The respondents are the Test Claimants in this litigation. Their claims concern corporation tax paid by UK resident parent companies on dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries, and ACT typically paid by the group’s ultimate parent on dividends distributed to their shareholders, under the regime in force until 5 April 1999. The Test Claimants contend that the relevant UK tax provisions were contrary to Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) on freedom of establishment and/or Article 56 EC (now Article 63 TFEU) on free movement of capital. In consequence, they claim restitution and damages from HMRC.
The litigation has a long procedural history. To date, the issues raised have been decided in favour of the Test Claimants. HMRC now appeals against the judgments of the Court of Appeal in FII (CA) 1 [2010] EWCA Civ 103 and FII (CA) 2 [2016] EWCA Civ 1180, as regards their determinations in respect of the compatibility of the tax regime with EU law and the appropriate remedy.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKSC 39, the parties submitted additional documents to address the issues which were resolved in that case and to identify what issues remain. The issues for the Supreme Court in this hearing are issues 3, 11 and 13 in FII CA (1) and issues 10, 11, 15, 17, 18 and 26(a) in FII CA (2), as set out above.

James Maughan, the appellant’s brother, was a prisoner held in HMP Bullingdon. On 11 July 2016, James Maughan was found hanging in his cell. He was pronounced dead shortly afterwards. At the subsequent inquest into his death, the Senior Coroner invited the jury to consider a narrative verdict to the effect that James Maughan committed suicide on the balance of probabilities. The jury returned a narrative conclusion finding that it was more likely than not that James Maughan had committed suicide.
The appellant began judicial review proceedings challenging the jury’s determination and arguing that the Senior Coroner erred in law in instructing the jury to apply the civil standard of proof when considering whether the deceased had killed himself. The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, concluding that the standard of proof in all suicide conclusions is the civil standard. The appellant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the Divisional Court’s judgment. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court