When will a refusal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to grant leave to remain to an individual, who cannot be removed to their country of nationality, violate that individual's right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?

Can a worker who is subject to detriment for the purpose of preventing or deterring her participation in a union-organised industrial action can potentially bring a claim under s. 146(2)(b) of the Trade Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("TULRCA")?
In particular: (i) does Article 11 ECHR protect workers in such circumstances, and can the absence of sufficient protection under s. 146 TULRCA as conventionally interpreted be justified under Article 11(2)?; and (ii) is it possible to interpret s. 146 TULRCA so as to be compatible with Article 11 pursuant to the duty in s. 3 HRA 1998, or should the court make a declaration of incompatibility pursuant to s. 4 HRA 1998?

How should a court assess damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity ("PSLA") in the tort of negligence, where the claimant suffered PSLA caused by both: (a) a whiplash injury ("WLI") which comes within the scope of the Civil Liability Act 2018 (the "2018 Act") and therefore attracts a fixed "tariff award"; and (b) a non-whiplash injury ("NWLI") which does not attract a tariff award?

(1) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial?
(2) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where it is not possible for a judge to say that a finding of deliberate absence by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, is "theoretical" or "so remote that it can be discounted"?

(1) For a requested person to have deliberately absented himself from trial for the purposes of section 20(3) Extradition Act 2002, must the requesting authority prove that he has actual knowledge that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia?
(2) Where the requesting authority asserts that it can be demonstrated by inference that a requested person could reasonably foresee that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia, must the inference be the only reasonable inference?