
II. *An ESSAY upon the UTILITY of DEFINING SYNONYMOUS TERMS in all Languages; with Illustrations by Examples from the Latin. By JOHN HILL, LL. D. F. R. S. EDIN. and Professor of Humanity in the University of Edinburgh.*

[Read by the Author, Feb. 18. 1788.]

WORDS that are precisely equivalent are rarely, if at all, to be met with in any language. Those properly called *synonymous*, exhibit one leading circumstance in which they all agree, and one or more accessory circumstances in which they differ. When the point of their general coincidence, and the grounds of their particular diversities, are clearly ascertained, it is then in the power of the writer to use them with propriety. By the assistance of the grammarian, he knows which to adopt and which to reject, and can reconcile embellishment with accuracy and precision.

THE excellence of any language may in a great measure be judged of, by the number of synonymous terms that belong to it. A multiplicity of them, under skilful management, creates no hurtful redundancy. On the contrary, it enables every author of taste to exhibit his thoughts with energy and lustre. For the most delicate variety of shades in thought, he is furnished with a corresponding variety in expression; and the language in which he conveys his idea, becomes a complete picture of the idea itself.

THE author of this essay is abundantly sensible, that though the Latin tongue presents many classes of synonymous terms,
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yet to catch the circumstance on which their differences rest, is no easy matter, and may often leave room for diversity of opinion. After a careful examination of the classical writers, he suspects it will be found, that in the glow of composition, the strict distinctions between such words have not been always attended to, and that the purest writers have occasionally deviated from the standard which their general practice had established. Still, however, he apprehends, that there is room for a critical and scientific discussion of the Latin synonymous terms. As this is a subject to which, in the line of his profession, he was led to give particular attention, and as he considers it to be of no small importance to those who wish to discriminate the slightest violation of purity in the Roman language, he has made a very large collection of its synonymous words, with remarks upon them. The following specimen of the instances he has collected, he submits, with much diffidence, to this learned Society.

ROGARE, PETERE, POSTULARE, POSCERE, FLAGITARE, agree in denoting the expression of a desire to obtain something not possessed, but differ in respect to the urgency with which this desire is announced. They are all distinguished from the verbs *cupere* and *optare*, which, though not equivalent, suppose, like them, the existence of desire, but not the expression of it, with a view to its being fulfilled.

THE power of the verb *rogare* extends no farther than to the simple intimation of desire. By means of it, a want is suggested to the person addressed, of which he was before ignorant, and both he and his petitioner are supposed conscious, that compliance with the request must be voluntary and the effect of good-will. “*Molestum verbum est, et onerosum, et demisso vultu dicendum rogo* *.”—“*Malo emere quam rogare* †.”

HE

* Sen. Ben. 22.

† Cic. in Ver. 4. 12.

HE who proposed a law in the Roman Comitia, and was then said *rogare legem*, presented his request respectfully, and left it to the Assembly to judge as to the expediency of granting it.

PETERE differs from *rogare*, in supposing a certain difficulty in coming at the object desired, and a greater degree of keenness upon the part of the petitioner. “Ad te confugimus, a te opem *petimus* *.”—“Cum a me *peteret* et summe contenderet, ut propinquum suum defenderem †.”—“Id sibi ut donaret, *rogare* et vehementer *peterere* cœpit ‡.” In the last example, the verbs *rogare* and *peterere* are evidently contrasted. The latter denotes a degree of zeal upon the part of the person who asks, which the former does not.

THE definition now given of *peterere* does not correspond with that given by SERVIUS. “*Peterere*,” says he, “est cum aliquid humiliter, et cum precibus postulamus §.” With all the respect due to so great a critic, it may be urged, that this power of *peterere* is not to be discerned in the verb when taken by itself, though it may be expressed by words with which it is occasionally accompanied. Thus, CÆSAR, *De Bello Gallico*, says, “Suppliciterque locuti, flentes pacem *petissent*.”—“Pueri mulieresque, passis manibus, pacem ab Romanis *petierunt* ||.” Nothing in either of those instances serves to prove, that the keenness of the petitioner, which marks the verb, may not exist, independently of the manner in which the request is presented. The manner is in fact expressed by those terms that happen to be adjuncts to the verb.

PETERE, from the Greek verb *πετω*, *ferri*, *volare*, shews its native force in such derivatives as *impetus* and *præpes* **. It seems

* Cic. Tusc. Q. 5. 5.

† Cic. Quin. 14. a.

‡ Cic. Ver. 215. a.

§ Æneid. 9. 193.

|| 1. 27. & 2. 13.

** The observations of the celebrated GESNER upon this verb, are worthy of that extensive erudition and acute discernment for which he is justly distinguished. By means of his accurate remarks upon the force of some single terms, my labour in tracing the circumstance by which they are allied to other ones, has been abridged; and no scholar should be ashamed to avow his obligations to so able a guide.

seems to have originally expressed an effort to come at objects not within reach, and to have been transferred from material objects to intellectual conceptions. Its primitive power appears in such instances as the two following: "Sciebam CATILINAM
" non latus aut ventrem, sed caput et collum *petere* solere*." — "Malo me GALATÆA *petit*, lasciva puella †."

THE power of *petere*, thus limited, appears to have been afterwards extended, so as to express a desire, accompanied with an effort to obtain any object whatever; and thus the original idea of bodily exertion was lost in that of the eagerness of any pursuit. Candidates for offices at Rome were said *petere magistratus*; and from a sense of the value, as well as of the difficulty of obtaining the object, they were keen in the pursuit of it.

FROM a passage in HORACE, it should seem, that any means for the acquisition of an object that are less than coercive, may be expressed by the verb *petere*.

——— CÆSAR, qui cogere posset,
Si *peteret* per amicitiam patris atque suam, non
Quidquam proficeret ‡.

Nothing more is suggested here by *petere*, than CÆSAR's keenness to hear this musician perform. It were absurd to suppose, that the Emperor, who possessed the power of compulsion, would ever stoop to beg the favour, according to SERVIUS, "humiliter et cum precibus."

POSTULARE differs from *petere*, in as far as it suggests neither keenness nor difficulty in the acquisition of the object. Besides the sentiment of desire, which is common to all the five verbs compared, the idea of claim, which is manifestly not inherent in either of the two former, is essential to *postulare*. Upon a proper limitation of this claim, however, a due apprehension of the power of the verb depends.

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* CIC. pro Muræn. 136. b.

† VIRG. Ec. 3. 64.

‡ HOR. S. 1. 3. 4.

THE distinctive character of *postulare* seems to rest on the acknowledged reasonableness of that which is demanded. "Geometræ solent non omnia docere sed *postulare*, ut quædam sibi concedantur, quo facilius quæ velint explicant*." When geometers require any concession of those they are about to instruct, they appeal to their reason, and tacitly bind themselves to allow the validity of that which they require. The axiom again, which is an undeniable principle, carrying with itself its own proof, is not to be confounded with the postulate or entreated maxim. Other philosophers, as well as mathematicians, establish postulates, though often in terms less definite, and of course more readily mistaken. "M. Dædne igitur hoc, POMPONI, Deorum immortalium vi, natura, ratione, naturam eam regi? A. Do sane si *postulas* †."

CICERO uses the expression, "Impudenter *rogare*, impudentissime *postulare* ‡." and thus intimates, that the indecency which was culpable in the bare suggestion of a desire, as implied in the former verb, rose in a superlative degree, when to this was superadded the idea of a claim, as implied in the latter.

