The cases concern a number of patents, which are declared to be essential to the practice of numerous telecommunications standards, held by the Respondents in both sets of proceedings, who commenced proceedings against the respective Appellants for infringing those patents. The Respondents are under an obligation to make available standard essential patents ("SEPs") on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms ("FRAND") terms.
In Unwired, two of Unwired’s patents were found to be valid and essential to the standards, and Unwired obtained an injunction against Huawei for the latter’s infringement of the SEPs. Huawei, with the permission of the first-instance judge, appealed to the Court of Appeal on three grounds, namely Issues (1), (3) and (4). Huawei’s appeal was dismissed and Huawei now appeals to the Supreme Court.
The proceedings in Conversant were brought after the High Court judgment was handed down in Unwired. The defendants in the Conversant proceedings challenged the jurisdiction of the English court, raising issues (1) and (2). The application was dismissed but Huawei and ZTE appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed and Huawei and ZTE now appeal to the Supreme Court.

Mr Shortall, the freehold owner of land in Londonderry, wished to develop a shopping centre on the land. On 2 February 1981 he granted a 999-year lease of part of the land to the appellant. The lease contained a restrictive covenant that any development on the remaining land would not contain a large unit for the purpose of trading in textiles, provisions or groceries. In 1983 Mr Shortall transferred the freehold and his interest in the lease to the respondent. In 2010 the respondent issued proceedings for, amongst other matters, a declaration that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade. This issue was determined in the High Court as a preliminary issue.

The appeal arises out of the estate of Mrs Rachel Staveley who died of cancer on 18 December 2006. The Appellants are the personal representatives of Mrs Staveley’s estate. Shortly before her death Mrs Staveley transferred her pension fund from a pension under section 32 of the Finance Act 1981 to an AXA personal pension plan. If the pension had remained in the company scheme, on her death a sum would have been payable to her estate and chargeable to inheritance tax.
Under the AXA personal pension plan, the deceased’s two sons were her beneficiaries in relation to death benefit. The deceased did not take any retirement benefit during her lifetime. Section 10(1) of the 1984 Act removed from the charge to inheritance tax a disposition which was not made with the intention of conferring a gratuitous benefit on any person, and which met further conditions, by providing that it was not a transfer of value. The effect in this case was that if section 10(1) applied, the sons would receive the death benefit free of inheritance tax.
The First-tier Tribunal found that the deceased's sole motive for the transfer was to avoid any part of her pension fund reverting to the company, and thus to her former husband and partner in the company. The transfer was therefore not intended to confer a gratuitous benefit on her sons. However, it found that the omission to take any income benefits did constitute a transfer of value. This decision was upheld by the Upper Tribunal regarding the pension fund transfer, however the Upper Tribunal reversed the decision concerning the omission to take income benefits. HMRC appealed to the Court of Appeal and the appeal was allowed.