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A STUDY OF HOMILETICAL THEORY.

ARTICLE I. SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF ORATORY AND PREACHING.

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Homiletics needs and deserves a new appraisal. It is worthy of a more scientific study and treatment than it usually finds among those who teach and learn it, and it is entitled to far more respectful consideration than it ever has received from thinkers in the wider ranges of general science. The importance of preaching in history and in existing social conditions would seem to justify, if not demand, a better attitude toward the theory of preaching. Whether regarded merely as an accepted discipline of the theological schools, or more justly as a body of long and carefully tested principles for guidance in the performance of a great social task, homiletical theory has a claim upon science. This claim is emphasized and encouraged by the better understanding which has come up between the two momentous interests of religion and general science. Moreover, this increased mutual respect makes possible a more thoroughly scientific study of religion both in its largest reaches and in its details. It also calls for a more definite and convinced recognition of the important place which religion and its special departments occupy in the broad field of scientific research and thought. Along with the other Christian institutions, preaching has a notable history as one of the great forces which have made for human culture. If there is a history of art, of

science, of philosophy, of literature, of music, of worship, of doctrine, of hermeneutics, of criticism, is there not also a history of preaching and of its theory? And are not these histories worth research and record? As in other great departments of knowledge a double process of evolution may be traced; that of action and that of thought—theory and practice. All along they have reacted on each other; practice has developed theory and theory has in turn guided and improved—yes, sometimes refined and weakened—practice. Now science is concerned with methods, as well as with causes and contents; with the evolution of theories as well as the progress of events. It is readily seen how this principle works in other spheres of intellectual and social activity, such as have just been mentioned: art, philosophy, literature, theology or any of their more specialized departments. Our theme, therefore, needs no apology. It presents, however imperfectly stated, its own defense to any one who will give it a moment's careful thought.

But such an incomplete treatment of the theme as may be presented in a few condensed articles for a magazine may well call for at least a word of explanation. During his fifteen years of service as professor of homiletics the writer could only catch glimpses of what might be done with this subject if there were opportunity and the necessary outfit of learning, leisure and books. The present discussion is but a suggestion arising from such studies in this field as the author was able to pursue during his busy life as a teacher and can now only recall from memory and notes during his no less busy life as an active pastor. How glad he would be if some better equipped student of preaching and its theory should be led to devote time, research and skill to the production of a really scientific and satisfying treatment of what can here be only inadequately sketched! The principal aim of the proposed series of articles is to trace the origin and historical development of homiletical theory as it is now taught in our seminaries and practiced (more or less!) in our pulpits. This historical survey will be outlined in the three articles which are to follow. In this first one it seems desirable to pre-

sent a preliminary topic, which is deemed important to a proper valuation and a right understanding of the history.

The result of any series of developing causes is what lends practical value or scientific interest to a study of the line of causation; or, to put it differently, the present phase and content of any process of evolution must have some value and interest to make a study of the process itself worth while. Applying this obvious generalization to our immediate purpose we should say that in a study of homiletical theory as historically developed it is important first to relate the present stage of the development to its environment in modern knowledge and modes of thought; in other words, to show what relation, if any, homiletical theory may have to other branches of modern science, and what claim it may therefore possess to scientific recognition and study. So, as preliminary to a survey of the origin and development of a theory of preaching, it is proper to notice some of the larger aspects of public speaking, or oratory, in general, and of preaching in their theoretical and disciplinary features. That is, we are to consider both in its relation to general oratory, and through this to other and still larger concepts, the scientific significance of homiletical theory.

We have today, as a conventional and confessedly important element of theological education, that is, an accepted discipline in the academic training of preachers and pastors for their life work, a highly developed art or theory of preaching, which we call homiletics. Has that discipline a meaning and value which may be fairly called scientific? Both the distinction and the necessary relation between the scientific and the practical are here assumed; for these ever work alongside of each other in human progress. In all the developed arts the processes of practice and theory are concomitant and mutually influential. Illustrations are hardly necessary in so obvious a case. The question is, Is preaching an art? If our notion of art is hopelessly vitiated by thoughts of unreality and mere artifice, we ought not to think of preaching as an art. But if we have the proper conception of art we need not fear the term. If any sustained action and product of the human mind and body working together to effect impression through expression may

be called an art, preaching certainly falls under that definition. This is the practical side. Then is homiletics an art? That which teaches how an art may be learned and practiced may itself be called an art. This is the theoretical side. The total concept of an art lies in the co-operation of theory and practice to the end of expression in a product which shall in its turn produce impression. Art is social or nothing. An observer or observers must be either real or imagined. Even the pseudo-critical phrase, "art for art's sake," carries this implication, for it supposes an uncritical or undeveloped taste which must be cultivated; and this, of course, necessitates those in whom the faulty taste resides. Now the sense-appeal of art is almost exclusively to eye and ear; at least the other senses may be left out of account, as they must in all cases be either substitutes or auxiliaries. But it is evident that the primary and simple appeal of art to sight and hearing is enlarged, complicated and enforced by combination and derivation. All public speaking, oratory in general, is accordingly a complicated and highly developed art. It makes appeal first to hearing, but nobody needs to be informed how its effect is enhanced by sight, nor how the final and main appeal is to reason, feeling and conduct through these. The relation of preaching to other forms of oratory will receive consideration again, perhaps several times, and here it is only necessary to say in general terms that for present purposes no distinction need be insisted on. Whatever artistic or scientific value attaches to oratory belongs also to preaching, as one of its most important forms.

