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Friday, April 1, 1881.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GARNET J. WOLSELEY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
Quartermaster-General, in the Chair.

THE BEST MEANS OF ADAPTING THE EXISTING MILITARY FORCES TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EMPIRE.

By Captain WALTER H. JAMES, late R.E.

THE time at my disposal this afternoon will only allow me to touch briefly on the various branches of the wide field which forms the subject of my lecture, and I must, therefore, ask your forgiveness if I allude but cursorily to many points which, while undoubtedly of great importance, affect only indirectly the question as I propose to treat it.

Strictly speaking, the military forces should embrace both the Navy and Army; but I feel it better to leave all considerations as to the way in which the former should be organized to those who have better right than myself to speak on the subject, and will confine myself to the land forces alone.

I propose, therefore, to commence by ascertaining, first of all, for what purposes we want an army; and, secondly, what numbers are required for these various purposes.

The British Empire requires an army—

1. To defend Great Britain and Ireland.
2. To hold India and the Colonies.
3. To take part in European wars in support of treaty rights, or which may be produced by the aggressive action of other Powers.

First of all, the defence of Great Britain and Ireland. In the case of England and Scotland we have to consider the force which would be used to invade us. Such a force would probably be about 100,000 or 150,000 men. To oppose it successfully we ought to have an army considerably superior to the invaders in point of numbers: because we have not only to meet the actual invading army, but also to guard against feints, and such an arrangement involves a certain amount of dissemination. Our field or active army should, therefore, consist of at least 200,000 men. In addition to this, we should require about 60,000 to 70,000 for the proper defence of our fortresses, such as Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. I do not take into consideration the defence of London as an intrenched camp; for although it is highly necessary to protect this city by a ring of detached forts, it is emi-

nently improbable that it ever will be done by permanent works; and it is extremely doubtful whether, in case of war, we should have time to erect the necessary semi-permanent constructions.

To garrison Ireland in time of war, *i.e.*, to keep down rebellion and repel invasion, would take about 60,000 men. It would seem, therefore, that altogether about 320,000 are required for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland.

To hold India and the Colonies. Past experience would seem to show that about 70,000 are needed to garrison India, and 20,000 for the Colonies.

Lastly, for expeditionary purposes in Europe. To arrive at a proper understanding as to what force is required for this purpose, it is necessary to ascertain what would be required of it. Now it is extremely improbable that we should ever enter on a European war without allies, so that we should not have to provide the whole fighting force; but we must, on the other hand, not forget that the times have considerably changed since the beginning of the century. Then we were able to raise a considerable foreign force, now by the universal introduction of compulsory service we should be unable to do so. Moreover, the size of modern armies is very considerably in excess of what was formerly the case, so that we should be obliged to put a relatively larger force in the field than we did then to meet them. It is certainly within bounds to assume that at the first outset of a war, Germany would put into the field 800,000 men, and would keep her field armies up to that force at least. France would begin war with a field army of about the same strength. Russia might raise about 600,000 for a European conflict, Austria some 500,000, Italy, about 200,000. We must, therefore, be prepared to enter into the field with a force which would form an adequate reinforcement to any nation with which we might be allied, *i.e.*, we must be able to maintain a field army of 100,000 to 150,000 men. Such an army would be large enough to act independently, while experience shows that a force of that size does not suffer from numerical inferiority so severely as a smaller one does. It is an open secret, I believe, that our expeditionary army is estimated at two army corps, *i.e.*, about 60,000 fighting men. Such a force would be totally inadequate to take a respectable part in any modern European war.

There is one other point to which I must draw attention, *viz.*, the necessity for a force of some 10,000 men, ready at all times to take the field, and available for those small colonial wars which we are constantly engaging in.

To recapitulate, then, we require for—

Home defence	320,000
India and the Colonies	90,000
Expeditionary purposes	120,000
Total	530,000

Our organization must be such as will permit this force being raised with a moderate peace establishment, and it is hardly necessary

to say that it must be done by a purely voluntary system. Whatever may be a soldier's opinion as to the desirability of universal service, its introduction lies far beyond the sphere of practical politics, and must be dismissed.

Our Army, then, must be raised by our present voluntary system and as the national spirit seems to have settled into the partite division of regular army, militia, and volunteers, including yeomanry; it would seem desirable that our military forces should embrace these sources in a proper proportion.

Let us, then, see in what way they can be applied to the requirements of the Empire.

First of all, India. Our Army there must be composed of regular troops, supplemented, as at present, by a regular native army. Into the organization of this latter force I do not propose to enter. With regard to the European portion of our Indian garrison, shall it be local or as it is at present? Now, there are undoubted advantages about a local Indian Army, but it is impossible not to see that to re-introduce it on the scale of the large number of battalions now maintained there would considerably dislocate our present organization. It would be impossible to order by a stroke of the pen that a certain number of regiments should henceforth be local Indian regiments, and if this were not done, it would involve the disbanding of a large number of our existing battalions, since the present number is far in excess of what the nation would pay for if a large proportion of them were not kept in India. It seems, therefore, pretty certain that any scheme which may be adopted must maintain the present system of a non-local army, forming an integral part of the general military organization of the Empire.

With regard to the Colonies. Three duties are required of the military forces of a colony, viz., to hold the ports and coaling stations for Imperial purposes, to resist any attempt at conquest by a foreign Power at war with the mother country, and to protect the colony against attack from native tribes within it or on its borders. The first two of these may be said to be the common duty of the Home and Colonial authorities, and the burden of the last will fall entirely on the colony when it is self-governing. It would, therefore, seem desirable that some scheme should be drawn up embracing the whole of our colonial possessions, and showing in what way the resources of Great Britain and the colonies should be combined for these various purposes. The ports and harbours required for our Navy and our commerce should be to a great extent held by regular troops in the pay of the Home Government, supplemented in time of need by local levies. But it is absolutely necessary that these local levies should be organized, officered, and equipped in a manner which would meet the approval of proper military authorities; that they should, moreover, when called out be under the same law as the regular soldier. It is much to be feared that in some of our colonies, quantity, not quality, has been obtained in the local forces; that they are not in all cases well officered or equipped, while recent reports would seem to show the desirability of such forces being under those rules and regulations which the expe-

rience of centuries has proved to be necessary for the proper government of an army in the field.

To deal with the native wars the colony would, except in the case of those too thinly peopled by the white race, employ its own forces only.

It would, therefore, seem to me that the ideal organization for a colony would be somewhat as follows:—Its harbours to be protected by fortifications at the cost of England or the colony, according to circumstances; for example, Australia can pay for them, Bermuda cannot. A force of Imperial troops should be kept there to serve as a sort of *garnison de sûreté*, and as a type on which the local forces could model themselves as far as drill and discipline were concerned. That the latter should be organized on a plan suitable for the country, and so as to fit in with the Imperial troops. That England should provide a certain number of Officers to train the local forces and for staff and instructional duties.

In my ideal colony, therefore, we should have a nucleus of Imperial troops, capable of expansion from local sources in time of war, provided with a proper staff and proper training establishments. The War Minister of the country, even if he were not a military man, might have at his right hand the Officer commanding the troops, who should also command the local levies. There would, I believe, be little difficulty in getting good Officers for the colonial troops—men who would be willing to undergo the necessary amount of training, provided they received commissions from Her Majesty. The rank and file might be volunteers or militia according to circumstances, and a portion of the forces might be permanently embodied, as is the case at the present time in Canada. All must admit that some understanding with our colonies as to the respective proportions of the Imperial and the various local government troops is necessary, and that it should be come to as soon as possible. It is to be hoped that the labours of the Commission now sitting may be so directed as to lead to this result.

In the case of those foreign possessions, such as Aden, Malta, Gibraltar, and Bermuda, &c., where there is no local population, they must be treated as fortresses to be garrisoned, as at present, by Imperial and regular troops.

And now with regard to the army required for home defence, for foreign wars in Europe, and for small expeditions for foreign wars, we must have, as I have said, a force of at least 100,000 to 150,000 men, and it must necessarily be composed of regular troops. But it must not be forgotten, that to maintain an army operating in the field, we must have troops available to guard its communications. The numbers required for this purpose would vary with the country we were operating in, and with the length of the line of communications, and cannot therefore be accurately estimated, but it would seem probable that at the outset about 10,000 men would be sufficient. We must also have some arrangement by which the troops in the field can be kept up to their full strength by properly trained reinforcements. We learned in the Crimea the urgent necessity for organization of this kind, and it is devoutly to be hoped we shall have it before we are again involved in war.

For home defence we have two different cases to meet. The one when we are suddenly threatened by an invasion when at peace; the other, when, being at war with some nation, and with our Army employed abroad, invasion has to be met. The second being the graver danger, if our organization enables us to meet it we need not consider the former. Our military system must therefore provide a sufficient force to act abroad with proper means to keep it up to strength, and at the same time some means of embodying a properly trained and sufficient force to take the place of the Army when abroad. Such a force must be mainly composed of regular troops, and if we had a due proportion of regular reserves, we might arrange that its place should be taken by them with the militia as a second line. I would propose, therefore, that when we are engaged in a European war, which necessitates our putting the whole of our regular Army in the field, that their place at home should be taken by reserve regiments to act as dépôts, and defend the country. These reserve regiments would be composed chiefly of regular, but supplemented by militia and volunteer reserves belonging to each regiment, and might vary in strength with the magnitude of the struggle. They would exist only in war time, but they would form the recognized substitute for the Army, and would always be embodied when the regular Army went abroad. With an organization such as this, supplemented by the militia and volunteers, a sufficient force would be raised to protect the kingdom.

