
VI. A GRAMMATICAL ESSAY on the NATURE, IMPORT, and EFFECT of CERTAIN CONJUNCTIONS; particularly the Greek ΔΕ. By JOHN HUNTER, M.A. F.R.S. EDIN. and Professor of Humanity in the University of ST ANDREWS.

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LEVIA quidem hæc, et parvi fortè, si per se spectentur, momenti. Sed ex elementis constant, ex principiis oriuntur, omnia: Et ex judicii consuetudine in rebus minutis adhibitâ, pendet sæpissimè etiam in maximis vera atque accurata Scientia.

SAM. CLARKE Præf. ad HOM. Iliad.

IT is a maxim in physics, that “ an effect ought not to be ascribed to the joint operation of many causes, if fewer are adequate to the production of it.” *Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora.* This maxim is no less just when applied to language. It is equally unphilosophical in grammar and in physics, to multiply without necessity the principles from which the phænomena are to be explained.

IN the English, however, and in other languages, certain words are classed by the grammarians as different parts of speech, according to varieties observed in the application of them, even when these varieties are merely *accidental*. Thus, in the sentence, “ I came *after his departure*,” the word AFTER is classed with the *Prepositions*; while, in this other, “ I came *after he departed*,” it is classed with the *Conjunctions*. The word AFTER is, however, the same in both sentences; its *meaning* is the same, and its *effect* precisely the same. The only circumstance of discrimination is, that, in the first example, it is prefixed to a noun substantive,

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—*his*

—*his departure*; in the latter, it is prefixed to a nominative and a verb—*he departed*. But even the nominative and verb thus applied do not constitute a proposition; they do not contain an independent assertion; they express no more than a specifying circumstance annexed to the other proposition, “*I came* ;” and, whenever they are rightly apprehended by the mind, they are stripped of their propositionary form, and stated *abstractly* under a new phasis—*his departure*. Thus considered, then, the two propositions are synonymous in every respect, excepting the *apparent* grammatical nature of the words—*his departure*, and—*he departed*; and even these are reduced to one grammatic form in the mind, whenever the import of the propositions is rightly apprehended.

FROM these observations it should seem that there is no sufficient reason for classing the word *AFTER*, in the one case, with the *Prepositions*, and, in the other, with the *Conjunctions*; since, by the seeming change of its regimen, no real change is made, either in its grammatical nature, or in its signification.

OF this unphilosophical method of arranging the same words in different classes, I shall mention *two* other instances, chiefly with a view to prepare the way for a conjecture which I am to offer with regard to the nature and import of one of the Greek particles; which instances will serve to illustrate and confirm that conjecture, and will, in their turn, be illustrated by it*.

I. THE English preposition *TO* is very variously applied. Being extremely *general* in its signification, it is consequently capable of various *special* applications. One of its special uses is to mark *addition TO*. Thus DENHAM,

“Wisdom he has, and, *TO* his wisdom †, courage ;

“Temper *TO* that, and, *unto* all, success.”

In this example, every succeeding circumstance is, by the preposition

* In the progress of the essay, it will appear, that the reasoning proceeds upon an analogy much more strict and close than here it seems to do.

† ΠΡΟΣ τῇ σοφίᾳ.

position *TO*, marked as an *addition to* the preceding. “Wisdom he has, and courage *additional to* his wisdom,” &c. In this acceptance of the word *TO*, the object which it governs, or to which it marks something else as *added*, is frequently *not expressed*, or not formally stated along with the preposition. The reason is, that it readily occurs to the mind, being mentioned in the context immediately before. Thus DENHAM might, with equal propriety, have said,

“Wisdom he has, and courage *too*,” &c.

This mode of expression would have been more concise and equally intelligible as the other, “Wisdom he has, and courage *TO his wisdom*,” &c.

Not only is the object governed by *TO* omitted, when it is represented by a noun substantive in the context, but also when it is involved in a proposition. Thus Mr POPE,

——— “Let those eyes that view
“The daring crime, behold the vengeance *too*.”

So “He made him prisoner, and killed him *too*.” In the one example, the circumstance of *beholding the vengeance* is stated as an *addition to* the *viewing the crime*; and, in the other, the *killing him* is stated as an *addition to* the *making him a prisoner*. In both examples, the object governed by *TOO* is not formally stated; and, in both also, it is involved in a preceding proposition. It is the *amount* of that proposition taken *abstractly*, or as a *Noun substantive*.

ALTHOUGH all these uses of the word *TO* are really one and the same, differing in nothing but this, that the object governed by it is, in some of them, *expressed*, and, in others, *not expressed*; yet the grammarians have considered them as different, and have classed *TO*, in the one case, with the *Prepositions*, and, in the other, with the *Conjunctions*, or with the *Adverbs*. This circumstance, together perhaps with the accented pronunciation

of *to*, when the object governed by it is not expressed, has given rise to a difference in its orthography, the writing it with two *O*s instead of one. And the two words have ultimately come to be universally considered as *different*, inasmuch that even the supposition of their being the *same* is not likely to be listened to without prejudice.