The relation of science to art, or to any particular art, necessarily grows out of the nature and operation of science on the whole and its application to the case in hand. The business of science, as commonly understood, is that of observation, investigation, classification, explanation, valuation. When science takes hold of art, therefore, it proceeds to observe the phenomena of art, to investigate its nature and sources, to classify its kinds, to explain its meaning and causes and developments, and finally to assign its place and value among the forces and achievements of human culture. This scientific process may be applied to art as a broad and practically un-

limited field of research, or to any related arts in smaller or larger groups, or to any special one of a group of related arts. In the first instance the determination of general principles is the main objective, in the second classification with a view to explanation, in the third more minute research for accuracy in detail and estimate of values. But, as is often the case, these procedures may take place in reverse order; or they may be jumbled in action, the distinction between them being only a matter of clearness of thought. Taking for granted the first procedure, we are here concerned with the second only so far as to determine the relations of our art to others of like nature, and thence to derive whatever may help us in the third, which is our main business. Taking up then briefly the group of arts to which preaching and its theory belong, we have no difficulty in relating them first to oratory, and then more generally to the language arts. Now the language arts may be distinguished, according to the mode of expression, as oral and literary. Whoever seeks to express himself in language so as to produce impression must do so either through signs and characters which appeal to the eye (written or printed words), or through sounds and modulations which appeal to the ear (sung or spoken words) or by some combination of these modes of expression, as where written or printed words may be spoken or sung, or words that have been spoken or sung may afterwards be written or printed and read silently. It is easy then to define the place of preaching among the language arts; if there is written preparation for it, or if there is written or printed reproduction of it, a place may be given to it among the literary arts; but if, as its nature requires, we have in mind chiefly public verbal expression for the sake of impression, then preaching is one branch of the art of oratory. But it is more than this. Its other connections and aims forbid that it should be so simply and narrowly defined. It is an established institution of the Christian religion; as such it is a function of worship; it is a means of public instruction in religion and morals; it is a great and worthy social occupation to which some of the best intellects and characters in human history have been devoted; it is, in the preparation required for its

best exercise and in its actual performance, an individual function possessing both interest and merit. What is here said is presented from the practical side, but the theoretical side is necessarily involved, for the teaching of the art and the principles back of the teaching are wrapped up in the practice. If thus we have discovered the true place of preaching and its theory among the language arts, and justified its claim to scientific study and valuation, it now devolves upon us to apply the scientific process to the art and its theory; that is, to consider the scientific aspects of preaching and its theory. But for this study we shall find it best to regard preaching as a branch of oratory, as the most of what will be said applies to the general subject, and the more particular applications to preaching will either be apparent as we go along, or may receive comment wherever thought to be needed or fitting.

Oratory or public speaking, like every other great distinctive exercise and expression of the human spirit, has its scientific side and its "unalienable right" to careful scientific research and interpretation. Such a study could be properly regarded as scientific if it should take any or all three of the following directions: (1) It could consider oratory as an exercise of the whole man engaged in it, and therefore be a study of those primary and ultimate functions of the human organism on which that exercise depends. (2) It could be a study of the origin and development of oratory as a force and function of human progress. (3) It could be a mastery and expression, for purposes of instruction, of those principles whereby the exercise of oratory may be made most effective and useful in promoting human welfare. The last is theoretical, the second historical, the first may be called scientific proper. It is not the purpose of these articles to present any ordered discussion of oratorical or homiletical theory. This will be exhibited only incidentally and by way of illustration as we go along. It has already been stated that the main purpose is to outline the historical development of homiletics. In this introductory part of the treatment, therefore, we are left to the first-named method of scientific presentation, that is, to a study of oratory as a function of the human organism, an expression and exer-

cise of the human being. In this view of it a scientific study of oratory will consist in properly relating it to those great sciences which have man, as man, for their subject-matter: physiology, psychology, sociology.

The physiology of oratory relates almost entirely to the speaker, but it is self-evident that the organs of hearing are the necessary correlatives to those of speech. This aspect of the subject may be briefly dismissed, as not requiring elaboration. The science of acoustics is concerned, the organs of hearing, the auditory nerves and the physical condition of the hearer. The supreme importance of all these as conditions to the exercise of oratory needs no demonstration; but the physiology of speech is our more immediate concern.