The weak spot in our present organization is the small reserve force it creates, due to a wrong proportion between the times spent in the Army and in the reserve. Moreover, our lowest strength battalions are so weak, that tactical training is impossible, and the brigade dépôts, as at present organized, contain so few men, that instruction cannot be carried out, and they are ridiculously over-officered. For instance, except for twelve battalions which have dépôts 150 strong, no dépôt exceeds 80 men, and the majority, 47 out of 71, have only 50. But in all cases the number of Officers is the same, viz., 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Captains, and 2 Lieutenants, 5 altogether, exclusive of the Officer commanding the dépôt. This gives an average of 10 men per Officer, the result being that, as is well known, Officers at a brigade dépôt have absolutely nothing to do. Moreover, the connection between the dépôt and the regiment is at present chiefly theoretical. The mere ghost of the latter represented by the former does not bring it home to the people. Keep up a regiment in a country quarter with its men drawn from the neighbourhood, and with its regimental organization, its band, &c., to keep it before the non-military population, and you will find the bond between the soldier and the civilian grow and increase every day. At present it is unsatisfactory: thus, the numbers raised by each brigade dépôt for its line battalions varied, but on the whole, we find that in 1879 only 5,518 recruits out of 15,915, i.e., only one-third, were enlisted for the linked battalions.

Again, the system which obtains of raising the battalions gradually from the lowest to the highest strength as they approach the time for going abroad, is one that cannot be too strongly con-

demned. It ensures the presence of the maximum number of recruits in a regiment just at the time when it ought to be composed of trained soldiers. It follows, therefore, that either we must send a battalion of boys abroad or else must make up its strength by volunteers from other regiments, a most pernicious practice. It seems to me, moreover, that the proposed arrangement of our battalions is illogical. Seventy battalions abroad of 800 to 820 strong are to be fed by battalions which, with their depôts, vary in strength from 530, 580, and 630 to 1,000. If the strong battalions are necessary to feed certain regiments, surely they are necessary for all. What really happens, however, under this system is, that the weak battalions cannot feed their links abroad, and that the necessary drafts have to be supplied from other regiments. Again, the system of relief by battalions and regiments is wrong and costly. Either the home-coming corps must give up the men who have not served their time to others that are stopping abroad, or else it must bring them home to replace them by others, many of whom must be sent back in two or three years. Regiments which are serving abroad, which have no reserves of old and seasoned men to fall back on, should be composed of men of some length of service. On the other hand, the regiments at home should serve as mere training schools through which men should be passed into the reserves, and as depôts for the regiments abroad. We have hitherto tried to carry out these two incompatible ideas in one battalion, and have necessarily failed. I would propose, therefore, that the double battalion plan, shortly to be introduced, should be carried out to its logical conclusion. That one battalion should always be abroad and one at home. That the home battalion should embrace the present brigade depôt, thus giving a battalion of a respectable strength, and that it should be absolutely localized, *i.e.*, given a quarter from which it should not be moved except for manœuvres or war. Such an arrangement would greatly facilitate mobilization, and every headquarters should contain the whole of the equipment necessary for this purpose. A similar organization should be introduced for all the other branches of the Service.

We must also bear in mind that our peace establishments should be the minimum possible for a proper war strength. The reserve service should, therefore, bear as large a proportion to the colour service as possible. For the infantry, judging from other nations, we might fairly compose our war battalions of half reserves, half men who are serving. But we must not forget that depôts are needed to keep these battalions full, and that in England it would be necessary to have regular troops to take the place of the Army if it went abroad to fight. Our reserves must, therefore, be sufficiently numerous—

1. To fill up regiments to war strength;
2. To provide a second line and depôts for the army in the field.

The organization for this purpose should be latent in peace, but so contrived as to be readily available in war. It seems to me that this might be done by keeping the necessary cadres of Officers and non-commissioned officers in existence for a 3rd or depôt battalion, somewhat in a similar manner to the German *landwehr*. The number of

reservists that would be obtained by the increased length of reserve service would be sufficiently large to permit the formation of this additional battalion after the 2nd had been made up to war strength, and, when necessary, the former might be strengthened by the addition of militia and volunteer reserves. I show in Table A how this would be done for the infantry, the arrangements for the other branches of the Service being similar, the necessary force of reserve Officers to be obtained as at present, and by making every Officer who enters the Army serve fifteen years either with the colours or reserve. Reserve Officers should be told off to regiments in peace, and should, as a rule, be attached to those in which they have served, or with which they are linked in the case of those belonging to the militia and volunteers. Their names should appear in the Army List with their regiments, and the men of the reserves should rejoin their own regiments and no others. In 1878 a very large proportion of the reserves were posted to regiments other than those they had served with. The ordinary practice in the event of a European war would be to mobilize the Army first of all, the reserve battalions, cavalry regiments, batteries, &c., in the second place, and finally the militia if necessary. To meet the case of small expeditions, I would propose that 8 infantry battalions should be kept at a strength of 1,000 men, so that 8 battalions, 800 strong, might be sent abroad, leaving 8 depôts, 200 strong, behind them. Similarly 4 batteries of artillery might be kept on a war footing ready for active service. Cavalry I propose should always be on a war footing ready for service.

I will now describe more in detail the manner in which I propose to carry out these propositions.

The Regular Army.—It is, of course, necessary to start with the assumption that this is to be raised by voluntary enlistment. I propose that we should have 71 regiments of the line of two battalions, the first of which should be always abroad. That the reliefs should be by annual drafts, the Officers going out and coming home by roster. That the foreign battalion should have a strength of 800 men. The home battalion 650 men. That the brigade depôt should be abolished and the regiment absolutely localized, *i.e.*, the battalion at home should have a permanent quarter told off to it, and kept there. That the term of service should be twelve years—four years with the colours and eight with the reserve—for men who do not go abroad. In the latter it should be ten years and two years. No man to be allowed to go abroad under two years' service. The service abroad with the foreign battalion to be for eight years at least, and the men to be induced to go into it by bounties. The men when abroad, if medically fit, to be encouraged to re-engage to serve twenty-one years for a pension. Too much stress cannot be laid, first of all, on only sending men abroad who are physically fit, and, secondly, on allowing those whose physique can stand the foreign climate to re-engage. By proper attention to these two points the recent Report on Army Reorganization shows that drafts of 5 per cent. per battalion per annum, *i.e.*, 40 men for a battalion 800 strong, would suffice to maintain the infantry at

a proper strength. Those men who do not go abroad, but enter the reserve, to be liable for a fortnight's training every year for the first eight years of their "reserve" service, unless they join the volunteers, and keep themselves efficient and first class shots. Men in the last two years of their reserve service not to be called on for their annual training. The reserve to be permitted to volunteer to rejoin the ranks when occasion requires. If it were necessary to increase the strength of our troops abroad, as in the case of the Afghan War, I should propose that the foreign battalions should be increased in strength, say up to 1,000 men, by large drafts sent out from the home battalions, or made up from the reserves by volunteers. This would not dislocate our machinery as we do at present when we send battalions abroad, which have already their link away from England. The pay to be arranged on a totally different principle. The ordinary working man is used to weekly wages. He should be paid on the same principle in the Army. I would propose that the soldier should be fed properly, clothed and housed at the expense of the country, and allowed a certain sum per week in addition. I believe that, adopting this plan, a man might be paid about 4s. a week as pocket-money. This sum should be continued in the reserve in this way, 3s. per week monthly in arrear, and 1l. at the end of each training.

The changes which are about to be introduced in the pay and position of non-commissioned officers seem to me judicious. But I think that for them, too, the pay should be estimated by the week. Moreover, I believe that we do not put the pay question fairly before the men. A man on enlisting is told that his pay is so much, but he finds immediately that he is liable to all sorts of stoppages, and that the sum which he is told he ought to receive is swallowed up in a hundred different ways. I should prefer to manage the messing, washing, and clothing of the men as a regimental affair, which can easily be done with local regiments. Then the sum which is now deducted from the individual soldier's pay for the first two items would be credited directly to the regimental fund, and managed by a regimental committee. I would also allow the soldier the average amount spent annually in keeping up his kit. In short, as I have said, the soldier should be clothed, fed, housed, and doctored at the expense of Government, and receive pocket-money in addition. Accounts would be simplified, and one great source of discontent removed. As to the clothing, it would be infinitely better managed by the regiment. A central department might supply the materials, but they should be made up in the regiment. The gigantic centralization of our clothing department is a mistake; it would fail to supply the Army in war, as it failed in the mobilization of 1878. By making up the things locally and regimentally, better fits would be ensured, economy would be obtained, and, what is best of all, we should know that on mobilization we had efficient machinery for the supply of the necessary articles.

With regard to the cavalry, it may be well to point out that we are the only nation which does not keep its cavalry constantly on a war

footing. Experience has shown that it does not do to suddenly augment regiments with untrained horses. It seems to me, therefore, that we should accept this fact and keep our cavalry always on a war strength. As it takes longer to make an efficient cavalry man, and as, being always on full strength, reserves are not wanted so much as in the infantry, I would propose that the cavalry should serve eight years in the ranks and four in the reserve. In time of war these reserves would be formed into reserve regiments, to act as dépôts, or, if necessary, might be sent into the field.

Foreign service for the cavalry to be provided for as follows:— There are 31 regiments altogether, of which 9 are in India, leaving 22 at home. Of the 31 regiments, 13 are hussars and 5 lancers. I would propose to arrange these as 12 hussars and 6 lancers, doubling them up as in the infantry into 6 regiments and 3 regiments respectively, keeping one half abroad, the other half at home, and relieving the rank and file by drafts composed of men of over two years' service, who would volunteer to serve eight years in India under the same conditions as the infantry soldier. The thirteen single regiments would do no foreign service except in case of emergency, but, being always at war strength, could be sent abroad at a moment's notice.

So far as the artillery is concerned, it seems that we might again imitate the example of foreign nations and keep only four guns and a certain proportion of wagons, &c., horsed in peace time. This would enable us to keep about eighty batteries at home on foot, instead of fifty-three. Our garrison artillery might be kept at about its present strength, being made up when necessary by militia and volunteers. Service in the artillery to be for six years with the colours and six in the reserve. The garrison and field artilleries to be separated, and the regiment divided into three regiments, each of these to have a field and garrison division. As with the cavalry and infantry, so with the artillery, reserve batteries would be formed out of the reservists on mobilization to act as dépôts or to take the field if necessary. The foreign service would be managed, as in the infantry, by roster for the Officers, by drafts for the men, cadres being kept always abroad.

The organization of the engineers should be constructed on the same lines as the rest of the Service. I would divide the corps up into three battalions of six companies, so far as the men were concerned, and conduct the reliefs exactly on the same principle as the infantry. Similarly the reserve men would form reserve companies on mobilization. With regard to those administrative branches of the Army which may be classed under the head of "train," they are portions which are required in small numbers in peace, but very large numbers in war. I would therefore propose that the service of the men should be three years in the ranks and nine in the reserve; this would give a large force of properly trained men for the multifarious duties required of this branch of the Service in time of war.

I have now to refer to the Auxiliary Forces.

The militia should be united with the line, forming the 4th and 5th Battalions. The Officers, up to the rank of Captain inclusive, should be liable to serve in time of national emergency with the line or reserve

battalion. The men to be enlisted as at present, but to be available for foreign service in Europe. The men of the militia reserve to be supernumerary to the extent of half their number. I believe it would also be well to induce them to train for a couple of months with their linked battalion. The militia recruits to be trained with the line battalion immediately they enlist. At present a very large number of men take the bounty and never join the Service. Steps must also be taken to make the Officers efficient. All should be compelled to pass through an instructional school, and no one should attain field rank until he has served six months with a regular regiment, and passed an appropriate examination to show that he is fit for the position he aspires to. An Officer, on joining, should serve two months with the line battalion.

The volunteers should be intimately associated with, and form part of, the line and militia regiments. They should wear the same uniform, with some slight variation. The men should undertake to serve for a given period, say two or three years. As a practical fact, in most volunteer corps there is a regimental rule to this effect. All the Officers should be made to pass through a school of instruction, and Inspecting Officers should see that they keep up their knowledge. The different corps should be encouraged to take part in autumn manœuvres. Volunteers should be allowed to join the army reserve under certain conditions. They should be marksmen, have served two years as "efficients," come up to the proper physical standard, and be not less than twenty years of age. It might be necessary to limit the numbers, but by such means as these a very valuable auxiliary reserve might be obtained.

Both varieties of Auxiliary Forces should, I think, be clothed and equipped from the local establishments I have suggested.

So far as the yeomanry are concerned it would seem to me desirable to attach the various corps to regular regiments, on the same principle as the militia and volunteer battalions. It is, however, by no means so essential a part of organization as the former is.

The object sought to be gained by the suggestions I have made is to popularize the Army, and to bring it home to all classes of the nation. By localizing and associating regulars, militia, and volunteers in one regiment, this will be done. It is the volunteer force that has spread military tastes throughout the country, and we have only to foster and direct those tastes to render the British Army a vastly more efficient force than it is at present. By strict localization the inhabitants of each district will feel that the regiment is a part of themselves. There will be less difficulty in getting men for the foreign battalion when those who go to it know they will find in it their own friends and former comrades. By drawing together the bonds between the regulars, the militia, and the volunteers, recruiting will be facilitated, and the supply of men to fill the ranks during war will be rendered far easier. The militiaman or volunteer will join "our battalion" fighting abroad, when it numbers in its ranks his own relations and friends; but the same man would not dream of going to a regiment with which he had no connection whatever. This feeling of

clanship it was which made the old Highland regiments what they were; and this feeling will again, if properly fostered, make regiments which are not mere bands of soldiers but military families.

There are only two arguments against localization which deserve notice, the one that men would marry, the other that they would form too much a part of the civilian population. The latter is now-a-days of no weight. The former can be met by not allowing the men who serve so short a time to marry. On the other hand, must be remembered the saving of the large sum spent every year in moving the regiments from quarter to quarter. Another advantage of the scheme I have sketched is the saving from the fact that every man who goes abroad does so for eight years. At present a man may go to India one year, and be brought back again to join the reserve after two years' service.

I may also point out the advantage of some definite scheme of Army organization. At present our Army forms an agglomeration of battalions, batteries, and squadrons. It is the only army in the world which has no higher unit. By casting it into brigades and divisions mobilization is facilitated. Generals and Staff Officers learn to know in peace the troops they will have to deal with in war; no mean advantage, and one which we have too long neglected. Our Army might be organized into eight divisions of nine battalions infantry, exclusive of the Guards. The twenty-two regiments of cavalry at home to be divided thus:—Three Guard regiments to the Guard division, eight regiments to be told off as divisional cavalry, the remaining eleven into four brigades, one of two, three of three regiments, these latter being the double regiments which furnish the foreign reliefs. The artillery, engineers, and train to be similarly divided. It would perhaps be better to go farther, and to divide the United Kingdom into army corps districts which might to a great extent be independent of the head office. Within these districts the Officer commanding the corps should be supreme. Assisted by his staff he would make the arrangements for the instruction of reserves and auxiliary forces, would work out the mobilization plans, arrange for the necessary drafts for the foreign portions of his corps, &c. To fully describe how this system should be carried out would, however, take more time than is available. It is, moreover, so bound up with the larger subject of the general reform of our Army administration, that the one could not be adequately dealt with without the other.

It may be well to explain why I have placed the war strength of a battalion at 1,200 men. I have done so first of all because 650 is about the largest number of men that we can expect to be allowed for a battalion in peace time, and that number may be raised to 1,200 on war strength without introducing too large a proportion of reserves. Secondly, because while thinking the authorized strength of the British company—125 men—to be a good one, I think it none too large. Experience shows that even before the first actions regiments suffer loss, and it is not too much to assume that if we start with a nominal strength of 1,200 men we shall not have many more than 1,000 when collision takes place.

As to the cost of the scheme. It is always difficult to compare

proposed with existing schemes, as there are always unforeseen points which will affect the calculations with regard to the former. But I do not see any particular reason to believe that my scheme will be more costly than that which exists at present. The points of saving on my proposals are :—

- Saving of pay of one Lieutenant-Colonel per regiment;
- Saving of cost of annual moves;
- Saving of cost of transport of troops abroad and home.

There are other points on which I believe saving would be effected, but which do not easily admit of calculation. On the other side must be put the extra cost of maintaining a larger number of horses for the cavalry, and difference of pay between two Subalterns as opposed to one Captain; in other respects my numbers do not exceed those contained in the General Annual Return of the British Army for the year 1879, and would be maintained by the same expenditure. My proposals as to pay of the men and the increased numbers of the reserve will, of course, involve some expense; but I believe this will not be excessive, and at any rate it will give a *quid pro quo*. With regard to barracks some expense would most likely be incurred, but in a great measure the existing accommodation would suffice.

I have thus briefly sketched the method in which, I believe, our military forces should be organized to meet the varied requirements of our Empire. I have necessarily been obliged to deal somewhat generally with the subject; but to have treated it in detail would require, not one, but twenty hours; and I will, therefore, ask your pardon if I have omitted much that is of importance. It seems to me, however, that we have lived in our chaotic state long enough, and that the time has long come when we may sit down and ask ourselves, what do we want our troops for, how many do we want, and how shall we raise them? Let us only put these questions fairly, and surely we may hope to get something like a definite answer. We have hitherto lived from hand to mouth in our military affairs, let us now try to provide ourselves with a system. We must not, however, forget one thing. Our man-producing machinery may be all that we require, but unless we supplement it by a proper system of training, its working can give us no commensurate results. Autumn manoeuvres seem to be quite forgotten. It is but a few years ago that an elaborate plan was announced by which we were one year to have a large force mobilized for this purpose, the next year a force was to land at some point on our coast, thus practising embarking and disembarking; the third year a portion of our troops were to be trained at some tactical place, such as Aldershot. I need hardly remind you that this programme has never been carried out. We seem to act on the principle that our men require no training, that they know intuitively what others must be taught. Neither in the company, squadron, battery, nor regiment do we instruct them as they should be instructed. No one who is acquainted with foreign armies, especially the Austrian, French, and German, can for a moment doubt that, whether we should copy them in all points or not, they possess one feature at least which we might with advantage imitate, viz., the earnestness of purpose

with which they strive to teach practically in peace what they have to do in war.

A.

Table showing Organization of an Infantry Regiment.

1 Colonel commanding, 1 Regimental Adjutant (a Captain).

1st battalion. Abroad.	2nd battalion. At home.	3rd battalion. Reserve.	4th and 5th battalions. Militia.	6th, &c., battalions. Volunteers.
800	650	To be formed in case of war from supernumerary reservists, supplemented if necessary by militia reservists, and volunteer reservists. Officer cadre to be formed from retired Officers and other qualified individuals. This cadre to be put in the Army List with the regiment.		

Table showing composition of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions in Peace and War Time.

	Peace.				Mr. Childers' scheme.	War.				
	1st battalion.	2nd battalion.	Regimental Staff.	Total.		1st battalion.	2nd battalion.	Addition to peace strength.	Regimental Staff.	3rd battalion.
Lt.-Colonels..	1	1	1	3	5	As before	1	..	1	1 ¹
Majors.....	4	4	..	8	8		4	4 ¹
Captains.....	5	5	1	11	12		5	..	1	5 ¹
Lieutenants..	16	16	..	32	30		24	8 ¹	..	16 ¹
Men.....	800	650	..	54	55	..	1,200			

¹ From reserve of Officers.

B.

Organization of Army.

8 divisions and 1 division of Guards.

- 1 division :—
 - 9 infantry regiments.
 - 1 cavalry regiment.
 - 8 { horse artillery batteries (2 divisions, 10 batteries).
 - { field batteries.
 - 2 engineer companies, including pontoon train, &c.
 - Train.
- Guard division :—
 - 7 battalions Guards.
 - 3 regiments Guards cavalry.
 - 1 battery horse artillery.
 - 7 field batteries.
 - 2 engineer companies.
 - Train.

Four independent cavalry brigades, one of 2, three of 3 regiments, and each with a battery of horse artillery.

C.

Peace Strength of the Army at Home.

Infantry.

63 battalions of 650 men.....	40,950
8 " 1,000 "	8,000
7 " Guards of 650 men	4,550
	<hr/>
	53,500

Cavalry.

22 regiments of 549 men and 500 horses .. 12,078 men, 11,000 horses.

Artillery.

	Guns.	Men.	Horses.
76 batteries of 4 guns, 120 men, and 78 horses..	304	9,120	5,928
4 batteries on war strength.....	24	600	440

Engineers.

18 companies of 120 men 2,160 men, 540 horses.

Train.

18 companies of ? men..... ? men, ? horses.

D.

*War Strength of Army.**Infantry.*

71 2nd battalions of 1,200 men	85,200
71 3rd or reserve battalions of 800 men	56,800
142 4th and 5th militia battalions of 800 men	113,600
Volunteer battalions, say	174,400
	<hr/>
	430,000
Add for Guards { 7 battalions of 1,200 men..... }	14,000
{ 7 reserve battalions of 800 men }	
	<hr/>
	444,000

Cavalry.

22 regiments of 500 horses	11,000
11 reserve regiments of 500 horses	5,500
Yeomanry, say	14,000
	<hr/>
	30,500

Artillery.

80 batteries of 6 guns	12,000 men, 480 guns.
80 reserve batteries of 6 guns	12,000 „ 480 „
Regular, militia, and volunteer garrison artillery.	

Engineers.

18 companies in 3 battalions of 6 companies	3,600
18 reserve companies	3,600
Militia and volunteers.	

Train.

3 battalions of 6 companies of 200 men	3,600
3 reserve battalions of 8 companies of 200 men	4,800
Reserve battalions as necessary.	<hr/>
	8,400

The CHAIRMAN: We shall be glad to hear gentlemen who may have any remarks to make upon this interesting paper. I think I may congratulate the meeting on the presence here of Lord Waveney, who, as we all know, has given great attention to this subject.

LORD WAVENEY: It would be absurd affectation on my part if, after the observations of your Chairman, I were to refrain from saying a few words. I have no doubt given the matter a good deal of consideration, and I have this signal advantage, that I have seen the system emerge from the chaotic state in which, as my gallant friend the lecturer has remarked, it remained for so many years. That chaotic state lasted some thirty years, and it may be said to have first been brought before the notice of the country when the Duke of Wellington, great soldier as he was, spoke in accents of distrust of the power of our troops to repel the attack of a

French army on London. Since that time we have advanced far, and I am happy to acknowledge the chaotic state is so far a thing of the past that many of us can hardly remember it. Things improved by degrees, and in May, 1852, the first camp formed in England since 1813 was established on the common at Chobham. I remember on that occasion that the regimental system was very excellently carried out, and the troops marching on Chobham took up their ground exceedingly well, in fact, the only fault was that there was too much of mere book knowledge, and of course too little of the actual science and practice of war. From point to point we proceeded, and we have no doubt arrived at a moment when our lecturer has appropriately directed our attention to a point of the very greatest importance, if not to the very existence of England, at any rate to the military and political supremacy of the Empire throughout the world. With regard to the British Service, it has this peculiarity, as has been observed again and again, and has been specially remarked in papers on army organization, that a very considerable demand on our military power is based on the need of preparation for small wars. These wars are reproducing themselves on every occasion. Last evening I was present at the debate on the war in the Transvaal, and I have been present at the discussion of three or four Kafir wars in the Lower House of Parliament, and I am afraid we are not likely to be quit of these wars for some time. With regard to the duties which fall upon us as compared with other countries, of course it is a comparatively easy thing for great Empires like Prussia and Austria, who only fight a great war once in a quarter of a century, and whose men are always in their own divisions and departments. It is, however, a very different thing when we come to the three great fighting armies of the world—the Russian, the French, and the British. The Russians especially, like ourselves, are always prepared for war. The French, I believe, thoroughly see the necessity for the same preparation in respect of their African possessions, and therefore it is that we require a system more applicable at a moment's notice than is required by the other Great Powers, and our system must be elastic in proportion to the enemy with whom we have to deal. I was very much struck on reading in a recent paper of the Royal Artillery Institute the reports of three young Officers in the Royal Artillery. One was a report of an expedition against the Naga tribe in India; the second was an account of the march of an elephant battery from Mooflan to Candahar; and the third was the report of another march in Africa. Those young Officers were in command of their respective expeditions, with the honour of England resting upon their individual efforts in a country to which the soldiers they led were not accustomed, and yet, as is evident from the internal evidence of these papers, they understood their duties thoroughly and did their work well. Service of that kind not only requires considerable preparation but also military instincts, and those military instincts are never wanting in England, when fair play is given them. The behaviour of many a young Officer in the presence of great bodies of rebels in the Indian Mutiny will illustrate this. With regard to supplying our strength for foreign expeditions and home defence, there is one point that has not yet attracted attention, and that is this: if we come to a great stress of war, whether it be for European service or *quasi* European service, as in the case of East Europe, at Sebastopol, you will find a resource, believe me, of no ordinary, —I may say, of extraordinary—amount, in the militia regiments. I speak thus of my own knowledge, that the authorities at Woolwich would have hailed with satisfaction the presence of the artillery regiments of militia before the lines of Sebastopol, because in them they had the material of soldiers who would have met difficulty, sickness, and famine from the training they had received. They were of the best class of soldiers for the field; they were men from 19 to 23 or 24 years of age, who had been drilled for three or four years, and in the interval had passed their time in the occupation of country or maritime life; and I may say of those whom I had the honour to command that a very large proportion of them were men who spent one-half of the year in rough lodgings or at sea, were thoroughly inured to exposure, and able to go anywhere. But let me say this—do not break up regiments, do not interfere with the militia system; if the men are well officered they will go anywhere, they will not volunteer into other regiments, but they will go with their own Officers. With regard to preparation for European service we have various ports of embarkation—Harwich, Portsmouth and Plymouth, Cork and Limerick. Now,

for any expedition at sea it would be well to determine the regiments on each of those points in succession, and in preparation for the *corps d'armée* which should be taken abroad. I believe that real serious work would very soon teach the least-formed soldier what his duty is, and indeed I may refer to the practice of the Italian infantry. The Italian infantry are for twelve years in the first class, two years and eight months with the colours, and the rest of the time with the reserve; but during those two years and eight months continuously, they do not leave the colours. They are thoroughly trained, and the knowledge they gain of their work is very great. And now, at the risk of perhaps speaking of the Service to which I belong rather more prominently than I ought, I will say according to the training which militia regiments get in the ordinary way of two months of preliminary drill during the first year, and a third month for brigade drill, it is a very slow militia regiment indeed that cannot come on to parade on the day of assembly at 9 o'clock, have accoutrements given out, hair cut, arms ready, do a day's march, and hang up their packs in camp at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

Captain LUMLEY, late 13th Prussian Uhlans: I shall commence what I am about to say by a few words of apology. It may be that my observations will not all come from an English point of view, but they will come from the heart of an Englishman. By a quibble of age I was prevented from serving my own country, and took foreign service, which enables me to give you my ideas on an English subject as viewed by foreigners. I first had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of our lecturer when he was learning our ideas abroad, and I have since had the benefit of his assistance in this country. He began by alluding to India. Now I am certain that the most important point in regard to the defence of the British Empire is ensuring the protection of that country. There is not the slightest doubt that within a short period England will have to defend her Indian Empire by force of arms. Russian Officers have told me on many occasions that the object of their advance in Central Asia is India, of which they make no secret. I maintain, therefore, that England should be prepared at any moment to place a competent army in the field to oppose a Russian advance on India. I will not touch upon the question of Candahar, but there is no doubt the nearer you are to your base the more likely you are to annihilate your opponent, especially if he has a long line of communication to keep up. Captain James says that for the home defence of England it is necessary to have a regular army with a large proportion of regular soldiers. From the experience that I have gained not only in European wars, but also in one in Africa, I am of opinion that the Volunteer force of England, together with the Militia, is quite competent to resist any invasion. I will not forget to mention in the first instance that, with the help of the Navy, an invasion of England I believe to be a myth, and a thing we need not trouble our heads about. Therefore in all our military reorganizations I think we should look to the defence of our colonies and of India, and leave the matter of home defence alone, for I am sure that British hearts will defend England of their own accord. Allusion was made to the colonial forces that they were badly commanded, and so on. It is very true, but the responsibility lies greatly with the Officers who held the superior commands at the outbreak of the war. Great power was given them, but they would not take the responsibility themselves, but shifted it on to the individuals who raised the irregular corps, and allowed them to nominate men who did not know how to command and had never been soldiers, while on the spot there were many English Officers who had come out to seek service, but because they did not know the people raising the corps they did not get employment, while inefficient men were put into the places in their stead. This would have been avoided if a little more trouble had been taken. A remark was made with respect to an expeditionary force in Europe, but I will pass it over, for I do not think that such an expedition is at all likely to take place. With regard to the cavalry, Captain James inferred that there should be cavalry reserve regiments formed; this is a most difficult thing to do properly, and I agree with him that cavalry regiments should always be maintained on a war footing, because you cannot make cavalry soldiers in one, two, or three years. Perhaps three years may be the limit. With regard to cavalry reserve men you may always find good employment for them. The Transport, Commissariat, and ambulances require men that have served in the cavalry. In Prussia

the men who have served their time in the Army with cavalry regiments are employed in those duties. When war is declared the wagons, &c., which are always ready, are horsed, and they are called in to act as drivers and conductors. There are one or two points I wish to add on my own behalf. I maintain that if you wish to have an efficient army, its reorganization must be complete, and if necessary it must be entirely rebuilt with the good material now so inefficiently put together. For this purpose these are the points which must have the consideration of those who have to do it; 1. A proper distribution, organization, and localization of the forces; 2. How to increase the numerical strength of the Army with as little expense as possible; 3. How to raise the efficiency as well as the social status of the soldier; 4. How to obtain good non-commissioned officers, and provide for their ultimate welfare; 5. To raise the efficiency of the Officers by allotting to them the proper duties of their calling; 6. To better their pecuniary position, and to regulate their promotion. It would take me a long time to go minutely into these six points; I will, therefore, touch on them very slightly so as to give you an idea of my opinion. As to the first point, by distribution of forces I mean, in the first place, you should not have a jumbled-up army without properly organized divisions and brigades. You should have your divisions, your staff, as well as your brigades, always ready, so that you are in a position to send them away in a body when necessary. I saw this difficulty out in Zululand, and I have seen it before. Nothing is so injurious to a force as getting a lot of Staff Officers together who do not know one another. How is it possible for them to act together under such circumstances? It is very much like putting four horses in a team who have never been driven together, and expecting them to go properly. As to localization, I must say that in localization lies the future strength of the Army, because by localization you will improve the status of the soldier. Until now the soldier has been an outcast: he has been looked upon by the British public as a man they did not like to approach; but if he joins the regiment of his own county he will be known there, which will induce him to behave properly, and he will consequently gain respect, and a better class of recruits will be obtained. Then women will not be ashamed to be seen with a soldier; but, on the contrary, they will feel a pride in their acquaintance. The women of Germany are afraid of being seen with a man who has not been a soldier, because they say he must be good for nothing, for a man who has been convicted cannot enter the army. No doubt the double-battalion system is the only one which will be effective. There ought to be two battalions attached to these double-battalion regiments, a reserve battalion, and the militia, the militia formed upon the principle upon which it is formed at present, so that the sons of county gentlemen not adopting the Army as a profession, and the Officers who have served in the county regiment after their term of active service is completed, should officer the militia and reserve battalions of the regiment they originally joined. If you do that you will localize your army, and there will be a better *esprit de corps*, the Officers and men vying with one another to make their county regiment the best in the kingdom. There is but one way to increase the numerical strength of the Army as economically as possible. The lesson was taught the Prussians by Napoleon, after the Treaty of Tilsit, "short service," by which means alone you can obtain a strong reserve. I maintain that a soldier can be made a competent infantry soldier in three years if properly drilled and taught. But, on the other hand, we must consider India, and the expense of moving troops backwards and forwards, and therefore what the lecturer has said as to offering inducements to the men to join for service in India for a lengthened period is certainly the right thing to be done. Some people say short service has given us boys. Why has it given boys? Because the recruiting sergeants have enlisted men who were not men, and consequently this objection is to be attributed to the way the system has been carried out, and not to the system itself. As I have already said, improvement in the social status of the soldier is only to be attained by localization, by bringing him to his home, and by looking upon him as one of the people. Captain James said there were two reasons against this: one that the men would marry, and the other that the men would form part of the nation. Let them marry if they like—you need not recognize the wives of those who marry without leave; as to the second objection, I am of the opinion that the soldier should form part of the

people. With regard to obtaining good non-commissioned officers, that is to be done by future inducements. There are in England many county as well as public institutions which will provide amply for worthy men who have served a certain period. Those positions should vary, and the pay should be varied according to the length of service of that non-commissioned officer. If he leaves after eleven, fourteen, or eighteen years, he should have a corresponding position given to him. This will be an economy to the nation, and it will give an inducement to the men to stay. After twenty-five years they should be allowed not only to draw their pensions but to receive appropriate employment besides. As to raising the efficiency of the Officers, that is a difficult subject to touch upon, especially placed as I am; but in my opinion the English Officers are not at present employed exactly as they should be. I believe the material of the English Officer is as good as any in the world, but his instruction and training does not conduce to efficiency. He is not taught to teach his men, consequently the men do not look up to him for instruction and example; they look more to the sergeants than they do to the Officers. What should be done is this: the English Officers should do the work that is now done by the non-commissioned officers, and the non-commissioned officers the inspection work which is done by the Officers. The Army should be looked upon not as a pastime, not for persons to go into and amuse themselves, but it should be looked upon as a profession upon which depends the existence of the Officer and that of his family after him; for this purpose inducements should be held out to the Officers so as to make it worth their while to devote their whole life to their profession. These tables will show you how much money is wasted. Here you have 27 Officers to 800 men, nominally a tremendous proportion. In Germany there are to a battalion 1,000 strong, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 4 Captains, 13 Lieutenants (4 1st and 9 2nd Lieutenants), including the battalion Adjutant. What you want is to make the company the unit, to give the Captain greater responsibility, to make him solely answerable for the efficiency as well as interior economy of his company. By having 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 4 Majors commanding companies, 4 Captains corresponding to the 1st Lieutenants in Germany and 9 Lieutenants, a great saving in money would result, and promotion would be facilitated. I propose that the money saved in this manner should be divided proportionately among the Officers, thus improving the pecuniary portion. The bane of the English Service is the Adjutant. Why? Because he is himself in a false position, and puts Officers in the same. Moreover, the Colonels are apt to look to him and the non-commissioned officers alone for the efficiency of their regiments. In the Prussian Service the Captain is answerable by his commission to the Emperor for the efficiency and drill of his company or squadron. If that were done in England you could do away with the Adjutant as he now is, and he would become what he is in Germany and in Austria, the writer and private secretary of the Colonel, which is his right position. I hope you will accept what I have said in the spirit in which it has been said.

Colonel BLUNDELL: It appears to me that reserve men should certainly be liable to serve in any little war in which the brigade to which they belonged is engaged, nor can I see the object of giving a reserve man 6*d.* a day unless that is the case. Great wars only occur once in about fifty years, and twenty-five years elapsing between the Crimean War and the first time our reserves could have been called out. Our reserve is very small as compared with the requirements of the country. If it ever reaches 60,000 men, it will not even raise all the regiments to a war strength, so that to call it a reserve is a misnomer.¹ No one, however, who has seen it can doubt its extreme value; but really the reserve men should be regarded merely as men on long furlough. If reserve men were liable to serve with their former brigade in little wars there is no reason to fear that it would prevent men enlisting, and therefore why not make them liable for such service? The next point that occurs to me is as to the Army Reserve men. We have constantly cases of men in the Army Reserve who try to re-enlist, and do so successfully. They re-enlist and re-enlist again, and are what is called "relegated" to the reserve after com-

¹ The population of the United Kingdom is as large as that of the United States was at the time of their civil war. The history of that war illustrates the point urged.

pleting long periods of imprisonment at the public cost. Their excuse is they cannot get work. It would be a great advantage apparently that these men should be allowed to re-enlist for general service, and should be sent to India. The objection appears to be the idea that they would establish a claim to pension if their re-enlisting was permitted; but that might be met if their former service were allowed to count only in the case of their being invalided "in and by" the Service, or their being wounded. The next point I wish to urge is, that a battalion of 480 men is reduced below the strength at which it can possibly be efficient—I mean to say efficient even for the purposes of instruction. Many of the men probably are recruits.¹ There are men detached and employed in various ways, bandsmen and so on, and really the number left is quite insufficient. What I would urge is that men seventeen years old ought to be allowed to be engaged at a lower rate of pay, and posted to battalions last for foreign service; they might receive the sort of pay that soldiers formerly used to get until they can be called able-bodied. I think every one will agree that it would be advantageous if the weakest battalions were not reduced below 550 or 600 men; but the question, I presume, is one of expense. What economy could be made? I think one of the militia battalions at a brigade depôt should be the depôt itself. It should be commanded by an Army Officer belonging to one of the regiments of the sub-district. In that way a considerable saving would be effected, and I think also one corps of musicians² ought to perform the duties of bandsmen and drummers for a battalion. By reducing our battalions to 480 men, we really destroy their efficiency, because in our position we cannot measure our little wars. We might have two little wars on hand at once, and then we should require to raise these battalions to full strength. This country cannot afford to give up taking men at seventeen. They are the best men you can get if you can afford to keep them for a couple of years. General Bulwer's should be a trammel-net to take all kinds.

Colonel Sir LUMLEY GRAHAM, Bart.: There is only one branch of the subject on which I wish to make one or two remarks in allusion to what Captain Lumley has so ably stated about the training of the soldier and the Officer, and also in allusion to what Colonel Blundell has said. Colonel Blundell states that our infantry battalions on the reduced establishment are 480 rank and file, and are too small for efficient training. The Prussian battalions, which we allow to be very efficient indeed, are all on their peace establishment, I think, 444 rank and file.³

¹ In estimating the minimum establishment necessary for a battalion, the large deductions to be anticipated from that establishment are to be considered. There are men at musketry, at gymnastics, undergoing courses of signalling, non-commissioned officers at Chatham, Hythe, &c., men employed as school assistants, at the canteen and refreshment bar, shoemakers, tailors, servants, batmen, not only for the battalion but frequently for the depôt and militia regiments attached to it; non-commissioned officers are often required for militia as cooks and drill instructors. During a little war volunteers are often called for for the Army Service Corps and Army Hospital Corps, and at the same time soldiers are called for to replace the men of those departments temporarily. The percentage of recruits is greater than formerly, as many purchase their discharge within the three months. A commanding Officer with his battalion so pulled to pieces may then receive an order to call for volunteers for some brigade which has a battalion in the field. The probability is that battalions in the Prussian Service on a small establishment are not liable to be depleted in this way, and that a mere comparison of establishment as between an English and Prussian battalion is delusive. It is contended that the British Army, as a whole, would be stronger if the minimum establishment of a battalion were increased to 600, even if it involved the reduction of the war establishment fixed for a battalion in the 1st Army Corps.

² The power of purchasing his discharge by a bandsman when instructed at the public expense embarrasses a battalion and requires modification.

³ The peace establishment of a Prussian line battalion is 18 Officers, 54 non-commissioned officers, and 460 privates (including 16 musicians). There are thus 444 privates exclusive of musicians.

The CHAIRMAN: It is nearer 400, I believe.

Sir LUMLEY GRAHAM: That will only make my argument the stronger, for those battalions carry on their training most efficiently. There is no soldier in the world better trained than the Prussian soldier. Why is that? Because they have the most perfect company instruction. How is it they can get this perfect company instruction? We with our battalions of 480 men cannot get any company instruction, and that is the chief reason why our men are trained so much worse now than they used to be. I am not an eye-witness of it now, having left the Service; but I hear it stated on all sides that the training of the British infantry soldier is not what it used to be. Why is that? Because there is no company instruction whatever. Why is that? Because the battalions 480 strong are divided into eight companies of 60 rank and file per company. Every one knows that with casuals and all the various duties that have to be performed and so forth, a Captain can get very seldom enough men together to represent even a section on parade. How can he instruct these men, how can he instruct himself, and how can he instruct his subalterns? I was reading the other day a very interesting account about the training of the Prussian Army, and I found that a Captain in a Prussian infantry regiment can, as a rule, depend on having ninety men on parade, and with ninety men you can teach and learn a good deal; therefore what I want to state is that you can very well have small battalions, and have them efficient if you have large companies. To have large companies you must divide the battalion into fewer companies; therefore for the sake of effective instruction, as well as for many other reasons, I think the proper organization of a British battalion should be in four companies on the Prussian system.

Colonel NORBURY: Although I have been a member of this Institution for twenty-five years, this is the first lecture I have had the pleasure of attending; and I wish to state that I have received very great pleasure and instruction from so doing. All I will do now is to take exception to one column in Table A—the third or reserve battalion, which I see is suggested to be formed in case of war partly from the reserves of the militia and volunteers, to be officered from the reserve of Officers. I must say, for my part, I think it would be more practicable to form your third or your reserve battalion by embodying the first battalion of the militia, which is really the third battalion of the line regiment, or will be, I suppose, very shortly. I cannot help thinking that the reserve battalion, as suggested in that column, would be rather a scratch lot, composed of a great number of men, no doubt individually very good, and officered by an entirely strange body of Officers. I have the honour of commanding, I believe, the strongest militia regiment in England (the Worcestershire) with two battalions; and I cannot help thinking it would be more practical that, in the event of the second line battalion being called upon to take service, the first thing to be done would be to embody the first militia battalion of that brigade; and it would be far more serviceable and reliable, especially when we remember what good service the militia battalions rendered to this country both in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, instead of calling out the proposed third or reserve battalion, simply to embody one or both of the militia battalions of the district. Lord Waveney has spoken of the character of the men who formed the militia force of this country, and I must bear testimony to the greatly increased efficiency of late years of the Officers, and particularly the junior Officers, of the militia. I served some years in the line myself, in the cavalry, and I have no hesitation in saying that the standard of efficiency required from Officers of militia in these days at least equals that which was required from Officers of the line in the days when I was in the line myself. I do not mean to say the same progress has not been made in the line. No doubt a higher standard is required in the line; but I maintain that the examinations that the militia Officers are subjected to, the degree of efficiency expected from them at the general inspection, and so forth, is such that a militia Officer of the present day is certainly required to know as much as a line Officer did when I joined the Service thirty years ago. With regard to what Captain Lumley stated, I entirely agree with the expression he made use of, that a great deal too much is left to the Adjutant; but that evil is very much mitigated in the regiment to which I belong. We have two battalions with one Adjutant, and in consequence of the very great amount of office work which is thrown upon

him during training, the company Officers have to do very much what Captain Lumley has described, namely, to drill and train their own companies. The militia sergeants are, no doubt, good, trustworthy men; and they can do their work on guard, and so on, but they cannot drill their men. The duty, therefore, falls upon the company Officers of taking a very great share in the instruction of individual companies. There are only nominally two staff-sergeants to a company. Many of these are away on other duties, and consequently the question of drill and instruction left to a great extent in the hands of the Captain and subalterns. I am sure that no Officers in the Service work harder than militia Officers. They all attend two parades a day, and drill and instruct their own companies to a very great extent, and to that I very much attribute their greatly increased efficiency.

General HERBERT: I entirely concur with Sir Lumley Graham in what he said about the advantage of having four companies instead of eight. I have had a good deal of experience in the instruction of young Officers and in the instruction of regiments; and when I was in command in Ireland I found that it was totally impossible to have a company sufficiently strong off duty on parade for instruction by the Officer in command. The Officers complained to me constantly that they had to attend parades when there were no men of their companies: the men were on guard, on fatigue, or employed in a variety of ways, leaving perhaps from 40 to 80 men in the whole regiment for parade. No doubt, the organization in the Appendix N, submitted to the Royal Commission of which Lord Penzance was President, states there are to be four Majors, but those four Majors are not to be dummies, as in the scheme proposed by the Secretary of State for War, going on parade to do nothing: but there were to be four Officers, each in actual command of one-fourth of the battalion. The musketry instructor was to be done away with; the drill and musketry instruction to be imparted by the company Officers; the Adjutant was to be the secretary and aide of the Colonel, and was not to interfere with the companies in the instruction imparted to them by their Officers. An organization has been established with four Majors, but I have not heard any one as yet state what the duties of these Officers are to be. There were two Lieutenant-Colonels recommended by the Royal Commission, one to take the place of the Major with the service companies or to command the dépôt with the home battalion. Now I am confident that Officers will never take interest in their companies, and the men will never look up to their Officers in a proper manner, unless the Officer is actually in command of the company at all times. At the present time, on an average from 120 to 200, and sometimes more, recruits join a regiment in a year; these remain on an average six months at drill; during that time the Officers commanding companies, except to sign their accounts and to see them in the barrack-room, have literally nothing to say to their men; the Officers waste their time, not because they wish to do so, but because they are obliged to. The Officers I have met with have been most anxious to do their duty, and I have never found them grumble at any work I gave them. When at the Curragh, during the summer drills, there were three parades a day, and I never heard the slightest complaint from any of the Officers. The lecturer has said that Officers in the dépôts have nothing to do. Now, if he had seen a dépôt when both battalions were abroad, or when a battalion was augmented, and the recruits were arriving at the rate of 10, 20, or 30 per diem, he would not have said that those Officers have nothing to do. In one of the brigade dépôts under my command, 500 strong, the Officers had as much work as they could do, because they were obliged to drill and instruct their own men, and detachments had to be sent out, the barracks not being large enough to contain the whole of the large number of recruits necessary to supply the wants of the regiments abroad. In time of peace, I will admit that Officers at some of the dépôts have not much to do; but you must remember that those dépôts were not established only for times of peace, they were intended not merely to equip the recruits, but at the dépôt the recruit was to remain three months, and receive his preliminary instruction. According to the present regulations, instead of carrying on the system recommended by the Localization Committee, that all recruits joining should be drilled for three months previous to being sent to their regiments, the orders are that they shall be sent on to the linked battalion at home as soon as they are clothed, and as soon as they can muster twenty to be sent together.

That is not carrying out the recommendations of the Localization Committee. But if those recommendations were carried out, and the recruits at the dépôt were formed into one company and drilled under the immediate superintendence of the Officers of that company, the system advocated by Sir Lumley Graham, by myself, and in the Appendix N alluded to, and which is carried out in all foreign armies, the Officers would then have full occupation and be usefully employed. What I advocate is, that men should be thoroughly drilled in preliminary recruit and musketry drill at the dépôt, and then sent to the battalions at home for battalion drill. The battalions at home should have no men at elementary drill with the exception of headquarter recruits. I do not quite agree that it would be advisable to localize our regiments, as proposed by the lecturer; if we were a country like Germany, no doubt it would be the proper plan. The localization system there is admirable; but our own country is differently constituted. I do not think that any regiment would enjoy being localized at, say, Athlone, Castlebar, Mullingar, &c. I do not think the system would, for other reasons, answer in Ireland; many disadvantages would arise from localizing in that country. There are places in England, such as Burnley and some of the manufacturing towns, where localization, as wished for by the lecturer, would be most unpopular. Imagine the feelings of an Officer gazetted to a regiment localized in one of these towns, and reflecting that whenever his corps was on home service he would be stationed at Burnley, &c. No doubt, if it were possible, it would in many respects be advantageous. It may also be said against localization as proposed, that there are many places where you cannot obtain recruits. The great majority of our recruits are enlisted in large towns; those men must be sent to some dépôt, and it does not very much matter to them whether they are sent to a regiment at Aldershot or elsewhere. The expenditure which our lecturer saves, I think, would be very doubtful, for I presume he would like these localized regiments to be assembled for military manœuvres; to send regiments down from the north of Scotland for manœuvres at Aldershot, or to send regiments from all parts of Ireland for manœuvres at the Curragh, is so expensive that it could never be done. When I was in command in Ireland I was most anxious, and the Colonels of the militia regiments were most anxious also, to have certain regiments from the west of Ireland brought up to the Curragh to undergo instruction once in every five years. We appealed to the War Office, and the answer was, that they thought the plan an excellent one, but the expense would be too much. I am therefore afraid that regiments localized in the north of Scotland and other out-of-the-way places would remain there, and would never come down to England. In regard to the proposal of the lecturer relative to cavalry, I differ entirely. My opinion is, and I believe it is that of many cavalry Officers, that if you have well-drilled cavalry soldiers and Officers you can easily drill the horses. I should like to see a regiment of 600 troopers with 300 horses: any one who has had any experience with horses will know that those 300 horses will go through four great field days a week, and that would be quite sufficient to instruct the 600 men. I would undertake, and many cavalry Officers have told me the same, to stand at the corner of the Regent Circus and to mount a cavalry regiment within an hour, if I was allowed to take the horses passing by; there would be no great difficulty in finding horses when required. The horses also are the most expensive portion of the regiment to keep up, because a horse, on an average, in a cavalry regiment will not last above six years. I should be very sorry to see the dépôts done away with. It was my fate when the Crimean War broke out to be left in England for the first two or three months (when the regiment went on to Malta) in command of a dépôt. There was no organization for it. We were ordered to form dépôts at home very much in this way: A commanding Officer was dug up from half-pay, an Adjutant and a Quartermaster from somewhere else. There was no sergeant-major, no quartermaster-sergeant, no drill-sergeant, no mess for Officers or sergeants; it was totally impossible to carry out the instruction of the crowd of recruits who poured in. We must have dépôts ready to be a point of formation when the headquarters of regiments embark. Had I time, I would go into a system of organization which I think would meet every want: but I am sure gentlemen have heard enough from me.

Captain BARRINGTON, R.A.: I should like to make one or two remarks with

reference to the able lecture we have heard. It seems to me to go very much beyond what any of us can expect will be done, but in one respect it has not touched upon a very important part of the subject generally, and that is, the arming of the troops. One great object that I conceive the lecturer has, is to bring together the various branches of the Service, the regulars, militia, and volunteers, and even his reserve battalions, I perceive, are formed of supernumeraries from various sources, including the militia and even the volunteers; but in the hasty bringing together of these men it must be remembered that the regulars and militia are differently armed, and it would create confusion and difficulty in training the militiamen thoroughly in the use of the arm to which they have not been accustomed, and, of course, it would be impossible that they should carry the same arm that they previously had; therefore, I think it would be an essential point that the militia and the volunteers also should, as soon as possible, be armed similarly to the regulars. There is not only the objection with regard to the different arms, but what follows in consequence, with regard to the different ammunition in the field, and all reserves would have to be calculated with reference to two or three kinds of ammunition instead of with reference to one. For infantry you would have the Martini-Henry ammunition and the Snider,¹ and all ammunition columns would have to be considered with reference to these, as well as the regimental and field reserves, and this could hardly fail to create confusion in supplying ammunition in the field. Again, even with the Martini-Henry arm there is a different ammunition required for the cavalry carbine from that which is taken by the rifle, which is a very great disadvantage. The ammunition can no doubt be used on an emergency, but it is not primarily intended that it should be so. We want simplicity in these matters. As regards the excellent tables we see before us, there is one point on which I would observe: the establishment of the home battalions at a uniform strength of 650 appears to be low. Undoubtedly it is superior to the bulk of battalions under the proposed scheme, which number 480 rank and file only, but, inasmuch as 650 is recommended as a uniform battalion strength, it seems to me to be inferior to the proposed scheme in one respect, which proposes a certain number of battalions on a much higher establishment for emergent services, exclusive of the Guards, which have also a special establishment. I should prefer to have a uniform establishment of 600 for 50 of the 71 battalions on home service, and an establishment of 800 for the remaining 21, keeping the Guards as a reserve. The 21 battalions would be the infantry strength of one army corps, and would be available for a small war, or the equipment of the first army corps for a great army. In the other battalions you would have a uniform strength of 600, and to complete a second and third army corps we should draw upon the reserves to complete the establishments. The great and difficult task, no doubt, is the formation of a sufficient reserve, and I take it our requirements for a great army would be, as I think Captain James shadowed out, about three army corps. The bulk of the battalions being 600 strong, in order to create a reserve rapidly they should enlist about one-half or two-thirds of their strength for a short service of three years, the men passing into the reserve for nine years more, and the remaining portion of the battalion might be enlisted for eight years' colour service, and four years in the reserve, which would give a proportion of older men, and all the 21 battalions should be uniformly enlisted for eight years with the colours and four years in the reserve, doing away with the linked battalion system and having dépôts 300 strong to feed the battalions in India, and 200 strong to feed the colonial battalions. Then these dépôts would enlist and train men to feed the battalions abroad, and the business of the home battalions, which need have no dépôts, would be to form a reserve. That would be their primary work. Under the new scheme, men after three years' service will be allowed and even encouraged within certain limits to pass into the reserve, while at the same time all seven years' men must go into the reserve; and large drains having to be made upon battalions for foreign service, the arrangement will necessitate such an influx of recruits into the battalions that when they have to go on service they will have

¹ These remarks apply specially to the case of home defence at the present time, when the militia would have to take the field armed as they are with Snider rifles.

perhaps over one-third to one-fourth of the men under one or two years' service, which would be a serious evil.

Captain JAMES: There are very few points in the discussion which require reply. First, with regard to what Captain Lumley said about the number of Officers in the Prussian Service as compared with our own. I think a very common mistake is made in the mode of calculating the number of Officers. People are apt to forget that individual who in Prussia is known as the "Porte-épée-Fähnrich;" he, to all intents and purposes, is an Officer, and you will see if you work out the war-strength of a Prussian company, with its Captain, its subalterns, and its "Porte-épée-Fähnrich," who holds the same position in the Prussian Army as a midshipman does in our Navy, *i.e.*, although technically not an Officer he is practically one—you will see that on a war-footing the proportion of men to Officers in the Prussian Service is exactly the same as in our own. I quite agree with what Captain Lumley says about the Adjutant. I believe no one doubts now-a-days that the proper individuals to instruct the men are the company Officers. With regard to what Colonel Blundell said about the reserves being allowed to join the colours, I think that this should be permitted, especially for the drafts, which I propose to send annually to join the foreign battalion. If a man finds he cannot get employment and would like to return to his regiment, let him do so by all means. Say to him, "Here is a draft going out; you may join it and serve your eight years with it 'instead of the reserve.'" I think Colonel Blundell misapprehended what I said about the battalion. My 71 battalions of 650 strong come to about the same thing as the different varieties of strength proposed, and you get the advantage of having a more uniform organization. With regard to what Sir Lumley Graham said about training the men, my 650 men will give, roughly speaking, about 80 men for a company; but with regard to the numbers we get on parade, I cannot help thinking there is a point that we suffer from in England, and it is a point on which the Duke of Wellington remarked in the Peninsula, namely, the enormous number of men we consume as orderlies and servants. He said he never could get the British cavalry, because everybody who could get an orderly always insisted upon having one, and the cavalry was swallowed up doing duties for which it was not primarily intended. With regard to Colonel Norbury's remarks about my third battalion. My reason for having so large a proportion of the army service passed in the reserve, is that when you have filled up your home battalion to war strength, you will still have a sufficient number of men left to form the third battalion. I propose to make it 800 men strong as a first step; that gives you a dépôt of efficient and trained men, who would be able to take their places in the ranks and furnish drafts for the battalion engaged on active service abroad. If it were necessary to increase this number, then by all means call in your militia and volunteer reserves, but do not use them in the first place. With regard to Officers, I do not think it would do to take the Officers at one fell swoop from the militia battalion and put them into the third battalion, for they would know nothing of their men. If my Officers are taken in the way I propose, that is to say, if men who have served in the regiment form the reserve of Officers, the men who would form the third battalion would be in large proportion known to the Officers. I believe everybody will agree that the efficiency of militia Officers has increased *pari passu* with that of Officers of other branches of the Service; and the only thing I wish to ensure is that there shall be no case of a regiment having even one Officer who is not efficient. If that is not the case, what I say falls to the ground; but I think some system should be introduced by which the qualifications of everybody in the reserve forces should be tested. At present you may have, for instance, a commanding Officer who is known by all his battalion to be inefficient, but, nevertheless, he is allowed to stop on in command. I quite agree with General Herbert as to the duty of the Major under the new system. The duties of the Major are rather like the Spanish fleet. "The Spanish fleet you cannot see because it is not yet in sight." What he said with regard to dépôts seems to me to apply more particularly to the old dépôt battalion.

General HERBERT: The present dépôt.

Captain JAMES: The present dépôt, at the strength it is going to be, is, in my opinion (and I trust a good many people will go with me in that opinion), enormously over-officered. According to the present system, for 47 régiments, the strength of

the dépôt is not to exceed 50 men in peace, and you are to have 5 Officers for that dépôt, excluding the Colonel, &c., and their sole duty is to look after these 50 men.

General HERBERT: You will have recruits?

Captain JAMES: Yes, but the dépôt, according to the proposed organization, is not to exceed 50 men.

General HERBERT: It would be as well to explain that those dépôts have to take the recruits for the whole regiment. You cannot say how many that will be, because the strength of the regiment may be less and the dépôt more, while in the total there will only be a certain number. The regiment should be 450 and the dépôt 50, but a regiment may be only 400 and the dépôt may be 100.

Captain JAMES: Therefore, it seems to me the more reason to amalgamate the home battalion and dépôt into one. With the system of small dépôts it is notorious that Officers have often nothing at all to do. With regard to the localization of regiments, I am perfectly sure you can never have proper mobilization until you have localization; for if the men are to join their regiments anywhere and everywhere, how can it be quickly and properly done? That because localization is adopted it is necessary to put regiments in out-of-the-way places, has yet to be proved. Personally I do not see that there is any such necessity. With regard to the expense of my plan. It would, of course, be necessary to assemble the localized regiments from time to time for manœuvres; but moving regiments in marching order without impedimenta is far less costly than moving them as at present with all their baggage and women and children. With regard to the question of horses, certainly all foreign nations keep their cavalry on a war footing; and, so far as I am aware, they do not put it forward as their reason because their men cannot ride, and it is not only a question of putting untrained horses into ranks; but horses taken out of a civilian stable and treated as cavalry horses must be when in the ranks are very liable to catch cold, which is often followed by a regular epidemic of influenza. Some Officers here saw the horses at Aldershot in 1878, which had been purchased when there was a probability of war, and they well know that a great percentage of them were incapacitated because they caught influenza. It is well known when you purchase large quantities of horses and take them out of stables they do catch cold in that way. That is a fact which shows to my mind very conclusively that it does not do at the last moment to purchase a large number of horses.

General HERBERT: The horses at the manœuvres were all bought in that way, and there was no disease.

