



Concerning the immortality of the soul, Plato conceives this as belonging to *νοῦς* alone, and as being both 'individual' and 'personal.' The immortality which the soul has in virtue of its kinship with the ideas is qualitative rather than durational. "The existence of the ideas is eternal, *i. e.*, timeless and self-explanatory. To this the human soul can never completely attain; soul and body as indestructible have an immortality in time, but it is distinctly stated that they are 'not eternal,' as their nature is never entirely and absolutely at one with reason. Still, the more the soul by exercising her rational cognitive function upon the ideas brings herself into harmony with them, the more nearly does she become immortal in this highest sense" (p. 386).

As regards knowledge, in order to explain how the soul comes into contact with the ideas, we have the poetical hypothesis that it knew them in a previous existence before it became imprisoned in the body; a conception which is more poetically presented, I think, by Wordsworth's lines,

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.

The article of Roberts of which I have attempted to give some account is a very thorough bit of work and is worthy of careful study.

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PRAGMATISM.

Le Pragmatisme. C. DESSOULAVY. *Revue de Philosophie*, 1905, V. (7), 89-94.

M. Dessoulavy has given us a most concise and excellent account of the development of pragmatism, as thus far presented, and his short

article is also valuable for the number of references it contains. I may therefore be pardoned if I make a rather free use of his account, by bodily extraction and free translation.

As M. Dessoulavy says, and as is now rather well known, the term 'pragmatism' the title of the new system, first preferred by James, drew its origin from C. S. Peirce, who used the term in his paper of 1878, 'Illustrations of the Logic of Science,' *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XII., p. 287; but the system which bears the name pragmatism was outlined for the first time by William James, in his 'Philosophical Conceptions,' published, 1898, in the *Publications of the University of California*. Among the defenders of this theory soon appeared Schiller, who wrote in *Mind*, 'Useless Knowledge,' April, 1902, 'On Preserving Appearances,' July, 1903, in the *International Journal of Ethics* of July, 1903, in the *Personal Idealism* (Macmillan, 1903, essay 'Axioms as Postulates'), and also in his *Humanism* (Macmillan, 1903), in which the new title, 'humanism,' was adopted by him. He adopted this expression as representative of the pragmatic spirit, which in its common disapproval of intellectualism and pure irrationalism seems properly to belong to man, as a complex, according to Plato and Pascal, partly divine, partly brute.

Since the publication of *Humanism* have appeared Bradley's 'Truth and Practice,' *Mind*, July, 1904, James' 'Humanism and Truth,' *Mind*, Oct., 1904, Schiller's 'In Defence of Humanism,' *Mind*, Oct., 1904, H. W. B. Joseph's 'Prof. James on Humanism and Truth,' *Mind*, Jan., 1905, and finally William James' rather precise definition in the *Journal of Philosophy*, March 2, 1905. The religious aspect of pragmatism has been emphasized in the *Monthly Register*, Nov., 1902. In 1903, Vesey Hague in a series of articles in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* laid stress on the religious side, and finally an anonymous writer treated the subject in a similar manner in the *Tablet*, Feb. 11, 1905.

We must look upon pragmatism as the culminating point of the philosophical tendencies which have become evident in the course of the nineteenth century, *i. e.*, of Kantianism, evolutionism, and of philosophic utilitarianism.

Discouraged by the (to him) insoluble antinomies of pure reason, Kant insisted on the superiority of the practical reason. As it happened, however, in wishing to perfect his system his followers finally came to divergent paths, and were even discredited by Kant himself. The environment was probably not of the furthering kind, and pure idealism and pessimism usurped the place of the young heir to philosophic thought.

"While the German professors argued in their fashion, that is to say, somewhat 'in the air,' the English philosophers, less metaphysical than their brethren on the continent, followed the national road of experience, and that experience, of the senses. This English philosophy, correct as far as it goes, has always been somewhat lacking, unfinished, imperfect, characteristics which have not been removed even when Darwin came to its aid with his system. In ethics we know that the English school has ended by identifying moral good with utility" (p. 90).

