongly fortified town. The attempt failed, and he then tried to reach and take the town of Jedda. He had vast dreams of converting the world and destroying Islām by taking its holy places. He had not, however, reckoned with the climate of the Red Sea. He could not reach Jedda, and his men perished from fever in the terrible island of Kamarān. He was unable to renew his attempts on Aden, and Portuguese power was never established there. Although the Indian Ocean became a dangerous place for Turkish ships, yet some trade continued to find its way to the Red Sea, and from time to time expeditions came out of it through the Straits of Bāb-el-Mandab. Also occasional Portuguese fleets went in through the same straits, but were never able to do much. In 1515-16, just before the Turkish conquest of Egypt, a small expedition under Raīs Sulaimān went out and tried to take Aden. Although the walls were battered down the Arabs were able to beat it off.¹ Soon afterwards Lopo Soares D'Albergaria, the incapable successor of Alboquerque, appeared in the harbour with his fleet. The Arab chief felt himself so helpless that he offered to surrender the fort to the Portuguese. The foolish Lopo Soares preferred to go on

¹ It had been intended that the fleet should go on to the Indian coast, but it was not able to go beyond Aden. See the account in Castanheda, IV, vii, 11-13.

with the impossible project of taking Jedda,¹ actually reached it, and sailed back again. As with the first expedition, he was shut up in Kamarān by the monsoon, and lost most of his men, and when at last he got back to Aden he found that the Arabs had rebuilt their wall and laughed at the idea of surrendering the town.

Just before Lopo Soares arrived in front of Jedda the news had been received of the conquest of Egypt by Selim. Raīs Sulaimān, the governor, declared for him and was confirmed as Governor of Jedda. Selim at once pursued the plans for the invasion of India, but as the fleet of Egypt had been destroyed he had no means of carrying them out. He urged on the construction of a large fleet² at Suez, but did not live to see its completion. Selim died in 1519, and it remained for his successor Sulaimān, generally called "the Magnificent", to prosecute his schemes. Nothing was, however, done for some years, and the work on the fleet seems to have been retarded by a feud between Raīs Sulaimān and a Circassian named Haidar, who succeeded him as Governor of Jedda, though not in command of the fleet. This ended in both being killed.³ The retreat of Lopo Soares from Jedda had much injured the prestige of the Portuguese, and, although he had taken and destroyed Zeila, on the Somali coast, on his way back to Hurmuz in 1517, and Saldanha sacked Berbera the next year, there was, according to Correa, a general idea that the Portuguese would not venture to oppose the Turks. It was felt that some action must be taken, and in 1523 an expedition was sent to Massowa, in the Red Sea, to bring back a Portuguese Ambassador who had gone to Abyssinia, but it returned without effecting its purpose.

In 1524⁴ Eitor da Silveira again went into the Red Sea, and also made peace with Aden, the Chief of which expressed his willingness to submit to Portugal; a treaty

¹ Castanheda, iv, 18 and iv, 41.

² De Barros, IV, i, 8, 24 f.

³ De Barros, IV, i, 8, p. 24.

⁴ Correa, ii, 780.