IN the parent Saxon language, however, both uses are comprised under one form, *to* ; and, even in the English, as late as the reign of Queen ELIZABETH, they were both written with one *O*. This appears from the specimens prefixed to Dr JOHNSON'S Dictionary, as a history of our language previous to that period. Thus, Sir THOMAS MORE, speaking of fortune and one of her quondam favourites,

“ She glydeth from hym, and her giftes *to* ;

“ And he her curseth, as other fooles do.”

And to the accented pronunciation of *to*, when its object is not expressed, that is, by no means, a sufficient reason, either for classing or for writing it differently, being a circumstance common to it with every preposition whatsoever. All of them, when their objects are expressed, may be accented or not accented, according to the meaning, or shade of meaning, intended to be conveyed. But, when their objects are not expressed, they are *commonly* * accented: “ *To stand by,*” “ *to come on,*” “ *to run in,*” “ *to rush out,*” &c.

FROM these observations, it should seem, that the word *too*, though generally considered as different, and though ranked by grammarians in a different class of the parts of speech, is really the same with the preposition *to*, in its special meaning of *additional to*. This has been shown from the sameness of their *meaning* and *effect*, as well as of their *original orthography*, and
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* In fact they are *always* accented, though their accent may sometimes be obscured by an equal or superior accent given to an adjoining word, as, “ He did not *walk in*,
“ but *rushed in*.”

the circumstances of *apparent* diversity have been accounted for. This, then, I think, may be fairly admitted as one instance wherein the various classing of the same word, founded on imperfect and partial views, tends to deceive, by leading us to suppose *grammatic* differences which are not real, and to consider *words* as different, when they are really the same.

II. I SHALL subjoin a similar example from the Latin language. The Latin preposition *AD*, like the English *TO*, is extremely *general*, and consequently capable of various *special* applications. One of these is to mark one object as *added to* another*. “*AD hoc*, promissa barba et capilli efferaverant speciem oris †.” “*Additional to this*, his long beard and hair had given a wildness to his aspect.”

BUT the object governed by *AD*, when used in this special meaning, is often not expressed, or not formally stated; and, in that case, like the English preposition *TO*, *AD* is classed with the *conjunctions*, and written differently, *AT*. Thus, as *ABS*, compounded with *que*, produces *ABSque*, so *AD* compounded with *que* produces *ATque*, *i. e.* *ADque*. “*BRUTUS ATque CÆSAR*,” “*BRUTUS and CÆSAR TOO* ;” “*BRUTUS, and CÆSAR additional to BRUTUS*.” “*CÆSAR DUMNORIGEM cepit, ATque interfecit*.” “*CÆSAR made DUMNORIX prisoner, and killed him TOO*.” In this example, the *killing* *DUMNORIX* is stated as *added to the making him a prisoner*. In these examples, it is evident, that *AT* marks one object as *added to* another, and differs from *AD*, when used in the same special meaning, in nothing but the *suppressing* of the object governed by it.

EVEN when *AT* appears by itself, and without *que* subjoined, it seems to be sometimes used in the same special meaning. Thus *TERENCE*,—“*PH. Fac, ita ut iussi, deducantur isti*.
“ *PA.*

* *Added to*—where *accumulation only*, or the increase of number or magnitude, is attended to.

† *LIVY*.

“ PA. Faciam. PH. AT diligenter. PA. Fiet. PH. AT ma-
 “ ture*.” By the means of AT, the circumstances of *dili-*
gence and *haste* are *superadded* to the action commanded. “ PH. It
 “ is not enough that you do it, you must do it carefully too.”
 “ PA. Well; it shall be carefully done. PH. In good time too.”

BUT further: *Another* of the *special* applications of the prepo-
 sition AD, is to mark one object as *united* or *joined to* † another,
 and that, too, whatever be the nature of the objects, whether
 they be such as are *commonly* united, or such as appear *incongru-*
ous, and whose union is contrary to expectation. Of the first
 kind is this example from LIVY: “ AD imperium dictatoris,
 “ cuncta mota acies;” “ *Joined to* the command of the dictator,
 “ the whole army was in motion”—*i. e.* “ AT the command,”
 &c. In this example, there is nothing incongruous in the ob-
 jects united; their union is even considered as necessary, the
movement of the army being joined to the *command of the dictator*,
 as an *effect* to its *cause*. Of the second kind is the following in-
 stance: “ AD imperium dictatoris, discedere nolabant;” “ AT
 “ the command of the dictator, they refused to depart.” In this
 last example, the sentence is constructed in the same manner as
 in the other. Two events are represented as *conjoined*, a *refusal*
to depart and the *command of the dictator*; and the same preposi-
 tion AD is employed to mark their *union*. From our knowledge,
 however, of the power vested in the Roman dictator, we per-
 ceive, that these events are, in some measure, incongruous, and
 their union consequently unexpected. And this perception of
 incongruity in the objects united leads us to give to AD the
 force, not of TO simply, but of TO with emphasis, or EVEN TO.
 “ Joined EVEN TO the command of the dictator, they refused
 “ to depart”—*i. e.* “ EVEN AT the command,” &c.

Now it is in this last manner, *viz. to mark the unexpected union*
of incongruous objects, that AD, when the object which it governs

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* Eun. Act. ii. Sc. i.

