Nu,Case Name,Year,Year Start,Year End,Is Ongoing,Digital Disinformation and Manipulated Content,Cyber-Enabled Information Operations,Social Media and Platform Exploitation,Digital Psychological Operations,Strategic Objective,Actors Involved,Perpetrating Country,Target Audience/Platform,Geographic Scope,Target Country/Location,Description,Information,Communication,Co-Production,Primary Source/Reference,All Additional Sources,,,,,,,,,,
1,The Doppelganger Case,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems ', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],"['France', 'Germany', 'Italy']","[""Users on Facebook (also X and Telegram) were targeted with counterfeit articles, doctored videos, and made-up polls. Internet domain names were purchased that resembled the ones of legitimate media and their wesbite design was copied for more than 17 sources. Paid advertisements for at least $115,000 USD increased the spread on this disinformation. Millions of people viewed the content stemming from fake profiles across France, Germany, and Italy which violated Meta's community standards as they did not disclose the addvertiser's identity.""]",TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],"['Explanation of Doppelganger Case Study', 'Blog Post on Response to Doppleganger Case Study', 'EEAS', 'Russian Malign Acitivities in France Since 2022 Paper']",,,,,,,,,,
2,Fake Ukrainian Job Vacancy,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Ukraine'],"['In July 2023, a fake job vacancy was posted on a Ukrainian job portal, advertising a position for a mentor for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Requirements listed for the position were an ""active sexual life"", ""absense of venereal diseases"", and ""identifying hidden gays"". The job posting was later spread by Russian-state linked accounts across social media']",TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
3,Fabricated Document from Armed Forces of Ukraine,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Ukraine'],"['In 2023, a fabricated document that was said to be from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, prohibited gay people from having intimate relationships on the battlefield. This document was spread on unattributed websites and Telegram channels.']",TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
4,Fabricated Document from German Government,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Germany'],"['In July 2023, an altered page from an official German booklet addressed to Ukrainian refugee families mentioned possible gender reassignment in German schools. These messages were spread in Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish across social media and websites.']",TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
5,EU Political Objective Narrative in Somalia,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Somalia'],"['Multiple images were published in threads on X which included a image\xa0from the EUTM-S post on Internationnal Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT). Along with this image, others were included that made claims that the EU dumped radioactivie material Somali waters and were illegally fishing, all objectives of a larger political agenda.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
6,Killnet NATO Hacking,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],"['Kiev', 'Moldova']","[""In April 2023, a pro-Russia hacker group known as Killnet, were able to target NATO's cyber infrastructure. After acquiring the names and emails of several employees, the hackers registered them on a gay dating website in Kiev and Moldova. This story was then spread through state-affiliated and state-linked media channels in Russia""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
7,South Front Mobile Game,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],[],"['In June 2022, South Front, an outlet ties to the Russian FSB, released a game called ""Smash the Nazis"" on its website and as a mobile app for Android platforms. The game was similar to the game Fruit Ninja, but the players had to slash helmets with Nazi symbols, the NATO logo, and rainbow flags instead of fruit.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
8,Nashville School Shooter Conspiracy,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"['After the school shooting in Nashville, USA on 27 March 2023, unattributed accounts on X and Telegram began sharing a photo showing a bedroom with a rainbow flag, transgender flag, and a NATO flag on the walls. They claimed that this was the bedroom of the school shooter and this disinformation began to spread across various platforms and Russian websites. However, the image was previously posted by a Twitter account that had nothing to do with the shooting.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
9,Government Child Removal Narrative in Germany,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Germany'],"['A video was shared across social media platforms showing the German government removing a child from a Muslim family. The descriptions online were spread in Arabic, English, Russian, and Serbian and depicted the German government as pursuing an ""LGBTIQ+ agenda"" on minorities and children. Supposedly they removed this child because he was being taught that homosexuality and transgenderism was unacceptable. However, the police later clarified that they removed the child from the family based on a court order from the youth welfare office.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
10,Fabricated Flyer for MOCAF Beer Company,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Central African Republic'],"['A photo of a fabricated flyer advertised the MOCAF beer company (part of French Castel group) in the Central African Republic. The flyer showed two men kissing with the text ""MOCAF, promotion of European values"". This led to many comments that European values should be promoted in France and left out of Africa.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
11,Somali Social Media Accounts Shaping Narrative of US in Uganda,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Somalia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Uganda'],"[""Unattributed social media accounts linked to Somalia accused the United States of conducting violent attacks on Ugandan schoolchildren after the government's adoption of the anti-LGBTIQ+ bill.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
