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Prof. W. C. Bagley

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THE PEDAGOGY OF MORALITY AND RELIGION AS RELATED TO THE PERIODS OF DEVELOPMENT.

PROF. W. C. BAGLEY.

It is generally recognized that the years of growth and immaturity form the most favorable period for the development of what we term "character." Indeed the fact that man is a moral being, as contrasted with the lower animals which may be characterized as unmoral, may be very largely attributed to the superior advantages which man's prolonged period of plastic immaturity affords him. It is also generally recognized that this period of immaturity in man presents different characteristics at successive stages of growth, and that these characteristics furnish important suggestions as to the methods of instruction and training that can be most economically and effectively applied during each stage. It is the problem of the present paper to examine these successive stages with particular reference to the methods that their characteristics may suggest in respect of moral and religious education.

As a preliminary to this part of our discussion, however, it will be necessary to state rather precisely the meanings in which certain terms are to be used. This procedure is all the more necessary because of the nature of the question under discussion. It is safe to say that three-fourths of the disagreement upon fundamental questions of morality and religion has its basis in the fact that different individuals use the same words with different, and often quite contradictory, meanings. If the following brief discussion should seem, therefore, to deal with matters that are thoroughly obvious and with distinctions that are quite elementary, it is because I shall attempt to be definite at any cost.

What, then, do we mean by the phrase, "Periods of development"? There are two divisions of the period of immaturity that are universally recognized as presenting very distinctive characteristics, the preadolescent period, lasting from birth to the onset of puberty, and the adolescent period, lasting from the onset of puberty to complete maturity. For purposes of educational discussion, the dividing line between these two periods may be placed arbitrarily at the age of twelve. It is true that the sex functions do not mature among civilized peoples at the age of twelve; but many of the physical and more of mental changes which characterize the period of adolescence make their appearance at this time.

The preadolescent period is marked by nodes or turning points of development, less striking, it is true, than the node that we term puberty, but still sufficiently important from the stand-

point of education to demand recognition. The first two years of life may be termed the period of infancy proper; this stage, important as it is to the development of speech and locomotion, and to the formation of certain essential physical habits need not detain us long with reference to its moral and religious characteristics. The years two to six, however, are quite different, both in their characteristics and in the opportunities that they present, and will require a somewhat more detailed treatment. Between the ages of six and eight, Hall and some others recognize a development node characterized by important physical and mental changes which distinguish it especially from the period that follows. For this stage of development I have elsewhere proposed the term "transitional."

From eight to twelve, development seems to follow still another trend. Hall says that these years "constitute an unique period of human life." (*Adolescence*, vol. i, p. ix.) Inasmuch as the importance of this distinction is not generally conceded, it may be well to review very briefly the evidence upon which it rests. Hall enumerates certain very important physical differences between this period and the periods that precede and follow it: "The acute stage of teething is passing, the brain has acquired nearly its adult size in weight, health is almost at its best, activity is greater and more varied than ever before or than it ever will be again, and there is a peculiar endurance, vitality and resistance to fatigue." (p. ix.) I have examined rather carefully into the evidence that underlies these generalizations, and I find that the tables of growth and the most authoritative compilations of vital statistics would permit even stronger assertions than Hall has ventured. The mental characteristics of the period he summarizes as follows: "The child develops a life of its own outside the home circle, and its natural interests are never so independent of adult influence. Perception is very acute, and there is a great immunity to exposure, danger, accident, as well as to temptation. Reason, true morality, religion, sympathy, love, and aesthetic enjoyment are but very slightly developed. Everything, in short, suggests the culmination of one stage of life, as if it thus represented what was once, and for a very protracted and relatively stationary period, the age of maturity in some remote, perhaps pigmoid stage of human evolution, when in a warm climate the young of our species once shifted for themselves independently of further parental aid. The qualities now developed are phyletically vastly older than all the neotatavistic traits of body and soul, later to be superposed like a new and higher story built onto our primeval nature. Heredity is so far both more stable and more secure. The elements of personality are few, but are well organized and on a simple, effective