We should first observe that the body as a whole is more or less closely connected with any one or any groups of its organs in the exercise of their functions; and that the various organs are more or less concerned with each other, separately or in groups. Hence in speaking all the organs of the body have a greater or less direct influence on the oratorical product and effect. A complete and healthy body is therefore one of the elements of success in public speaking. More directly the vital processes of the body—nutrition, circulation, respiration—should be in normal condition for the best results.

Between the body as a whole, with its vital processes, and the immediate organs of speech, other parts and functions of the organism may be regarded as the indispensable auxiliaries of speech-making. Thus the bony structure finds its special adaptation to oratorical uses in posture and gesture. The erect figure, forward look, complete outfit and normal action of the frame are needed in oratory. From toes to skull the orator is tied to his skeleton, and any defects will be to some extent a diminution of his power. Likewise the muscular apparatus performs its indispensable service. The muscles control posture and regulate gesture; in the trunk and throat they guide vocalization; in the face they determine expression. Their training and use for natural and impressive action is accordingly very important to the orator. Pervading the whole body with its numerous and wonderful but often obscure action

is the nervous system. The eminent place which this holds in oratory is apparent at a glance. Both the afferent and efferent nerves, with their corresponding sensory and motor functions, are active in both the auditory and vocal sides of speech-making. Nerve action is pervasive and vital in both speaker and hearer. So far as the operations of the mind—consciousness, perception, thought, imagination, emotion, volition—are dependent on the brain and nerves for their action, just so far is the orator concerned that the machinery of these shall be in excellent working order. Of course also the nerves, which are immediately active in the functions of speaking and hearing, ought to be in healthy and normal condition.

It remains to speak more in detail of the immediate organs of speech. The face as a whole is an instrument of vital importance. Every speaker knows how a hearer's face listens, and every hearer knows how an orator's face talks. All the features have their place—any defect is a drawback. Especially is the eye a power in oratory. Its power lies partly in its noble faculty of expression, but chiefly, perhaps, in its remarkable use as the chief medium of mutual consciousness between persons. We are most aware of each other ordinarily through the eye. The common phrase "catching the eye" is witness of this. The movements of the lips, also, apart from their use in producing speech, are a most important means to complete expression.

But of course our main interest is with the sound-producing organs of expression. In technical oratory the more particular study of these belongs to the art of elocution. This much-abused department of the general subject deserves a more serious consideration and treatment than it often receives. But there have not been wanting some really scientific treatises and suggestions. Long ago Aristotle considered the voice as worthy of note in his immortal treatise on rhetoric, and Dr. Rush contributed in quite modern times a noteworthy study of the vocal apparatus. The more sane and sensible teachers of elocution are more and more disposed to take their subject seriously and cry down the impressionistic follies which often pass under the name of "elocution" or "expression". Correct physiological knowledge of the organs of speech; and their con-

trol, training and use in actual speaking in order to the best results, are surely matters of no mean importance to him who would worthily and effectively perform a great and noble task. A running survey of the vocal organs may remind us of their function in oratory.

When the mind through the brain issues command that voice shall pass the lips the whole muscular and nervous machinery from that exit back to the starting point is engaged to execute the imperial decree. What is that starting point? It is the diaphragm, the slight muscular dividing sheet between the chest and abdomen. It contracts, makes a vacant space above, air rushes into the lungs; then it expands, rises, drives the air out again. This may be nothing more than respiration, but it is the necessary condition, precedent or starting point of voice production. Air inhaled is the raw material of voice. Now the manufacture is begun. Stimulated and assisted by the diaphragm and other muscles the lungs drive out the air into the bronchial tubes, into the trachea, through the larynx, with its so-called vocal cords. These are better considered as flaps coming together with their edges so as to make a slit. The regulation of this opening and the vibratory motion of its thickened (corded) edges make sound. In the cavity of the pharynx this escaping volume of sound is shaped into voice, with its tone, pitch and emphasis; and individual peculiarities of voice are determined. The organs of the mouth now complete the wonderful work by turning voice into articulate speech. This is done by the varied and trained action of palate, tongue, teeth and lips. These last are the final gateway of utterance. Their contact and parting and the shaping of the orifice between them act as modifiers of voice in various familiar ways. They are the only visible agents of the rapid and admirable process which has gone on back of them. Through them at last words fly forth into the outer air, vibrate through it to the hearer's ear, smite upon that wonderful and delicate apparatus for receiving and transmitting these vibrations, pass on this commotion through the auditory nerve to the brain of the listener, and so the brain machinery of the speaker is put into connection with that of the hearer—and our study

of the physiology of speech brings us to the borderland of sensation, consciousness, feeling, thought, will, where another great science spreads before us its inviting domain!

