DCM is a company primarily supplying glasses, but also providing eye tests and dispensing other optician services. The supply of frames and lenses for glasses is subject to VAT, however eye tests and services are not.
DCM has for a number of years challenged the amount of tax charged to it by HMRC. The present appeal concerns output tax, which is the tax which a taxable person must charge on non-exempt supplies of goods or services to customers. A range of issues have arisen, but this appeal concerns firstly whether assessments made in 2005 by HMRC of DCM’s tax liability were made out of time and were therefore time barred, and secondly whether HMRC have an implied power to refuse to accept a sum claimed by a taxpayer by way of input tax (i.e. the tax charged to them when purchasing goods or services).
The First-tier Tribunal held that HMRC’s 2005 assessments were not time-barred and that it could refuse a taxpayer’s input tax claim. The Upper Tribunal refused the appeal on the input tax issue but allowed it on the timebar issue. The Inner House overturned the Upper Tribunal’s decision on the timebar issue but upheld it on the input tax issue.
The Inner House of the Court of Session granted DCM permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Sequana’s subsidiary was liable to indemnify BAT for costs arising from the clean-up of a polluted river. The directors of the subsidiary resolved that it should pay a substantial dividend to Sequana, without – BAT says – leaving enough money in the subsidiary to pay for the clean-up costs.

In 2004 Mr Andrewes obtained the post of Chief Executive Officer of a hospice by making a number of false or dishonestly inflated and misleading statements about his educational qualifications and experience in his application for that role. He remained employed in that role until 2015. During that time he also successfully applied to other remunerated offices at two NHS trusts on the basis of the same falsehoods plus one more about having obtained a doctorate (PhD.) from Plymouth University. His employment and appointments came to an end when the truth about his qualifications started to emerge. He was prosecuted and pleaded guilty to three counts, including obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception contrary to s.16(1) of the Theft Act 1968 and fraud by false representation under the Fraud Act 2006. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for those offences.
The Director of Public Prosecutions sought a confiscation order under section 6(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Crown Court found that, by pleading guilty, Mr Andrewes had accepted that he had benefited from the wrongdoing. The Crown Court concluded that it would not be disproportionate within the meaning of section 6(5) of the 2002 Act to make a confiscation order in the sum of the recoverable amount of the benefit obtained by Mr Andrewes and accordingly made such an order. The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Andrewes’ appeal and quashed the order. The Director of Public Prosecutions now appeals to the Supreme Court.