12,Fabricated Russian Video of Man Dating in Western Countries,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['Israel'],"['In December 2022, a video was spread by the Russian House in Tel Aviv that depicted a man looking for a romantic partner finding it impossible to meet heterosexual women in Western countries.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
13,Disinformation on Olympic Committee Actions,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Manipulation '],[],"['FIMI campaign that used false claims and quotes that to accuse the International Olympic Committee and its president of preferential treatment og LGBTIQ+ athletes by imposing different rules depending on the country and promoting an ""LGBTIQ+ agenda"". The original postings claimed to be from Western media outlers, but later incidents had statements from Russian state-affiliated sources.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['European External Action Service'],[],,,,,,,,,,
14,Paperwall Case,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],"['Belgium', 'Luxembourg']","['In February 2024, a Chinese-originated information operation was exposed. The operation consisted of 123 dummy media outlets worldwide, with a strong European presence. Among the impersonated sources, included a Belgian and a Luxembourg website. The websites wrote about local topics related to the economy, housing, or politcal news consisting of plagiarised content. The part of the websites that stood out the most are under ""Press Release"" which seemed to be paid content promoting Chinese interests in English articles.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['EU Disinfo Lab'],[],,,,,,,,,,
15,Russian Propaganda in European Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['EU'],"['In 2024, there was a campaign of Russian Propaganda channels and right-wing blogs on the web and social combining falsehoods and altered facts to influence voters leading up to the European elections (ADAC.io). The European External Action Service (EEAS) found 42 incidents of Russian FIMI as the election approach, which peaked between 6-9 June. The incidents followed a similar pattern: organized structure, attacks on democracy, and cyber-enabled interference, surge right before voting, and post-election efforts to undermine trust in the results (EEAS).']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['ADAC.io '],"['ATHENA', 'Debunk.org', 'EEAS']",,,,,,,,,,
16,China's Attempt to Influence Taiwanese Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Search Engines and AI-Driven Digital Spaces']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Taiwan'],"['In 2024, China launched a FIMI campaign leading up to the Taiwanese elections. China used a combination of spreading fake news and cyberattacks to influence the election in favor of the Kuomintang (KMT) party which they supported. The fake news was difficult to identify as it used AI and subtle messaging to undermine citizens trust in the Taiwanese government instead of being overtly pro-China. Cyberattacks increased by 3,370 percent from the previous year and more than doubled 24-hours before the election as Chinese-linked hackers attempted to locate compromising information on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and further undermine the trust in the government.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['ATHENA Project'],"[""TikTok: China's Glaring Trojan Horse Paper""]",,,,,,,,,,
17,Russia's Claim of US Biological Weapons Labs in Ukraine,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],[],['Russia made claims and disseminated disinformation that the United States had established a network of biological laboratories in Ukraine to create biological weapons against Russia. This was mainly to help legitimize their invasion of Ukraine.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['ATHENA Project'],[],,,,,,,,,,
18,Russian Disinformation on Western Vaccines for COVID-19,2021,2021,2021,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],[],['Russia launched disinformation campaigns about the Western vaccines for COVID-19 to sway opinions in favor of their vaccine. Their vaccine ironically has a similar name to the source that was disseminating the Propaganda - Sputnik (Sputnik V).'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['ATHENA Project'],[],,,,,,,,,,
19,Russian Hacking of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's Website,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']",['Georgia'],"['In 2022, pro-Russian hackers attacked a website belonging to former Georgia president Mikheil Saakashvili ad posted images of him with Hitler. Putin has stated that the goal of Russia, especially in Ukraine, is to get rid of Nazis. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['ATHENA Project'],[],,,,,,,,,,
20,Belarussian Media Channel Misleading Lithuanian Presidential Candidates,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Belarus'],['Video Platforms and Streaming Services'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Lithuania'],"['In 2024, two Lithuanian presidential candidates accepted an interview with who they thought was a credible Russian language news outlet based in Latvia. However, they were fooled by the email address and ended up being interviewed by a Belarusian-based channel who edited the conversation. The interview was then broadcasted to portray them as being pro-Russia and anti-West. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Debunk.org'],[],,,,,,,,,,
21,Russian Interference in Moldovan Presidential Elections and EU Accession,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Digital Financial Tools for Manipulation']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Moldova'],"['In 2024, Russia attempted to undermine the democratic process in Moldova by targeting its Presidential elections and the referendum on EU accession. Their attempts were driven by covert influence through puzzling money transfers, paid influencers, and social media spamming.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['EEAS'],[],,,,,,,,,,