The relation of psychology to oratory is vital, necessary, minute in detail, extensive in range. For we must keep steadily in mind that in speaking and hearing the whole man, bodily and mental, is concerned; hence, we have ever before us the two fundamental viewpoints of psychological science: (1) psychophysics, and (2) metaphysics. In this branch of our topic we must further remember that the hearer's part is no longer almost wholly passive, but must also be highly active. So in the psychology of oratory, besides the two fundamental viewpoints mentioned, we must have in mind these three great subjects of thought: (1) the mind of the speaker in action; (2) the mind of the hearer in action; (3) the phenomena of their interaction. We thus deduce and set before us the five past named elemental factors in oratory considered as a psychological study. A moment's reflection will suffice to show that the psychical process in oratory is by no means so simple as it might appear, but is remarkably complicated and full of interest. The subject is worthy of more extended scientific treatment than it has ever received, both in its most general oratorical scope and in its more particular homiletical aspect. Of course it has not been wholly neglected, because in the nature of things it could not be; but special and ample exposition is sadly wanting. Aristotle, with his remarkable insight and comprehensiveness, gave some attention to the metaphysical elements of rhetoric, and many later writers have taken up the matter with more or less of ability; but it is not going too far to say that the newer psychology calls for a thorough revision and profound treatment of the subject of general rhetoric from the point of view of modern science. In homiletics the case is similar. Some notice has been accorded to the psychology of the subject, but the treatment has been rather in the way of necessary implication and incidental mention than of thorough-going special discussion. In the Royal Library at Berlin the writer once chanced to see a treatise on the psychology of preaching, but it did not

seem to promise much on a cursory look, and even the title is not recalled. In this country Dr. J. Spencer Kennard published a volume on "Psychic Power in Preaching", but while the book is suggestive and valuable it does not claim to be a thorough scientific study. The field is open. Only a bare suggestion or two can here be offered.

Taking up first the psychophysical problem we are not directly concerned with its purely scientific discussion, but still it is evident that both our theoretical and practical rhetorical principles are likely to be at least to some extent affected by our attitude toward the fundamental problem of the relation of the mind to the body. One of the four great theories must be held: materialism, idealism, monism, or dualism—with their various modifications or combinations. It is enough here to say that the dualistic view is in this study adopted and assumed. The mind and body are two distinct yet united entities or substances, neither identical with the other, nor both the dual expression of an obscure unity which lies back of them; each is in close and vital connection with the other, but the exact nature of their union and interaction is as yet an unsolved scientific problem. This view necessitates a distinction between psychophysics and metaphysics, which will here be observed.

The psychophysical side of oratory accordingly first claims notice. It presents some points of exceeding interest and value, which may be grouped respectively as they concern the speaker and hearer or hearers separately, and then in their relation as speaker and audience. Consider the speaker; and what hearing on his functioning in that mode has the relation of his body to his mind? So the question may be put scientifically; but its practical importance needs no demonstration. Everybody knows that the state of a speaker's body has much to do with his success or failure. We may omit detailed illustration of this well-known fact. Take the hearer; and similar questions at once arise. The practical one is, What are the best bodily conditions for normal hearing? And the scientific form of it is, What is the function of body and mind separately and together in the act of hearing

a discourse? To sum up the whole matter we can only say that the normal conditions of body are best both for speaker and hearer when they are so related to each other in the function of oratory. But it is evident that only approximately normal conditions can ever be reached on any given occasion. And the oratory always suffers whatever drawback results from conditions of body in both speaker and audience below the normal. It follows, however, that the nearer the approximation to perfect physical conditions in both parties to the function, the nearer will be the approximation to perfect oratory. When under such conditions speaker and audience face each other, the speaker is a battery of psychophysical energy; the audience is a compound battery, a multiple force made up of many and quite varied forces of the same general nature. The initiative and attack lie with the speaker, the disturbance and response belong to the audience. It is a splendid phenomenon of psychophysical reciprocation. Has it a scientific interest? Is it worth while to study it—this magnificent display of nervous energy? Is the electric play between floating masses of vapor above our heads comparable in interest or value to this battle-dore and shuttlecock game of psychical forces? What speaker that has ever felt the thrill of such a combat but needs only a suggestion to awaken some of the most joyous memories of his life? What hearer but can recall the strange nervous shock which shivers through his being at times, and finds relief, when the spell is gone, in a sigh? It is partly mental and emotional, but it is also partly physical and nervous. We cover our ignorance of its nature by calling it magnetism or something of the sort. But we know it is real, explain it or not. Now the thrilling experiences just mentioned may be only occasional, but they rest upon what is ordinary in the reactions between speaker and hearer. They are the intense reaches and realizations of the normal, there is nothing abnormal about them. In every meeting of hearer and speaker there is more or less of this reciprocation of forces. Where such reciprocation is weak, or hindered by any circumstances or happenings calculated to interrupt or disturb it, the occasion is so far an oratorical failure. The preparation which can heighten the

psychophysical efficiency of the speaker and co-operation of the hearer should be sought by all.

