

III.—THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY.

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THE idea of Progress is the ruling thought of the modern world. There is no earnest thinker who is not influenced by it. It is the principle by which historians seek to systematise the facts with which they deal. It is the very backbone of science. It exercises a marked influence on practical politics. It penetrates every branch of general literature. It has even, of late years, begun to influence the thinking of theologians.

But this term "Progress," without further qualification, is a vague and misleading term, and one which has had a baleful influence on politics on the Continent, and which has been the occasion of much indecision in the conduct of affairs here in England. This arises from the fact that the term "Progress," unless strictly defined, means nothing more than change. It is without scope or goal, and has no standard by which to estimate change. The improved, more perfect state of things, towards which it professedly tends, is altogether undetermined. Is it possible to state what it is that constitutes this progressive life—what its end and aim is? Can we determine the whence and the whither of this great struggling human life whose deeds constitute what is called History? This is the question to which I shall attempt, in this paper, to give a very general answer.

I shall best pave the way for my answer by adverting briefly to the theory of life which has lately gained currency as the result of the discoveries of science. These discoveries have established the fact that this earth was at one time a molten mass, in some such state as the sun is at present; that this mass gradually cooled; that, as this process of cooling went on, life, in a perfectly simple, uniform type, showed itself; and that, from this primitive, uniform type, all higher grades of animal life have originated by a process of evolution, due to the continuous operation of purely physical causes. The attempt to account for the first form of life, on what are called physical principles, has failed. Darwin stated his belief that this primitive form was due, not to physical causes, but to the direct action of the Creator.

Given, however, the simplest form of life, he held that science could account for all subsequent, more complex grades, without recourse to the idea of the special action of the Creator. He believed also that as the earliest forms of life have disappeared, and given place to other and higher forms, so, by a similar process of modification, those species of animal and plant life now existing will, in the far-off future, have given place to new and dominant species, that man, for example, will, in some immeasurably distant period, have disappeared from the face of the earth, and have been replaced by some species possessing higher corporeal and mental endowments. The conditions which determine the progress are purely casual ones. That is to say, the succession of animals might have been different from what it actually has been; the theory maintaining that there was no definite aim, no intelligent purpose underlying and determining the process of evolution. The course which the process has followed can now be determined; but so far as can be seen, it might have followed a different one. It is, for example, conceivable, according to the hypothesis, that such an animal as man might not have been evolved from the process at all; and, consequently, that thought, or the power of interpreting the process, might not have been evolved, and that thus the process might have remained blind to its own course. And it is because the process is thus a natural, aimless one, not one urging towards a definite end and aim in which it completely realises itself, that it is maintained that it will go on in the future as it has in the past. If it were not so, if the process were a predetermined one which reached its final stage of realisation in consciousness, then man, as the absolute summit of the life-structure, would be able to determine not merely the course of life but its aim, its essential meaning. He would be not merely the product of vast natural forces which find in him only partial realisation, but he would have risen above the temporary life of the individual, who forms but a link in the great process, who receives the spark of life from his progenitors, and who passes it on to his posterity; he would have risen above that existence in time which is blind to its origin and its end, and he would live in conscious union with that Will whose purpose in the world had now reached its final stage. But according to the theory this is not so. The origin of life is unknown, its course uncertain, and its end lost in the interminable future.

If this view of life be a true one, then a Science of History, in any true sense of the term, is impossible. Mr. Herbert

Spencer indeed, though holding this view, does develop a theory of the course of human life, which, though it does not claim to be completely satisfactory, does claim to be final. In the early workings of conscious life, while mankind had amassed but a meagre knowledge of the phenomena of the world, and little or no knowledge at all of the laws that determine these phenomena, each phenomenon, as it presented itself, was not accounted for by the action of law, but was regarded as the manifestation of some power, external to the phenomenon itself, and capricious in its action. As knowledge grew, as phenomena began to group themselves in classes, these external, capricious powers gradually grew less in number, till in the Jewish and Christian religions the idea of law became so far predominant that all action was referred to one power, though that power was still a personal and capricious one, one whose relation to the world changed with the changing attitude of mankind towards it, depended, that is to say, on the conduct of men. And now, at last, the truth, towards which mankind has throughout the ages been slowly advancing, is fully recognised, and man's highest duty is declared to be the recognition of universal and immutable laws, and the regulation of human life in accordance with them. It is hardly necessary to say that, according to the theory, the laws which regulate human life in society and the state have always been determined by the interpretation given to natural phenomena,—that caprice and brute force have given place to law and justice contemporaneously with the elimination of caprice as the controlling power in nature.

On the presuppositions of this theory, I shall have something to say at a later stage of the discussion. In the meantime, what I desire to point out is, that Mr. Spencer's theory of life gains a ready acceptance because it is an easy and, at first sight, satisfactory explanation of that process of renunciation of the mere individual, capricious will, which is the necessary presupposition of action in social life, and does in reality constitute progress in history. But this process of renunciation, as he explains it, does not in truth constitute a progressive life; and this, not merely because progress implies a recognisable end, but because the renunciation is purely formal, that is, based upon the recognition of laws which are not only immutable and, in the last resort, inexplicable, but which have no essential relation with the life which they determine. The so-called progress is a merely formal adjustment of human life to inexplicable necessity; not progress towards a fuller, completer life, whose end is to

realise itself not merely as the shadow of the necessary but as its substance and presupposition. I may express this otherwise. According to Mr. Spencer, the fabric of the world is formed of necessity and chance. Chance, at the beginning, determined the course of events in the world, though, by some means, this course, when once taken, is no longer the mere creature of chance but assumes fixity, and then, as the necessary element, co-operates with chance in determining the subsequent course. He thus ascribes to chance a reason of its own, by which it shapes the universe, and because of this ascription it is unnecessary for him to ascribe to reason itself an essential relation with the world ; and human life, as conscious, thus becomes formal and aimless, empty and worthless.

This is the result of that interpretation of life which Mr. Spencer deduces from the recent discoveries of science, and which he maintains is final. Now, no theory of life can be satisfactory or complete which is not in essential harmony with the facts of science,—the facts, as distinguished from the theories deduced from these facts by scientific men. If then we accept as true those facts of life which the labours of scientific men have lately revealed ; if we admit that the discoveries made in Geology and Biology force us to the conclusion that “ the present conformation and composition of the earth’s crust, the distribution of land and water, and the infinitely diversified forms of animals and plants which constitute its present population, are merely the final terms in an immense series of changes which have been brought about in the course of immeasurable time by the operation of causes similar to those which are at work at the present day ” ;—if we admit this, are we also forced to the conclusion that the theory, of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is the most distinguished exponent, is an adequate explanation of the facts of human life in so far as human life is distinguished from mere animal life ?

This question has been answered once for all by the late Professor Green ; and those who desire a detailed answer are referred to his writings, more particularly to the series of articles which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* in 1877-8. I can give here only a brief summary of results.

Mr. Spencer discusses his theory of knowledge after discussing and accepting the theory of evolution as an adequate explanation of the world. He finds that, as the world has actually developed itself, each higher species of life succeeded the lower in such a way as to preclude the idea that any species had a conscious part in the production of any other

species; in such way also as to destroy the idea that there was any conscious or final purpose determining the succession as a whole. The laws which now regulate the living world are the laws which have made that world what it is. In them that world is summed up and finds its explanation; and beyond them, to that common source which they suggest but do not reveal, none of the special forms of life can penetrate. Man therefore had as little to do with the production of the world as it existed before his appearance, as that pre-existent world had consciously to do with the production of man. His destiny is linked to the world as a whole by the same laws as link together the destinies of the lower species of life. But although his destiny is thus the same as the destiny of all living things, although he too is the creature of laws from dependence on whose action he cannot free himself, he is endowed with a power peculiar to himself, the power of consciousness, the power of obtaining a knowledge of the entire system of laws and of acting in conscious harmony with them.

Whence does this endowment spring? How is consciousness related to the world at large? The obvious answer, according to the theory, is that the relation is that of shadow to substance. The world is already, independently of consciousness, an ordered system, and the function of consciousness is to produce in itself a counterpart or reflection of this order. But how does this formal consciousness come into connexion with its material? By what means does it retain and compare those phenomena in which the laws are expressed? It has, to begin with, nothing peculiarly its own, nothing by which it could enable the individual subject to distinguish himself from the individual phenomena presented, and thus to characterise and retain them. It is, in fact, to begin with, not there at all; but appears only after the lapse of time, as the gradual result of the action of the world on the individual subject. What then is the character of this action, and how does the result spring from it? The sole gateway of communication between the individual and the world is feeling or sensation. But feelings or sensations are, in themselves, momentary and perishable. They come and go, and tell of nothing beyond themselves, because to do so would not only imply the something beyond, of which they do tell, but also another something to which each makes its report, something which must have been there from the beginning, and could not therefore have been the result of the operation of an external agent. But before feelings can become known, that is, marked off from each other by dis-

inct characteristics, become reports of individual objects, they must in some way be retained and compared, be in some way related to each other. How is this possible? The answer briefly is, that repetition leads to retention. Feelings by repetition gradually create tendencies towards retention which are hereditarily transmitted, and these tendencies gradually develop into complete consciousness. Thus, though there is no power of retention to begin with, yet repeated feelings, though there is nothing to which they can repeat themselves, create tendencies towards retention in a something which is not a feeling or a collection of feelings, and cannot be consciousness, because consciousness is the result of the retention. Here then we have assumed, and not accounted for, the relation of succession as that of which the experience generates the tendencies described. But feeling following feeling, *ad infinitum*, does not constitute a succession except as held together by a something else present equally to each of them; and this something else is, by the hypothesis, excluded from the succession. Thus the explanation of consciousness as the result of the transmission of tendencies which are created by the regular action on feeling of the systematised phenomena of the world is self-contradictory; for, in the absence of everything but the succession, the succession itself could not be.

I need not dwell upon the "unknowable source of knowledge," which Mr. Spencer's theory of consciousness forces upon him; nor need I dwell, further than I have already done, upon his account of the relation between the "great unknowable First Cause" and the religious consciousness, as that relation has manifested itself in various forms in history. If his theory of consciousness destroys the possibility of any knowledge, there is no need to dwell upon what it confessedly knows only as unknowable.

What I have thus far aimed at showing is that consciousness as explained by the doctrine of evolution is not what consciousness actually is; that it is not merely formal, but that the most elementary knowledge, the power on the part of consciousness to seize a single phenomenon, necessarily implies the power to distinguish between the conscious subject and the object of consciousness, and also the power to distinguish, however vaguely, between both subject and object and that totality or world of which they are mere parts. There could be no conscious subject without an object of consciousness, and there could be no object of consciousness unless there was implied, in however general a form, a totality of objects, of which this particular object was a

single member. The relation here is a mutual one, no member being independent of the other, each having its reality not in itself but in the others and the whole.¹ In other words, the most elementary knowledge implies that threefold relation which all knowledge, the most complex as well as the most simple, only serves to bring into clearer light; and the attempt to trace the origin of knowledge beyond a consciousness so constituted can only be compared to an attempt to get outside the universe. According to this theory of consciousness, then, the history of mankind is the history of the effort on the part of the individual subjects to grasp, through a slowly acquired knowledge of the contents of the world, the character of that totality, of that Godhead, which is not only the source but also, from their nature, the substance of both. It is the progressive effort to realise, through knowledge, the unity of the divine and human, a unity which is expressed in all aspects of life, but which finds its highest realisation in religion.

In what remains of this paper I shall deal very briefly with—

(1) The characteristics of consciousness in so far as consciousness is distinguished from mere animal life.

(2) The means by which conscious life realises its end.

(3) The form in which the perfect conscious life embodies itself.

(1) Reason, the system of law which explains the phenomena of the world, is the very essence of the world; and it is in man alone, of all existent beings, that this reason becomes conscious; it is in him alone that reason urges towards self-knowledge. The lower animals are, like man, the outcome, the expression of the great process; but they neither know that they are so, nor seek to know it. Man is the only animal that seeks to know that life of which he, as a mere individual, is, like the lower animals, the momentary expression; but of which, as self-conscious, he is the eternal essence. In all lower grades of life, action takes place in a direct natural fashion: it is not mediated, *i.e.*, determined by a consciousness of its own character. This is the important point. Not only do all actions in the brute world take place according to reason, according to laws which are

¹ It seems hardly necessary to point out that the reality which the world had before the manifestation of consciousness in time was not a reality independent of consciousness in the sense in which Mr. Spencer maintains, but a reality which is truly understood only when seen in every stage to imply, and in the final stage to result in, consciousness or self-completion.

capable of being determined by us; but the development of physical life is itself essentially rational, groups itself into species, and this reason, this process, for the first time becomes conscious of its own nature, its own character, in man. Man is, in one point of view, the outcome, the creature of this process of life; and in another point of view he is the conscious realisation of this process; and in this consciousness he becomes free. The brutes are not free: they do not know the character of their actions, they do not know the system, the purpose by which these actions are determined; they act in blind obedience to impulse. The destiny of man, on the other hand, is to realise his own freedom, his spiritual freedom, that freedom which springs from a knowledge of the system of which he is not only the highest expression but also, from the very nature of the process, the absolute substance: to realise his emptiness, his worthlessness, as a mere individual, but his essential infinite worth when he realises his oneness with the universal aim, with God made manifest. It is this destiny that is slowly accomplished in the course of history.

Thought then, spirit, as distinguished from the physical world, is nothing other than that world made conscious of its own purpose, its own end, made free; for spirit becomes free when confronted by no absolutely alien world, but by a world in which it has its source and of which it is the end and aim, by a world which is the expression of itself. Thus then the destiny of the world of thought, of spirit, and, since this is the substantial world, that towards which the physical world was continually urging and in which it reaches its full expression, the final cause of the world at large, is the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of spirit, and the realisation of that freedom, its application to the relations of actual, present life. This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the absolutely perfect being, the source and end of all being, who can therefore will nothing other than Himself, His own will. The very nature of His will, that is His very nature itself, all-embracing and all-determining, is what we here call Freedom. To obtain this Freedom in its complete form, to realise the unity of the divine and human, is the object of the world's action, that which gives continuity to the life of man, and that which makes a Science of History possible.

This object is at first general and abstract. It has not received real, outward expression. All aims partake, at first, of this abstract, unreal character. In all stages, short of the complete realisation of freedom, men are not fully

conscious of their own nature, of their relation to the world's purpose, to God. That full, complete consciousness came with Christianity. But even the precepts of Christianity were at first nothing more than abstract principles; and were so far untrue, unreal. According to these precepts, *e.g.*, all men are brothers, deriving their existence from the same source, subject to the same great law and government, and through this law and government made free. But this truth was at first in the air; it had not merged into actual existence. In proof of this I need merely note that slavery did not cease with the introduction of Christianity, nor was law made harmonious with freedom. This application of the principle to political relations, the thorough moulding and interpenetration of society by it, is identical with the process of history itself. The realisation of the end is thus a gradual one, a process has to be passed through, and this process constitutes history.

(2) By what means does this process realise its end? The end is the perfected life of man, the bringing of all men's actions into essential harmony with divine justice, the making all men one in and through the knowledge of the world's purpose. This end implies that there was at the beginning the very opposite of an essential unity of interest, that there was a collection of conflicting interests, that the springs of action were passions, private aims, the satisfaction of selfish desires. These passions, private aims, in the conflict which necessarily takes place between them, are the means for the development of freedom, of that life whose very essence is law and order. Thus, to adapt words of Darwin, from the war of Passion, no matter in what form it may display itself, the true, the complete life results. The process here is, in one aspect, a natural one—the mere conflict of the Passions, of the strictly individual interests, and of the evolution of those conditions best suited to social life. This is the only aspect of the process dwelt upon by Mr. Herbert Spencer. But the end, and the presupposition of the whole process, is the very opposite of natural; for the conflict develops not only better conditions of life, but the consciousness of the character of these conditions. It is important to comprehend this distinction. The destiny of man is to make the world of nature, of which he is the outcome, conscious of its own purport, and to transform his individual life in accordance with this consciousness,—to overcome the natural, unreflecting life of the individual, and to replace it by the spiritual, conscious life, which is essentially one and universal,

—the presupposition of all. Man is no mere creature of conditions that are imposed from the outside by some alien, unknowable power, to which he blindly submits; for he is able not only to demonstrate in each condition its specific aim, but in the whole the grand object of the world. He is able to demonstrate that the conditions of knowledge are also the conditions of the world, of the known thing,—that neither could be without the other; to demonstrate that the conditions of knowledge do not appear for the first time in man, but are immanent in every grade of the world, but know themselves as essential conditions only in consciousness. He is able, in a word, to demonstrate that Thought, the essential, in its threefold relation, is not only the outcome of the world's development, but its presupposition. Man, therefore, is free, not in spite of, but in and through the conditions of life. The conditions are the realisation of the complete life.