22,Russian Interference after Georgian Parliamentary Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Georgia'],"['The parliamentary elections in Georgia led to an increase civil unrest. Pro-Kremlin actors, using the same methods as in Moldova, attempted to use FIMI to hinder societal cohesion and further divide citizens politically.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['EEAS'],['Securing Democracy'],,,,,,,,,,
23,Disinformation Video about Ukrainian President Zelenskyy,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks ', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']",['UK'],"['On 31 March 2024, a new YouTube channel uploaded a video that falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Zelenskyy bought a £20 million villa from King Charles III. One day later, the video was attached in an article on the False Façade outlet londoncrier.co.uk. From 2 to 4 April, Russian FIMI Telegram channels and media platforms such as Newsfront, Tsargrad, Readovka, and Argumenty i Fakty republished the article. State-controlled outlets like Sputnik then picked up the story and eventually a Russian diplomatic account claimed it was from a ""British media"" report. ']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['EEAS'],[],,,,,,,,,,
24,"False Façade (Storm-1516, CopyCop)",2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']","['EU', 'UK', 'USA']","['The operation began in late 2023 and used a network of 230 inauthentic websites with active and dormant domains. The websites operate in Engliish, French, and German to mimick Western media by including city names from the EU, UK, and US in their branding. There has been 47 recorded incidents connected to this operation. The main focus is information laundering of carefully chosen content between attributed and non-attributed sources. It initially targeted Western support for Ukraine but then expanded to election interference. The campaign uses a bi-directional information laundering strategy. Articles from Russian state-controlled channels are translated by AI, republished on websites, and spread through many platforms. Reversely, fabricated videos with actors are made into articles which circulate through independent and state-affiliated channels. Eventually, the Russian state media will pick up the content to establish its credibility. The network of pre-created websites are difficult to detect,  backup domains are commonly used, influencers are paid to promote the content. The operation connects with other infrastructure clusters on three levels. First, the content is boosted by influential booster nodes that spread Russian narratives, then Portal Kombat sometimes translates and spreads content from False Façade. Finally, the content overlaps with channels connected to the Foundation for Battle Injustice founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['EEAS'],[],,,,,,,,,,
25,Portal Kombat (Pravda Network),2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],"['EU', 'Africa', 'Asia']","['The operation began in 2022 with 200 inauthentic media outlets in 35 languages, targeting local and regional audiences in Europe, Africa, and Asia, mainly focusing on African influence. There have been 73 incidents relying on a high-frequency of automated republications of Russian FIMI content attributed to a firm based in Crimea. While it began by targeting regional audiences in Russia and Ukraine with content about the invasion, it became more global in 2024 with content about other geopolitical issues and local politics. The strategy of the campaign does amplifying local information spaces with republished content from official Russian government entities, state-affiliated media, Russian Telegram influencers, and local anti-establishment outlets. Automated systems and using local languages allow for the comtent to appear in search engine results at a low cost. The content originally started on platforms like Telegram and VKontakte but the campaign has begun expanding to X since the beginning of this year. Portal Kombat has amplified some content from False Façade but not in a coordinated manner like it does with African Initiative content.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['EEAS'],['Russian Malign Acitivities in France Since 2022 Paper'],,,,,,,,,,
26,African Initiative,Ongoing,2023,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Africa'],"[""The campaign primary disseminator of Russian FIMI in Africa, with some of its operations previously managed by Wagner Group-affiliated organizations. There are 16 websites and social media channels in six different languages: English, French, Russian, Arabic, Portuguese, and Spanish. It runs across multiple platforms and there have been 18 recorded incidents. There are local branches of the initiative in Burkina Faso and Mali and a correspondent in Niger. The FIMI content is often republished by Russian state-controlled media and boosted by local outlets. Overall, the project acts as a bridge between Russia's core infrastrcucutre and local African networks. Portal Kombat systematically amplifies content from the African Initiative ""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['EEAS'],[],,,,,,,,,,
27,Propaganda Video about Egypt and Russia Relations,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Egypt'],"[""A short video was spread across all social media platforms emphasising Egypt's long, friendly relationship with Russia. The video reached 3.4 million views and 185 thousand shares online""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
28,Pro-Russia and Anti-Western Social Media Content in Egypt,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Egypt'],"['Pro-Kremlin and anti-Western content was disseminated to Egyptians by anonymous accounts impersonating legitimate news sources. Some were openly pro-Russian, while others tried to present themselves as ""war monitors"" but just reused content from Kremlin statements and affiliated channels. An account by the username @Roaastudies grew its following from 100 thousand in October 2022 to 350 thousand in October 2023 and some of its content was repsoted by other fake news accounts pushing an anti-Ukranian and pro-Russian agenda.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
