Whether periods of time the appellant spent in the UK after overstaying a visa should be considered as time in the UK for the purpose of establishing 10 years' continuous lawful residence for an application for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. During the ten year period, the appellant had periods with leave and without leave to remain.

When should a court make a mandatory order against a local housing authority to enforce a duty owed to a homeless individual under s193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 (the "1996 Act")? In particular, should the court take account of either: (a) budgetary constraints imposed on the housing authority; or (b) the availability of housing under a non-secured tenancy under Part VII of the 1996 Act (as opposed to a secured tenancy under Part VI of the 1996 Act).

What is the correct construction of the anti-avoidance provisions in section 739 and following of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (and its successor in Chapter 2 of Part 13 of the Income Tax Act 2007)? In particular:
                i)  Does the transfer of assets have to be a transfer by the individual who has the power to enjoy the income that becomes payable to the overseas person?
                ii)   If the individual has to be the transferor of the assets in order for section 739 to apply, in what circumstances (if any) can an individual be treated as a transferor of the assets where the transfer is in fact made by a company in which the individual is a shareholder?

Did the CAC's refusal to accept the Union's application to be recognised by Deliveroo for collective bargaining interfere with the rights of Deliveroo riders to form and join a trade union under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights? If so, was this interference justified? Should the courts below have construed section 296(1)(b) of the 1992 Act so as to give effect to Article 11?

The Supreme Court is asked to decide the following legal questions:
Did the Divisional Court apply the wrong test when determining whether removal to Rwanda would breach article 3?
                If the Divisional Court applied the right test, was the Court of Appeal entitled to interfere with its conclusion that Rwanda was a safe third country?
                If the Divisional Court applied the wrong test or there was another basis for interfering with its conclusion, was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that Rwanda was not a safe third country because asylum seekers would face a real risk of refoulement?
                Did the Home Secretary fail to discharge her procedural obligation under article 3 to undertake a thorough examination of Rwanda's asylum procedures to determine whether they adequately protect asylum seekers against the risk of refoulement?
                Were there substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda will face a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in Rwanda itself, in addition to the risk of refoulement?
                Does the Asylum Procedures Directive continue to have effect as retained EU law? This is relevant because the Directive only permits asylum seekers to be removed to a safe third country if they have some connection to it. None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda.