

and art is a summary of the difficulties which beset the artist in any attempt to reproduce the exact impressions from the object, as these difficulties have been brought to notice in Weber's law and the principle of relativity. Upon this practical impossibility of an exact realism is based a plea for a less mechanical interpretation of nature. In discussing the place of suggestion in art, the author finds it necessary to distinguish between the natural appeal to the attention which every work of art must make and that abnormal concentration of attention which we find in the hypnotic state. Reality must be suggested, but not so strongly as to destroy the distinction between it and the artistic representation—the beholder must not be hypnotized into belief in its reality. This principle of æsthetic *Schein* is of course good, as well as ancient, but when it is applied in criticism of the Bayreuth performances (which the author admits that he has never seen) it fails to convince. The concentration of attention upon the lighted stage in the dark and silent house is certainly far from destroying either the æsthetic illusion or the contagious influence of the audience.

The concluding papers on the relation of art to curiosity and to morality are purely non-psychological and also somewhat misleading in title. The former is a discussion of the place of subject and local color in art, the latter a rather loose treatment of some of the moral evils which are the possible results of art and its study.

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ETHICS.

Constitution de l'éthique: quatrième essai sur la morale considérée comme sociologie élémentaire. E. DE ROBERTY. Paris, Felix Alcan. 1900. Pp. 223.

M. de Roberty begins this the fourth essay in his series of ethical writings with a brief confession of his philosophic faith. His general position, often called modified positivism, sometimes attacked as a defection from positivism, he himself calls hyperpositivism—a name first applied to it in a depreciatory sense, but which he adopts as the symbol of his divergence from Comte. The positivist school errs in recognizing only one series of the products of intelligence, the scientific series; it ignores the 'grande' or 'psychosocial' series which includes philosophy, art, and industry, as well as science. In place of Comte's law of the three states M. de Roberty substitutes the 'law of correlation between the abstract sciences and philosophy.' Positivism inverts the

relation of these two terms of the mental series, the complete order of which should read: science, philosophy, art, industry. Philosophy and religion are determined by science, the æsthetic sentiments are determined by the prevailing religious and philosophical beliefs, and finally our practical activity reflects our sentiments and ideas: so that each term of the series depends upon all that precede it. Misconception of the mutual relation subsisting between the different members of the psychosocial series caused Comte to fail in the attempt to 'constitute' sociology as an abstract science. His first error was in separating morals from the totality of sociological studies, whereas, according to Roberty, ethics and sociology are in reality identical.

Sociology (or ethics) is not to be founded upon biology, nor should it be confounded with psychology (another of Comte's errors). It is a mistake to make either individual or collective psychology the basis of sociology: though it is less pernicious to make individual psychology the middle term, giving the primacy to collective psychology and considering the latter as the source of both individual psychology and of sociology, than it is to make collective psychology the middle term with individual psychology below and sociology above. Nor is sociology identical with *Volkerpsychologie*; the former underlies the latter. It is important to distinguish between the *fait social* and the *fait mental*. The latter is the necessary consequence, the inevitable product (manifesting itself in individual minds) of the contact, the reciprocal action, of living organisms already endowed with psychophysical faculties (*fait social*). Social phenomena precede, originate and sustain mental phenomena. But they are not identical with vital phenomena, nor are they to be found in some sphere vaguely said to lie between biology and psychology. The connecting link between biology and psychology is found in the phenomena of sociality, or altruism, or (if one prefers) of the moral sense. The 'biosocial' theory recognizes in sociality the true productive cause of the socially qualified individual, the person of rights and duties. The theory of 'collective psychism' (*psychisme collectif*) sees in sociality the *quid proprium* of sociology.

The three fundamental conceptions in the author's view of the nature of ethics are thus: (1) His view of the relation between the various factors of superorganic evolution, (2) his 'biosocial' theory, (3) the 'collective psychism' hypothesis. The combination of these leading ideas results in the doctrine that psychology is a concrete science studying the complex phenomena of mind—which are due to the concurrent action of the laws of life and of sociological laws; while soci-

ology is an abstract science of the vast world of superorganic facts, a science whose essential phenomena are identical with those of ethics. More briefly, sociality and morality are identical; so that, instead of blotting the word sociology out of the dictionary, as would be necessary if the collectivist psychology were right in identifying social phenomena with mental phenomena (p. 119), it would seem that the word ethics can now be blotted out.

Having dealt, in Chapters IV. and V., with the relation between morals and the other sciences contained in the first term of the psychosocial series, the author proceeds in the last two chapters to deal with the relation between morals and philosophy (including religion). Religion and metaphysics are here treated in the familiar patronizing manner of the positivists, who see in them once useful phases of thought now happily fast becoming obsolete. Until ethics has once and forever cut loose from metaphysics it will remain a normative science, encumbered by duties and imperatives, and saying 'One ought,' while the sciences arrived at maturity say simply, 'This is.' As to theology: Positivism failed because, among other reasons, it did not really do away with God. *Dépasser Dieu* is the real end of science arrived at the age of reason.

To indicate the general tenor of M. de Roberty's ethical views is not difficult; but to disentangle the constructive element from the superabundance of critical digressions and *obiter dicta*, and to read through the repetitions which are perhaps incident to the serial form in which the author has chosen to expound his ethical system, is a somewhat tedious task. His work would gain both clearness and strength from a rigid condensation and the more thorough, concise and connected discussion of certain leading ideas—such as, *e. g.*, the conception of sociality as equivalent to morality, and the identification of ethics and sociology.

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