† *Joined to*, in respect of time, as *cause* and *effect*, &c.

is not formally stated, *i. e.* *AT*, the *conjunction*, is most commonly applied, "Aulam tyranni frequentabat, *AT* patriam amabat;" literally, "He frequented the court of the tyrant; joined *EVEN* "to that, he loved his country." "He was a courtier and a "patriot *TOO*." By means of *AT*, the circumstance of *loving his country* is stated as *united* to the other, *viz. his frequenting the court of the tyrant*.—The character of a *patriot* is represented as *united* to that of a *courtier* in the same person.

CICERO, in his address to CÆSAR in behalf of MARCELLUS*, has the following sentence: "Nihil est opere aut manu factum, "quod aliquando non conficiat et consumat vetustas; *AT* vero hæc "tua justitia et lenitas animi florescet quotidie magis." Here first one truth is stated—"There is nothing made by the labour or "hand of man which length of time may not waste and destroy." Then, by means of *AT*, another circumstance is stated as *joined* *EVEN* to this truth, *viz.* "That CÆSAR's justice and gentleness "of disposition shall flourish every day more and more." It is not *simply* asserted, that "CÆSAR's justice shall flourish," but that it shall flourish, *conjoined even* to the truth of the other position—"That every work of the hand must perish"—a position which we conceive to be almost incompatible with it. Instead of *AT* *vero*, CICERO might have used *AT* *tamen*. "Every work "must perish, *yet* *JOINED EVEN* *TO THAT*, your justice shall "flourish." The former circumstance shall not prevent the truth of the latter. In these, and in all similar examples, the two objects or events, however incongruous they may *seem* to be, are actually *united*; and of their union, *AT* appears to be the symbol †.

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* Cap. 4.

† THE frequent application of *AT*, to mark the union of incongruous objects, first gave rise to the habit of annexing an emphatic meaning to it; and, when once this habit was formed, the word necessarily raised an expectation of something incongruous to follow. And hence it has come at last to be mistaken for a *symbol* of incongruity or opposition.

It would be difficult to collect examples of *all* the various applications of the word *AT*, that may be met with in the Latin authors. In those, however, that most frequently occur,

THE word *AT* is indeed called an *adversative*, and is commonly imagined to mark, not the *union*, but the *opposition* of objects. But,

I. THE authority of *QUINCTILIAN* is explicit in favour of our hypothesis. In treating of the Latin orthography, he has the following observation: “ *Illa quoque servata est a multis differentia, ut AD, quum esset præpositio, D literam; quum* “ *autem*

occur, it is evidently expressive, not of *opposition*, but of *union*. When there is no incongruity in the objects united, and consequently nothing unexpected in their union, the effect of it will be perceived by rendering it *to* simply; and, when the objects united appear incongruous, by rendering it *to* with emphasis, or *EVEN TO*.

I. *To* simply—as in the form of surrender recorded by *LIVY*, [*Lib. i. cap. 38.*] “ *Deditisne vos populumque Collatinum in meam populique Romani ditionem? Deditis. AT ego recipio;*” “ *Joined to that, I receive them.*” *ET* might have been used in this instance. In imprecations, and the like, it represents the amount of the prayer, as *joined to* an action *mentioned, perceived, dreaded, &c.* I. *To* an action *mentioned*; as in *TERENCE*; “ *CH. Factum est hoc, DAVE? DA. Factum. CH. Hem! quid ais, Scelus? AT tibi dii dignum factis exitium dunt!*” 2. *To* an action *perceived*; as in *VIRGIL*, when *PRIAM*, upon seeing his son killed by *PYRRHUS*, exclaims:

“ *AT tibi pro scelere, exclamat, pro talibus ausis,*
 “ *Dî, si qua est cœlo pietas, quæ talia curet,*
 “ *Perfolvant grates dignas, et præmia reddant*
 “ *Digna,—qui nati coram me cernere letum*
 “ *Fecisti, et patrios fœdasti funere vultus.*” [*Æn. ii. 535.*]

II. *EVEN TO*—as in *TERENCE*; “ *Si ego digna hac contumeliâ sum maximè, AT tu indignus qui faceres tamen;*” “ *Joined EVEN TO that, it was unworthy of you to do it.*” So when *CHREMES*, after he has heard many circumstances tending to prove that *PAMPHILA* is his daughter, says, “ *AT mihi unus scrupulus etiam restat.*” “ *Joined EVEN TO [what I have heard] there still remains one difficulty.*” *i. e.* “ *All I have heard is not sufficient to remove it.*” It is used precisely in this manner, when it introduces an *objection*, or the *answer* to an *objection*. I. An *objection*; as in *CICERO* pro *MILONE*; “ *AT valuit odium, fecit iratus, &c.*” “ *Joined EVEN TO [what you have said] his hatred got the better of him, he acted from passion:*” *i. e.* “ *For all that you have said,*” &c. “ *All that you have said does not hinder the deed to have proceeded from hatred or passion.*” 2. The *answer* to an *objection*; as, “ *Domus tibi deerat? AT habebas. Pecunia superabat? AT egebas.*” “ *You will say you wanted a house; joined EVEN TO that, you had one,*” &c. It is used in this manner too, when it introduces the *circumstances* of an action which tend to heighten our surprise. “ *Vidit CLODIUS necesse esse MILONI proficisci Lanuvium illo ipso, quo profectus est, die; itaque antevertit. AT* “ *quo*

“ autem *conjunctio*, τ acciperet *.” From this passage, it is evident, that the conjunction *AT* was originally written *AD*: That the difference in their orthography, though observed by *many*, was not, at that time, *universally* observed; and that this difference was introduced to distinguish the conjunction from the preposition. The fortune of the Latin *AD* appears, therefore, to have been similar to that of the English *TO*. Both of them are *prepositions*, and of the *same* signification. Both of them, when the object which they govern is not formally stated, have been reckoned *conjunctions*; and, in both, a difference of *orthography* has at last obtained to distinguish the *conjunction* from the *preposition*.