plan." While there is less evidence for these assumptions than for his conclusions concerning the physical characteristics of this period, my experience in the work of the elementary school has convinced me that Hall has here made a distinction which teachers have for a long time almost unconsciously recognized in practice. The methods employed in what we term the intermediate grades of the elementary school are quite distinct from those employed in the primary and grammar grades. Indeed, an attempt to take the same attitude toward fifth grade pupils that one takes toward second grade pupils is almost certain to end in disaster. It is also to be noted that the most successful text books are differentiated for intermediate and grammar grades. For these and other reasons, it would seem that the recognition of a distinctive and unique period between the ages of eight and twelve is justified, from the standpoint both of theory and of practice. I have proposed the designation "formative period" as adequately characterizing this stage of development.

During adolescence, the nodes or turning points of development appear to be even less well recognized than during the pre-adolescent period. Some authorities distinguish between a period of pubescence, covering the more marked changes that occur between the onset of puberty and the age of sixteen; a period of youth proper, covering the slower growth up to eighteen or nineteen; and a final "finishing period" that precedes the complete maturity. Ruediger hypothesizes a nodal point at about the age of eighteen, marked by rather profound changes in mental functions, represented in education by the transition from the secondary school to the college and university. It is true that there is a vast difference, mentally and physically, between early and later adolescence, but it is rather difficult to determine just where to draw the line. The changes seem to be distributed over a rather long period, instead of concentrated between relatively stationary periods, as is the case with the nodes at eight and twelve.

Let us now consider briefly the meaning of the other terms that our topic involves. What do we mean by "morality?" As employed in this discussion, moral may be considered as fairly synonymous with "social." The man who leads the moral life is the man who leads a life best adapted to subserve the ends of social welfare and progress. This means essentially that the keynote of morality is altruism. To have a predisposition toward social rather than individual conduct is in that degree to possess a moral character. Character, in other words, can be interpreted only in terms of tendencies to conduct, and to develop character means to develop the various capacities that control or govern conduct. These controls may be roughly grouped into three

classes: (1) instinctive controls, or inborn tendencies toward certain types of conduct; (2) habit-controls, or automatic tendencies that have been consciously acquired and then, through repetition, reduced to an automatic or unconscious basis; and (3) judgment-controls, or ideas, standards, and prejudices that consciously direct human conduct in situations to which habit and instinct are inadequate.

From the standpoint of moral education, the first emphasis must be laid upon the development of the second type of controls—namely, habits. It is safe to say that the average adult makes comparatively few judgments, either of a moral or of an immoral nature. The average man feels no temptation to steal, or to commit murder or arson or any one of a score of crimes and misdemeanors, the opportunities for the commission of which are almost constantly present. Even where nature has provided powerful instincts that, uninhibited, would lead to such conduct, the temptation is rarely felt. The individualistic instincts have been conquered by judgment, repetition has established the habit of inhibition and the temptation no longer exists.

While no one would deny the importance of these moral habits, the very fact that they are taken for granted leads to an under emphasis of the importance of their development. Indeed, the fact that morality is something that must be acquired, something that must be trained and developed, and not something that is innate or instinctive, needs constantly to be impressed upon the minds of parents and teachers. The great majority of adults are, as we have said, good by habit, but the habits were formed at so early an age that many people forget the genesis of their morality, and fondly delude themselves with the belief that they were "born good." The moment that a parent or teacher can throw the blame for vicious tendencies back on heredity, the loophole of easy excuses is temptingly opened. There are doubtless some individuals whom no amount of training could make good, and individuals whom no combination of evil surroundings could corrupt; but such cases are so rarely to be found that they may be quite neglected in practice.

