

come of his passion for reform. Like his follower Plato, he considered the reformation of Athens to be possible only by reforming the rulers; and hence his doctrine of Duty and Virtue "ist nicht eine solche für den Menschen überhaupt: sie ist unter dem Gesichtspunkte seiner Gesellschaftsreform entworfen und bezieht sich wesentlich auf den Stand der Leitenden". This proposition Dr. Döring seeks to establish by a detailed examination of the Socratic theory of the Virtues. The direction which in Socrates' opinion reform should take was towards aristocracy, in the etymological sense of the word. In this respect Socrates agreed with the tendency of all Greek political speculation, although he did not lose himself in mere Utopias like Plato. Finally, in part iii., it is shown that such a conception of Socrates' life and doctrine is strictly in harmony with the circumstances of his age, and supported to some slight extent by the testimony of the ancients themselves, as well as by the political speculations of his pupils, particularly of Plato in the older section of the Republic, and by Xenophon in his *Cyropædia*.

Such is the view of Socrates presented by Dr. Döring. As a protest against a certain school of critics, who are unwilling to allow that Socrates was anything but 'the father of philosophy,' the work is of the greatest value. It gives us a picture of Socrates which, so far as it goes, is true. But is it the whole truth? We doubt it. Let us grant that Socrates himself aimed at reforming his country, by the creation of a school of statesmen who should rule for their country's good; we have still to explain the impulse which he gave to philosophy in the person of Plato. The work before us gives an admirable account of the substance of Socrates' teaching; but touches only lightly on his *method*. It was his method, as Aristotle observed long ago, which gave birth to a new era in philosophy, and no picture of Socrates can be complete without the presence of this feature. Now it is just the method of Socrates, and all that it involved—imagination, enthusiasm, sympathy—which we should *a priori* expect to have eluded the matter-of-fact Xenophon. The *Cyropædia* is a melancholy proof that Xenophon was almost totally lacking in philosophical insight and imagination; and it is unreasonable to suppose that he could have sounded the depths of so marvellous a nature as Plato has described for us in the *Symposium*. To us it seems that intellectual stimulus and moral enthusiasm are singularly lacking even in the *Memorabilia*; and without these qualities no one could have influenced the soul of Plato as Socrates did. Schleiermacher's formula, that the historical Socrates was $x +$ the Socrates of the *Memorabilia*, still holds the field; and the unknown quantity is still to be interpreted from the dialogues of Plato, especially, perhaps, from the *Symposium* and the *Phædo*. None the less should we be grateful to Dr. Döring for so scholarly and exhaustive an account of one of the two sides in the character of Socrates.

J. ADAM.

Psychologie. Von Dr. ALOIS HÖFLER. Wiess und Prag: F. Tempsky. Pp. 604.

Dr. Höfler, whose *Logic* was published some years ago, and then attracted considerable attention, has now finished a text-book of psychology, which constitutes with the former a "Philosophische Propædæutik," intended for the higher classes of Austrian middle schools. The greater part of books of this kind consist of little more than extracts from larger hand-books, imitating them in their divisions and proportions

with great accuracy, and forgetting that both quality and quantity of intellectual, as well as material, food should depend upon circumstances. Dr. Höfler, who is not only a schoolmaster but a distinguished philosopher as well, takes a line of his own.

An elementary text-book of any science may pursue two very different aims: either it is intended to be a real introduction, the perusal of which is to be followed by the study of larger hand-books and monographs, or it is meant to give such information as is valuable in itself as an essential element in the education of the higher mental faculties. In the first case, the author has to ask himself: What knowledge of notions, facts, and methods is generally presupposed in scientific literature? In the second case, he has to answer the much more subtle question: What can the study of this science contribute to the general culture of the mind? Dr. Höfler, writing for readers who, for the most part, do not intend to study psychology for its own sake, has deliberately chosen the second way. He has given us a book, which, neglecting a detailed exposition of the facts and methods of current psychology, is extremely well adapted to foster those habits of careful self-observation and self-analysis which even among our cultivated classes are still greatly neglected.