which, however, led to nothing. Next year a Turkish fleet under Raīs Sulaimān again threatened Aden, but was beaten off by Silveira. This fleet and others in the following years made their way across the Indian Ocean to the coast of Gujarāt, where many contests took place with Portuguese vessels.¹ Sulṭān Sulaimān was undoubtedly attracted to India by the state of unrest and disorganization which followed the invasion of Bābur in the north and the collapse of the Bahmanī kingdom in the south. Bābur's great victory at Pānīpat on April 20, 1526, which led to the fall of the Lōdī kingdom of Delhi and the foundation of the Mughal Empire, preceded only by four months Sulaimān's own triumph at Mohacs (on August 28, 1526), which led to the subjection of Hungary to Turkey. At this period Gujarāt stood out as the most wealthy and apparently the strongest among the existing kingdoms of India, and there can be no doubt that Sulaimān regarded a foothold on that coast as a necessary step towards the foundation of an Indian Empire. To effect this it was evidently his policy to form an alliance with Gujarāt for the expulsion of the Portuguese from the Eastern seas; in fact, to carry out with far greater force what had been attempted by the Egyptian fleet in 1509. Negotiations were therefore commenced with any elements which gave the promise of raising a strong Turkish party in India. The Mughal Emperor Humāyūn, who succeeded Bābur in 1530, inherited his ambitions without his extraordinary resolution and energy. One of his principal projects was the conquest of the wealthy region of Gujarāt, and Bahādur Shāh, the king of that country, was willing to obtain support wherever he could, either from Turkey or from the Portuguese. His country had already served as a refuge for malcontents from the Delhi kingdom, among whom was the pretender to the crown, 'Alā-ud-din Lōdī (uncle of the king Ibrāhīm, who had been defeated by Bābur). This man or

¹ De Barros, IV, 1, 8. 27.

some member of his family found his way to Constantinople,¹ and begged for help, while Bahādur Shāh's emissaries at the same time laid his case before the Sulṭān with very valuable gifts and large sums of money in gold. These applications provided the opportunity he wanted, and he immediately began to fit out a great expedition at Suez. A fleet of sixty-six ships, including twenty-four large galleys and a great number of smaller craft, was constructed and armed with powerful artillery. A force of 20,000 men was embarked, which included 7,000 Janissaries, as the Turkish historian, Hājī Khalīfa, informs us. This fact, alone, shows that conquest by land as well as by sea was contemplated, and there can be little doubt that Sulaimān's intention was to establish his power in India, relying at first on the support of Gujarāt. The whole was under the command of Sulaimān Bāshā, a eunuch of Greek descent, a man of great cunning, known for his cruel and unscrupulous nature. He held the post of Governor of Egypt, and owed his appointment, it was reported, to a harem intrigue. He was over eighty years of age, and inordinately fat, so much so that according to the chroniclers it took four men to lift him from a seat. His appointment to such a responsible post may be regarded as an example of the vicious Turkish system of later days, but can hardly be considered as typical under the usually vigorous administration of Sulaimān the Magnificent. A Portuguese pilot named Alvaro Madeira, who had been taken prisoner by the Arabs at Shiḥr on the coast of Hadhramaut, offered his services as guide, but escaped before the expedition sailed, and found his way to Lisbon, where he exposed the Turkish plans. His information was, however, too late to be of any value to his countrymen in India.

¹ Turkish records (quoted by Hammer-Purgstall) mention one Burhan Beg, "son of Sikandar Lōdī, who had been defeated by Humayun." No such person is mentioned by the Indian historians. Sikandar Lōdī was the father of Ibrāhīm, who was defeated not by Humāyūn but by Bābur, nor is the title Beg borne by Afghāns such as the Lōdis. In India it denotes Mughal descent. Firishta (Persian text, ii, 222) says that 'Alā-ud-din was one of the sons of Bahlōl Shāh, Lōdī.

The island of Diu had been ceded to the Portuguese by the Sultān of Gujarāt, Bahādur Shāh, in 1535, as a bribe to obtain their help against Humāyūn. They also obtained his consent to the erection of a fort on this island, and immediately set to work to construct it, under the orders of the Viceroy Nuno da Cunha. A quarrel afterwards broke out, and in 1536 Bahādur met his death in a sudden and apparently unpremeditated dispute which broke out during a visit to the Portuguese Governor. The succession to his throne was disputed, and in 1538 the nominal ruler was Maḥmūd Shāh, but the army seems to have been under the control of an Italian renegade named *Kh*wāja Ja'afar,¹ who was working in the interest of Mir 'Ālam *Kh*ān, a Lōdī refugee. The Muḥammadan historians give but little information regarding these events, and we are dependent mainly on Portuguese records for what happened after the death of Bahādur Shāh. The defences of the Diu fort had been pushed on, and *Kh*wāja Ja'afar, who had for a time feigned friendship to the Portuguese, suddenly turned against them, having learnt of the Turkish preparations. His troops, consisting of a motley army of Arabs, Turks, Abyssinians, and others, were joined by the army of 'Ālam *Kh*ān, and occupied the north shore of the strait which separates the island of Diu from the mainland. This strait was in some places fordable at low water. The Portuguese fort occupied the eastern corner of the island, and the native town with a mercantile population of Muḥammadans and Hindus lay to the west of it.