29,Russian Embassy and RT Arabic Actions in Egypt,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks '],['Egypt'],"[""The Russian Embassy in Egypt and RT Arabic are the most common distributors of pro-Kremlin content. The most popular post on the social media feed of the embassy was the announcement of the Kremlin's investment into Egypt's first nuclear power plant (25 thousand views), and a post celebrating 80 years of friendship between Russia and Egypt. ""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
30,Disinformation about Egypt's Cooperation with Russian Military,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Egypt'],"[""A disinformation episode falsely claimed that Egypt was supplying rockets for Russia's military. There were some people who were critical in the Egyptian community, but many showed their pro-Kremlin beliefs.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
31,Whatsapp Disinformation on US Plans to Stage Plane Crash in Mali,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks '],['Mali'],['A disinformation campaign that spread across Whatsapp in Mali claimed that the United States was plannning to fly a plane with prisoner or corpses over the Malian desert and then detonate it on purpose to justify invading the country. This claim is parallel to Kremlin narratives after Russian separatists shot down an MH-17 in Ukraine in 2014 and attempts in Mali by the Wagner group to frame French peacekeeping initiatives as massacres.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
32,Malian Junta and their Pro-Kremlin Actions,Ongoing,2021,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Digital Financial Tools for Manipulation']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Mali'],"[""The Malian Junta is one of the most common sources for dissemination of pro-Kremlin and anti-Western narratives. Defense Minister Sadio Camara, Prime Minister Choguel Maiga, and Minster of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Diop have played a role in spreading these narratives. There are also civil society actors acting as proxies for both the Junta and and Kremlin as well as African influencer ans media workers as well as African influencers and media figures. The Wagner Group is also working behind the scenes in the country to help justify a narrative of authoritarianism in the country. The Kremlin reportedly finances local radio stations such as Radio MaliBa FM. The following TTPs are commonly used in Mali by the Kremlin: state capture, local languages, astroturfing, discrediting critcs through 'swarming', edited imagery, outsourcing, information laundering, and doxing.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
33,Kremlin FIMI Tactics in Kenya,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Kenya'],"['The Kremlin uses a few different narratives in Kenya to promote their idealogy and instill a feeling of distrust in the West. These narratives are neocolonialism, racism, and injustice by the West and in the international system, the Kremlin as a friend to Africa, and LGBTQ+ as a Western conspiracy. The main distributors of FIMI are the Russian embassy and its diplomats, the RT media outlet, religious leaders, a strong disinformation network on social platforms, and even the CCP. There is a dual-pronged approach by Russia to target high-level policymakers and also the grassroots level of the country such as youth groups and religious communities. The TTPs of the Kremlin are making citizens question information (especially Western), amplifying existing misinformation, and outsourcing.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
34,Kremlin FIMI Tactics in South Africa,Ongoing,2019,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['South Africa'],"[""In South Africa, politically aware youth, especially on the left, are the primary audience for Russian FIMI. For example, a supporter of Russia, Julius, Malema, gets considerable support through youth outreach campaigns, but these tend to foucs on anti-capitalism and not Russia directly. Some of the issues that Russia promotes in their FIMI dissemination are nationalism, xenophobia, anti-establismentarianism, and protecting national reosurces. Some of the main figures involved are Julius Malema of EFF;  the daughter of the ex-president, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudia; and Paula Siler of RT. Others connected to the EFF, ANC, the Russian embassy and Russian Consulate, and certain government representatives like Naledi Pandor, the Minister of International Relations, also play a role. The main TTPs used by Russia in South Africa are 'whataboutism', opportunism, amplification, and state capture.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
35,Kremlin FIMI Tactics in UAE,Ongoing,2024,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['UAE'],"['The main narratives used by the Kremlin in UAE focus on food security and false-flags and a deceptive West. The primary actors involved in the spreading of these narratives are RT Arabic and other Russia-connected channels who have significant influence due to their free content. There are two levels of target audiences which are state leaders and grassroots level as the youth are more receptive to anti-Western narratives. The TTPs used by Russia in UAE are state/elite capture, interfaith/cultural exchanges and investment, information laundering, and sock puppets and bots']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['NATO Strategic Communications COE '],[],,,,,,,,,,
36,Russian Narrative on Photo of Ukrainian Soldiers Moving Items from Building,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['Ukraine'],"['A Russia-linked Facebook account attempted to create the narrative from an image posted online that Ukrainian soldiers were participating in looting buildings and shooting civilians. However, the image dipicted Ukrainian soldiers removing items from a building that had survived a Russian bombing.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
37,Russian Narrative on German Support to Ukraine,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],"['Ukraine', 'Germany']","['A Russian narrative started to spread that Germany would not assist Ukraine in the war anymore. The aim was to spark unrest that the biggest EU country ""wants"" the war to continue but at someone else\'s expense (USA). However, this claim is manipulative. While, there has been a reduction in stockpiles, Germany is still supporting Ukraine with military and financial aid.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