These two lines of development, Kantian practiciness, and English experience and utilitarianism, so diverse in their points of departure, are finally joined by the mediating position of pragmatism. Agreeing with Kantianism, pragmatism strongly doubts pure metaphysics; agreeing with evolutionism, it admits the provisional and tentative character of our intellectual faculties; agreeing finally with the English moralists, it identifies the two forms of ethical good (the moral and the utilitarian) and furthermore makes them equal to truth.

James was first led to his theory of pragmatism by the increasing multiplicity of systems, especially of metaphysical systems. As he says, 'There can *be* no difference which doesn't *make* a difference.' We must use our own judgment as regards the different systems, and select some basic principle which will stand testing and examination. This principle is the principle of end, of result, of effect, — τὸ πρᾶγμα. 'Truth is found in, is shown by, the result' (p. 91).

Kant has done great service by placing pure reason in a certain disrepute, and thus has 'cleared the way a little' for the growth of empiricism. Darwin has emphasized the principle of natural selection, which was suggested by the process of selection going on in men's minds. 'We keep what is useful, we abandon what is useless' (p. 93). Axioms and principles themselves must stand the test of selection and experiment. Pragmatism may here be distinguished from either empiricism, or classic *à priori*sm, because for pragmatism the first principles are neither the product of a purely passive experience (as the empiricists would have it), nor are they the result of laws unexplainable according to our mental structure. "When our experience suggests to us the utility of a given conception, we endeavor to find whether or not it is true; and if it is found in accord with the facts, if we are led to discover them, we believe in them, and our belief is increased in proportion as the utility of the hypothesis is proved more and more by the senses. Finally, when the given conception ceases to disagree with any fact, it changes its name and is

called a principle. It seems that it is only by means of such a reduction that we can defend the value of our principles, since the induction on which they are founded is far too incomplete; even the principles of contradiction and agreement are nothing but results acquired in this manner" (p. 94).

Finally, the new school agrees with the old scholastic, in that the latter, almost instinctively, has already expressed the equalization of *bonum* and *verum*. We too see that the good is useful, because being good for nothing is synonymous with being evil, and for the same reason the true is the useful. It is in this affirmation that pragmatism consists.

For its size, M. Dessoulavy's article is a gem, and my added remarks are supplementary more than anything else. I think it safe to add that a movement strongly aiding the others in the pragmatic direction is the psychological, under the guidance of Baldwin, Dewey and Münsterberg, of whom the second mentioned can hardly be left out in any discussion of pragmatism. The present emphasis of the motor side of any conscious moment, and the signification of the attitude taken in any explanation of meaning, offers a new interpretation of 'use' and 'practical' which will, I think, safely meet the objections put forth by Bradley and others. As far as I am able to understand the matter, a thing is of 'use,' not only when it is a means towards serial reaction, *e. g.*, shoveling coal, chopping wood, etc., but also when it creates in us an attitude, has for us a certain meaning. We need not throw connotation fits to establish an attitude. Any body adjustment which is felt as meaning, as tendency, is enough. It is in this light, so at least it seems to me, that the objections to pragmatism must be met.

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Pragmatism and Its Critics. ADDISON W. MOORE. Phil. Rev., 1905, XIV., 322-344.

This article might justly be called 'Critics of Pragmatism Criticized.' The term 'pragmatism' is used in its broader sense, the 'Studies in Logical Theory' serving as basis for much of the discussion. The main point urged by the pragmatist against absolutism, and one which has elicited but meager response, is that 'there is no connection between the absolutist's general definition of truth and error, and the standard actually employed in testing any particular judgment.' The two are irrelevant. Professor Creighton's paper on 'Purpose as Logical Category' makes one of the most direct attempts to meet this contention. But, although he allows with the pragmatists that in judg-