2. THE propositions, whereof *AT* is said to mark the opposition, are both of them *true*, and they express truths which are *co-existent*. They cannot, therefore, be *opposite* in one of the acceptations of that term. They may be *apparently* incompatible, but they are not *really* so. Thus, in the example formerly mentioned, “ Aulam tyranni frequentabat; *AT* patriam amabat,”—the two characters of *courtier* and *patriot*, however incongruous they may *seem* to be, are represented as *united* in the same person. Considering the matter *a priori*, then, it seems reasonable to imagine, that, on such occasions, a term would be employed to mark the *union*, which is *uncommon* and *unexpected*, rather than the *opposition* or *incongruity*, which is *apparent*. Accordingly, we find, in fact, that those of the conjunctions called

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“ quo die? Quo, ut ante dixi, infanissima concio ab ipsius mercenario tribuno plebis est concitata: Quem diem ille, quam concionem, quos clamores, nisi ad cogitatum facinus appropinquaret, nunquam reliquisset;”—“ On what day, too?” &c. This is an instance extremely fortunate for our purpose; because, although the *action* of *CLODIUS* and the *time* which he chose for it appear incongruous, yet the practice of the English language admits of our rendering *AT* literally; “ *CLODIUS* was beforehand with him, on a day too when his presence was necessary at Rome.”

In the foregoing examples, which comprehend all the common applications of *AT*, it seems to mark the *union*, [*expected* or *not expected*], not the *opposition*, of the objects connected by it.

* Lib. i. cap. 7.

ed *adversative*, whose signification can be ascertained, are significant, not of *opposition*, but of *union*, or something that is equivalent. Of this kind are the Greek, *ὅμως*, accented on the penult, and *καί*; the Latin, *etsi*, *verum*, *vero*, *tamen*, *verum tamen*; the French, *cependant*, and perhaps *encore*; the English, *yet*, *nevertheless*, *notwithstanding*, &c. It might, however, be reckoned tedious, were I to attempt to state the precise import of each of these, and to show, that their effect, in a sentence, is consonant to their signification, and arises out of it.

3. THE *adversative appearance* of *AT* seems to have arisen from the circumstance of its raising an *expectation*, that something seemingly opposite, or incongruous, is to follow. Thus, when it is said, “*CÆSAR fuit vir fortis, prudens, clemens*; “*AT ———*,” the word *AT* is no sooner heard, than an expectation is raised, that something opposite to the qualities previously mentioned—something disadvantageous to the character of *CÆSAR*, is to follow. And hence, from its raising this expectation, it has been concluded, that *AT* itself is significant of opposition: But that this conclusion is by no means *necessary*, will appear from the following observations.

WHEN objects or qualities, considered as in their own nature opposite or incongruous, are observed to co-exist, it seems more necessary to *intimate their co-existence*, than if no such opposition were felt. The perception of their *natural* incongruity leads to the giving a *marked* intimation of their *union*, when they happen to be united. “*CÆSAR fuit vir fortis, prudens, clemens*; *AT ambitiosus, patriæ proditor*,” &c. It might have been imagined, that such opposite qualities could not unite in the same person; and, therefore, it appeared necessary, that pointed intimation should be given of their union; and, for that purpose, the word *AT* is employed. The same circumstance, *viz.* the perception of the incongruity, also leads the hearer to *interpret* the symbol of union in the same *emphatic* manner; that is, to give to *AT* the force, not of *TO* simply,
but

but of *TO* with emphasis, or *EVEN TO*. “*CÆSAR* possessed fortitude, prudence, clemency ; joined *EVEN TO* that, he “ was ambitious, and a traitor to his country.”

Now, this emphatic meaning, which men were *accustomed* to annex to *AT*, in consequence of its being so very frequently employed to mark the union of incongruous objects, will sufficiently account for its raising an expectation that something apparently opposite, or incongruous, is to follow : For, no sooner is this emphatic meaning given to it, than such an expectation is raised,—and *must* be raised, because an emphatic intimation of union *supposes* an incongruity in the objects united, and is given in consequence of a perception of that incongruity. Thus, “ *CÆSAR* possessed fortitude, prudence, clemency ; joined *EVEN TO* that ———.” When these last words are heard, we immediately expect that something is to follow, apparently opposite to what is contained in the first member of the sentence. We are prepared for such attributes as—*ambitious* and a *traitor* to his country. Thus, then, from the emphatic meaning given to *AT*, an expectation was raised that something incongruous was to follow ; and, from its raising this expectation, the word has preposterously been imagined to *express* that incongruity or opposition, which it only *presupposes*.