38,Russian Narrative on Videos from Mariupol,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['Ukraine'],"['Videos began to circulate online that were supposedly depicting around 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers surrendering to Russian military in the Kursk region. The majority of the clips were filmed in Mariupol in 2022 and the number of Ukrainian soldier in Kursk is actually much smaller (around 10,000).']",TRUE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
39,Georgian Dream Narrative of Anti-Government Ideology from Zelenskyy/Additional Russian Involvement,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']","['Russia', 'Georgia']",['Video Platforms and Streaming Services'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Georgia'],"['During a program on Imedi (a pro-government media channel) on 5 March, Gia Volski, a member of the ruling party Georgian Dream, claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for the overthrowing of the Georgian government in 2022. The Ukrainian President never did this and has actually thanked Georgian citizens for their support to Ukraine. To contribute to the anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Georgia pro-Russian actors have spread disninformation that Western leaders are calling for war in the country.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
40,"Belarus, Russia, and Georgia Disinformation on Acquisition of French Investment by Zelenskyy",2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],"['Belarus', 'Russia', 'Georgia']",['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],[],"[""Between 6 and 9 March Belarusian media pages along with Russian and Georgian-language Facebook accounts spread disinformation that an offshore company connected to Volodymyr Zelennskyy, Maltex Multinationnal Corp., purchased Milleis Banques, a French investment bank. The video that was shared across social media was voiced by an AI-generated voice and supposedly originated from the outlet TV 12 which does not exist. No reputable source has published anny information any information on the bank's sale or a connection to Zelenskyy. ""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
41,Georgian-Language Accounts Claim European Countries Abstained from NATO Vote on Syria,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Georgia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],[],"['On 10 March, posts were shared mainly in Georgian claiming that  after the UN Security Council meeting, 25 countries including Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, the Baltic, and Scandinavian countries abstained from voting on a resolution on the situation in Syria. However, while there was a meeting on 10 March, the claim that these countries abstained from voting is not true because neither the UN Security Council nor the General Assembly has adopted a resolution yet.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Myth Detector'],[],,,,,,,,,,
42,AI-Generated Conversation between Lithuanian and Palestinian MFA Ministers,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],"['Lithuania', 'Palestine']",['An AI-generated conversation between the Lithuanian and Palestian MFA ministers depicts the Palestinian minster asking the Lithuanian one for his public support in their ongoing conflict in Gaza. '],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],[],,,,,,,,,,
43,Fake Hulu Trailer,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Regional Manipulation'],[],['A disinformation campaign made a fake Hulu trailer claiming that Western politicians use drugs through selective video editing and contextual manipulation.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],[],,,,,,,,,,
44,Disinformation in Portuguese/EU Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['Portugal', 'EU']",['There were several instances of anti-immigrant ideology and and false claims during the Portuguese elections which included manipulated videos and content lacking context in order to incite fear and sway public opinion.'],FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['FIMI-IDAC'],[],,,,,,,,,,
45,Spain EU Election Fraud Narratives,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['Spain', 'EU']",['There were campaigns promoting null votes as well as spreading conspiracy theories about delayed election results to hurt public opinion on the legitimacy of the electoral process in Spain.'],FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['LUSA'],,,,,,,,,,
46,Italy EU Election Disinformation,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['Italy', 'EU']",['The spread of disinformation that electoral fraud in the EU elections were connected to anti-NATO and pro-Russian narratives in Italy.'],FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['Maldita.es'],,,,,,,,,,
47,Gendered Disinformation in EU Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['EU'],['Several misogynistic abuse and disinformation on social media platforms targeted female EU leaders and candidates leading up to the EU parliamentary elections.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],[],,,,,,,,,,
48,Eurovision 2024 Disinformation,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['EU'],['A disinformation campaign claimed that the Eurovision competition is used by the EU as a propaganda device to promote LGBTQ+ ideologies in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of EU-level decisions'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],[],,,,,,,,,,
49,Health Disinformation Targeting Migrants in Spain,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks ', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['Spain', 'EU']","['Migrants and Muslims were targets of disinformation suggesting that these groups commit more violent acts and also receive greater privileges in the access of social benefits in Spain. For example, a video shared online claimed that migrants received aid of 1,000 euros per month upon arrival in Spain and another post claimed that there was a ringworm and scabies epidemic in Catelonia that could be attributed to migrants.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['Global Disinformation Index'],,,,,,,,,,
