Should Ms Begum be granted leave to enter the UK so that she can pursue her appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deprive her of British citizenship?
                Was the Special Immigration Appeals Commission wrong to apply judicial review principles to Ms Begum’s appeal against the deprivation decision?
                If Ms Begum is refused leave to enter the UK, should her appeal against the deprivation decision be allowed?

This appeal concerns the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, as amended ("the Collision Regulations"). The issues in the appeal are:
(1) The proper construction of the Collision Regulations. In particular whether the crossing rules are inapplicable, or whether they should they be disapplied where an outbound vessel is navigating within a narrow channel and has a vessel on her port (or starboard) bow on a crossing course approaching a narrow channel with the intention of and in preparation for entering it.
(2) On the proper construction of the Collision Regulations, in determining whether the crossing rules are applicable, whether there is a requirement for the putative give-way vessel to be on a steady course before the crossing rules can be engaged.

The issue is whether the Director of the Serious Fraud Office can issue a notice pursuant to section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice 1987 requiring a foreigner to produce material held overseas.

These appeals against the orders of the Butcher J and Flaux LJ concern the construction of certain provisions in insurance policies written by the Appellant Insurers, and obtained by a range of businesses and organisations, which purport to provide coverage in the event of business interruption. The Divisional Court considered the construction of each policy wording and the FCA, the Appellant Insurers and the Hiscox Interveners appeal on a number of points. However, broadly speaking, the Supreme Court is asked to determine:
1. certain matters of construction relating to:
                a. "Disease Clauses" (i.e. those which can be triggered by the occurrence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 ("COVID-19"), typically within a specified distance of the insured’s premises);
                b. "Prevention of Access Clauses" (i.e. those triggered by public authority intervention preventing access to, or use of, premises as a result of COVID-19); and 
                c. "Hybrid Clauses" (i.e. those clauses which contain wording from both Disease and Prevention of Access Clauses), and
2. whether the Divisional Court was correct:
                a. to apply certain counterfactual scenarios in relation to the operation of the clauses in relevant policies which provided for loss adjustments (the "Trends Clauses"); and 
                b. in its analysis of Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.