(1) Whether, for the purposes of the follower notice regime in the Finance Act 2014, "would" in s.205(3)(b) requires HMRC to consider that the principles or reasoning of a judicial ruling are more likely than not to result in the tax advantage being denied, or that the principles or reasoning will deny the advantage.

                (2) Whether in the present case HMRC had overstated the significance of Hughes LJ’s judgment in Smallwood v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] EWCA Civ 778, [2010] STC 2045.

                (3) Whether the CA was wrong to conclude that the identified misdirections justified quashing the follower and accelerated payment notices.

Whether the "dealing requirement" is a constituent part of the tort of causing loss by unlawful means.

In criminal proceedings arising out of protest activity: (1) is deliberate physically obstructive conduct by protesters capable of constituting a lawful excuse for the purposes of s.137 of the Highways Act 1980?; and (2) what is the test to be applied by an appellate court to an assessment of the decision of the trial court in respect of a statutory defence of ‘lawful excuse’ when Convention rights are engaged in a criminal matter?

Commercial interactions with foreign states are governed by the State Immunity Act 1978 ("SIA"). This appeal raises questions about how to enforce an arbitral award (the "Award") against a foreign state within this framework, namely whether:
the SIA requires service of certain documents to the state concerned through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ("FCO");
                an arbitration claim form is within the category of documents required by section 12(1) of the SIA to be served on a state through the FCO; and
                in exceptional circumstances, the court can make use of certain rules of English civil procedure (which govern litigation proceedings) to dispense with such service.

If a child born with more than one disability would not have been born but for a doctor's failure to advise of the risk of their being born with one of those disabilities, can the mother sue the doctor for the costs associated with all of the child's disabilities, or only for the costs associated with the disability the doctor was consulted on?