I cannot pause here to show the unthinking character of the conception of God, as an empty, unconditioned something, entertained by Mr. Spencer. I merely remark that a God who did not necessarily manifest himself, could not be the source or end of the universe, but must be an empty abstraction, a fiction produced by an incomplete theory. He is the source and aim of conditioned life, and in this conditioned life, therefore, he is free. Beyond conditioned life it is as impossible for God as it is for thought to pass. To the level of this freedom, to the knowledge of the source and aim of the world, to the knowledge that all things work together for one end, to the full enjoyment of sonship in the Father, it is the destiny of man to rise. Summing this up, we find that human life is not merely that natural adjustment to the conditions of general life, which is conveyed in the phrase "Survival of the Fittest"; but is that adjustment which through consciousness adapts itself to the end.

(3) I now pass to the third point: What is the object to be realised by these means, *i.e.*, what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality? It is in human knowledge and volition that Freedom, the end and aim of life, attains positive, conscious existence. Here the individual will in its consciousness of the essential, divine life, in its consciousness of the purpose of all existence, has itself essential existence. This essential existence is the union of the individual will with the divine will, the divine purpose; and this union finds its highest expression in the State. Whenever men, through the natural conflict of interest, pass out of the

primitive barbaric condition, and form for themselves a State, that conflict has been, so far, overcome, and a certain unity of interest, which expresses itself in Religion, in Law, Morality, Government, has been established. The State then, with its laws and institutions, its government and morality, is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom. It is the actually existing realised moral life; for it is the unity of the universal essential will with that of the individual. The individual, living in this unity, has a moral life, possesses a value, that consists in this substantiality alone. It is the very object of the State that what is essential, what is in harmony with the great purpose of the world, in the practical activity of men, should be duly recognised, that it should have a manifest existence and be able to maintain its position. In the history of the world only those peoples can come under our notice which form a State. For it must be understood that the State alone is the realisation of freedom, *i.e.*, of the absolute final aim which determines the course of History. It must further be understood that all the worth which the individual possesses, all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State. For his spiritual reality consists in this, that his highest life, which is one with the aim of the world, possesses for him, not a merely abstract empty existence, but a real outward existence in the world. It is only in the full knowledge of this existing real life that he becomes fully free, fully conscious. It is only through this real existence that he becomes a partaker of morality, of a just and moral social life. The State is the divine idea as it exists on earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of history in a more definite shape than before: that in which freedom obtains real existence. For law is the reality of conscious life, volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law is free; for, in obeying law, it obeys that which expresses its own nature and aim, and so is free. Law has necessary existence as being the reality and substance of things, the conscious expression of the divine purpose; and we are free in recognising it as law and following it as the substance of our own being. The divine will and the will of the individual are then reconciled, and present one identical, homogeneous whole.

The State then is the manifestation of human will and its freedom. It is to the State therefore that change in the aspect of history indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive stages by which spiritual freedom, the end, is realised,

manifest themselves in history as distinct political principles, distinct forms of State-life.

We have thus far established two elemental considerations : first, the idea of freedom as the absolute and final aim ; second, the means for realising it, *i.e.*, the subjective side of knowledge and will with its life, movement and activity. We then recognised the State as the moral whole and reality of freedom, and consequently as the objective unity of these two elements. The State is, therefore, the basis and centre of the other and concrete elements of the life of a people, of Art, of Law, of Morals, of Religion, of Science. All the activity of Spirit has only this object, the becoming conscious of this union, *i.e.*, of its own freedom. Among the forms of this conscious union, Religion occupies the highest place. Religion is, in a special sense, that form in which man expresses his oneness with God ; but all manifestations of life, in so far as they are realisations of freedom, also show forth this unity. In Religion, spirit, rising above the limitations of mere secular existence, becomes conscious of the absolute Spirit, and in this consciousness of the self-existent being renounces its merely individual interest. With this self-renunciation, whose aim is to obtain freedom, true life begins. I have said that Morality is the identity of the individual will with the will of God. Now the mind must give itself an express consciousness of this identity ; and the focus of this knowledge is Religion. Art and Science, when truly seen, are only various aspects and forms of the same substantial being. Religion is the form in which a nation gives itself the definition of what it regards as the true, that which it regards as the explanation of existence. The conception of God, therefore, constitutes the general basis of a people's character. In this aspect Religion stands in the closest connexion with the political principle. All religions realise, in a more or less complete degree, the relation between the divine purpose and human life, the principle of freedom. But full freedom can exist only where the individual is recognised as having his positive and real existence in the universal aim ; where the actions of the individual are sanctioned not by the will of another individual, nor by any compact or arrangement between individuals, but by Religion, by the very constitution of existence. This means that the practical work of the individual has not in itself that absolute validity, that absolute claim to recognition, to which even kings and governors must bow, except in so far as the principle that pervades it receives absolute validity ; which it cannot have unless it is recognised as the definite manifesta-