When we come to the purely mental acts in oratory, or the more properly metaphysical conditions of oratorical success, we reach more familiar territory but none the less important and attractive. While there may be some need, from the scientific point of view, for a new classification of the mental powers, the old one will serve us quite well enough for the purposes of this discussion. We meet here the oratorical employment of the intellect, the feelings, and the will. The same points of view serve again. In the preparation of the speaker for his task—both his general culture and his specific study—all the intellectual powers are of necessity, and according to specific need, laid under contribution. So there is no need here to enter more into detail. But in the actual exercise of speaking itself it may be well to think for a moment of what intellectual qualities seem to be chiefly at work. Attention, of course, first of all. If a speaker is distraught, absent-minded, forgets his point, loses his thread, he becomes aimless, weak, futile. A speech, in the delivery of it, is one of the most exacting of all exercises in its demands on the exclusive attention of the speaker. One reason why extempore speech is more effective than reading or recitation lies just here. The speaker is more obliged to concentrate his attention upon the matter in hand. Next, and somewhat involved, comes memory. This applies both to the structure and material of discourse. One must have his outline in mind, his points, his arguments in their order, he must also have his material before him, not only that which belongs to the special subject under discussion, but all memory's storehouse to draw upon in need, The older rhetorical and homiletical teachers insisted much upon this factor. Next comes ratiocination. The reasoning process in speaking is vitally important. Aristotle and some of his followers perhaps emphasize this somewhat out of proportion to other things, but none too strongly in itself. Lastly there is imagination. This is the supreme oratorical function of the intellect. Imagination must be not only glowing but controlled, not only fruitful but pruned, not only soaring but regulated.

In the hearer the corresponding qualities must be touched and employed. Attention must be stimulated and held. Memory must be awakened by suggestion, but not to the degree of distraction. Reasoning must be aroused and guided. Imagination must be touched and kindled. The glow of reciprocation is here again intense and pleasurable. When people tell us they "enjoy" our speaking this is what they mean—their mental qualities are set in motion by ours, and they feel the exhilaration of exercise. That speaking which does not produce this quickening in the hearer is necessarily and hopelessly dull. Here also the matter of adaptation becomes very important. If the intelligence of the hearer is overtaxed fatigue and inattention result.

Rhetorical and homiletical writers generally pay suitable attention to the oratorical use of the feelings. Aristotle gives a long and acute discussion to this part of the subject, and modern authors have not neglected it. Here it is only necessary to remark that care must be taken by the orator as to the kind of feeling awakened, and the intensity of the appeal. Restraint is better than exaggeration. Most careful study and wise action are here of great importance. Great mistakes are made in the wrong direction or excessive use of this most potent energy of speech. As in case of the intellectual powers the orator's task is to arouse in others the feelings which move himself.

But after all the final aim in oratory is for the orator to captivate and influence the will of the hearer. Dr. Broadus was fond of quoting the saying of Daniel O'Connell that a speech was a great thing, but the verdict was *the* thing. We are not here concerned directly with the philosophical problem of the will, though our theory on that mooted question must underlie our oratorical use of it. It also does not need to be pointed out that the orator employs the will in preparation and arrangement of his material, choice of subjects, and all the details of composition. Our main point here is the contact between speaker and hearer in the acts of speaking and hearing. The speaker has to use his own will and seek the best way of approach to that of his hearer. There must be deter-

mination, but not overbearing on the part of the speaker. His approach to the hearer must be somewhat veiled. On the hearer's part the play of the will is of the utmost interest. It inclines or disinclines to the speaker, it concentrates attention, it acquiesces or resists, it surrenders or revolts, it puts into subsequent practice or casts aside or leaves in suspense the things for which the orator has pleaded. When the speech is done what will the hearer do? That is the oratorical problem of the will, and to its right solution all study and reflection on this weighty subject should be earnestly directed.

Physiology and psychology find a synthetic and comprehensive expansion in sociology. Oratory is a social function of high rank and proved utility. So the relation of speaking and preaching to sociology is a very important part of the scientific study of oratory in all its forms. As a phenomenon of human association oratory is both a product and a force—an effect and a cause. It is distinctly a fruit of association and it has profoundly influenced society in many ways. Here again we meet a theme for prolonged study and extended exposition, but the limitations of an article such as this confine us to a mere outline. The subject may be appropriately presented from at least three points of view: language, assemblies, progress. These general social phenomena may not perhaps exhaust, as heads of discourse, all that can be said on the subject; but they are at all events the prime elements of oratory considered as a social phenomenon and force.