The first attack was made on the town on June 26, 1538; the Portuguese commander, Antonio da Silveira, was able for a time to hold the straits, but in August he found that his small force was insufficient for this purpose, and he gradually withdrew his artillery into the fort, not without considerable losses. This action was just in time to avoid certain destruction, for the Turkish fleet was approaching. No news

¹ The correct form of this name is uncertain. It may be *Zafar*. The Portuguese historians give it as *Sofar*.

had reached Goa, and no reinforcements had been dispatched, but rumours began to come in, and at the end of August a light vessel, known as a *fusta*, or "foist", was sent to Mangalor (or Mangrol), at the west end of the Kathiawar peninsula, to reconnoitre. The captain, Miguel Vaz, caught sight of the great armada, and hurried back with the news that he had seen forty-five galleys and a multitude of smaller vessels. Miguel Vaz was immediately hurried off to give the news at Goa. He was sighted by the approaching enemy, but was able to escape them as there was a break in the monsoon, and the breezes which were sufficient for his light craft were not enough for the Turks. It may be remarked here that the Portuguese were better sailors than the Turks. They were at home in the stormy waters of the Indian Ocean, while the Turks, who had been trained in the Mediterranean, and who relied more on galleys than on sailing ships, often suffered severely during the monsoons.

Sulaimān Bāshā¹ had sailed from Suez on June 22, 1538,

¹ The principal authorities for Sulaimān Bāshā's expedition are the following:—

De Barros, IV, x, chs. 1-11.

Castanheda, viii, chs. 191-7, but history stops short in the middle of the siege.

Faria y Sousa (ed. 1666), i, 354 ff. Do Conto V, iv.

Hāji Khalifa, *Maritime Wars of the Turks*, O.T.F. trans., p. 65 f., and *History des Guerres Maritimes*, f. 26.

Hammer-Purgstall, *History of the Ottoman Turks*, v, 297 f. (French translation).

Firishta (Persian text, ii, 224-5) and the Mirāt-i-Sikandarī conclude their accounts with the death of Bahādur Shāh, and do not relate the events connected with the Turkish fleet. This applies not only to the translation in Bayley's *History of Gujārāt* but also to the fuller translation by Fazlu'llāh Latfullāh Farīdī (Bombay, n.d.).

The relation of the Venetian officer who was a prisoner under Sulaimān Bāshā is given in *Ramusio*, i, 274-80 (*Viaggio scritto par un Comito Veneziano*).

These and subsequent events are also dealt with in the introduction to Bittner and Tomaschek's edition of Sidi 'Ali's Mohīt (*Die topographische Capitel des Indischen Seespiegels Mohīt*, by Kapudan Sidi Ali, Kātib-i-Rūmī), Vienna, 1897, and in Sidi 'Ali's own account of his expedition, *The Mirāt el Mamālīk*, which is referred to here in the French version, *Relation des Voyages de Sidi Ali*, Paris, 1827.