ANY emphatic intimation of union, thrown into a sentence, will raise an expectation that something incongruous is to be subjoined ; and the reason is the same in them all, namely, that every such intimation is given on the supposition, that the objects are perceived to be naturally incongruous. “ *CÆSAR* was “ brave, prudent, merciful ; *at the same time*, he was ———.” Or, “ *CÆSAR* was brave, prudent, merciful ; *notwithstanding that*, “ he was ———.” In these, as well as in the Latin example, we are led to expect that some circumstance in the character of *CÆSAR* is to follow, which we should not have expected to be united with the qualities, bravery, prudence, and clemency. Yet the words, *at the same time*, do not express *opposition*, and *not-*

withstanding expresses almost the *contrary*. I appeal, then, to the judgment of every candid man, whether the circumstance of *AT* raising an expectation of something opposite to follow, ought to be considered as sufficient to found the conclusion, that *AT* itself denotes opposition; and, if it is not, I know no other ground on which such a conclusion is founded.

WHAT, then, are the *views*, or considerations, upon which the words, *at the same time*, and *notwithstanding*, are used in the preceding examples? When, in contemplating the various qualities which constitute the character of CÆSAR, we observe them to be such as, from their nature, are generally conceived *not to co-exist*,—*this view* of them leads us to obviate the general prejudice, by intimating that (in this particular instance) they existed *at the same time*. When, again, we consider them as naturally *opposite*, or conceive, that the one class of them has a *natural* tendency to *oppose* or prevent the existence of the other, *this view* of them leads us to intimate, that (in this instance) it did *not oppose* it; and it is for that purpose that we employ the word *notwithstanding*. In the same manner precisely, when a Roman viewed these qualities as naturally *incongruous*, he was thereby led to give notice that (in this particular instance) they were *united*; and, for this purpose, the word *AT*, *i. e.* *AD*, is employed.

It should seem, then, that the conjunction *AT* is an intimation, not of *opposition*, as is generally supposed, but of *union*; and that the habit of annexing an emphatic meaning to it, is sufficient to account for its raising an expectation, that something apparently opposite or incongruous is to be subjoined.

ACCORDINGLY, if, in any instance, we give to *AD*, even in its *undisguised* form, the emphatic sense of *even to*, a similar expectation will be raised. “*AD imperium dictatoris —.*” “*EVEN AT the command of the dictator —.*” When these words are heard, we instantly expect something to be added, which but ill accords with our notions of a dictator’s authority,
whether

whether it be a refusal to depart, or any thing else of a like nature. “ *AD imperium dictatoris discedere nolebant.*” “ *EVEN AT the command of the dictator, they refused to depart.*”

Now, in this last example, and in every other of the same kind, by varying the structure of the sentence, *AT* may be introduced instead of *AD*, without even the slightest variation in the meaning. “ *Dictator imperabat ; AT discedere nolebant.*” Wherein, then, does this last mode of expressing the idea differ from the former? In the former, the dictator’s giving the command is *not asserted* ; it is presupposed, and appears only in the *abstract* form of *imperium dictatoris*, governed by *AD* ; whereas, in the latter, it is formally *asserted* ; “ *Dictator imperabat ;*” but the *abstract amount* of the assertion, *viz.* “ *imperium dictatoris,*” is not repeated as the object governed by *AT*. In the one, the *formal assertion* is *omitted*, and the *abstract amount* of the assertion is *expressed* ; in the other, the *abstract amount* is *omitted*, and the *formal assertion* is *expressed*. In these circumstances, and in these only, the two modes of expression seem to differ.

FROM the preceding observations and examples, it appears, that *AT* is nothing else but the preposition *AD*, taken in the special meanings—*added to*—*joined to*, and not having the object which it governs formally expressed ; and that however opposite the objects may appear to be which it unites, yet it does not *express* their opposition.

THE word *AT*, as it denotes addition, might, indeed, be considered as implying *difference* ; for if an object is stated as additional to another, it must be at least *numerically* different from that other. And, indeed, *AT* agrees with the Greek $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$, the Latin *cæterum*, and the French *mais*, in this respect, that all of them imply *difference*, but none of them *opposition*. The last of them particularly, *mais*, (*magis*), like the Latin *AT*, implies *difference*, only because it denotes *addition*.

WE have now seen, that the English *too* and the Latin *AT*, are really the same with *TO* and *AD* ; that they are, in truth,
nothing

nothing more than special applications of these; and we have shown on what these specialities depend, and that their effect in a sentence is actually such as, by their original signification, they may be supposed to produce; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the effect of them may be satisfactorily explained, by resorting to their proper and primitive signification.

III. LET us next enquire, whether the preceding observations can throw any light on the nature and import of the Greek particle ΔΕ, for the sake of which, chiefly, they have been premised.

1. THIS particle is, not uncommonly, found after the accusative case of *proper* names of places, when motion *TO* these places is expressed. “ΙλιονΔΕ,”—“*To* Troy,” &c.

2. NOT only is it thus affixed to proper names, but also to *common*, or appellative, nouns, and in the same sense; “οικονΔΕ,”—“*To* a house.” “αγορηνΔΕ,”—“*To* the forum.” “άλαΔΕ,”—“*To* the sea,” &c.

3. IT is not affixed to the accusative singular only, but frequently also to the accusative plural, “οικαΔΕ.” When, however, the accusative plural ends in ε, it is often disguised by a transposition, the letters δ and σ being transposed for the sake of the sound. Thus, “ΑθηναςΔΕ,”—“*To* Athens,” is commonly written “ΑθναZE.” So “χαμαZE,”—“*To* the ground;” “ΘηβαZE,”—“*To* Thebes,” &c.