Language is a highly developed instrument of social intercourse. Theories of its origin and development need not detain us here; but we should at least designate four stages as characteristic of that development when completed, and as suggesting the probable order of evolution: (1) Communication by articulate sounds tending to fixity by repetition and common acceptance; (2) Conversation, or interchange of ideas by this communication through fixed words; (3) Oratory and Poetry, different forms of extended communication of ideas through spoken language; (4) Literature, the communication of thought by fixed symbols of sound, recalling or suggesting spoken words; with all the vast complications and develop-

ments resulting, reacting, propelling, perpetuating. So great and manifold are these developments and combinations that we are apt to lose sight of the simple and primary elements and forces which originated and still mingle with them. Oratory and poetry, for example, have both taken on the literary form. Poetry has almost lost the original mode; improvisation and recitation from unwritten composition or tradition are things of the past. Reading aloud and recitation of written and printed poetry are the remnants of the ancient order. In oratory the oral method has necessarily been retained alongside the literary developments; and it is still the most important form of oratorical expression.

The phases of oratorical development in connection with language may be distinguished for purposes of discussion into psychological, formal, and reactive, though all are intimately correlated in action. By the psychological phase is meant the orator's choice and use of the language best suited to attain the psychological ends of discourse; that is, to please, instruct, persuade his hearers. This is simply the linguistic side of the relation of oratory to psychology already considered. This brings us to the formal or modal development of oratory in relation to language. What forms has oratory taken as a linguistic instrument for reaching its psychological ends? If we could properly include soliloquy among the modes of oratorical expression we should have to reckon that as the simplest form. But this could only be called oratory as a way of preparation for speaking, or as a reproduction or imitation of speaking for personal gratification. Yet it has at least this much claim to notice as practice in the use of oratorical language. The natural development, as before indicated, is probably from conversation; and oratorical conversation has developed two forms: dialogue and debate, where the speaking is alternate between two or more persons; sometimes the interlocutors alone being present, sometimes a larger audience. Dialogue early passed into the literary form, and even there has tended more and more to disuse. Debate remains in various kinds as one of the most common and useful forms of oratory. But the full and final form into which oratory developed

is that of the extended address by one person to a group of hearers; the group being larger or smaller according to circumstances. The strictly sociological aspect of this development will be considered presently; we are now concerned only with its linguistic bearing, and this brings us to the third phase of the oratorical evolution of language—the reactive. By this is meant the reciprocal influence of oratory and language in their connected development. It is evident that this mutual service has been great. A concrete instance will save us elaborate argument and illustration. Consider what was the effect of the contemporary Greek speech on the oratory of Demosthenes and the preaching of Chrysostom. The language has greatly changed in the seven centuries between these two eminent masters of it for oratorical uses, but yet it was the same great tongue with its marvelous adaptation for just the purposes for which it was employed. Consider, on the other hand, what was the effect of oratorical usage upon the language itself. Here the work of any one man, however eminent, must needs be small; but the total influence of a gifted and popular orator upon the vocabulary and usage of his frequent hearers cannot be slight. It must be one of the influences in molding speech.

Recurring now to the idea of oratory as an address by one person to a group of persons, we reach the main point in the sociology of public speaking: its relation to assemblies. One of the most important concepts of sociology is that of the crowd. Not only is this concept included in studies of general sociology, but it has been made the subject of special investigation and exposition. It offers many points of profound interest and difficulty; and its point of contact with oratory is evident at a glance. The limitations of the present discussion forbid that we should do more than indicate the main topics in a study which invites much more elaborate treatment. There are two methods of approaching the subject: (1) that of the classification of assemblies from the point of view of oratory; and (2) the psychological character and phenomena of these assemblies. While we may not keep these lines of study en-

tirely apart they will at least afford us convenient headings for a complete even if cursory survey.

How are assemblies in which oratory is the leading function to be classified? Here again the matter divides, and we find two leading principles or bases of classification. One has regard to the nature of the assembly, and the other has regard to its purpose. By the first category is meant to include gatherings assembled on the principle of time or permanency. Such as these: fortuitous gatherings where speeches may be called for without previous intention, occasional or special meetings where speeches are intended as part of the proceedings but that particular assembly will never meet again, voluntary organizations with regularly recurrent meetings where speaking is a recognized feature of the meeting, and finally those bodies fixed by law or custom in which oratory is an established element. Examples of all these will readily occur. The other principle of classification relates to the purpose of the assembly, and is more easily seen. Here a number of assemblies will be thought of without difficulty: educational, political, social, literary, commercial, religious and miscellaneous. In these the speaking will be more or less prominent according to a great variety of circumstances which it would be quite impossible here to specify.