But while education must emphasize the side of habit-building, the formation of standards and the development of moral ideas are not to be neglected. Indeed, these important controls of conduct have a distinct functional relation to habits, both as cause and as effect. It is sometimes said that the imparting of moral ideas has little or no influence in the formation of character. The following statements, for example, appear in the editorial columns of a recent educational journal:

"If we consider what the general features are in the moral life we readily distinguish some which are not to be supplied by

any instruction. For example, we say that conduct is formation of good habits—of character. Now, we know that habits of action are not formed by thought and discussion; they are formed by action. No class-room instruction, then, will ever form a child's character so far as this implies actual doing."

This is but one instance of a point of view often expressed by those who talk and write about moral education. It is misleading in one very important particular, for, although habits are formed only by repeated action, nevertheless, action can be initiated and sustained by ideas that instruction may supply; thus standards of conduct may lie at the very basis of a number of specific habits.

Even more important than this, perhaps, is the retroactive influence of the habits themselves upon the standards or ideas. Even if the normal adult should happen to feel the temptation to commit a crime or misdemeanor, or to do an immoral act, the chances are that his judgment would come to the rescue and inhibit or repress the impulse. Suppose that it is a temptation to steal. Let us assume that the situation is a real one—that is, that the impulse to steal is really felt by the individual. Under what conditions will the standard or ideal of honesty come up to inhibit the impulse? It is safe to say that the standard of honesty in such a situation will have a greater chance to operate, the more thoroughly it is backed up by specific habits of inhibiting similar impulses. In other words, the person who has built up habits of honesty will be more likely to apply his idea that stealing is wrong than the person who has not built up such habits, although he may recognize just as thoroughly the sinfulness of theft. In other words, ideals and standards and prejudices that govern conduct consciously in critical situation derive no small part of their power from the wealth of specific habits that lie back of them.

The judgment-controls of conduct, then, owe their efficiency very largely to habit. But there is another factor that must not be neglected. Under what conditions could the temptation to steal be inhibited or repressed, even if the former habits had been in quite the opposite direction? Could the idea of honesty be made sufficiently strong to break up a habit of the opposite modality? It is safe to say that ideas or standards do operate in this way, and it is also safe to say that the chances for their so operating are directly proportional to their emotional coloring. That is, an ideal or standard that is sufficiently emotionalized will control action in the face of instinct, or in the face of previously formed habits. The reason that the *ideas* of morality imparted by education are generally so futile is simply that they are sufficiently colored with emotion. They may be

accepted readily enough as intellectual propositions, but merely accepting an idea in this way does not mean that one will carry it out in action. Action is determined by feeling rather than by knowing, by the emotional side of mind, rather than by the intellectual side of mind; and an idea or a standard that is effectively to control conduct must be accepted, not only by the head, but also by the heart.

So much for morality. There is still another term in the statement of our topic upon which there must be an agreement of meaning if our discussion is not to be hopelessly confused—the word, “religion.” Again let us try to be definite, even at the risk of certain other virtues.

It is needless to say that religion is closely and vitally related to morality. In just what terms can this relation be most helpfully stated? In discussing morality, it was pointed out that moral standards are effective over conduct in direct proportion to their emotional coloring. It is this emotional coloring, I believe, that religion supplies. In other words, a moral standard that is supported by religion possesses, in virtue of this support, an emotional force that, other things being equal, very greatly increases its directive influence over conduct. The Ten Commandments are fundamental rules of social life. They are absolutely essential to the stability and perpetuation of society. And yet if they were simply stated in a didactic fashion, as intellectual propositions, the sphere of their influence over human conduct would be almost negligible. But give them concreteness and vitality by telling the dramatic story of their origin; put them forth as the imperative commands of an all-powerful Deity; clothe them with the impressive vestments of rite and ritual; and their appeal is well-nigh universal.

This is not to say that religion exists simply or principally as a handmaiden to morality; it is simply to say that one very vital function of religion is to support and vitalize moral standards and ideals. It is this very obvious function that has given religion in the past its social sanction, for society must always give an effective sanction to the institutions that are essential to its survival. But beyond this function, religion answers a fundamental need of the individual—a need for comfort, faith, hope, and inspiration. Whether it manifests itself in a crude, animistic, or anthropomorphic form; or in a form the most rarely refined and highly idealized, religion is found to subserve these ends. It is the native and original need for these “things of the spirit” that constitute the religious nature—the development of which according to Horne, is the “great, abiding aim of religious education.”

And now to bring these various principles together in answer to the question that our topic proposes:

I. The period of infancy, as already intimated, will not detain us long. So far as moral and religious characteristics are concerned, we may say that they exist only in the germ. The child is thoroughly individualistic in his reactions; he is neither moral nor immoral, but rather, unmoral. The distinction between himself and the outer world, between himself and others, is yet to be made. And yet in the instinctive craving for sympathy and love, in the helplessness and dependence which lie as the basis of faith and trust, the germs exist out of which the religious nature will be developed.

The training to which the child will be subjected during this period is readily suggested by these characteristics. Certain fundamental social habits are now established and firmly fixed. These are few in number and concerned largely with the most vital physical functions. Perhaps the parental instincts could almost be trusted to direct the child's training in these particulars. But beyond the mere matter of habit-forming, it cannot be doubted that the environment of these early years has an important, although a rather intangible, effect upon character. Someone has said that the first five years of life are by far the most important in determining character; and if this estimate in any measure approximates the truth, the first two years cannot be entirely without their influence. But this influence, as has been said, is intangible. Every little detail of environment contributes to it: the material equipment of the home, the personal influences that surround the child, the voices of other members of the family, the manners and deportment of the parents and servants and brothers and sisters. No one can note the readiness with which the child of two or three "takes on" the attitude and manners of those with whom he is in constant contact without becoming convinced of the fundamental importance of providing the best possible sort of environment for the earliest years of infancy. Perhaps there is no prevalent idea that needs more seriously and strenuously to be combated than the idea that the influences of an evil or unfortunate environment during the period of infancy can be easily counteracted by later training.

II. The period of early childhood from two to six is, however, more important than the period of infancy from the standpoint of specific and conscious moral and religious culture. The few fundamental social habits initiated during infancy must now be extensively supplemented by training in truth, modesty, courtesy, respect for authority, and other essential social virtues. It is necessary to observe little children only in the most casual fashion to realize how essential is the training of this period to

the development of anything approaching social efficiency. The unmistakable tendency of the child, when left to his own devices, is toward individualism of the crassest type. He has no respect for the property or feelings of others; falsehood comes as easily as truth if a selfish advantage is to be gained thereby; the existence of others has no meaning for him except as it exerts an influence, through pleasure or pain, upon his own existence. Entirely without self-consciousness, he is, strange as it may seem, the most selfish of human beings.

It is the training of these early years that must be depended upon to transform him into the semblance of a human being. Habits are initiated by the instinctive forces of imitation and play; they must be modified and continued in appropriate forms by adult correction and direction. It is during this period that those habits are formed that are later generalized into the ideals and prejudices that we have seen to be so important in the mature control of conduct—ideals of truth, cleanliness, self-sacrifice, regard for the rights and feelings of others.

It is in initiating and fixing these basic habits that the religious training of this period is chiefly occupied. Horne says (*Psychological Principles of Education*, p. 352):

"The religion of a child under six consists in its love for its parents and other members of the family, its vague sense of dependence on them to supply its wants, its fear of the consequences of disobedience, its imagination peopling the dark and the woods with beings, its open-eyed wonder at every new phase of real experience, and its vague feeling of mystery, indicated in the changed tone of voice when it repeats or hears a prayer it does not understand. . . . It is evident . . . that these characteristics contain the simple forms of many complex developments in mature religion."

In Horne's opinion, the religious training of this period will be informal in its nature, although it will be consciously undertaken and directed by those who have it in charge.

It "will consist in being kind to him, initiating him gradually into the customs of religion, getting him to do the unselfish deed of which he might not have thought himself, showing pictures of children and animals, being consistent with rewards and penalties, securing regular obedience, directing the imagination to pleasurable objects only, exercising patience in meeting his wants, permitting only good things, forbidding only evil things, providing associations with other children, and ministering to his life out of the fullness of a religious heart."

The dynamic factor—the factor of *doing*—must be emphasized in this period more than in any other. All recent authorities agree upon this point. It is not by telling the child to be un-

selfish that the habits of unselfishness are developed from which, in later years, the all-important ideals of altruism will grow. It is rather by encouraging in every way, from the very outset, the unselfish, the self-sacrificing deed—by making certain that self-sacrifice receives a sanction that is sufficient to insure its repetition and so to carry it to the stage of habit. The child can learn the lessons of right and wrong, of *licit* and *non-licit* in no other way than this. It must be clear to him at the earliest possible age that there are some things that it is good for him to do and others that he must not do; it is impossible to base these distinctions upon the refinements of reason; they must be impressed as forcibly and directly as possible. It is sufficient, or it should be sufficient, for the child to know that a thing is wrong because his parents disapprove it, and right because they approve it. Certainly the “why” of right and wrong should seldom go beyond this, either in the early stage of childhood or in the stage that follows. Professor G. H. Palmer has said that if a six-year-old boy of his should ask *why* he *ought* to tell the truth, he would spank him. Whether we agree with the penalty prescribed, Professor Palmer here puts in a concrete form one of the most important principles of moral education. In the fundamental virtues, the habit is the important thing, and anything that will in any way multiply the difficulties of habit-building must be looked upon as bad practice from the standpoint of moral education. Certainly a dependence in habit-building upon principles that the child may or may not accept or understand is an uneconomical form of pedagogy. The advice of Professor Kirkpatrick is especially illuminating in this particular (*Fundamentals of Child Study*, p. 183):

“As soon as the infant notices the results of his action, *consciousness* may be utilized in the development of moral habits and the acquisition of moral truths. In doing this one must see to it that right actions are followed sooner or later by pleasurable results to the child, and wrong actions by disagreeable results, because both blind instinct and acute intelligence impel to the repetition of actions having pleasurable results, and the avoidance of those whose results are painful. The child should come to realize that most fundamental, though not the highest, of moral truths, ‘It pays to do right.’”

III. The period from six to eight is scarcely to be separated from the earlier period just discussed in so far as moral and religious training is concerned. In the field of general education, the age of six commonly marks the beginning of formal instruction, and in those countries where religious education is a function of the state schools, definite regulations are made as to the content and method of religious education during these years.

The Berlin course of study for common schools, for example, provides that pupils from six to nine shall be made familiar with certain Bible stories with the aim of developing "a sympathetic understanding" of the characters represented. The teacher is warned against formalism, and is directed to make "the fullest possible use of sense-perception and observation." Where the instruction in religion is left to the home and church, as in this country, the best practice tends to follow a similar course during this period.

IV. In what we have termed the formative period, covering the years eight to twelve, both moral and religious training become somewhat more formal in their nature. The habits initiated in the earlier periods must still be maintained; indeed during these years the key-note of all education, secular as well as religious, should be habit-building. Kirkpatrick summarizes the great social or moral habits that are to be formed in this period in twelve groups: (1) regularity of physical and mental processes, (2) the consciousness that it pays to do right, (3) the tendency to inhibit (unsocial) impulses, (4) to endure hardships, (5) to wait for future good, (6) to take pain before pleasure, (7) to seek the satisfaction of the higher instincts, (8) the habit of forming right habits, (9) to act from increasingly higher motives, (10) to form right ideals, (11) to obey, (12) to exercise self-control. To these might be added, by way of emphasizing what was said in the preceding discussion, the habits of seeking the welfare of others prior to one's own welfare.

As Hall and others have repeatedly pointed out, the years eight to twelve represent a period of life when energy is abundant, when health is at its maximum, when fatigue is easily resisted, and when, under proper direction, children can be subjected to habit-building processes with least likelihood of untoward results. Teachers who work with children of this period frequently remark the pleasure that their pupils take in the drill processes that later become so obnoxious—provided, of course, that these drill processes are represented by spirited exercises which are not too long in duration. Verbal memory is also now at its height, and if anything is to be "learned by heart" now is the time to do it.

It is difficult in this period, as in the preceding, to separate the moral from the religious training. Horne, in discussing the characteristics of the religious life in later childhood, lays emphasis particularly upon habit-building. He instances as especially important, a punctilious emphasis upon externals, the recognition of law, the obedience to authority, and habits of helping others, beginning with helping in the work of the home. He

would be temperate with the development of religious ideas and conceptions, but he recommends the teaching of simple truths about God, such as His presence and help at all times, and the implanting of a few elemental principles of conduct, like the Golden Rule, and the "unviolated principle of veracity in one's own life." He warns us that it is very easy to overstimulate the religious nature of twelve-year-old children. "Before adolescence," he says, "it is better to guide than to press the natural religious development. Precocity in religion, as in other lines, is likely to mean a weakened maturity." (P. 355.)

Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, does not object so strenuously to a moderate amount of formal religion during this period:

"It is perfectly evident," he says, "that there can be no *comprehension* of abstract theology . . . , though some sort of crude doctrine or cosmology is needed to satisfy the child's questions regarding causes and reasons. That the deeper religious *feelings* cannot be aroused during childhood is less evident, but scarcely less certain. The child has great capacity for fear and faith, which are important elements in reverence and worship. He also has a strong tendency to love whatever brings him pleasure. What he lacks is the vital element of religion in its higher form, the impulse to self-surrender—the spirit that says, 'Do with me as thou wilt.' Every instinct of the child says, 'Do for me as I wish, and I will love and serve thee.'" (*Op. cit.*, p. 197.)

Kirkpatrick appears to favor for children of this period a religious service which involves some measure of ceremonial and ritualism. "An element of mystery in forms and ceremonies," he says, "makes them far more fascinating and impressive to the child than any acts which he thinks he understands." And he distinctly recommends that instead of appealing to the child's mind, religion should appeal to his heart (that is, to the emotional and feeling side of his nature) and "perhaps even more to the hand"—that is, "a training in doing, or, in other words, taking part in religious forms." He tells us that the cruder and more objective religion of the Old Testament and of some of the narratives of the New Testament is far more suitable for these years than are the finer and more subjective teachings of Christ and the apostles. "Few stories in all literature," he adds, "can be compared with those of the Old Testament as instruments of moral and religious instruction, and their moral value remains whatever belief is held regarding their origin and literal truth."

This last point leads inevitably to a question that will constantly recur in religious education—whether it is ever advisable or justifiable to teach certain propositions that the child,

when he attains maturity, may not accept as truth. Curiously enough, Kirkpatrick, while he would advocate some formal instruction in religion and while he insists that the moral value of religious stories is quite independent of their literal truth, warns us to proceed with great caution in teaching tenets concerning which the child may later change his views.

"The great thing in religious training before twelve years of age," he says, "is not to make children religious in the fullest sense of the word, but to prepare them for becoming religious by cultivating feelings and habits that will be in accordance with the religious impulse when it is felt. In doing this, religious conceptions should be left in a crude, plastic form, that they may be moulded to fit the broader life of the individual, instead of having to be torn out of the mind and replaced by others, to which early habits and feelings do not so readily attach themselves." (*Op. cit.*, p. 200.)

The practical working-out of this suggestion is sure to involve serious difficulties. Will not the child, as he develops toward adolescence, constantly revise and refine his religious conceptions, whether we will or no? The very concrete character of the young child's conception of God is a case in point. I still have, as a constant associate with the word "God" my early image constructed in strict accordance with my childish fancy of what God would be like. One of the most persistent characteristics of this image is a three-corner hat which I think I got from a picture of George Washington. This crude image, I repeat, has persisted unchanged while the conception itself has undergone repeated transformations in the direction of refinement and abstraction.

It seems clear, then, that the early religious conceptions are bound to change with the development. Undoubtedly some of these modifications will be in the nature of sudden and complete changes of front upon fundamental questions; others will be so slow and gradual in their progress as scarcely to be noticed. In any case, it is folly to think that religious conceptions can be fixed once and for all in a permanent form. The vital question is this: Should we make out religious teaching so vague and hazy that the child will get no definite notions of what we really mean, in order that the dangers of a later upsetting of belief may be avoided?

I shall not presume to answer this question, for its answer will, in any case, be rather a matter of personal bias and temperament than an established principle of educational science. To give my own personal and unimportant view upon the matter in a word, I should say that I have no sympathy with any form of teaching that attempts to avoid real or apparent pitfalls by leav-

ing vague and indefinite ideas in the pupil's mind. I am firmly convinced that 80 per cent. of accuracy, accompanied by 100 per cent. of definiteness is a better educational policy than 100 per cent. of accuracy and only a trace of definiteness. However, this is a decidedly unorthodox view, and, as I suggested, it is purely personal and quite unimportant.

Whatever may be our verdict upon this question, it is undeniable that the influence of religion over conduct is dependent in no small measure upon the character of the child's conception of religious forces. Religion to be effective must be strong, vital, personal religion. A religion from which all elements of force have been carefully eradicated for fear that they will impede later development will not be of any great service at any period. For example: A child of my acquaintance was reprimanded for a certain offense, but the reprimand was ineffective. The offense was repeated, and this time it resulted in a severe bodily chastisement; the punishment had a temporary effect, but it did not prevent a third relapse. Finally the child's mother, in despair, fell back upon a religious incentive. Heaven was a very real place to that boy's imagination. Death was a real phenomenon with which he had become acquainted through a bereavement in the family. When he was told that boys who did what he had been doing would not go to heaven when they died, he was thoroughly impressed. The impulse to do the forbidden thing was inhibited thereafter, and the act of inhibition quickly became a habit, so that the temptation no longer appealed to him. Now I have no doubt that this boy's notion of heaven will be greatly refined and transformed as he grows older, but the habit that was initiated by this crude and yet definite idea of childhood will not, in all probability, be changed. Very likely he will forget about its origin, just as we adults have forgotten about the origin of 99 per cent. of all our habits. More than that, the habit that he has formed will do a great deal toward the formation of a conscious and powerful prejudice against the particular form of vice represented by the inhibited act. This, too, will function effectively irrespective of its genesis.

Whether this appeal to fear is justifiable in the training of children, I shall not discuss. I simply assert that an incentive of this sort is very frequently effective, and that its efficiency depends upon the definiteness with which religious conceptions appeal to the child's mind.

It is safe to conclude, then, that religion offers a means of appealing to the child's mind in a way that has undoubted efficacy in controlling his conduct during the period of later childhood. One has but to refer to one's own early years to appreciate the force of religious sentiments in initiating moral and

social habits. The impressiveness of religious service, the gravity and solemnity with which certain phases of service are conducted, the intimate relation that religion sustains to certain very serious occurrences with which the child early becomes acquainted either through hearsay or observation—baptism, marriage, death—all these factors serve to give to precepts which take the form of religious tenets or commands, a fundamental force, more powerful, perhaps, than any other force that can be brought to bear upon the child's life. The years immediately preceding adolescence are the time for fulfilling this function of religion if it is to be fulfilled at all.

