In these conjoined appeals, the appellants challenge the lawfulness and constitutionality of the respondents’ decisions and actions in the implementation, and operation of the Northern Ireland Protocol (“the Protocol”). The issues raised concern the constitutional settlement of the UK, the operation and interpretation of the Belfast Agreement, and the effect of the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU and the Protocol in domestic law.
The grounds of appeal are, among others, the claimed incompatibility of the Protocol and related regulations with the Acts of Union 1800 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the correct approach to statutory interpretation to resolve a conflict or clash between the constitutional provisions of constitutional Acts, and the lawfulness of the Protocol.

Whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to hold that the claimants were entitled to a remedy in the tort of private nuisance by reason of the Tate Modern’s use of the top floor of its Blavatnik Building as a viewing platform.

Where an oral contract provides for an introduction fee to be payable upon a property being sold for a certain amount, and the property is sold for less than that conditional amount, does the seller have an obligation, whether contractual or non-contractual, to pay reasonable remuneration to the introducer for their services?

Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of a provision in a commercial lease concerning service charges.

The key issue is whether the Respondent’s charging policy for community care services is discriminatory.

Where a contractual force majeure clause contains a proviso requiring the party which is affected by force majeure to exercise reasonable endeavours to overcome it, can the proviso require the affected party to agree to accept a non-contractual performance?

What is the nature and extent of the liability of a director, or senior executive employee, for causing a company to commit a civil wrong, for which a claim can be brought without a finding of fault by the wrongdoer (e.g. a ‘strict liability tort’)? Here, the strict liability tort was trademark infringement.
If a director is legally responsible for the tort, can they be ordered to pay profits made as a result of the tort to the wronged part (e.g. a ‘account of profits’), even if those profits were not personally received? Does this extend to the director paying back the portion of their salary that was attributable to the tort?