After classification we should study the psychological character and phenomena of assemblies in which the principal or a characteristic function is the delivering and hearing of speeches. The psychology of a crowd is only the psychology of the individuals composing it. It is erroneous and misleading to talk of any "social consciousness" or "social mind" as a separate unit above the crowd itself and directing it as the mind does the body of the individual. Yet there is a difference, and the difference is simply that of association, and may be analyzed under the two concepts of aggregation and reaction—though these cannot be kept rigidly apart. The mere aggregation of so many minds under the unifying conditions of place, occasion and a common interest, is a consideration of the first importance. The most obvious phenomenon is that of volume. There is a sense of size, a consciousness of weight and power

which the crowd itself feels. The individual feels himself reinforced by the multitude, and knows that every other feels as he does. It is like a combination of forces for some physical task, as the lifting of some weight which would be too much for one. The sense of co-operation and therefore of power raises the individual to his appropriate share in a great work which he alone could never accomplish. Yet he has had part in it, and it is done. So this spirit of the crowd, not so distinctly felt perhaps, is present in an assembly for psychical tasks or engagements. The speaker also feels his crowd. His appeal is not to the intellect, feeling and will of one, but to the aggregated intelligence, feeling and will of his audience. It is an immense mass of intellect to which his own intellect must appeal, which his own powers of mind must influence. And so of the feelings and will. It is a challenge to effort, a stimulus to his best powers. So much for aggregation merely; but there is more.

Another phenomenon of aggregation is that strange double effect of division and multiplication which shows itself in a listening crowd. What the speaker says is both divided and multiplied; and the effect of this both on himself and the crowd is a variable but ever-present factor in the oratorical situation. It is difficult to put this matter quite clearly, but subtle as the effect is it will be recognized as very real. What the speaker says is divided among the crowd, becomes less personal, and so loses force, but it is multiplied by the crowd, increased in impressiveness and so gains force. Sometimes one result prevails, sometimes the other, sometimes there is equilibrium. To most speakers, perhaps as the normal effect, this double action brings increase of boldness and power; one cannot be so much embarrassed as in a close personal interview and can speak his mind freely to some real or imagined individual in the crowd, assured that the majority may pass it on, but hoping that some may feel it is meant for them. On the other hand the speaker is stirred by the thought of multiplication, as each hearer not only is an additional unit of receptiveness—as pointed out before—but becomes a distributing center of impression to those around him.

This brings us to our second concept: reaction. An assembly is not a mere aggregation of bodies, but a congregation of minds as well; and between the units which make up the mass there is a constant play of reciprocal influences. This is true of any crowd, of course; here we are only concerned with it as a phenomenon of the hearing assembly, and a most interesting and complicated one it is. Suppose hearer A, the average man, and neither opposing the speaker nor specially inclined to him; in front is B, back of him is C, on his right is D, on his left E. In hearing the speaker what impression does A receive from B? Is B man or woman or child? is he attentive or listless? is his attitude that of indifference, agreement or hostility to the speaker and his speech? is he a stranger, an acquaintance, or an intimate friend of A? How many other modifying conditions must be taken into account to describe the full extent of the impressions exchanged and qualified as between A and B? Take the same line of inquiry with C and D, and how far it leads! Go further, and let A see other hearers more remote from him. Yonder is F in his line of vision, G across the hall, H on the platform—what impression are these receiving and giving out from the speech as it proceeds? Now consider A's impressions as modified by all these other hearers according to his own temperament and personality, and then consider him as a giver of his impressions to those about him or more remote from him, as the case may be; thus the extremely complicated nature and action of these reciprocal influences will plainly appear. But we are more nearly interested in result than analysis. Suppose the other hearers are intent upon the speaker, pleased, aroused, moved by his discourse; how does this affect A? Suppose the opposite and how is it? Now go back to the thoughts of aggregation and multiplication, and you will find some sort of explanation of the feeling of an audience as a whole toward the speaker and his address. Is it enthusiasm, indifference, or hostility? Nearly always a mingling of these in various measures, but which has the upper hand and determines the effect of the speech as a whole? Here then lies the orator's problem. How can he capture a sufficient number of his hearers to make the sum total of his oratorical

effect favorable to his purpose in addressing them? Popular speech tells the story of a speaker's success when it pronounces judgment in the saying that "he got his crowd."