and after a considerable delay at Jedda arrived at Aden, where he again delayed from August 3 till August 19, in order to obtain command of that important port which was under its own Arab chief, Shaykh Ghāzī bin Dāūd. This chief, though unwilling to submit to the Turks, wished to propitiate the commander of this powerful armament, and agreed to his request to send supplies to the fleet and to pay him a visit in person, and at the same time to receive at Aden a number of invalids from the fleet. Sulaimān under this guise landed a large number of soldiers with concealed arms, who, on a pre-concerted signal, seized on the defences of the town and sacked it, while the unfortunate Ghāzī and three other Shaykhs who had accompanied him on board were at the same time hanged on the yardarms of the Bāshā's galley. He then sailed for Diu, leaving a garrison in Aden. This treacherous conduct, which soon became known among the Gujarātis, did not conduce to good relations between them and the Turks. The fleet arrived off Diu on September 4, 1538. The Turks made a bad beginning, for Sulaimān was unable to conceal his desire to treat Gujarāt as a conquered country. The troops which were landed made a demonstration in front of the Portuguese fort, but also indulged themselves in an orgy of plunder and murder in the town, and spread dismay among their allies. The break in the monsoon came to an end, and the admiral found himself obliged to seek a safer anchorage, which he found (at Muzaffarābād) some twenty miles away. In moving he lost four cargo-boats, which were wrecked, and the munitions of war they contained were scattered along the coast. Among these were a large number of saddles and other equipment for cavalry, which deepened the impression among the Gujarātis that the expedition was intended for land operations, for cavalry could not be needed for the siege of an island fortress. After about three weeks the fleet was able to return to Diu, and the actual siege began with what was for those days a tremendous bombardment. We are told that nine basilisks were employed throwing shot of from 90 to

100 lb. weight, and others throwing stone shot of upwards seven palms in circumference, and battering guns which could smash a solid rock. The bombardment was fully developed by October 5, and lasted till November 5. During this time numerous assaults were made without success. The Portuguese had received some small reinforcements, but were nearly at the end of their resources, when to their astonishment the Turkish fleet suddenly sailed away, and they remained undefeated. The events of this siege have been described in great detail, and occupy a prominent position in all modern histories dealing with the history of the Portuguese in India. The Turkish and Indian historians pass over its close in a very summary way, and attribute it to the failure of the Gujarātis to furnish the fleet with supplies. It is evident, however, that this ambitious scheme ended in absolute failure.

The failure of Firishta and of Sikandar, the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, to give any account of the Turkish expedition is remarkable, and the reason for it is not easy to detect. Firishta, indeed, in ch. xi of his history gives a short account, which is, as he states, taken entirely from the *Tuḥfatu'l-Mujāhidin*, but in its own place under the history of Gujarāt he leaves a blank, as does the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, the special history of that country. This, combined with the similar omission of the naval battle of 1509 by the same writers, has the appearance of deliberate suppression. The author of the *Tuḥfatu'l-Mujāhidin*, however, shows greater honesty and is not afraid to admit a Muḥammadan defeat, although not to be relied on for details. Like Hāji *Khalifa*, he attributes the failure of Sulaimān Pasha solely to the want of supplies, and the failure of the Gujarātis to co-operate, and says nothing about the fighting. He states plainly that the intention of the Sultān Sulaimān was not only to drive out the Portuguese but to take possession of the territory himself. In the version of his history given by Firishta (Persian text, ii, 372) he says, " At this time Sultān Sulaimān

bin Sultān Salīm Rūmī expressed the desire to expel the Firangīs from the ports of Hind, and to possess himself of these regions.”

Sulaimān was in no hurry to show himself to his master ; he lingered at Aden and other places on the Arabian coast, and did not reach Jedda till March 13, 1539. He found himself in disgrace at Constantinople, and as he understood that his destruction was certain he put an end to his own life. This failure was decisive. The Portuguese remained in command of the open waters of the Indian Ocean, although the Turks were still strong in the Red Sea, as was shown in 1541, when the Portuguese Viceroy, Estevão da Gama, son of the great admiral, attempted to attack the Turkish naval port of Suez. The expedition led to no valuable result, although, incidentally, it contributed to the preservation of the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia from destruction at the hands of the Muḥammadan tribes of the coast which had been furnished with firearms by the Turks. The quixotic, but heroic, adventure of Christovão da Gama, the Viceroy's brother, in this cause, has been fully dealt with in Mr. Whiteway's *Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia*. In spite of his defeat, the “Grand Turk”, Sultān Sulaimān, did not give up his projects of aggrandisement in the East, but the story of the various attempts made only serves to show how decisive the defeat of the Turks had been and how strong was the hold the Portuguese had now obtained over the waters of the Indian Ocean.