4. IT is not only applied, in this manner, to the place to which *real* motion tends, and at which it is conceived to terminate, but also to that object, whatever it be, *to* which any action is directed as a *final cause*. Thus HOMER*, “Μη αγορευε φοβον-ΔΕ”—literally, “Do not speak *to* flight.” Let not your speech tend to flight; let not flight be the *object*, or *final cause*, *to* which it is directed. The Latins use *ad*, and the English *to*, in the same manner. “Hoc fecit *ad* honorem meum,”—“He did *this to* my honour;” where his *doing this* is, in like manner, considered as *tending to* my honour.

THE

* Iliad. ε'. 252.

THE word ΔE was, indeed, but seldom joined with an accusative case by the *Attic* writers, and only in some expressions which the grammarians consider as *adverbial*. May we not, however, conclude from the facts just now stated, that, with the more early Greeks, and even with HOMER, it was considered as a *preposition* governing the accusative, and equivalent to the Latin *AD*, or the English *TO*? It is, indeed, always put *after* the noun which it governs; but that makes no difference as to its *real* grammatical nature: For though a *pre-position* put *after*, is, in truth, a contradiction, yet it is no uncommon occurrence in most languages. The Latins use *nobis-cum*, *tantis-per*, &c. and we *there-to*, *where-to*, and others similar. These last also our grammarians consider as *adverbs*; but they are compound words, in which the preposition *TO* is palpably one of the component parts. And the facts before stated render it, in some degree, probable, that the Greek ΔE is sometimes, in like manner, a preposition put after the word which it governs, and equivalent to *TO*.

ON this hypothesis, then, that ΔE is a preposition signifying *TO*, it is reasonable to imagine—1. That, though it is, in itself, extremely *general*, yet, like the corresponding word in other languages, it may be used in the *special* meanings of—*added to*—*joined to*, &c. And—2. That the object, governed by it, may be not formally stated, but left to be collected from a preceding *noun* or *preposition*. In short, that it should follow the same analogy of application as the Latin *AD* and the English *TO*, when they are called *conjunctions*. Accordingly we find, that it does so in fact. When ULYSSES, in the 9th book of the *Iliad*, enumerates to ACHILLES the presents intended for him by AGAMEMNON, he does it in this manner:

————— “ ἐγὼ τοι καταλεξω·
 “ Ὅσσα τοι ἐν κλισίῃσι ὑπὲρ χεῖρο δωρ’ Ἀγαμέμνων·
 “ ἔπ’ ἀπυρρὺς τριποδάς, δέκα ΔΕ χρυσοῖο ταλάντα,
 “ Αἰθωνὰς ΔΕ λεβήλας εἰκοσι, δώδεκα Δ’ ἵππους *.”

In.

* V. 265.

In this example, by means of $\delta\epsilon$, each succeeding article is represented as $\tau\omicron$, *i. e.* *additional to* the preceding article. “Seven tripods—ten talents of gold $\tau\omicron\omicron$ ”—*i. e.* “Ten talents of gold *additional to* the seven tripods.” This instance is precisely similar to that formerly quoted from DENHAM, except that the object governed by $\delta\epsilon$, and to which the succeeding article is added, is not repeated along with $\delta\epsilon$. In DENHAM it is,

“Wisdom he has, and, $\tau\omicron$ *his wisdom*, courage”—

which, if expressed according to the Greek idiom, in the example quoted from HOMER, would be,

“Wisdom he has, and courage $\tau\omicron\omicron$.”

In the above example, then, the word $\delta\epsilon$ is used in the special meaning of *additional to*, and the object which it governs is *not formally stated*, but is collected from a preceding *noun*.

Again, XENOPHON, describing the Persian polity, says,—
 “Διδασκεσι τες παιδας σωφροσυνην διδασκεσι ΔΕ πειθεσθι τοις αρχεσι.”—
 “They teach the children temperance; they teach them, $\tau\omicron\omicron$,
 “obedience to the magistrates.” In this example, by means of $\delta\epsilon$, their *teaching the children obedience to the magistrates*—is represented as *additional to* their *teaching them temperance*. Here also the object governed by $\delta\epsilon$ is not expressed; it is collected from the preceding *proposition*—*διδασκεσι τες παιδας σωφροσυνην*. It is the *amount* of that proposition, taken as a *substantive*. So HOMER, in the beginning of the Iliad, says, that the anger of ACHILLES—

————— “ μυρι Ἀχαιοις αλγέ’ εἰηκε,
 “ Πολλας Δ’ ἰφθιμης ψυχας αἰδι προΐαψεν
 “ Ἡρώων.” —————

In this passage, first one event is stated, “*The anger of ACHILLES brought numberless woes upon the Greeks* ;”—then another,
 “*It*

“ It sent many brave souls to PLUTO before their time ;” and, by the means of δε, the last event is represented as *additional to the former*. “ It sent, too, to PLUTO many brave souls of heroes.” In this example, also, the object governed by δε is not expressed. It is, however, obviously suggested by the context ; being the amount of the preceding proposition taken *abstractly*, or as a noun *substantive*. It is unnecessary to multiply examples. Every page of every Greek author abounds with them ; for of this kind are all those in which the sense leads us to render δε—*and*.