It appears from QUINTUS CURTIUS, that the insolence of DARIUS. after a severe defeat, provoked ALEXANDER. He not only took to himself the appellation of King, without giving it to his Conqueror, but presented his requests in terms that became not his situation. The historian of ALEXANDER accordingly says, "*Postulabat autem magis quam petebat* §."

POSCERE agrees with *postulare*, in supposing, that the petitioner has a claim to have his request granted; but it besides denotes, that he himself is entitled to judge as to the validity of that claim, without regard to the opinion of the person requested, or to the acknowledged equity of the demand. Thus, CICERO

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says,

* Cic. de Off. 58. b.

‡ Cic. de Off. 1. 88.

† Cic. de Legg. 1. 7.

§ QUIN. CUR. 4. 1.

says, "Nemo tam audax qui *posceret*, nemo tam impudens qui *postularet* *." The pointed opposition made here by the orator between the two verbs, shews clearly the meaning affixed by him to each. Impudence, he tells us in the last clause, or a contempt for the opinion of the world, who would judge as to the propriety of the demand, is all that would be needful for enabling the petitioner to present it in the form denoted by *postulare*. With regard to *poscere*, however, the case is different. A sentiment of courage is supposed needful, when a petition, implying the violation of some private right, was to be presented. A matter of favour would, with an unbecoming boldness, have been held forth as a matter of right, so that the person requested might reject the petition, as being an insult to himself.

THE definition given by VARRO of *poscere* seems perfectly just, except only in as far as a compound is preposterously taken to state the power of the verb itself. "*Poscere*," says he, "est quoties aliquid pro merito nostro deprecimur†." Had the critic taken the trouble previously to define "*deprecare*," we should have been at no loss to understand his account of the simple verb. His definition appears to be, in other respects, complete, as he supposes the petitioner possessed of the power of measuring the extent of what he styles "*meritum*."

THE different uses of the verb *poscere* may be all reconciled with the definition now given, when it is applied to the intercourse that takes place between man and man. In its application, however, to those petitions that were presented by the ancients to their gods, its power becomes more mysterious. The idea of right is not easily reconciled with that of supplication; so that, according to the definition given of the verb, those who were said *poscere deos veniam*, might well be accused of profaneness.

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* CIC. in Ver. 4. 44.

† SERV. ÆN. 9. 193.

IN order to obviate this seeming objection, it must be remembered, that a difference of opinion respecting the same act in any two countries, may very naturally produce a difference in the interpretation of those words, that are expressive of this act in each. Undefined terms have in this way become a fruitful source of controversy in matters both civil and religious; and even the science of grammar has suffered by those inaccuracies of expression, which it professes to remedy in all other subjects. The religious sentiments of the Romans were by no means refined. Vows were presented as bribes to their deities, into whose ear they whispered petitions, which they were ashamed to acknowledge in the face of the world. “*Turpissima vota diis infusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem, conticescent, et quod scire hominem nolunt deo narrant* *.” The prayer of such worshippers, then, was a matter of traffic, not an act of devotion. That disinterested benevolence, in reliance upon which more pious supplicants present their requests, was none of the attributes of a Roman deity. The humiliation of the devotee was in his own eyes an article of merit; and he left the altar on which he had laid his offering, feeling the obligation imposed on that being to whom it was presented.

MANY passages in the Latin classics confirm the truth of the observations now made.

——— non tu prece *poscis* emaci,
Quæ nisi seductis nequeas committere divi †.

“Antequam limen Capitolii tangerent, alius donum promittit,
“si propinquum divitem extulerit, alius si thesaurum effoderit.
“Ipse Senatus recti bonique præceptor, mille pondo auri Capitolio
“promittit Omnibus diis hominibusque formosior videtur massa
“auri, quam quicquid APOLLO PHIDIASVE, Græculi delirantes
“fecerunt.

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* SEN. Ep. 10.

† PERS. Sat. 2. 3.

“ fecerunt *.” — “ Prisco instituto rebus divinis opera datur. “ Cum aliquid commendandum est, prece ; cum solvendum, “ gratulatione ; cum *exposcendum*, voto †.” The vow then among the Romans was a bribe, the acceptance of which was deemed obligatory upon the party who took it. As means leading to an end, it necessarily preceded the claim, and was the foundation on which it was built.

THE same notions respecting vows prevailed among the Greeks, as well as the Romans. In the prayer of the priest who had been affronted by AGAMEMNON, the Grecian bard makes him state his claim to be heard in the most express terms.

————— εἰ ποτε τοι χαριεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἐρεψα,
 Ἡ εἰ δὲ ποτε τοι κατα πιονα μηρι' ἐκηα
 Ταυρων ἠδ' αἰγῶν, τοδὲ μοι κρηνηνὸν ἐλδωρ ‡.

FLAGITARE differs from *postulare*, and agrees with *poscere*, in supposing the justness of the privilege assumed by the petitioner, of judging as to his own claim. Its power, however, is more extensive than that of *poscere*, because to the idea of being the judge of the validity of his right, it superadds that of effecting his purpose by such means as he reckons fit for doing so. In those means, at the same time, there may be a considerable variety. The petitioner may either distress the person requested with incessant importunity, or he may threaten vengeance, if the claim which he feels himself entitled to enforce is not fulfilled. That *flagitare* has more power than *rogare* and *postulare*, appears from the two following sentences: “ Metuo “ ne te forte *flagitent*, ego autem mandavi ut *rogarent*.” — “ Ta- “ metfi causa *postulat*, tamen quia *postulat*, non *flagitat*, ego præ- “ teribo §.”

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* Petron. Arbit. 88. 8.

† Val. Max. 1. 1. 1.

‡ IAIAD. a. 39.

§ Cic. Ep. Fam. 98. et pro Quint. 13.

IN the oration of CICERO for PLANCIUS, he calls upon LATRENSIS to specify his charge, and to mention any one tribe that his friend had corrupted in his competition for the Ædileship. “ Etiam atque etiam insto atque urgeo, infector, *posco* “ atque adeo *flagito* crimen *.” There is evidently a climax in the five verbs that compose this sentence, and the gradation is very happily supported. By means of *poscere*, the orator makes a requisition in behalf of his client, of the justice of which he had a right to judge, and by the public manner in which this requisition was made, he virtually threatens him with the penalties of law, if it was not complied with; which last conception is involved in the verb *flagitare*.

AUSONIUS POPMA defines this verb very properly, “ Vehe-
“ menter et plerumque cum strepitu et convicio *poscere* †.”

THE gentlest power of *flagitare*, which is that in which the petitioner proposes to effect his purpose only by teasing, appears in such examples as the two following: “ Implorare et “ *flagitare* auxilium Consulibus ‡.”

——— nec potentem amicum
Largiora *flagito*,
Satis contentus unicus Sabinis §.

THERE are other instances again, in which *flagitare* implies, that the petitioner threatens the person requested, and excites fear, in order to effect his purpose.

Ejicite ex animo curam atque alienum æs,
Ne quis formidet *flagitatorem* suum ||.

“ PETREIUS.

* Cic. pro Plan. 48.

§ HOR. CAT. 2 18. 12.

† De diff. Verb. lib. 2.

|| Plaut. Prol. Caf. 23.

‡ Cic. pro Rab. 9.

“ PETREIUS atque AFRANIUS quum stipendium ab legionibus
 “ pœne seditione facta *flagitarentur*, cujus illi diem nondum
 “ venisse dicerent, CÆSAR ut cognosceret *postulatum est* *.” The
 request made by the soldiers, in order to obtain their pay be-
 fore it was due, was very different from that made to CÆSAR
 in order to have the matter settled.