Diu was besieged a second time in 1548, but the Turks took no part in this siege, which was carried on entirely by the Indian Musulmāns ; it is probable, however, that it was not unconnected with Turkish schemes. Aden had submitted, nominally at least, to the Portuguese after Sulaimān Bāshā's return, and the other parts of Hadhramaut were also under their influence. By 1551 another strong fleet had been fitted out at Suez. It was placed under the command of Piri Bey, a distinguished naval commander, and sailed into the Indian Ocean, visiting Aden and Shiḥr and Dhofār, on the

Hadhramaut coast. He then appeared off Maskat, and finding the Portuguese unprepared he took it without much difficulty, carrying off the Portuguese commandant, João de Lisboa, as a prisoner. He appears, according to the Turkish historians, to have asked his captive for advice, and following this he turned out of the Persian Gulf, after he had plundered some of the islands there but had failed to take Hurmuz. He then heard of the approach of a strong Portuguese fleet under Noronha,¹ and attempting to slip past them was engaged in a disastrous battle. He got away with three galleys only, one of which was wrecked on the Bahrain Islands, and he found his way to the Red Sea with two only. The remainder of the fleet was locked up in the Persian Gulf, and took refuge in the Shatt-u'l'Arab. Katif, on the Arabian coast of the Gulf, which the Portuguese had taken in 1550, remained in their hands.

The enraged Sultān promptly beheaded Pīrī Bey, and sent Murād Bey (who had escaped from Katif when the Portuguese took it) overland to Basra, with orders to take the fleet out of the river and bring it round to the Red Sea. Murād Bey, anxious to retrieve his reputation, sailed boldly for the Straits of Hurmuz, but the Portuguese fleet, under Diogo de Noronha, was waiting for him there. A desperate fight ensued, in which one of the Portuguese captains, G. P. Marramaque, took a glorious part. Two of the Turkish captains, Sulaimān Rais and Rejeb Rais, were killed, and their ships sunk. The remainder of the fleet fled and again took refuge at Basra.

Sultān Sulaimān now had to recourse to one of the best-known naval commanders of the time, Sīdī 'Alī, an old Mediterranean warrior, who had served under Khairu'ddīn Barbarossa in the great naval victory of Prevesa, in which the pride of Andrea Doria had been abased. His task was to get the Turkish fleet of fifteen galleys out of the trap in which it

¹ Probably Fernando de Noronha, as the Turkish account says he was son of the Governor. Afonso de Noronha was Governor, and his son Fernando commanded the fleet which fought next year against Sīdī 'Alī.