tion, the phenomenal existence, of that divine spirit which constitutes freedom. The State is thus always more than a mere collection of individuals ; because it is the realisation of that freedom to which the individual must conform himself in order to become free. It is this that explains the saying that the State is based on Religion. The form of Religion decides the form of the State and its constitution. The latter actually originated in the particular religion adopted by the nation ; so that, in fact, the Chinese, the Hindoo, the Persian, the Egyptian, the Athenian and the Roman States were possible only in connexion with the peculiar form of religion existing among these peoples ; just as a Catholic State has a spirit and a constitution different from that of a Protestant one. I may illustrate this remark by noticing the folly of pretending to invent and carry out political institutions independently of religion. The history of France during the present century furnishes an example. That country is Catholic, and the Catholic confession, although sharing the Christian name with the Protestant, does not concede to the State an inherent justice and morality, a right independent of the will of any individual or class of individuals, a concession which, in the Protestant principle, is fundamental. Roman Catholicism and constitutional government are absolutely incompatible ; and the attempt to build up a constitution uninfluenced by any religion, as France will be forced to do, so long as it remains Catholic, can produce only an absolute unrest. A political revolution can obtain stability only if it is the result of a religious reformation, of a distinct advance in the conception of freedom.

Only in connexion then with a particular religion can a particular constitution exist. From the fact that in Religion all distinction of person disappears, that in it all men become one, it follows that each particular nation having, for the basis of its life, its own conception of the divine, is to be treated as only one individual in the process of universal history. For that history is the exhibition of the divine absolute development of spirit in its highest forms, that gradation by which it reaches the perfect life in God. The forms which these gradations assume are the characteristic "National Spirits" of history, the peculiar tenor of their moral life, their government, their art, religion and science. To realise these grades is the boundless impulse of conscious life—the goal of its irresistible urging.

One word, in conclusion, in reference to the course of the world's history. Each people that is forming itself into a

State does so on the basis of religion, on the basis of its own conception of the relation between the world and the divine, between the life of the individual and that universal life, which is its presupposition and aim. It is its religion that forms the distinctive characteristic of a people. It is this alone which takes the lead in all the deeds and tendencies of that people, and which is occupied in realising itself, in making its real life correspond with its idea of the divine. This harmony each people is destined to accomplish for itself; but its accomplishment is at the same time its dissolution as a historical people, and the rise of a new religion, another world-historical people, another epoch of universal history. This transition and connexion leads us to the idea and connexion of the whole, the idea of the world's history as such. To comprehend the thought involved in this transition, the study of history itself is necessary. The fundamental necessity of the transition lies in the fact that national activity ceases when the religion which it embodies reaches its full realisation in life, when the object of all its endeavours is accomplished. When this is reached the activity displayed by the spirit of the people is no longer needed; it has its desire; and the bond of union, which implies combined exertion for some object not fully realised, disappears. The contradiction between its inner aim and life and its actual being is removed; and what had been its aim becomes, as it were, the property of the individual. Enriched by this spirit—the final result of the labours of the nation—the individual assumes an attitude of superiority, of criticism, towards the laws and institutions by which the national endeavours had been guided; and private interest becomes predominant. In order that a truly universal interest may again arise, a principle of a new order, a new national spirit, must show itself. This is the soul, the essential consideration in the scientific comprehension of History.

The conclusion of the whole matter is this, that the History of the World aims at the realisation of a complete harmony between man and God, the realisation, through a painful process of self-conflict and self-conquest, of that freedom, which is the same in spirit as the love taught by Christ, the realisation of a State in which the interest of each will be the interest of all, and the interest of all the interest of each; and it is in the light of this aim that all progress in history must be interpreted. The true believer in the ultimate complete realisation of a kingdom of Christ on this earth does not confine his vision to the future, but recognises the development in the past and the essential worth of the present.