THERE is a passage in TACITUS, in which the three last of
 the five verbs considered are so placed, that the meaning of each
 is very elegantly and decisively brought forth. The historian
 is describing the sentiments both of OTHO and of the army at
 Bedriacum, which he had left just before the engagement that
 was to decide the contest between him and VITELLIUS. “ Ibi
 “ de prælio dubitatum; OTHONE per literas *flagitante* ut ma-
 “ turarent; militibus ut imperator pugnae adesset *poscentibus*;
 “ plerique copias trans Padum agentes acciri *postulabant* †.”
 By forming this anticlimax, TACITUS gives information to the
 grammarian which is worthy of his attention. The terms of
 the Emperor’s message, in which *flagitare* is used, are expres-
 sive of his authority, and intimate the danger of not comply-
 ing with his request. Those which announce the sentiments of
 the soldiers, by means of *poscere*, are expressive of no unbe-
 coming menace towards their commander, but make the ful-
 filment of their right to be led on to battle by him, the condi-
 tion of their obedience. Many, again, whose request is an-
 nounced by *postulare*, suggest a reasonable claim in which
 there is not even the shadow of contumacy. They are willing
 to obey the orders of their commander with all prudent dis-
 patch, and even in his absence, and they require a reinforce-
 ment, not as a right, but as the means of doing justice to their
 own courage, and to the cause which they had espoused. The
 delicacy exhibited by the historian in this description, will please
 the more the longer it is contemplated. He not only delights
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* Cæs. Bell. Civ. 1. 87.

† Tac. Hist. 2. 39.

his reader by an elegant and masterly discrimination of the various sentiments then prevalent in the minds of ORHO and his followers, but furnishes him also with some curious grammatical facts, which few other writers had ingenuity to perceive.

DOCERE, ERUDIRE, INSTITUERE, IMBUERE, agree in denoting a change produced upon the mind by communication from others, but differ in respect, either to the state of that mind to which the communication is made, or to the means employed in making it. *Docere*, which, according to VARRO, comes from *do*, signifies to give information to those who need it, without reference to their previous knowledge, and is a correlative term in respect to *discere*. Thus, SENECA says, “Hoc mines dum *docent*, *discunt* *.”—“Itaque not facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse, alteri non tradat. Ita non solum ad *discendum* propensi sumus, verum etiam ad *docendum* †.” That *docere* is applicable to all who receive instruction, whether ignorant, or in a certain degree previously instructed, appears from the following passages: “Quid nunc te Afine literas *doceam*? Non opus est verbis sed fustibus ‡.”

Hoc quoque te manet, ut pueros elementa *docentem*,
Occupet extremis in vicis balba senectus §.

In the passages now quoted. *docere* supposes the minds receiving the information to be completely ignorant; but in the three that follow, they appear to be in a state directly contrary. “Et *docebo* fus (ut aiunt) oratorem eum, quem quum CATULUS nuper audisset, fœnum alios aiebat esse oportere ||.”

Plura recognoscēs, pauca *docendus* eris **.

“Quid

* Epist. 7.

§ HOR. Ep. 1. 20. 17.

† CIC. de Fin. 104. a.

|| CIC. de Or. 2. 233.

‡ CIC. in Pis. 95. a.

** OVID. Fast. 4. 418.

“ Quid est enim aut tam arrogans, quam, de religione, de rebus
 “ divinis, ceremoniis sacris, pontificum collegium *docere* co-
 “ nari *.”

DOCERE is almost the only one of the verbs mentioned, that is employed to denote information given as to an event, as well as the acquisition of a new conception. “ Cum interea ne li-
 “ teras quidem ullas accepi, quæ me *docerent* quid ageres †.”

ERUDIRE, from *e* and *rudis*, differs from *docere*, in referring always to the rude state of the person instructed, and to the gradual progress by which he becomes learned. No such expression as “ *fus erudio oratorem*,” can exist, because, when *docere* is thus used, it vilifies the ability of the teacher, and heightens the information of the scholar. When the Romans used the phrase *fus Minervam*, the construction was to be completed by *docere*, not by *erudire*. They only admitted in idea the possibility of adding one or a few facts to the stock of knowledge, possessed by the goddess of learning.

THE instances that follow shew clearly, that *erudire* constantly implies the absence of information upon the part of the person to be instructed.

—— qui mollibus annis
 In patrias artes *erudiendus* erat ‡.

“ Inde puerum liberum loco coëptum haberi, *erudiri*que artibus
 “ quibus ingenia ad magnæ fortunæ cultum excitantur §.”—
 “ Philosophia omnium mater artium nihil aliud est quam do-
 “ num inventum deorum. Hæc nos primum ad illorum cul-
 “ tum, deinde ad jus hominum, quod situm est in generis hu-
 “ mani societate, tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque animi
 “ *erudit*vit ¶.” In this last example, the progress of man as
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* Cic. pro Dom. 219. *b*.

† Ep. 34. *a*.

‡ OVID. Ep. 1. 112.

§ Liv. 1. 39.

¶ Cic. Tusc. Q. 161. *b*.

the pupil of philosophy, is beautifully painted by *erudire* in its purest sense.

THERE is no inconsistency in *docere* and *erudire* appearing in one sentence, and being applied to the different degrees of proficiency made by those acquiring knowledge. “ Neque solum
“ vivi atque præsentes studiosos discendi *erudiunt* atque *docent*,
“ sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis literarum asse-
“ quantur *.” SALLUST says of SYLLA, that he was “ literis
“ Græcis, atque Latinis juxta, atque *doctissime eruditus* †.” Upon the principles laid down, this compounded expression will bear to be analysed. The participle, it should seem, denotes, that he had been regularly instructed in Greek and Roman literature, and the adverb, that the stock of his knowledge was such, that few, if any, were able to add to it.

ONE instance occurs in CICERO, in which *erudire* signifies to inform as to an event which *docere* does often. “ Obviæ mihi
“ velim sint literæ tuæ, quæ me *erudiant* de omni republica, ne
“ hospes plane veniam ‡.” This uncommon use of *erudire* seems to justify the definition given of it. CICERO modestly confesses that ignorance of the affairs of the state, in consequence of his absence, which is perfectly consistent with the pure use of *erudire*, and which, when duly represented, his correspondent was able to remove.

INSTITUERE differs from the preceding verbs in denoting the first step of a progress in teaching, and the communication of the elements of whatever is the ground of instruction. The simple verb *statuere*, in a figurative sense, denotes the determination to act, while the compound denotes the commencement of the action that had been resolved upon. It is only, however, as applied to teaching, that this verb can be held synonymous with the rest of the set. “ SOCRATES jam senex *institui*
“ lyra non erubescibat §.” The verb here evidently refers to

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* Cic. de Off. 31. b.

† Cic. Ep. 24. b.

‡ Jug. 95.

§ Quinctil. 1. 27.

the first lesson in an art, of which the philosopher was before utterly ignorant. "Susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi, sed etiam patriæ. Eos *instituere*, atque *erudire* ad majorum instituta atque civitatis disciplinam, non ad tuas turpitudines debuisti*." *Instituere* here refers to the first step in a process, which *erudire* supposes to be carried on in the education of children. The arrangement of the verbs, however, may be reversed, and each respectively applied to that particular state of certain pupils with which it best accords. "Senectus adolescentes *docet, instituit*, ad omne officii munus instruit†."