was enclosed and to bring it round into the safe waters of the Red Sea. He sailed down the Persian coast, touching the Isle of Khārak, Rī-shahr (now displaced by the more modern Abu-shahr or Bushire), Katif, the Bahrain Islands, and the Isle of Kishm (which he calls Barokht), and while turning the Cape of Musandam he encountered the Portuguese fleet, under Fernando, son of the Viceroy Afonso de Noronha. The fight which followed was not decisive, and the Turkish ships succeeded in making their way into the open sea, and followed the coast towards Maskat, where the Portuguese fleet seems to have retired to refit. It sailed out on the approach of the Turkish Armada, and a great and decisive battle was fought, which ended in the defeat of the Turkish fleet. Some of their ships were sunk and others driven on to the rocks, and Sidi 'Alī finally escaped with nine galleys. He describes the fight himself as more terrible than any he had taken part in while fighting against Andrea Doria under the orders of the great Barbarossa. He was forced to abandon his scheme of sailing to the Red Sea, and tried to make for the coast of India, hoping, no doubt, to find safety in the ports of Gujarāt. It was now about the middle of August, 1554, and, as on former occasions, the Turks seem to have selected the monsoon season for their ventures in the Indian Ocean, and their great galleys, depending mainly on rowing power, were not well-fitted to contend with the storms they encountered. The battered fleet was driven to the coast of Mekrān; the rowers were powerless, and they were forced against their will to set sail to avoid being driven on that inhospitable shore. At last some coasting craft guided them to the harbour of Gwādar, where a Baloch Chief expressed his devotion to Sultān Sulaimān, the Khalīfa, and was induced to furnish them with some pilots. Noronha's fleet had apparently remained at Maskat, but some ships had left in pursuit of the fugitives, and this had no doubt something to do with the dangerous course pursued by Sidi 'Alī. The tempest nearly drove him into what he calls the Khor of Jakat, that is the Gulf of Kachh,

to the north of Jagat Point. Escaping this danger, and keeping away from Diu to avoid being seen by the Portuguese, he found himself at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay, where the combination of the south-west gales and the dangerous tides nearly proved too much for him. Two of his galleys were pursued by the Portuguese ships, which drove them on to the rocks. The other seven ships at last found themselves at Dāmān, but the Governor of this place, no doubt through fear of the Portuguese, told them that they would be captured if they stayed there, and directed them to Sūrāt. Many of the sailors deserted and got ashore to take service in Gujarāt. With the remainder Sīdī 'Alī arrived at Sūrāt and was allowed to land there. The ships were blockaded by the Portuguese, who demanded their surrender. This the Gujarātis would not agree to, but to appease the Portuguese they destroyed the ships. Sīdī 'Alī was left stranded with no means of getting back by sea. His ships were destroyed and his crews had deserted. He met with many expressions of devotion to the Khalifa, but with no active support. For a time he remained in Gujarāt, taking part in some local wars, and employed his leisure in compiling his great work, the *Muḥīṭ*, or *Ocean*, a guide to the navigation of the Eastern Seas. Finally, he determined to make his way back to Turkey overland. His further adventures do not concern us here, although of great interest in themselves. He travelled through Sindh and Multān to Delhi, and thence through Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Khiva to Persia, and over the Pusht-i-Kūh to Bagdad, where he arrived after about three years' wandering.

The strong position of Turkish soldiers and officials in the kingdom of Gujarāt at this period has a curious light thrown on it by this adventure of Sīdī 'Alī. He was sure of a reception at Sūrāt, although other ports refused him hospitality, for the reason that it had a Turkish Governor who had himself fortified it in the Turkish fashion, and armed it with Turkish guns, which he had transported from the fort of Junāgarh. These guns were known as "Sulaimānī". The history of this