50,Operation Overload ,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['France', 'Germany', 'EU']","['A coordinated effort by the Kremlin to overwhelm fact checkers and news organizations with false verification requests. The campaign uses emails, Telegram networks, fake X accounts, doppelgnager media websites, and Russian-aligned websites to spread various types of content to create cohesive, multi-layered narratives. The campaign was most active in France and Germany. Over 200 emails were collected and analysed and over 800 organizations were targeted by the fake accounts on X.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['Maldita.es'],,,,,,,,,,
51,YouTube Ads in Portugal ,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],"['Brazil', 'Argentina']","['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']","['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']","['Portugal', 'EU']","['Political ads began to appear on YouTube promoting the extreme-right leading up to the EU elections in Portugal. This content was for by an unattributed company, but it has links to Latin America, likely stemming from Brazil or Argentina.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['EU Disinfo Lab '],,,,,,,,,,
52,Sanctioned Russian Media Entities and Individuals Accessible on TikTok,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Regional Digital Conflicts '],['EU'],"['One week before the European elections, TikTok accounts linked to EU-sanctionned Russian state-controlled media and pro-Russia influencers were shown to EU-based users. 29 accounts that were either officials channnels of sanctioned media or doppelgangers were found. There were also several other accounts that reposted and ampliefied this content.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['Covertly Yours'],,,,,,,,,,
53,Benin-based FB Page Attacking Macron and Ukraine,2023-2024,2023,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Benin'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']",['France'],"[""Starting in August 2023, a Facebook page by the name of Patriotes de France is running ads targeting France with anti-Macron and anti-Ukraine content. At the time of 29 May 2024, the page had created 90 different ads with at least 40 of them being edited to avoid detection by Meta's algorithms.  Canadian dollars were used to pay for all the ads Meta labelled as social issues, elections, and politics. The currency to pay for the others is unknown. The page is run by one user from France and three from Benin.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['Alliance4Europe'],,,,,,,,,,
54,Large Disinformation and Scam Attack in Lithuania using Media Impersonation and Fake Facebook Accounts,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Lithuania'],"['Online scammers in Lithuania impersonated major news portals and used fake Facebook accounts to entice people to invest in fake investment platforms to extort money from. This campaign also extended to other neighboring countries. Unattributed individuals exploited the brands of LRT, LNK, Delfi, InfoTV, the Estonian national broadcaster ERR, and the Estonian newspapers Eesti Päevaleht, Ignitis, and Orlen Lietuva by creating doppelganger accounts. Many of the scammers used a ""cloaking technique by creating many different websites and redirected users to different content depending on criteria.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],"['Debunk.org', 'Debunk.org Part 2', 'Debunk.org Part 3']",,,,,,,,,,
55,Operation Targeting French Snap Elections with AI-generated Content,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Geopolitical Influence and Strategic Gain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['France'],['A FIMI campaign targted the French legislative snap elections by impersonating political parties through the use of AI-generated content and other disinformation content. Many of this this content was amplified on Telegram after first being shared on inauthentic news outlets created by Russia. The methods and campaign seemed to be an extension of the False Façade.'],FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['FIMI-IDAC'],['DFRLab'],,,,,,,,,,
56,Disinformation on Mandatory Military Service for Slovakians in War in Ukraine,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']",['Slovakia'],"['In 2023, disinformation was spread in Slovakia on mandatory military service for men to be deployed and assist with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This generated fear within citizens and led to more than 40,000 men refusing potential service in the country\'s armed forces. In response to this and other disinformation, citizens started ""Marches for Peace"" across Slovakia which were largely rooted in pro-Russian ideology.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['International Republican Institute'],[],,,,,,,,,,
57,"Slovakian motorcycle group ""Brother for Brother"" as Dissimenator of Pro-Russian Ideologies",Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Slovakia'],"['In Slovakia, the motorcycle group ""Brother for Brother"" is a prominent channel for pro-Kremlin narratives is a channel for Russia to exert influence over Slovakia. The group is linked to a Russian nationalist motorycle club called the ""Night Wolves"" which has Kremlin ties. ""Brother for Brother"" is one of the most popular pro-Russian groups on Slovak social media, with tens of thousans of followers. Its leader Matúš Alexa, travels to Russia often and was even an ""election observer"" in the occupied Crimea. While appearing to care for memorial to fallen Red Army soldiers, ""Brother for Brother"" spreads Russian imperial ideology, and Russian strategic interests. The group keeps in contact with Russian representatives. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['International Republican Institute'],[],,,,,,,,,,
58,Telegram and Media Platforms as Channels for FIMI and Political Agendas of Politicians in Slovakia,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Slovakia'],"['Several instances of FIMI that occur in Slovakia are amplified by Telegram and other quasi-media projects who spread the disinformation content. These disinformation channels are even used by government officials and high-level politicians to promote their political agendas which helps to reinforce the credibility and legitimacy of these channels among the population. Furthermore, politicians undermine mainstream media crebility by avoiding these outlets.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['International Republican Institute'],"['YouTube', 'Denník N']",,,,,,,,,,