IMBUERE differs from *instituere*, in denoting the instilment of sentiments that fit the pupil for making progress in a particular line. It implies intention upon the part of the agent, like the former verbs, and supposes the means of instruction to operate without the consciousness of him who receives it. In its original application to material objects, it had denoted an affection of them in respect to colour, taste, or smell, communicated by means of a fluid, and has been afterwards applied to the production of a mental disposition or aptitude not easily to be destroyed. "APPIUM CLAUDIUM præfectum urbis relinquunt, jam inde ab incunabulis *imbutum* odio tribunorum plebique‡."—"Ad hanc legem non *docti* sed *facti*, non *instituti* sed *imbuti* sumus§." *Facti* here suggests the purpose of the Creator in opposition to that of a teacher, at whatever time he might communicate his instructions, and *imbuti* the instilment of preparatory sentiments, before any lesson was given, as involved in the verb *instituere*.

IMBUERE does not always imply the complete absence of information on any subject, but it uniformly implies an effect produced as the means tending to future improvement. "Sine fit is qui et doctrina mihi liberaliter *institutus*, et aliquo
" jam

* Cic. in Ver. 184. a.

† Liv. 4. 36.

‡ Cic. de Sen. 82. b.

§ Cic. pro Mil. 103. a.

“ jam imbutus usu *.” *Institutus* here denotes, that a good foundation had been laid upon which the scholar’s progress rests; and *imbutus*, that by habit he had acquired such predispositions, as fit him to advance in that line of study which the orator chalks out.

WHEN HORACE states the good qualities of a slave exposed to sale, he says he was

Literulis Græcis *imbutus*, idoneus arti
Cui libet : argillâ quidvis imitaberis uda †.

Though the power of the diminutive in the noun falls properly on the participle, yet no ambiguity is thereby produced in respect to the meaning of *imbutus*. From the words that follow, it evidently implies, that the smattering of Greek literature acquired by the slave, fitted him for making further proficiency.

ERRARE, VAGARI, PALARI, agree in denoting the uncertainty of those who have moved as to the point at which their motion is to terminate, but differ in respect, either to the ground of the uncertainty, or to the number of those involved in it. *Errare* properly signifies to wander, or to deviate from the path leading to a certain point which it is proposed to reach. It supposes, that both before and during the act of moving, an intention existed of coming to a certain place, but that this intention is frustrated from ignorance of the road that leads to it. “ Quæ tot vestigiis impressa, ut in his *errari* “ non possit ‡.”

Passibus ambiguis fortuna volubilis *errat*,
Et manet in nullo certa tenaxque loco §.

————— procul avius *erras* **.

o 2

“ Maxime

* Cic. de Or. 123. b.

§ Ov. Met. 3. 175.

† Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 7.

** Lucret. 2. 739.

‡ Cic. Ep. Fam. 5. 20.

“ Maxime vero mirabiles sunt motus earum quinque stellarum, quæ falso vocantur *errantes* *.” It is in this last example said, that there is both design, and the power of fulfilling design, in the author of that seemingly irregular motion observed by the planets. *Errare* is applied to animals grazing. They direct their motion not in a straight line, and may often miss the best of the pasture they are in quest of.

Mille meæ Siculis *errant* in montibus agnæ †.

—— armento teneras *errante* per herbas ‡.

VAGARI differs from *errare* in implying, that the wanderer means only to quit the spot he occupies, and has no intention to direct his course to any particular place. The person *errans* commits a mistake, which the person *vagans* never can, because he has formed no plan that can be frustrated. “ Non sumus
“ ii quorum *vagetur* animus errore, nec habeat unquam quid
“ sequatur §.”—“ Curandum est ne *vagum* villicum, nec aver-
“ sum contubernio suo habeamus **.”—“ Nam fuit quoddam
“ tempus quum in agris homines passim bestiarum more *vaga-*
“ *bantur* ††.” Men, at the period referred to, were vagabonds, who, knowing no place more desirable than another, continually changed their abode.

THE following figurative acceptance of *errans* and *vagus* seems to confirm what has been said of the verbs with which they are respectively connected. “ Est enim et philosophi, et pontificis, et COTTÆ, de diis immortalibus habere non *errantem*
“ et *vagam*, ut academici, sed ut nostri, stabilem certamque sententiam ††.” In the antithesis, *errans* is opposed to *stabilis*, and

* Cic. Nat. D. 36. a.

† Virg. Ec. 2. 21.

‡ Ov. Met. 15. 14.

§ Cic. Off. 34. a.

** Colum. 12. 1.

†† Cic. de Inv. 1. 2.

‡‡ Cic. Nat. D. 26. a.

and suggests, that the philosopher occupies a point at which he is disposed to rest, without making any attempt to go to another, in which he might fail. *Vagus* again is opposed to *certus*, and implies, that he is free from that want of determination as to the point he is to arrive at, which is peculiar to vagabonds.

PALARI agrees with *vagari*, in implying the act of roving without any settled direction; but differs both from it and *errare*, in suggesting the dispersion of a multitude and the straggling of scattered parties. The two former verbs apply either to one or a number, and have no reference to any party with which they were previously connected. It is otherwise with *palari*; which supposes more than one separated from a company that has been broken.

Fœmina *palantes* agit, atque hæc agmina vertit *?

“ Teucrorum auxilia, fœda fugâ dispersa, totis campis *palantur* †.”

THE purity of the following expression in *LUCRETIVS*, in which *errare* and *palari* are found in the same sentence, may be questioned :

Despicere unde alios queas passimque videre
Errare, atque viam *palantes* quærere vitæ †.

The same wanderers cannot be both with and without an object at the same time. While *palari* then marks only their number and their dispersion, the terms “ viam quærere vitæ” annexed to it shew, that it is not to be understood in its full extent.

MAGNUS.

* Virg. *Æn.* 11. 736.

† *Lucret.* 2. 9.

† *Tacit. Hist.* 4. 18.

MAGNUS, INGENS, AMPLUS, PROCERUS, agree in denoting the magnitude of objects, but differ in respect either to its degree, or to the manner in which it is estimated. The notion of absolute magnitude, it must be observed, is inconceivable. Men have compared the object they denominate *great* with others of the same kind with itself, and have given it its appellation from observing its relative greatness. Thus, “*magna balæna*” signifies either a whale that is larger than other animals of its own species, or that, compared with other sorts of fishes, exceeds them in size. As *magnus* relates to every kind of greatness, and embraces every object within that predicament, so it may be regarded as the general term. “*Magna dii curant, parva negligunt* *.”

In the original application of *magnus* to material objects, it signifies their greatness in respect both to quantity and number.

Heu magnum alterius frustra spectabis acervum †!

“*Magnum numerum frumenti pollicentur ‡.*” The mass which in both the above examples is denominated *magnus*, receives this appellation, both from the size of the whole, and from the number of its parts considered separately.

MAGNUS is figuratively applied to immaterial objects, and denotes a superiority in some respect among them, analogous to that of the largest over the smallest material subjects of a species. “*Si ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur magnæ animæ §.*”

*Magnum pauperies opprobrium jubet **.*

INGENS differs from *magnus* in denoting a greatness that is preternatural, and is unexampled in the class of objects to which that

* Cic. N. D. 51. b.

§ Tac. Ag. 46.

† Virg. Geor. 1. 150.

** Hor. Car. 3. 24. 42.

‡ Cic. Ep. ad Att. 82. a.

that specified belongs. It surpasses the power of *maximus*, the superlative from *magnus*, as the latter marks the greatest only among the objects of a species, in respect to a quality, which, though existing in different degrees in each, admits comparison in all. The superiority of that denominated *ingens*, again, is so decided, as to eclipse the rest that participate in its nature.

Scilicet et fluvius qui non est *maximus*, ei est,
 Qui non ante aliquem *majorem* vidit : —
 — et omnia de genere omni,
Maxima quæ vidit quisque hæc *ingentia* fingit *.

HE. Quid jubeam? ER. Ignem *ingentem* fieri.