Captain JAMES: In 1866, when the Prussian Cavalry adopted this plan, they say that within a very short time after they went into the field they lost a very large number of horses from sickness, because they could not stand the exposure. Such a practical trial is worth any number of peace experiments, which may be conducted under peculiarly favourable conditions.

Captain LUMLEY: In Prussia no horse unless it has been a year in the regiment is allowed to go on service.

Captain JAMES: With regard to the collection of Officers for the third battalion, I say these are not a heterogeneous collection, but they are Officers who, if my proposals were carried out, would have served with the regiment in nine cases out of ten; or if not would at least have had a certain amount of training with the regiment. They would, therefore, possess an *esprit de corps*; therefore, it is not the case to say that Officers assembled together in that way are a heterogeneous collection of Officers. With regard to what Captain Barrington said, of course everybody knows our forces ought to have a uniform armament. This is a most important point. We have three different kinds of ammunition in the reserves—for the Martini-Henry, the cavalry carbine, and the Snider. It would not affect the men whether they were put into battalions with these arms or not; because the same thing would apply to a mobilization of the army corps, where militia and line regiments are brigaded together. I think there is nothing else to which I need reply.

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion has been so protracted that I think there is not time for me to say much regarding the lecture itself. The subject is one of very great importance, and I am sure we have all listened with the deepest interest to the lecture which has been given upon it by Captain James, and also to the valuable

discussion which has followed. Captain James pointed out a great number of blots in our present military organization, and although I am not in the secrets of the Government, I think I am in a position to say that a great number of the blots to which he referred have already been corrected—at least measures have been taken for correcting them—and when the reforms which are now being carried out have been completely given effect to, many of those blots will exist no longer. With reference to the number of guns, we are now following the example of foreign nations in reducing our number of guns in a battery from six to four during peace service, except in those batteries which stand first for employment. With regard to linked battalions, it would seem that he was not aware that the linked battalion system is to be converted into a system of double-battalion regiments, and henceforth the Army will consist practically of seventy large territorial regiments, each consisting of at least two battalions of the line, whose individuality will be merged in the regiment, and which will no longer be the individual integers they were lately. They will be of one regiment, in the same way as the battalions of the Rifle Brigade, or the battalions of the 60th. There will be also with them two battalions of militia, and I hope by-and-bye we shall see a considerable number of volunteers also forming an integral part of that territorial regiment, so that the territorial regiment may be a reality. It will, in fact, be a localized regiment, consisting of two battalions of the line, two or three battalions of militia, and several battalions of volunteers. I hope by-and-bye those bonds to which the lecturer referred, and which he said ought to exist between the several component parts of a regiment, may be drawn tighter, until these several battalions become really one great territorial regiment, which will inherit all the glorious military traditions which belong to its line battalions, and also those of the militia, for henceforth the militia will form a very important part of our regiments. With regard to the cost of the frequent movement of troops from station to station, it has certainly hitherto been a very important item in our military expenditure year by year. Formerly, no doubt, there were very good reasons for moving regiments from one part of England to another. It seemed to have been a generally recognized rule that no regiment should ever be left more than one or two years in any one place or town. I hope that will soon be altered; and even with regard to sending regiments abroad and bringing them home, I hope that as no man can in future be kept very many years abroad, owing to the short term for which he is now enlisted, it may not be necessary to relieve the headquarters of battalions abroad so frequently as was necessary under the long service system. I have no wish to see the creation of local regiments abroad, that is, essentially Indian or colonial regiments. In future the battalion of the territorial regiment serving in India will be relieved at a greater interval of time than the regiment used formerly to be relieved, and it is very easy to see why that can be done without hurting the Army in any way whatever. The men only will be kept in India seven or eight years—never more; the Officers will go from one battalion to the other, as is the case in the 60th Rifles and in all our old double-battalion regiments. They will be able to exchange from one battalion to the other without losing their position in their regiments, a privilege which I think will soon cause the Officers themselves to appreciate the advantages arising from the system of these territorial regiments. Lord Wavenny, and also General Herbert, referred very pointedly to the younger Officers of the Army. I do not think any man in the Service has a higher appreciation of the young Officers of our Army than I have. I believe that it is upon the company Officers that success depends more than upon any other class of men in the Army. If the company Officers know their work well, and do it well, as I think they always do in the British Service, success is almost a certainty. My own experience as a company Officer, of course, is not as extensive as that of General Herbert's, but I can only say that in the campaigns in which I took part as a company Officer, I always felt that everything depended upon me as Captain commanding a company, and I think that was the feeling entertained by the Captains generally in the Service. At the present moment I confess I agree entirely with what Captain Lumley has said—that the young Officers of our Army have not enough work to do. I fully agree that they are able to do anything, but my experience, gained by moving amongst them now, is that they do not grumble at what they have to do, but they grumble because they have nothing to do. In times gone by, when I joined the Service, company Officers were given the most frivolous

duties to perform. But few recruits then joined the battalion annually, and they were drilled by sergeants and not by their Officers; it was necessary to find something for our Officers to do, and, in order to give them some semblance of employment, they had the most trivial duties allotted to them; such as going about the barrack-room during dinner-time, and asking the men if they had enough pepper and salt in their soup. When I first went into the Army, after the orderly room business was over—after 12 o'clock—the Officer of the Army had practically nothing whatever to do. At the present moment he is still an unemployed man during the greater part of the day, and I think that when there is so much to be learnt by Officers, and so much military instruction which they should impart to their men, this is very unfortunate. I believe one and all of the company Officers of our Army are quite prepared to undertake those duties, which in foreign armies (such as that of Prussia and Austria) are so effectively performed by the Officers, and I am quite sure when the time comes for giving our own Officers those duties, they will perform them as creditably to themselves and as usefully to the public service as is done by the Officers of corresponding rank in any other army in the world. I cannot sit down without referring to the number of companies in each battalion to which Sir Lumley Graham and General Herbert have alluded, and also to the duties to be performed by these new Majors, to which General Herbert has referred. I have never inquired what these duties are to be, but, as I understand it, the intention of the new organization is this: that we are to have actually the same number of Officers as heretofore, but in each battalion the four senior Officers in command of companies are to be Majors. They are to hold rank in the Army as Majors, as many of them at present do the brevet rank of Major; and they will continue to perform the same duties in the future that they have done in the past. That is the interpretation I give to the new organization. I quite perceive the great difficulty to which Sir Lumley Graham alluded of giving Officers company instruction when the regiments are at a very low establishment, but it is one that is got over in many regiments of the Service. In my own regiment, when we had very few men on parade—say not more than 120, or less than that—we did not attempt to form a battalion, in fact, we never did but twice a week, but we formed the number of men on parade into companies of 60 or 80 or 100 men, and those companies were given over to two or three Captains present, and drilled independently as companies forming part of a battalion. The subalterns present were told off for duty with these three or four companies or with the one company, as the case might be. I maintain that as long as you have 100 men on parade you can, by forming them into one company, give most valuable instruction to Officers and men, not only in simple company drill, but in all the movements of a company when forming part of a battalion in the field.

Sir LUMLEY GRAHAM: That is a very different thing to a Captain instructing his own men.

The CHAIRMAN: That is quite right. I fully concur in the necessity of his doing that, and I hope that by-and-bye all recruits joining a company may be drilled by the Captain and other Officers of that company. I think this end will be secured when the Adjutant ceases to be a drill functionary, and becomes what he should be, namely, the Staff Officer of the Colonel. When this is done, the Captain and his subalterns will necessarily come to know the men of their company thoroughly. In the Prussian service, at the present moment, as Sir Lumley Graham mentioned, the battalions are very weak. A battalion on peace strength in Germany is not more than 420 or 430 men. I counted them myself very recently on parade, when they had about eighty men added for their manœuvres, and the average strength was from 460 to 500. Then you must remember that one-third of those are recruits undergoing instruction, so that practically their battalions are really not stronger than ours.

Sir LUMLEY GRAHAM: Their recruits are all trained before the drill season commences; they are put into the companies until they have been inspected by the commanding Officer and passed, so that by the time the drill season actually begins, the recruits are quite as fit to go into the ranks as the old soldiers.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure I am echoing the views and opinions of everyone present in thanking, not only the lecturer, but all those gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 1st April
and 30th June, 1881.*

LIFE MEMBERS.

Connaught and Strathearn, H.R.H. the Duke of, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., Major-General.	Talbot, Lord Edmund B., Lieut. 11th Hussars.
Albany, H.R.H. the Prince Leopold, Duke of, K.G., K.T., G.C.S.I., &c., &c., &c.	Sewell, Sewallis A., Lieut. R.M.L.I.
Bainbridge, John H., Commander R.N.	Napier, Hon. J. P., Captain 10th Hus- sars.
Curtin, F. J., Captain 61st Regiment.	Steel, J. A., Major-General, late Bengal Staff Corps.
Evans, Thos. May, Captain Tasmania Artillery Volunteers.	Tanner, O. V., C.B., Major-General Bombay Staff Corps.
Lyell, Francis H., Captain Royal South Gloucester Militia.	Drury, E. Robt., Lieut.-Colonel Queens- land Art. Volunteers.
Goodfellow, W. W., C.B., Major-Gener- al, R.E.	Frere, W. A. J., Captain 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
	Parker, Hibbert S., Surgeon A.M.D.

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MacLeod, W. E., Major-General, late Bombay Army.	Norton, Reuben, Lieut. 106th Regt.
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Bradshaw-Lloyd, James, Captain 20th Lanc. Rifle Volunteers.	Earle, Chas. W., late Lieut. Rifle Brigade.
Wilkinson, H. S., Captain 20th Lanc. Rifle Volunteers.	Palliser, E. M., Captain, late 7th Hus- sars.
Aspland, J. L., Captain 20th Lanc. Rifle Volunteers.	Stevens, Leicester B., Captain 3rd Middx. Art. Volunteers.
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