The Appellant bears responsibility for the running of a school, while the Respondent was and remains a visiting music teacher. She is engaged on a zero-hours contract to work during term times and does not work full-time or for the whole year. She receives holiday period at three times during the school year.
In 2011, the Appellant altered the manner in which it calculated the amount of this holiday pay, with a result less favourable to the Respondent. The Respondent brought proceedings in 2015 before the Employment Tribunal, which decided against her on this issue, and then appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, where she was successful.

Ms Wong was previously employed in Mr Basfar’s diplomatic household in Saudi Arabia. In August 2016, she was brought to the UK to work in a similar capacity and was provided with a contract stipulating the main terms and conditions of her service. Ms Wong alleges that her conditions of employment amounted to modern slavery. Such allegations have not been proven in these proceedings.
In October 2018, Ms Wong brought certain complaints against Mr Basfar in the Employment Tribunal (the "Tribunal"). Mr Basfar sought to defend those claims on the basis of diplomatic immunity conferred by the 1961 Convention. At first instance, the Tribunal held that Ms Wong’s employment and her alleged trafficking by Mr Basfar came within the "commercial activity" exception to diplomatic immunity and held that, had the Supreme Court in Reyes been required to make a determination on this issue, it would not have adopted the Sumption Judgment. On appeal, the EAT held that the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the Sumption Judgment represented the "current state of the law" and, accordingly, allowed Mr Basfar’s appeal. The EAT also granted a "leapfrog" certificate to provide leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.

The Appellant underwent a metal-on-metal total hip replacement (“MoM THR”) in 2009. The prosthetic hip used was manufactured by the Respondents (each making separate parts). In 2012, the Appellant underwent revision of the left side of his hip implant.
The Appellant claims that the replacement hip used was defective and seeks damages based on section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. The issues in the present case were limited at first instance to the question of whether certain propensities and risks inherent in MoM THR prosthetic hips rendered the particular combination of components used in the Appellant’s operations defective within the meaning of section 3 of the 1987 Act.
The Outer House refused the Appellant’s motion, determining that the particular product was not defective within the terms of the 1987 Act. The Inner House refused the Appellant’s reclaiming motion.