The main import of Dr. Höfler's psychology lies on the descriptive side. In treating of a class of mental phenomena, he generally begins by ascertaining the precise meaning of the terms used for them in current language, proceeding from extension to intension, and distinguishing carefully between terms denoting slightly different objects, or different meanings of one term. The phenomena themselves are then scrupulously analysed and classified, their hidden elements brought to light, and their inner relations expounded. In all these directions Dr. Höfler's work is simply excellent. The space to which I must confine myself forbids ample illustration: so I only refer to the analysis of our ideas of Space (284-304), Time (353-356), and the Ego (378-384); to the discussion of the question, whether a judgment factor be present in the processes of observation and recollection (211-214, 252-257); to the demonstration of "form-qualities" as essential elements of many ideas (152-154); and to such distinctions as that between feelings from ideas and feelings from judgments (390), or that between egoism in the sense of taking one's own future pleasure as an end, and egoism in the sense of being guided by one's own judgment of worth (488). By these, as well as by many similar investigations, Dr. Höfler shows himself a thinker of great acuteness, and opens interesting perspectives in what may be called the logic of psychology. In the exposition of psychical laws the author limits himself as nearly as possible to the data of scrupulous self-observation, quoting the results of laboratory researches only for the sake of giving greater clearness and precision. Though this method necessarily fails to give an adequate impression of the importance of quantitative work for the solution of psychological problems, it has the direct advantage, that the reality of the facts, upon which the argumentation rests, is always under the reader's control, and the indirect one, that the habit of looking at the data of common mental experience as materials for scientific interpretation is strongly cultivated. In regard to explanatory theories, Dr. Höfler observes the utmost caution; never asserting more than his probable readers are prepared to judge of, and often limiting himself to the bare statement of conflicting opinions. So far as I can see, this is the right way. A high degree of mental culture involves not only a certain amount of knowledge and intellectual training, but also a deep impression of the dignity of science, and a disposition to abstain from

judgment in the absence of sufficient reasons. For the development of these qualities it is as dangerous to leave those problems, which surpass the powers of the beginner, unmentioned, as it is to offer a solution in a more or less authoritative way. The student should recognise that the limits of science do not coincide with the limits of his text-book, or with those of his present faculties; but the independence of his judgment should, above all, be respected. It is a great merit of Dr. Höfler's *Psychology*, as well as of his *Logic*, to have kept both these principles constantly in view.

As for the general philosophical and psychological standing-point of the author, it is sufficient to remark that the names of Brentano, Meinong, and Ehrenfels are those he especially quotes.

G. HEYMANS.

Schopenhauer und die indische Philosophie. Von Dr. MAX F. HECKER.
Köln: Hübscher & Teufel, 1897. Pp. 255.

That the author of this most interesting essay should also show himself ignorant of "Indological studies" at first hand, that is to say, with two out of the three systems of thought he sets himself to compare together, is much to be deprecated. Holding that Schopenhauer is practically Brahmanical in his metaphysic, and Buddhistic in his ethic—which is true only within certain limits—he draws in outline a systematic parallel between these three doctrines under the main heads of Mysticism, Ethic, and Metaphysic and Asceticism. The exposition is for the most part so lucid and simple that the work will probably be read beyond the circle of select readers. But the lucidity and simplicity are, it is to be feared, due in great measure to the over-restriction of the sources on which Dr. Hecker has drawn for his Oriental material. Prof. Deussen's *System des Vedānta* is, it is true, a host in itself, but our knowledge with regard to Buddhist philosophy is still too incomplete for any one to elicit a reliable account of it in all points by borrowing solely, or practically so, from one small work, good as that is, like Prof. Oldenberg's *Buddha*. To quote only two instances: we have reproduced, of course uncritically, the latter's theory of an element of consciousness (*viññāna*) surviving at death, which is based on one ambiguously recorded episode in the Canon, and is opposed by other explicit utterances of Gotama. Again, a wider acquaintance with the results of Buddhist scholarship might have led the author to dwell less on egoism as the basis and obtuseness as the ideal of Buddhist ethics, and more on its "enthusiasm of humanity" and its missionary ardour; while research into its original records might have suggested a possible coincidence with Schopenhauer's ethic of sympathy as based on his doctrine of identity.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

Grundzüge der Psychologie. Von HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, Professor der Philosophie an der Universität zu Breslau. Erster Halbband. Mit zahlreichen Figuren im Text. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp., 1897. Pp. 320.

This book is meant as an introduction to psychology; but its aim is not to give a preliminary outline of the subject, but actually to introduce the reader into the serious and detailed study of psychological problems. Much stress is laid on experimental work, but the scope of the book is by no means limited to the results of experiment. It is to embrace the entire life of the individual mind from its lowest to its highest manifestations. The part of the work already published contains about one-