Governor may be pieced together from various incidental mentions by Firishta, and in the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*. The original name of the Governor was Ghazanfar 'Aḳā, a Turkish Ghulām of Sulṭān Maḥmūd Shāh. He built the fort, according to Firishta, in 949 H. (A.D. 1542) (Firishta's text, ii, 226). He was then given the title of Khudāwand Khān, and made Governor of Sūrat. Briggs (iv, 147) gives his name as Suffy Aghā, and his title as Khudābanda Khān. In the *Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, where he is mentioned several times, he also bears the name of Khudāwand Khān. He is said there to have owed his position at Sūrat to another Ghulām, who had risen to a high position, 'Imādu'l-Mulk Rūmī, also a Turk, though not an Ottoman Turk. He had married Khudāwand Khān's sister, and in the various distributions of appointments which the leading men made in these disturbed times he is said to have appointed his brother-in-law to be Governor of Sūrat (*Mirāt-i-Sikandari*, p. 270). In the year 952 (1545) we are told that he acted as executioner of the celebrated noble, Malik 'Imādu'l-Mulk (not to be confounded with 'Imādu'l-Mulk Rūmī), whom he killed after torturing him. The *Mirāt* here (ib. 235-6) calls him the fiefholder of Sūrat. Still later, in 933 H. (1559), Khudāwand Khān was accused of oppression by the people of Sūrat, who complained to his brother-in-law, 'Imādu'l-Mulk Rūmī. He defied 'Imādu'l-Mulk, who laid siege to Sūrat. Khudāwand Khān finally induced 'Imādu'l-Mulk to visit him under the pretext of negotiation, and treacherously killed him. Changiz Khān, son of 'Imādu'l-Mulk, carried on the attack, and obtained Portuguese assistance by ceding to them Dāmān and Sanjān. The Portuguese fleet blockaded Sūrat, and Khudāwand Khān, in a sortie, was killed by Changiz Khān. There appears to have been a man named Khudāwand Khān, who Firishta (l.c.) says was killed by Burhān at the same time as Maḥmūd Shāh in 961 (1554), and the *Mirāt* (p. 238) speaks of a Khudāwand Khān Rūmī who was killed at Diu, but it seems clear that one man bearing this title was Governor of

Sūrat till 1559, and that he was the original Turkish Ghulām who built the fort. Evidently he was the Governor when Sidī ‘Alī landed there, and it was through his influence that Sidī ‘Alī remained there so long unmolested in spite of Portuguese pressure. This perhaps explains the Portuguese willingness to help Changīz Khān against Khudāwand Khān.

Thus ingloriously ended the last organized effort of the Turks against the Portuguese naval power.

Sultān Sulaimān, the greatest of Turkish rulers, abstained from any further attempt to drive the enemies of Islām from the Arabian Sea, although many isolated combats took place. He died in 1566.¹ It was not till the year 1580, in the time of Sulaimān’s grandson, Murād III, that a renewal of the struggle took place. It was, however, local, being entirely confined to the coast of East Africa. The occasion may have seemed to the Turks a favourable one, for Portugal was at this time distracted by the dissensions which followed the death of the Cardinal King, Henry, which occurred only a year and a half after his succession to the heroic and romantic Dom Sebastião. The Turkish Empire was, however, not in a position to take full advantage of its opportunities. It had

¹ At this period, while the brave but unfortunate king Dom Sebastião was still reigning in Portugal, it seems that a project of carrying the war into the Persian Gulf and driving the Turks out of Basra had been discussed. The historian Diogo do Couto, in his *Soldado Pratico* (a series of dialogues between a Viceroy lately appointed to India and an old soldier on affairs connected with the Eastern relations of Portugal), alludes to this project. The Viceroy asks the soldier’s opinion on the question, and the latter condemns the project, evidently giving expression to Do Couto’s own opinion. He thought they might succeed in taking Basra, but could not hold it against the great military power the Turks would be able to bring against it, and that it would be better to concentrate on strengthening Hurmuz and keeping it well supplied so that it would be able to resist all attacks. This was good advice, for the Portuguese could only dispose of a small land force quite incapable of resisting the powerful armaments of the Turks; their strength was on the sea and not on land. Such councils appear to have prevailed, for the expedition was never undertaken.

Dialogo do Soldado Pratico, Lisbon, Acad. Real das Sciencias per Diogo do Couto, 1790.