59,Cintorín Ladomírovà Information Operation,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Slovakia'],"['There was a disinformation campaign about the military cemetary in Ladomírovà, Slovakia. Russian actors were able to spread false information about the desecration of the cemetary with help from Slovak traitors. This was an attempt to generate anger within the population and is just one example of the many ways in which Russia uses local proxies for its hybrid warfare tactics.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['International Republican Institute'],[],,,,,,,,,,
60,Cyber Attack in Czechia Schools,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Czechia'],"['In 2024, at the beginning of the school year, hundreds of schools in Czechia starting  receiving threats of data mining that lasted for several days. Czech authorities believe that this part of a larger hybrid war against Europe by Russsia.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Center for an Informed Society'],[],,,,,,,,,,
61,Disinformation about Charles University Shooter in Czechia,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Czechia'],"['In December 2023, an active shooter killed 14 people at Charles University in Prague before committing suicide. After the shooting, there was some disinformation online claiming that the shooter was a Ukrainian man.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Center for an Informed Society'],[';`'],,,,,,,,,,
62,Pro-Russian Narrative with Far-Right in Romania,Ongoing,2021,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Romania'],"['George Simion, a militant for the unification of Romania with Moldova and Diana Șoșoacă, a lawyer of the Orthodox Archdiocese of Tomis promoted several COVID conspiracy theories in Romania. They gained popularity in the country and later founded the far right-wing party Alliance for the Union of Romanians with Claudiu Târziu. Their message was aligned with Kremlin narratives and later on Diana Șoșoacă founded her own party, SOS, which was even more openly pro-Russian. This, along with the disinformation spread by the Kremlin, has led increased the presence of Kremlin ideology. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Global Focus'],[],,,,,,,,,,
63,Hungarian Influence in Romania,Ongoing,2018,,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Hungary'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Romania'],"['The governing party in Hungary, FIDESZ, influences the positions of UDMR/RMDSZ, which is the party representing the Hungarian minority in Romania. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, is seen as a positive figure by some Romanian nationalists who are normally not in favor of Hungary, but admire his dedication to his people. Orban shared authoritarian and racist messages when he spoke at the Băile Tușnad summer school in Romania.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Global Focus'],[],,,,,,,,,,
64,Narrative on the UN resolution on Srebrenica in North Macedonia,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Serbia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['North Macedonia'],"['The UN resolution on Srebrenica was adopted in May 2024,\nand it condemns denials of the Srebrenica genocide as well as glorifying convicted war criminals.However, this resolution was framed on social media in the Western Balkans, including North Macedonia,  as a fake resolution that aims to portray Serbs as genocidal\nnation. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Metamorphosis'],[],,,,,,,,,,
65,Serbian Media Pushing Pro-Russian Ideologies in North Macedonia,Ongoing,2015,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']","['Russia', 'Serbia']","['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['North Macedonia'],"['Serbian online media channels alongside Sputnik RS and RT RS are prominent sources of Kremlin messages in North Macedonia as most of the population can read and understand the Serbian language. Additionally, there is content published by Serbian TV channels with Russian propaganda which is amplified without any fact-checking. Nova  Makedonija, a daily newspaper, often publishes interviews with the Russian or Chinese and ambassadors which further reinforces the misinformation messages.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Metamorphosis'],[],,,,,,,,,,
66,Russian Embassy in North Macedonia,Ongoing,2014,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['North Macedonia'],['The Russian Embassy in North Macedonia is active on X and Facebook. They often republish statements from Russian officials and comment on current events in the country especially when it is related to the EU.'],FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Metamorphosis'],[],,,,,,,,,,
67,Levica Party in North Macedonia as Kremlin Echoing Tool,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],"['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Global Strategic Digital Influence']",['North Macedonia'],"['Political parties in North Macedonia like Levica, support pro-Kremlin narratives including framing NATO as a terrorist organization and opposing the Ministry of Defense for providing aid to Ukraine. The party openly suports Russian activities in the country and has met with the Russian ambassador to criticize the government for imposin sanction on Russia. Levica speaks about the importance of cooperating with China is beneficial as a small country, but it also helps to combat Western globalization.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Metamorphosis'],[],,,,,,,,,,
68,Anti-Gender Movement in North Macedonia,Ongoing,2020,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],"['USA', 'Sweden']",['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['North Macedonia'],"['There is a very organized anti-gender movement in North Macedonia. The ""Coalition"" has a website and lists their partner/supporter organizations, some of them being Family Watch International and Gender Identity Challenge Skandinavia (GENID). ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Metamorphosis'],[],,,,,,,,,,