HE. Ignem *ingentem*? ER. Ita dico *magnus*
 Ut fit †.

INGENS agrees with *magnus* in admitting an application to objects, of which quantity is not an attribute.

THRAS. *Magnas* vero agere gratias THAIS mihi?

GNATH. *Ingentes* ‡.

CICERO comments upon this passage in a way that puts the precise difference between the terms in the clearest light possible. “ Satis erat respondere *magnas* : *ingentes* inquit. Semper “ auget assentatio id, quod is, cujus ad voluntatem dicitur, vult “ esse magnum §.”

DURING the Augustan age, the prose-writers never used degrees of comparison from *ingens*. When VIRGIL styles ÆNEAS “ fama *ingens*, *ingentior* armis,” his doing so must be considered as a poetical licence, such as that of MILTON speaking of the leviathan.

Hugest of living creatures, in the deep
 Stretch'd like a promontory, sleeps or swims,
 And seems a moving land.

THE

* Lucret. 6. 674.

† Ter. Eun. 3. 1. 1.

‡ Plaut. Capt. 4. 2. 64.

§ Cic. in Læli. 26.

THE superlative *ingentissimus* is not found but in such writers as SYMMACHUS and VEGETIUS, who lived late, and whose practice should not be regarded as a standard. The absurdity, at the same time, is equal, in giving *ingens* either a comparative or a superlative degree; as the essence of hugeness depends on there being nothing in nature in which the quality that it is made to denominate, is to be found in a superior degree.

AMPLUS differs from *magnus* and *ingens*, in being limited to that kind of greatness among material objects which consists in superficial capacity. It properly denotes such an extension of a surface as fits it for receiving what it is designed to contain. "In qua *amplissima* curia, *amplissimum* gymnasium et complures " *ædes sacræ: coliturque ea pars et habitatur frequentissime* *."

Illos porticibus rex accipiebat in *amplis* †.

"Ad eam multitudinem urbs quoque *amplificanda* visa est ‡." In this last example, the compounded verb marks the power of the adjective very distinctly. It denotes the necessary extension of the precincts of the city, so as to afford commodious habitations for the growing multitude. "Loci præter modum " *ampli* vagas imagines reddunt, et nimis angusti sæpe non videntur posse capere imaginum collocationem §."

AMPLUS, like the two words defined, is often transferred from material to immaterial objects. "Suosque omnes per se " *esse ampliores* volebat **."

PROCERUS differs from all the words stated, in never being transferred from material to immaterial objects, and in implying,

* Cic. in Ver. 228. a.

§ Aucl. ad Her. 22. a.

† Virg. Æn. 3. 353.

** Cic. Am. 109. a.

‡ Liv. 1. 44.

ing, that the magnitude is estimated, not from the extension of the object in all the directions that can take place on a surface, but in that of a straight line, that is either perpendicular or horizontal, according to the nature of the object specified. Applied to the human form and to trees, it denotes tallness; and to fishes and four-footed animals in their natural position, length. The general proportions in each, at the same time, are understood to subsist, according to the law observed in the rest of their kind. “Gallorum quisque *procerissimus* ad pompam triumphi lectus *.”—“Sues *procero* corpore, capitibus ut sint parvis †.”

Proceras manibus vertere fraxinos ‡.

— — — quo pertinet ergo

Proceros odisse lupos? quia scilicet illis

Majorem natura modum dedit, his breve pondus §.

HUMIDUS, UVIDUS, MADIDUS, agree in denoting the quality of wetness, but differ as to the manner in which it is generated and retained. *Humidus* implies, that the object which it specifies not only contains moisture, but is fitted to supply the waste of it, whether by evaporation or otherwise. It comes from *humor*, and that from *humus*, and regards the ground as furnishing a constant supply to those springs which break forth at different parts of its surface. “Præmissō Cecina ut occulta saltuum pontesque et aggeres, *humido* paludum, et fallacibus campis imponeret **.” *Humidus* then, in its primitive sense, refers to a subject as formed by the hand of nature, and possessed of a quality which, when absent, cannot be imparted, and when present, cannot be destroyed.

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THE

* Sueton. Calig. 47.

§ Hor. Sat. 2. 2. 35.

† Var. de Re. R. 2. 1.

** Tac. Ann. 1. 61.

‡ Hor. Car. 3. 25. 16.

THE definition given by SERVIUS of *humidus*, seems to have been very properly rejected by AUSONIUS POPMA, whose remarks “de differentiis verborum,” are often both ingenious and solid. “*Humidum*,” says SERVIUS, “quod extrinsecus habet aliquid humoris *;” to which POPMA refuses to assent, “Cui non adfentior. *Humidum* enim proprie est quod in pro- fundo continet humiditatem, ut terra †.”

HUMIDUS is transferred from the subject to which, from its etymology, it appears to have been originally applied, to others that strongly resemble it. Thus, VIRGIL speaks of the “humida nox,” and means by it that dampness which prevails in the air, next the surface of the earth, from the constant falling of the dew in the course of the night. It is transferred by OVID to the clouds, and by VITRUVIUS to those winds which ordinarily produce rain.

—— cadit Eurus et *humida* furgunt
Nubila ‡.

“Auster et reliqui (venti) qui a solis cursu sunt *humidissimi* §.”

IN both those applications of the word, there is a reference to a supply of the waste, and of course to the long continuance of the fall expected.

HUMIDUS is occasionally applied to bodies impregnated with moisture, which they receive from others that generated it. CICERO speaks thus of a bed bedewed with tears, “Qui jacet in lecto *humido*,

Ejulatu, questu, gemitu, fremitibus,
Resonando, multum flebiles voces refert **.

The

* In Virg. Ec. 10. 20.

† Lib. 2. 133.

‡ Virg. Æn. 3. 198.

§ Vitruv. 8. 21.

** Cic. Tusc. 9. 2. 33.

The wood of a tree, too, when vegetating, may be styled *humidus*, on account of the communicated moisture which supports it. Nay, CICERO, in one instance, applies the term to wood that is green and newly cut. “ Ignem ex lignis viridibus atque *humidis* in loco angusto fieri jussit *.”

UVIDUS agrees with *humidus*, in supposing, that the substance to which it is applied contains moisture, but does not suggest the means of supplying the waste, from whatever cause it arises. The definition given by SERVIUS of this term is more accurate and satisfactory than that given of *humidus*. It were better, at the same time, not to derive *uva* from *uvidus*, but to consider the shortest of the two words as the root. “ *Uvidum est*,” says he, “ quod intrinsecus habet aliquod humoris, unde uvæ dicuntur †.”

Arboribus redeunt detonsæ frigore frondes,
*Uvida*que in gravido palmite gemma tumet ‡.

THE hand of art, it may be observed, can operate in the destruction of the quality denoted by *uvidus*. A grape may lose its juice by its being expressed, or by a forced evaporation superinduced by heat, so as to avoid putrefaction in the substance containing it. When the succulent quality is destroyed completely, the substance left behind quits both the natural tenacity of its parts, and the flavour which distinguished the fruit, and gets into the state denoted by *aridus*. When this quality is removed by an intended evaporation, it is removed only in part. Such a quantity of the juice is retained as is consistent with the preservation of the fruit, and as will emit its flavour. The substance is then in the state denoted by the

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adjective

* Cic. in Ver. 2. 45.

‡ Ovid. Fast. 4. 235.

† In Virg. Ec. 10. 20.

adjective *ficcus*, which implies no tendency towards decay. “Ne
“ sint fragilia et arida potius quam sicca folia *.”