Further, we must not confine our study of the hearing crowd to the concepts of aggregation and reaction only, but we must consider the social psychology of the oratorical situation as such. This "situation" is, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, completely realized in the three concepts of speaker, speech, and audience; these sum up the "situation," and are equally essential to its existence. This is no dead truism; it is only a scientific statement of the fact to be studied. We have just been considering some of the more important elements in the psychology of the crowd. To put the matter a little differently let us ask: What does the audience bring together? The answer at once is comprehended in one word—diversity. All the infinitely various psychological elements and combinations of them which enter into and broadly characterize an average audience. Next ask, "What brings the crowd together?" Here the answer is just as prompt and short—unity. There is one motive, or one set or cluster of motives, which leads these different persons to assemble at one place and hear one speaker, or several successively. But analysis of this unity leads us back to diversity again; and the two bring us face to face once more with the concept of reaction when we ask, What the members of the crowd do when thus brought together? How do they influence each other, the speaker and the speech? So the oratorical situation must be psychologically viewed also from the standpoint of the speaker and the speech. As to the speaker, What brings him to his audience? Purpose. Here lies the principal test of quality and of effect in speaking. Is the speaker's aim to amuse, to inform, arouse, to mould his hearers? Is it to win applause, to draw tears, to create a sensation? Is it to reach ends of personal ambition, of party success, of social achievement? Or is it, through whatever is worthy in any or all of these subordinate aims, to reach the supreme end which finds its highest scientific expression in the well-worn phrase, "the good of mankind and the glory of God"? Ask again, What does he bring to his audience? Prep-

aration. All that past attainment which "swelled the man's amount". All that special study which concentrates in the present duty. Once more ask, What does his audience bring to him? Help or hindrance? Inspiration or discouragement? The life of sympathy or the death of indifference? The stimulus of some opposition or the paregoric of conventional acquiescence? The pain of expected criticism or the balm of hoped-for approval? Now we are ready to consider the social psychology of the speech itself. What is its character in the making, as the joint product of audience and speaker? All that goes before converges on this point and detailed exposition is not needed; it would but repeat and apply what has already been suggested. But in the effect? What forces does it set in motion in society? When the speaker concludes, the speech is made and the audience breaks up; its component units go their several ways. What do they carry away to put into the life of the world about them?

Thus finally are we brought to the topic of public speaking as it relates to the social progress of mankind. What is the place and value of oratory in general and preaching in particular as a force in human progress? The point of departure here is that with which the last paragraph concludes: the effect of the speech on the hearer as he leaves the assembly to mingle with his fellowmen in the various relations of the social life. Has the address enriched his intelligence, touched usefully his sentiments, strengthened and guided his purposes, and thus made him a more vital and beneficial force in society? Consider this individual as moulded not by that particular speech alone, but by all the speeches he has heard and will hear. Multiply the units, and reflect how all the hearers of that discourse have been affected, slightly or deeply, transiently or permanently, by that and all the other speeches they have heard and will hear. Hence we reach the inspiring, the overwhelming conception of the whole social function of oratory as the sum total of all the effects produced in the progress of mankind by all the speeches in all the ages, gone and coming! Historic illustrations are not wanting of occasions when oratory proved its power to influence the course of affairs. Re-

member Isaiah and Jeremiah in Jerusalem, Pericles and Demosthenes in Athens, Appius Claudius and Mark Antony in Rome, Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen at Constantinople, Urban at Clermont—and other instances, ancient and modern, easily recalled. But a curve, a fall, a freshet, is not a river; one event is not history; one speech is not oratory. These are incidents and exhibitions, in their several kinds, of mightier things which they reveal. Is public speaking worth while? Has it a right to “scientific” study? Is it entitled to respect as a factor in civilization?

It remains briefly to indicate the leading points of contact between oratory as a force and civilization as a process. They touch at the point of play. Speaking may be a means of social pleasure. This it may be either as a subordinate means for resting the mind, attracting the audience, winning attention, refuting an opponent, and other familiar ways; or as an end in itself, as in “popular” lectures, and other entertaining addresses. But there is also contact at the point of work. Labor, business, commerce, may be indirectly affected by the general influence of oratory in enlarging the knowledge and aiding the moral character of men. Or more directly, there are societies and organizations for promoting the ends of business and labor where speech-making is a determining force of no small account. Again, a most important point of contact is found in political affairs—in the largest and best sense of that much-abused expression. Nobody needs to be informed how large a place oratory has filled and is destined yet to fill in the business of states. Not only is there the general influence of making citizens, but the more particular effects of speaking in popular assemblies, partisan organizations, legislative bodies and courts of justice. Still another point of touch is that of education. Here both the educative value of other kinds of speaking and the special worth of that which is devoted to technical education must be reckoned with. There is here a broad and well-known sphere of influence where speaking is one of the most characteristic means of reaching desirable ends. And yet again, we must count the ethical function of oratory as one of its greatest contributions to human progress. The ethi-

cal content and influence may be implied in speeches mainly directed to other ends; or explicit as the avowed object in the speaker's mind. This brings us at last to the point of religion and to preaching. Here, too, there may be religious speaking, which is so only incidentally; but by far the largest part of religious discourse is that which is intentionally religious, and so especially, though not exclusively, preaching. Let history answer when we inquire what part has been played in the progress of mankind by the preaching of the gospel of Christ. Simple truth need make no extravagant claim.

If skill in preaching may be called one species of the art of oratory, and the principles which underlie the art may be systematized into a theory which may be taught, learned and practised, then homiletics may be conceded to be a human interest important enough to be historically investigated.