rapidly deteriorated since Sulaimān's death, and though still outwardly strong, was eaten up by corruption. The attack on the Portuguese seems to have been the work of one man, 'Ali Beg, who was sent out by the Albanian Wālī of Yemen. It is doubtful whether it was ordered or inspired from Constantinople, and it does not seem to have been mentioned by any Turkish historians. All our information is derived from Portuguese sources.¹ 'Ali Beg's first exploit was a raid against Maskat in 1580. The town was at that time unfortified, for the celebrated fort which still exists was not begun till six years later, and it fell an easy prey to the raider, as it had to Pīrī Bey in 1553. Though this raid led to no permanent result, it gave 'Ali Beg a great reputation, and in 1584 the Wālī sent him out of the straits to go down the coast of East Africa and obtain timber for the Red Sea fleet at Malindi. He was furnished with two galleys, but one of them was unseaworthy, and had to return at once. He proceeded with the other, and as he went he got together a number of coasting craft manned by the local Arabs. He proclaimed that a great fleet was following him to expel the Portuguese from the whole coast, and this bluff, taken together with the manifest weakness of the Portuguese, gained him much support among the coast Arabs. Mogadoxo, Brava, the Lamu Islands, and Mombasa declared in his favour, and Malindi, where there was a Portuguese captain in charge, alone held out. Meanwhile, a badly organized Portuguese fleet had entered the Red Sea, but effected nothing, as it was not even able to capture 'Ali Beg's galley on its return journey with its prize, a Portuguese ship, which had been taken. The Arabs who had declared in favour of the Turks continued to defy the Portuguese, and in 1589 the Wālī sent out 'Ali Beg a second time with a better equipped expedition, consisting of four galleys and the ship captured in the first attempt. Had the Turkish rulers now been in a position to send out a strong fleet they might possibly

¹ The only full account is that given by De Couto, *Decadas*, ed. 1788, Dec. X, bk. vii, chs. 7, 8; Dec. XI, chs. 5-15.

have overthrown the Portuguese naval power. This was the year following the defeat of the great Armada, in which the greater part of the Portuguese fleet had perished, and the English seamen were now on the watch for all Spanish and Portuguese vessels coming from the East, as Linschoten has vividly described. He himself, travelling from India in a Portuguese ship this same year, 1589, was held up in the Azores, and had to spend three years there before he could reach Lisbon. But Turkey was not ready, and the opportunity passed. 'Ali Beg was received with enthusiasm by all the Arabs who had declared for Turkey, but, as before, Malindi defied him. 'Ali Beg grounded on a sandbank and was bombarded by the Portuguese. He got away to Mombasa, intending to fortify himself there.

The local commandant, on hearing of his approach, had dispatched a swift sailing vessel to the Viceroy at Goa, with the news. The latter was a man of energy, and at once sent off his brother Thomé de Souza Coutinho with all the ships he could muster. The fleet arrived on the coast of Brava, and following it to the south by the Lamu Archipelago received news that the Turks were at Malindi. He found on arriving there that they had gone to Mombasa. The fleet arrived at the entry of the port on March 5, 1589. The fight which followed ended in the destruction of the Turkish fleet and the capture of the fort which they had occupied. Many Turks who took refuge on the mainland were killed and devoured by a cannibal Bantu tribe, known to the Portuguese as the Zimbás, who had for some years been spreading desolation along the African coast from the Zambezi northwards. This completed the Turkish discomfiture. 'Ali Beg himself surrendered. He was taken to Lisbon, and is said to have become a Christian. Possibly like many other Turkish sailors he was of European origin.

Thus the last attempt of the Turks to assert their authority in the Indian Ocean ended in failure, as the others had done. Coutinho's brilliant exploit left the Portuguese for the time in

command of those seas. They had won the victory for Europe; the sea-route was established, and all serious opposition was disposed of. Yet though they had laboured others were to enter into their labours. The accession of a Spanish king to the throne of Portugal had entangled Portugal in the schemes and the wars of Spain. England and Holland perforce became her enemies, and when after the "sixty years' captivity" she recovered her liberty, only the shadow of her Eastern Empire remained to her. The Dutch had taken the greatest part of it, and the trade of India proper was passing into the hands of other nations. It is not my object here to follow the history of the decline of the Portuguese power, but I hope that sufficient has been told to make clear the nature of the task Portugal undertook. It was a single-handed struggle of a small nation against the greatest military power then existing, one which threatened to dominate both Europe and Asia. Portugal was victorious, but exhausted, and the nations of Europe should not now be unmindful of the great part she played.