THE abstract noun *ficcitas* is occasionally taken to denote the firmness of the flesh, and of course the strength of an animal. It implies a quality opposite to what is meant by flaccid, or being without due tension, and supposes this quality to arise from the natural juices neither being in a superabundant nor a deficient state. Thus, CICERO, talking of the wonderful strength of MASINISSA when at the age of ninety years, says of him, “Nullo imbre, nullo frigore adduci, ut capite operto sit: summam in eo esse corporis *ficcitatem* †.”

SOME very subtle observations of ARISTOTLE seem to justify what has been said of *humidus*, *aridus* and *ficcus*, and will throw light on what is afterwards to be said of *madidus*. Κραυρον γαρ, το τελεως ξηρον, ωσε και πεπηγεναι δι' ελλειψιν υγροτητος. —αντικειται γαρ τω ξηρω και το υγρον και το διερον—και διερον μιν εστι το εχον αλλοτριαν υγροτητα επιπολης· βεβεργμενον δε το εις εαθος· ξηρον δε, το εσερημενον ταυτης—υγρον μιν γαρ εστι, το εχον οικειαν υγροτητα εν τω εαθει.—“Aridum enim est quod omnino ficcum est, adeo
“ ut humiditate deficiente corpus etiam concreverit. Adversatur ficco humidum et madidum. Madidum enim est quod
“ habet humiditatem non a se ortam, superficie tenus. Humidum vero quod introrsus habet; Siccum autem quod hac vacat. Humidum enim est quod in penitiora parte propriam
“ continet humiditatem ‡.”

THE term *uvidus* is applied to the earth as well as *humidus*, but the quality suggested by it is different. Thus, COLUMELLA says, “Nisi præpingui et *uvida* terra §.” By *uvida*, he does not mean the poor soil that is swampy, and generates water which it emits at its surface, but such as, though moist, is rich and loamy.

UVIDUS is transferred from those vegetable substances to which it is originally applicable, to others which strongly resemble them, by imbibing and retaining a quantity of moisture.

— me

* Plin. 12. 12. 26.

‡ Αριστοτ. περι γενεσιως και φθορας. κεφ. 6.

† Cic. de Sen. 10. 83. b.

§ Lib. 7. cap. 3.

—— me tabula facer
 Votiva paries indicat *uvida*,
 Suspendisse potenti
 Vestimenta maris deo *.

The mariner's clothes hung up in the temple of NEPTUNE are here supposed to have been soaked in the sea, and, like the grape, to contain a quantity of moisture, which would either free itself by evaporation, or might be easily wrung from them.

Uvidus hiberna venit de glande Menalcas †.

Longas O utinam, Dux bone, ferias
 Præstes Hesperia, dicimus integro
Sicci mane die: dicimus *uvidi*,
 Cum sol oceano fubeat ‡.

In the last of the above examples, it appears, that *uvidus* differs from *humidus*, in being applied to mind, as well as matter, and in suggesting the notion of drunkenness. This application seems to be founded on the kind of the drink which produces the intoxication. The amplificative adjective “*vinosus*,” denotes the quality of being a lover of wine, and *uvidus* as taken in the passage last quoted, denotes having drunk it plentifully, and feeling its effects.

MADIDUS differs from *humidus* and *uvidus*, in expressing moisture that is not contained in the substance specified, but which is adventitious, and affects its surface. It agrees also with the last term, in supposing it void of the capacity of supplying the waste of moisture, in whatever way that waste may be effected. It applies to the extrinsic or superficial wetness of a substance, whether this is produced by a natural or an artificial cause.

* Hor. Car. i. 5. 14.

‡ Hor. Car. 4. 5. 37.

† Virg. Ec. 10. 20.

cause. In the primitive and literal applications of *humidus* and *uvidus*, they denote subjects furnished by the hand of nature with the attributes they respectively denote. Thus, moisture is naturally inherent in humid ground and in a ripe grape. Dryness, again, is the natural state of that which, being accidentally wet, is then said to be *madidus*.

— nam dum se continet Aufer,
Dum sedet et ficit *madidas* in carcere pennas,
Contemnunt mediam temeraria lina Charybdis*.

“ Sed ille scripsit ad BALBUM illum fasciculum epistolarum totum “ fibi aqua *madidum* redditum esse †.” This packet was so much wetted from an accidental cause, that CICERO tells us the letter addressed to him was not legible. A superficial wetting would produce this effect. It is not necessary to suppose, that the *fasciculus* would be drenched like the *vestis uvida* before mentioned, which, from the porousness of the materials, had absorbed a quantity of water, and retained it as the skin of the grape does its juice.

MADIDUS agrees with *uvidus*, in being applied to persons as well as to things, and in suggesting the idea of drunkenness. He who was said *madere vino*, was understood to be “ vino rigatus,” that is, bedewed with wine.

Faciam ut fit *madidus* sobrius ‡.

The wit of the comic poet here rests upon his apprehension, that *madidus* refers to an external or superficial wetting in its primitive sense.

WHILE

* Juv. Sat. 5. 98.

‡ Plaut. Amph. 5. 4. 18.

† Cic. ad Quint. Frat. 2. 14.

WHILE *madidus* agrees with *avidus* in the respect just mentioned, it differs from it in denoting proficiency in science and in letters.

Si quis Cecropiæ *madidus* Latæque MINERVÆ
Artibus, et vera simplicitate bonus *.

Non ille quanquam SOCRATICIS *madet*
Sermonibus te negliget horridus.
Narratur et prisca CATONIS,
Sæpe mero caluisse virtus †.

The critics have very properly explained *madidus* and *madere*, in the above and other such passages, by means of the term *imbutus*. Both the adjective and the verb refer to a vessel tintured in respect to colour, taste, or smell, by a fluid with which it was wet when made to contain it.

COMMODUS, OPPORTUNUS, TEMPESTIVUS, agree in denoting the suitability of objects or events to those interested in their nature, but differ in respect to the circumstances upon which that quality is founded. The first comes from *con* and *modus*, and denotes, that the thing specified is neither more nor less than it should be, and possesses an inherent aptitude for some purpose to which it is just adequate. In the original application of *commodus*, it denotes the agreement of things as being adjusted by one common standard. Thus, when HORACE says,

Miscetur cyathis pocula *commodis* ‡,

he means, that those “cyathi” were neither more nor less than they should be. In consequence of this equality, each guest
got

* Martial. 1. 40.

‡ Car. 3. 19. 12.

† Hor. Car. 3. 21. 9.

got that share of the wine which was, on the one hand, sufficient to excite his vivacity, without producing, on the other, too quick an intoxication. When *PLAUTUS* also says,

Viginti argenti *commodas* minas *,

he means, that the pieces were of a regulated weight.

WHEN *commodus* is applied to persons, it denotes their agreeableness as companions. It implies a mental temperament, which is mild from the restraint of sentiments, that always give disgust when extravagant. It accordingly signifies that pliancy of character which, without fervility, endears a person to those with whom he lives. “Nemo *CATONE* proavo tuo “*commodior*, comior, moderatior fuit ad omnem rationem humanitatis †.”—“Qui antea *commodis* fuerunt moribus, eos “prosperis rebus immutari ‡.”

WHEN *commodus* is applied to events, it denotes, that they are agreeable, as being commensurate to the wishes of those concerned in their occurrence. It regards that medium, the happiness of which would be destroyed either by defect or excess. “Nihil potest fieri nec *commodius* nec aptius, quam ut “scribis. Ex literis tuis, ea quæ in agro Piceno gesta sunt cognovi *commodiora* esse multo, quam ut erat nobis nunciatum §.”