BUT δε is often said to denote *opposition*. In truth it *never* does. In this respect it agrees exactly with the Latin AT. The events which it unites may appear opposite ; but δε does not intimate their being so : It only marks the one as *added*, or *united*, to the other. This I am warranted in affirming, by the authority of the learned, ingenious, and most laborious HOOGEVEEN, an authority that will not be questioned, at least as to the *facts* of the Greek language. His words are :—“ Δε ponitur et pro
“ ΑΛΛΑ διαφορικῶς καὶ ἐναντιωματικῶς, five MEN præcedit, five non. vel
“ *potius* dicam sententiæ diversæ aut adversanti additur, ita ut
“ vicem τὴ ΑΛΛΑ explere videatur ; non enim ipsi particulæ δε ea
“ potestas attribuenda est, sed *sententiæ* cui apponitur *.”

FURTHER,—That the same word should be employed to denote sometimes the *union*, and sometimes the *opposition* of objects, is a supposition, in itself, extremely improbable ; because, in that case, the nature of the objects themselves could alone determine which of these significations we ought, in any particular instance, to affix to it ; and, if so, their opposition might be discovered without the help of this ambiguous symbol of it. Δε, indeed, like the Latin AT, is often employed to mark the union of incongruous objects ; and, like AT too, it has then been imagined to express that opposition which it only presupposes.

* Doctr. Particul. L. Gr. p. 245.

poses. Thus, when ORESTES, in EURIPIDES, makes the following observation—

“ Ονομα γαρ, εργον ΔΕ ουκ εχουσιν οι φιλοι,

“ ‘Οι μη επι ταισι συμφοραις οντες φιλοι *,”—

it is said, that δὲ states an opposition between the *name* and the *reality* of friendship: But, when the observations formerly made on ΑΤ, and the signification of δὲ, *ascertained* by the preceding examples, are taken into consideration, it seems much more reasonable to suppose, that, even here, it retains its proper signification of *union*. Literally thus—“ For the friends that are “ not friends in adversity have the *name* of friends, not the *reality* “ ΤΟΟ.” “ *Nomen, ΑΤ non rem habent.*” Two propositions in fact are stated, *viz.* “ That the friends that are not such in “ adversity have the name of friends;” and secondly, “ That “ they have not the reality:” And, by the means of δὲ, intimation is given, that—(whatever *might* have been expected) the latter is *united* to the former. This seems to be the precise meaning of the passage; and it is elicited without departing from the *known* signification of δὲ. Let us take an example still more striking. Suppose that it is said of a person— “ εἶμι μὲν νεος, εἶμι ΔΕ σοφος” —“ He is young, but he is wise.” The same person is represented as possessing *at once* the two seemingly incongruous qualities of *youth* and *wisdom*. Can any person allege, that, in this example, it is reasonable to depart from the *known* signification of δὲ, and to consider it as denoting *opposition*? The opposition between *youth* and *wisdom* is sufficiently apparent, without any expressed symbol of it. Is it not more reasonable to suppose δὲ to give notice, that—(whatever might have been expected—however opposite or *incongruous* these qualities may *seem* to be) they are (in this particular instance) *united*: That *his being wise* is represented as joined *EVEN TO* his *being young*? This, at least, is the intimation that every person *feels*

* Orest. 455.

feels himself prompted to give, when he observes the *union* of such incongruous qualities.

It should seem, then, that the conjunction $\delta\epsilon$, even when it is said to mark opposition, and translated *but*, still retains its genuine signification of *union*,—with this variation, however, that from the perceived incongruity of the objects, and the unexpectedness of their union, we ought to give it, in such instances, the force, not of *TO* simply, but of *TO* with emphasis, or—
EVEN *TO*.

BUT $\delta\epsilon$, when it appears in the form of a *preposition* governing the accusative, is not accented,— $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\mu\pi\omicron\nu\Delta E$ — $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\eta\nu\Delta E$, &c. ; whereas $\delta\epsilon$ the *conjunction* is always accented. If they are one and the same, whence arises this difference? This circumstance, among others, has led the very learned and ingenious author quoted above, to imagine them to be altogether different, and of different origin. His words are:—“ Cæterum quoties ΔE $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\lambda\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha\iota$, “ non conjunctio est, sed syllabica adjectio, nec *quicquam* cum “ particula $\delta\epsilon$ *commune* habet *. But, notwithstanding this seeming difference between them, and notwithstanding the great authority now quoted, we cannot hesitate to regard them still as the *same* word. For, if rightly considered, this difference as to accent, in the pronunciation at least †, instead of being an objection, is really a confirmation of our hypothesis ‡. We have seen already, that the prepositions, when the object which they govern is expressed, are commonly *not* accented,—“ He came *to* “ Rome.” In like manner $\delta\epsilon$, when its accusative is expressed, ought, upon this analogy, *not* to be accented,—“ $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\mu\pi\omicron\nu\Delta E$:” That, on the other hand, when the object governed by them is not expressed, or not formally stated, the prepositions are then *accented*, “ Wisdom he has, and courage *too*.” $\Delta\epsilon$, therefore, when

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the

* Doctr. Particul. L. Gr. p. 262.