Our discussion of the moral and religious training of the years, eight to twelve, may be summarized in the following propositions: (1) This is a period especially favorable for the formation of moral and social habits. (2) In initiating and continuing these habits, the factor of authority is very largely to be relied upon. (3) The factor of doing,—of actual and concrete adjustment to definite situations,—must be constantly emphasized. (4) At the same time, the impressing of the fundamental rules and precepts of morality, couched in simple terms, and reduced to verbal memory is both effective and advisable. (5) As in the preceding periods, the chances for the development of moral habits depend very largely upon the copies for imitation that the child finds in his environment; if the people that he admires are cleanly and self-sacrificing and regardful of the rights and feelings of others, the probability is greatly increased that he will develop similar habits; in other words, the child tends to imitate and emulate that which he respects and admires. (6) With regard to specific religious instruction during the period authorities differ; but there can be little disagreement upon the proposition that the larger religious conceptions can be effectively introduced; the narratives of sacred history form the best media for introducing these conceptions; the forms and ceremonies of religious institutions will, if employed, add a powerful emotional factor that will tend to make these conceptions more thoroughly directive over conduct; and the efficiency of these forms and ceremonies will be increased if the child has some active part in them.

Regarding preadolescent training in general, it would seem from our analysis that the most important suggestion for practice is involved in the principle that we have reiterated so often,—the principle, namely, that a moral character depends fundamentally on the dispositions and habits and tendencies that have their period of initiation and fixation between birth and the age of twelve. Eliminate the fundamental training of this period and the task of adolescent education must be well-nigh impos-

sible. As Horne has well said (*Op. cit.*, p. 351): "It is one of the wonderful new facts that adolescence is likely to strengthen the tendencies the child brings with him. When reason does come with its full force into the individual life, there must be a background of solid habit and good training whose value attests itself. Without a religious life in the years of childhood, the mill of reason grinds emptily in youth."

V. We come, then, to the consideration of adolescence with the assumption that the child who reaches this stage is in possession of a priceless capital of habit and disposition that will make the task of adolescent training much simpler than it could be otherwise. Briefly stated, the problem here is the development of ideals,—the generalization or extension of the virtues that are already matters of specific habit into vital, emotionalized principles or standards of conduct that will have a substantial basis in reason upon the one side and in aesthetic appreciation upon the other side.

Perhaps the most important mental characteristic of adolescence is the wider outlook that comes with puberty. The objects of the child's immediate environment seem trivial and unimportant. There is a yearning to break the bounds and see what lies beyond. The questioning attitude toward things heretofore taken for granted is a natural outcome of this tendency. Youth will demand a rational basis both for morality and for religion, and it is the business of education to give him that rational basis, even if it must do so at the peril of his soul's salvation. Professor Palmer, who warned us about rationalizing the morality of early childhood, admits that there are some individuals with whom it would be better if the question of "Why?" were never raised, but he adds that it is impossible to segregate these individuals and keep them from reflecting upon causes that they cannot understand and mysteries that leave them hopeless and baffled. Speculation and investigation may involve a danger to moral health and religious conviction, but the danger is negligible compared with that involved in any attempt to throttle investigation and shackle thought.

But to rationalize the principles of conduct is not all that youth craves, and herein lies a source of hope that is not always recognized. Goethe reminds us that life divided by reason always leaves a remainder, and Horne identifies this remainder with the peculiar and unique sphere of religion. Appreciation and insight may come to the rescue when understanding is baffled. It is true that adolescence brings with it a craving to know the inner secret of law and custom and requirement, but it is also true that adolescence brings with it a host of new

instincts and emotions that extend the limits of the field of feeling, and make possible new insights and appreciations. The sentiment of love which comes with the new instincts of adolescence will form the basis for an appreciation of the religion of love; the altruistic sentiments that arise with the consciousness of kind will give a new meaning to self-sacrifice; the new power to feel as others feel makes sympathy possible. These things are not matters of the intellect; they are functions of the emotional side of life, and may run counter to intellectual decrees without the slightest difficulty.

Into the educational implications of this point of view, we have not time at present to inquire; suffice it to say that, with adolescents as with children of the earlier stages of development, the character of the environment and especially of the men and women with whom the youth is most constantly thrown and from whom he must derive a large majority of his ideals, is the all-important factor. And so we come to the conclusion that we almost always reach in educational discussions,—the conclusion, namely, that matter and method are, in the last analysis, of only secondary importance compared with the personality of those that direct the educative process.