OPPORTUNUS differs from *commodus*, in having no natural reference to the adjusted quantity of that which is specified, and in regarding the suitability as founded on the exigency or pressing necessities of those to whom the objects or events present themselves. It comes from *ob* and *portus*, and its force rests on the agreeableness of any harbour to a mariner when contending with a storm. The suitability implied in *opportunus* may

* *Asin.* 3. 3. 135.

† *Cic. pro Muræn.* 66.

‡ *Cic. Am.* 106. *b.*

§ *Cic. Ep. Att.* 13. 37. & 126. *a.*

may be discerned either between objects and objects, or between events and the times and places of their occurrence.

Nihil homini amico est *opportuno* amicus *.

“ Ceteræ res quæ expetuntur *opportuna* sunt singulæ rebus fere
“ singulis : divitiæ ut utare : opes ut colare : honores ut lau-
“ dere : voluptates ut gaudeas †.” In the first of the above
examples, the friend may present himself either accidentally,
or in consequence of being sought for ; in the last, the differ-
ent things mentioned are all the objects of an intended and a
keen search. Both examples imply, that the occurrence or the
attainments are highly seasonable, from the circumstances of
the person concerned. “ Ad hocce proferendos, et tempus et
“ locum *opportuniissimum* elegi ‡.” In this last example, we see
the suitableness between the event and both the time and the
place of its occurrence.

TEMPESTIVUS denotes the suitableness of objects and events
from neither of the circumstances already mentioned, but from
the former being in their state of full maturity, and the latter
occurring at their proper season. As applied to objects, *tem-
pestivus* supposes them belonging either to the animal or the ve-
getable kingdom, and of course having a progress toward per-
fection, and afterwards a decline. “ Vindemia *tempestitiva* §.”

Aut *tempestitivam* fylvis evertere pinum **.

Tandem define matrem,
Tempestitiva sequi viro ††.

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q

WHEN

* Plaut. Epid. 3. 3. 44.

§ Colum. 11. 12.

† Cic. de Am. 100. 4.

** Virg. G. 1. 256.

‡ Plin. lib. 8.

†† Hor. Car. 1. 23. 11.

WHEN *tempestivus* is applied to events, it supposes them either as returning in a regular vicissitude, or as happening at their proper period, and of course being well-timed. “ Quam “ *tempestivos* autem dedit,* quam salutare non modo hominum, “ fed etiam pecudum generi, iis denique omnibus quæ oriuntur ex terra, ventos etefios? Quorum flatu nimii temperantur “ calores *.”—“ Ego vero propter fermonis delectationem *tempestivis* quoque conviviis delector †.”

Et *tempestivum* pueris concedere ludum ‡.

NAVIS, Ratis, CYMBA, SCAPHA, LINTER, agree in denoting a machine for conveying both persons and the subjects of trade by water from one place to another, but differ in respect to the size or the construction of that species, to which each can be properly applied. The first indeed is a generic term, applicable to a vessel of any kind, of whatever dimensions, or however formed.

Navem agere ignarus *navis* timet §.

The poet has here no intention to specify the kind of ship, as the danger from ignorance is the same in all kinds. “ Confi- “ cit optime cursum *navis*, quæ scientissimo gubernatore utitur **.”

THE generality of the term *navis* is often limited by the application of adjectives, which mark the use of particular species; as, *Navis longa*, *marina*, *fluvialis*, *piscatoria*, *oneraria*, *actuaria*, &c.

RATIS differs from *navis* in denoting the rudest vehicle to which a person can commit himself on water. The poets sometimes

* Cic. N. D. 52. b.

§ Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 114.

† Cic. de Sen. 14.

** Cic. in Ver. 244. b.

‡ Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 142.

times use *ratis* as a general term, but the prose-writers never do. The term expresses a raft, formed by the junction of a few beams, which can be used with safety only in smooth water. It had at first been but a floating platform, and when improved a little, got the appellation of *cava*.

Ipse vides cœlum pice nigrius et freta ventis
Turbida, perque *cavas* vix adeunda *rates* *.

BOTH FESTUS and ISIDORUS support the account now given of *ratis*. “*Rates* vocantur tigna inter se colligata, quæ per aquas agantur.”—“*Rates* primum et antiquissimum genus navigii e rudibus tignis asseribusque confectum.”

IN the two following instances, CICERO and LIVY seem to justify the distinction made between *navis* and *ratis*. “Cum aut *navibus* aut *ratibus* conarentur accedere †.”—“*Navibus* ab HANNIBALE incensis, *rates* ad trajiciendum in magna inopia materiæ ægre comparabat ‡.” When any reference is made to *ratis* as the subject of a simile, it is always regarded as denoting a rude vessel, capable of giving but very imperfect security. “Tanquam *ratis* in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio §.”

CYMBA differs from *ratis*, in referring to a vessel fabricated with more art, and that is always of a small size. It denotes a boat, such as is used upon a ferry or lake, but so formed as to give all the security to be expected from its dimensions.

Non ideo debet pelago se credere, si qua
Audet in exiguo ludere *cymba* lacu **.

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CYMBA

* Ov. Ep. 17. 7.

§ Cic. Tusc. Q. 164. a.

† Cic. in Ver. 236. b.

** Ovid. Trist. 2. 329.

‡ Liv. cap. 36.

CYMBA is often applied to the boat in which CHARON wafted the souls of the dead across the Stygian lake.

Scandenda est torvi publica cymba fenis *.

This boat, we are told by VIRGIL, was so small, that it could hardly support the body of ÆNEAS.

—— gemuit sub pondere cymba †.

SCAPHA differs from *cymba* in denoting a yawl that attends a ship for the convenience of those who belong to it. As coming from the Greek verb *σκαπτειν*, it seems originally to have signified a canoe, or boat formed out of the trunk of a tree; but the circumstance which distinguishes it, is that above mentioned. “ Ut dominus navis cum idem gubernator esset in “ *scapham* confugeret, et inde funiculo qui a puppi religatus “ *scapham* annexam trahebat, navim quoad posset moderaretur †.” — “ Quum merfissent quassas naves in alto, exceptis “ in præparatas *scaphas* nautis §.”

LINTER differs from *scapha*, in implying no connection between it and a larger vessel, and in denoting a “ navis fluvialis,” or wherry used only on fresh water, such as that of rivers and lakes. They agree as to the original mode of their formation, that is, as being *μονοξυλα*, or hollowed out of a solid piece of wood.

——— durum procudit arator
Vomeris obtusi dentem, cavat arbore lintres **.

Partitur lintres exercitus; Actia pugna
Te duce per pueros hostili more refertur,
Adversarius est frater, lacus Adria ††.

“ Qui

Propert. 3. 18. 24.

Æn. 6. 413.

Cic. de Inv. 81. b.

§ Liv. 23. 3.

** Virg. Georg. 1. 261.

†† Hor. Ep. 1. 18. 61.

“ Qui cum non impetrasset, ut insulam in lacu prælio venderet, repente *lintribus* in eam insulam, materiam, calcem, cæmenta atque arenam convexit *.”

COMES, SATELLES, SOCIUS, SODALIS, agree in denoting a connection that subsists between one person and either one or a number, but differ as to the end for which this connection is formed, and the conditions upon which it is maintained. *Comes* is properly applied to one who voluntarily gives his attendance to another as to his superior. That parity which subsists between a number of *comites*, does by no means take place between them and their patron. Reciprocal obligations are understood to subsist between the parties, but the duties vary according to the respective situations of each. The attendance of the *comites* is supposed to be given at all times, but especially when the superior is moving from one place to another, and the attachment of his followers is roused by a sense of his danger.

—— tibi parvula res est
Arcta decet fanum *comitem* toga †.