† With regard to the accentual *marks*, they seem to have owed their origin to an unsuccessful attempt to perpetuate a particular *mode* of pronunciation.

‡ As far at least as a thing so little known as the nature of Greek accent can be allowed to have weight in the present case.

the object which it governs, or to which it marks something as *united* or *added*, is not expressed,—that is, Δ the conjunction—ought, upon the same analogy, to be then accented. Were this a proper occasion for such a discussion, it might even be shown, that this analogy, in giving and with-holding the accent, is not arbitrary, but founded on principle.

MAY we not then conclude, with some degree of probability, that Δ the *conjunction* is not a different word from Δ the *preposition*, or *post-fix*, but only a special application of it? If this conclusion be admitted, it appears, that the conjunctive use of the Latin *Ad* and the English *To* illustrates the nature and use of the Greek conjunction Δ ; and that *it*, in its turn, serves to illustrate and confirm the account that was given of *them*. All of them represent the *same idea*; and, in the three taken together, there appears a beautiful gradation in the application of it. The English *Too* being applied as a *simple* intimation of union, is accounted an *additive* only; the Latin *At*, giving commonly an *emphatic* notice of *unexpected* union, is considered as an *adversative*; and the Greek Δ , being applied in *either* way indifferently, will appear *additive* or *adversative*, according to the *degree of emphasis* given to it, that is, according to the *nature of the objects* which it unites.

BUT what real knowledge have we gained in the progress of this long enquiry? The answer is,—That the *classing disparate phenomena*, and referring them to one common principle, is held to be *science* in *Physics*,—and why should it not also be accounted *science* in *Grammar**? But, not to give an answer which may seem captious, we have seen——

1. THAT

* THE observation in the text, although extremely common, appears to mistake the *half of science* for the *whole*. It is undoubtedly the part of science to investigate what, in dissimilar objects, is *generic*, or common to the whole: But to discern and to mark what is *specific*, or peculiar to each, is no less the business of science; and, as it is commonly of greater difficulty, so it is at least of equal importance. The author, therefore, has attempted, whether successfully or not, to ascertain what is peculiar with regard either to *grammatical nature*, or to *signification*, in the various applications of the words he has discussed.

1. THAT *Prepositions*, in various languages, govern not only nouns substantive, but also clauses of sentences bearing the form of propositions; but that such clauses are then equal to nouns in their *effect*, the *abstract amount* of them only being regarded: And, consequently, that, by this *seeming* change of their regimen, no *real* change is made, either in the grammatical nature, or in the signification of the prepositions themselves.
 2. THAT, whether the object governed be a noun substantive, or the amount of a proposition taken as a noun substantive, that object is often not formally stated, being obvious from the context; but that neither does the *formal statement*, or the *omission* of the governed object, make any change, either in the grammatical nature, or in the signification of the prepositions.
 3. THAT the specialities attending these *prepositions*, when they are called *conjunctions*, depend, in as far as the *expression* is concerned, on one or other, or both of the following circumstances, *viz.* the governed objects *being involved in a proposition*, or its *not being formally stated*.
 4. THAT the adverbative *appearance* of *some* of the conjunctions called *adverbative*, arises solely from the *emphatic* meaning given to them, when employed to mark the union of objects *seemingly* opposite or incongruous; but that, though they may *presuppose*, they do not *express* such incongruity or apparent opposition.
 5. BY having shown that the conjunctions *Too*, *At*, and Δi , are the same with the prepositions *To*, *Ad*, and Δe , we have discovered their strict and proper signification, and are thereby enabled to annex to each of them a *precise idea*, instead of having a vague and confused *feeling* of their *effect*.
- Lastly*, BY having ascertained the grammatical nature of *certain* conjunctions, we have advanced *one* step towards the development of the nature of the *Conjunction* itself,—I mean the
- part*

part of speech so called,—which is still a *Desideratum* in grammar, the nature of it being, perhaps, less understood than that of any other of the parts of speech *.

* THE author is fully sensible that, in several places of this essay, he has used expressions which, to an English reader, must appear extremely uncouth. Convinced as he is, that the word AD or AT, and ΔΕ, however variously applied, are always representative of the *same idea*, he has attempted to *hold that circumstance up to view*, by using always the same English word, TO, in translating them. Now, in this attempt, such uncouthness was unavoidable; for it happens that the Greek, Latin and English languages have not followed always the same range in the *application* of these words, although they are in *themselves* strictly synonymous. And whenever the usage of our language does not correspond with that of the Greek or Latin, a literal translation cannot be attempted, without a manifest violation of the propriety of the English idiom:—In truth, it frequently happens that words of the *same generic meaning* are found in *very different special applications*, in different languages. For example, the Greek preposition ANTI, and the Latin ANTE, not only represent the *same idea*, viz. priority, but they are really the *same word*; and yet the special applications of them are by no means correspondent with each other, ANTE, in Latin, never marking opposition, nor ANTI, in Greek, priority in respect of time.—On the other hand, words that are very different in their original import, frequently produce the same ultimate effect. Thus the words AD and EX are not only of different, but nearly of opposite meaning; and yet, of the two expressions, “AD suam naturam fingere cæteros,” and “EX sua natura fingere cæteros,” the effect is ultimately the same.