“ CREUSA matre, Ilio incolumi, natus, *comesque* inde paternæ fugæ †.” — “ Quanta illi in oratione majestas? Ut facile Duce[m] populi Romani non *comitem* diceres §.” — “ Non enim paruit ille TIBERII GRACCHI temeritati, sed præfuit: nec se *comitem* illius furoris, sed ducem præbuit **.”

SATELLES differs from *comes* in implying, that the difference of rank is greater between the superior and his attendants; that the latter do not necessarily act from affection, and give their attendance as the instruments of protection or pageantry, or of both.

Aurum per medios ire *satellites*
Amat—— ††.

“ Janitores.

* Cic. pro Mil. 27.

† Hor. Ep. 1. 18. 29.

‡ Liv. 1. 3.

§ Cic. Amicit. 113. b.

** Cic. ibid. 103. b.

†† Hor. Car. 3. 16. 9.

“ Janitores ducentos in annos singulos stipatores corporis constituit, eosdem ministros et *satellites* potestatis *.”

Socius differs from the two former words in implying, that parity of rank subsists between the parties, and that each has an equal right to enjoy the good that belongs to their common concern, and is under an equal obligation to take a share of its evils. The *socius* is actuated, not by respect to a superior, but by love to a party, in the success of which he feels that he has an interest. “ Nam *socii* putandi quos inter res communicata est †.”—“ Sed me movet unus vir, cujus fugientis *comes*, rempublicam recuperantis *socius* videor esse debere ‡.” The sentiment of respectful affection expressed towards the fugitive in adverse times, is held the foundation of a claim to become his ally in times that were prosperous.

It is to be observed, that the personal attendance necessary to preserve the relation between *comites* and *satellites*, and those with whom they are respectively connected, may be dispensed with in the case of *socii*. When the terms of the alliance are defined, any mode of communication is sufficient to maintain it. The same persons, too, may, at the same time, be considered both as *socii* and *comites*. In the one case, they are regarded as having a common fate with their leader, and in the other, as associating with their friend in a common adventure. Thus, TEUCER is made to address his *comites*, or followers, by the endearing appellation of *socii* also.

Quo nos cunque feret melior fortuna parente
Ibimus, O *socii comitesque* §.

SODALIS agrees with *socius* in supposing those connected to be upon an equal footing, but differs from it in respect to the

* Cic. Rull. 72. b.

† Cic. Ver. 3. 50.

‡ Cic. Ep. Att. 132. a.

§ Hor. Car. 1. 7. 25.

the principle leading to the association, and to the purpose of maintaining it. Men become *sodales*, not to promote their interest, but to enjoy society. Their alliance is formed and preserved for their mutual entertainment; it is never understood to lead to any thing disagreeable, and it may at any time be abandoned without the violation of compact. “ Et tempestiva
“ convivia, et pervigiles ludos, advocata *sodalium* turba, solutus
“ atque affluens agerem *.”

POMPEI meorum prime *sodalium*,
Cum quo morantem sæpe diem mero
Fregi ——— †.

“ Primum habui semper *sodales*. Epulabar cum *sodalibus* omnino modice ‡.”

COPIA, ABUNDANTIA, UBERTAS, agree in denoting plenty, but differ according as this refers to the removal of every want, to what is more than sufficient for this purpose, or to the regular supply of a necessary waste. *Copia*, which seems to be compounded of *con* and *opes*, denotes an assemblage of the means fit for effecting any purpose. It stands opposed to *inopia*, which denotes the absence of such means, and which is also derived from the same root. “ Nec in summa *inopia* levis esse
“ senectus potest ne sapienti quidem, nec in summa *copia* infipienti non gravis §.” — “ Rerum *copia* verborum *copiam*
“ gignit **.”

———— obnoxii ambo

Vobis sumus propter hanc rem, cum quæ volumus nos
Copia est, ea facitis nos compotes ——— ††.

The

* Quinct. Decl. 9. 10.

† Hor. Car. 2. 7. 5.

‡ Cic. Sen. 86. a.

§ Cic. de Sen. 78. b.

** Cic. Or. 3. 123.

†† Plaut. Cap. 2. 1. 21.

The obligation mentioned in this last example rests upon the complete supply afforded in respect to the object desired. It must not, at the same time, be understood, that the supply denoted by *copia*, is always much more than adequate to the exigency. The term cannot be applied where there is any want, but it occupies all the interval between the mere absence of this and that exuberance, which suggests a quantity more than adequate to any possible demand. "*Minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum extitisse **." Though there was no want of distinguished poets at the period referred to, yet there was the smallest number to which *copia* could be applied. "*Ex majore copia nobis quam illi fuit eligendi potestas †*." The *major copia* is here opposed to the *minor*, and the existence of that latitude clearly proved, in which it has been said that the substantive is taken. In the one case, *copia* denotes what ministers to the gratification of the caprice, and in the other, to the full supply of the wants of mankind.

ABUNDANTIA differs from *copia*, in denoting greater plenty, and in implying that the object to which it is ascribed, possesses more than sufficient means for satisfying any want. It comes from *ab* and *unda*, and has at first referred to a river when overflowing its banks.

Præsertim incertis si mensibus, amnis *abundans*
Exit, et obducto late tenet omnia limo ‡.

"Circumfluere omnibus *copiis* atque in omnium rerum *abundantia* vivere §." In the climax formed in this sentence, the last substantive denotes something beyond the satisfaction of want. It expresses somewhat to spare, which would be lost if not used. "Non erat *abundans*, non inops tamen **." CICERO
here

* Cic. de Or. 85. *b*.

§ Cic. de Am. 52.

† Cic. de Inv. 62. *b*.

** Cic. in Brut. 238.

‡ Virg. Georg. 1. 115.

here suggests the existence of that interval, in all the different points of which *copia* finds a place. There is said to be on the one hand nothing superfluous, and on the other nothing deficient.

WHILE *abundantia* denotes a greater plenty than *copia*, yet that implied even in it, may be occasionally carried to excess, and to what in English is styled “superabundance,” when the quantity is so great, as to be cumbersome and useless. “*Ludos et inania honoris modo rationis atque abundantia duxit, uti longe a luxuria ita famæ propior* *.” In the conduct of AGRICOLA, there was on the one hand no blameable œconomy, and on the other no needless waste, that might be termed extravagance. “*Non illa quidem luxuriosi hominis sed abundantis* †.”

UBERTAS differs from the two former words, in referring, not to the absolute quantity alone existing at a specified time, but to the regular supply of a necessary waste, and in supposing the plenty denoted by all the terms uniformly continued. The adjective *uber*, of which it is an abstract, takes its power from the substantive *uber*, signifying that which contains the milk of an animal giving suck. “*Nuper nati mammas appetunt, earumque ubertate saturantur* ‡.” From denoting the regular supply of this juice, designed for supporting the young of animals, it has been transferred to another operation of nature, visible in the fertility of fields and trees. “*Ubertatem frugum et fructuum a diis se habere* §.”—“*Facile est remedium ubertatis, sterilia nullo labore vincuntur* **.”

LAST of all, *ubertas* has been figuratively applied to that inexhaustible store of sentiment and expression which forms a dis-

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tinguished

* Tac. Agric. 6.

§ Cic. de N. D. 77. b.

† Cic. Phil. 2. 66.

** Quint. 2. 4.

‡ Cic. de N. D. 52. a.

tinguished orator ; and in the example subjoined, the metaphor begun in the first member of the sentence, is happily supported in some of the words that follow. “ Omnis enim *ubertas*, et “ *quasi sylva dicendi* ducta ab academicis est *.”

* Cic. Orat. 198. *a*.