69,Fundamentalist Christian Churches and Organizations Contributions to Anti-LGBTQ+ Laws in Africa,Ongoing,2002,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['USA'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Africa'],"['Several African countries like Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa have homegrown networks of anti-LGBTQ+ groups and organizations. These groups rely heavily on funding from outside Africa and Fundamentalists Christian Churches and Organizations from the United States such as Family Watch International asssist their agendas. Their funding support has led to them influencing both local laws and public opinion on the LGBTQ+ population.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Deutsche Welle'],[],,,,,,,,,,
70,RT and Sputnik Content in Albania,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"[""RT and Sputnik content reaches Albanian audiences through amplification by third-party sources. Since, the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine,  The Electronic and Postal Communications Authority (AKEP), has closed around 155 Russian domains in Albania due to illegal content or disinformation.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
71,Russia's Anti-NATO Stance in Albania,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['After the establishment of a NATO security air base and a defence innovation center in Albania, Russia amplified its anti-NATO narrative. Specifically, they labeled these developments as a ""source of hybrid threats,"" and a threat to Russian sovereignty. It is common in Albania for Russia to depict NATO and the EU as expansionist and harmful to Russia and other nations who are subject to the interests of the United States.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
72,Russian Embassy in Albania,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],['The Russian Embassy is very active in spreading disinformation across social platforms in Albania. The Embassy is third in popularity andd interaction on social media among Balkan countries and is thet 15th most active Russian embassy in the world for content creation. '],FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
73,Chinese Soft Power in Albania,Ongoing,2013,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['China interferes with Albania through the use of youth engagement programs such and the Confucius Institue at the University of Tirana, which promotes Chinese language and culture. The country also offers scholarships and summer camp opportunities to Albanian studdents. China uses soft power tools such as organizing study trips and exchanges for Albanian journalists and media workers to help amplify pro-Chinese content in Albanian media. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
74,Chinese State-Sponsored Media in Albania,Ongoing,2015,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"[""State-Sponsored media platforms such as China Radio International (CRI), publishes in Albanian, leading to a stronger shaping of Chinese narratives. Specifically, the narratives often focus on China's economic success and partnerships, while promoting their interests. CRI content in Albanian portrays China's Belt and Road Inititative in a positive light, while portraying US and EU actions as negative.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
75,Chinese Partnerships in Albania,Ongoing,2017,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],['Video Platforms and Streaming Services'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"[""Chinese media agencies such as Xinhua, have partnerships with the Albanian public broaddcaster, RTSH, and the Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA). Through these partnerships, media content including documentaries, films, and children's programs are exchanged and they often portray China favorably. Also, training programs for Albanian journalists, funded by China, try to influence their ideology during study trips which could then impact the media content once they return home.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
76,Iranian Cyber Attack in Albania,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Iran'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['Beyween May 2021 and June 2022, actors from the Iranian state gained access to the Albanian government\'s network and email content. The attack was attributed to the Iranian state along with an Iran-affiliated group, ""Homelandd Justice."" Albania cut diplomatic ties with Iran after the incident and got rid off its embassy staff. The attack was possibly a response to Albania hosting the Iranian opposition group, Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in the country. The attackers used ransomware, phishing, social engineerring, and DDoS attacks to gain access to Albanian networks and data and also spread disinformation on Telegram. The large scale part of the cyber attack occurrred in July 2022 when multiple government websites and services became unavailable. The goal of the attack was to stop public services, erase digital systems, and hack into records. The attack resulte in many service disruptions and financial losses, leading to distrust in the Albanian government\'s ability to protect its digital assets. In September 2022, the hackers went after the state police\'s Total Information Management System (TIMS) to leak personal data of government officials and police. They share d this data on a website, which was later blocked, and Telegram. By May 2024, their ""Homeland Justice"" Telegram group had more than 22,000 subscribers. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
77,Iranian State-Sponsored Media in Albania,Ongoing,2016,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Iran'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['Iran uses State-Sponsored media such as Pars Today to promote their interests and ideologies, mainly focusing on portraying MEK as a terrorist organization and criticizing Western countries. The content also criticizes Albania for hosting MEK. However, the content has not had significant influence as most viewers can see its bias.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
78,Non-state Media in Albania,Ongoing,2021,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Iran'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['The Nejat (Salvation) Association, has an Albanian-language website where it spreads propaganda against the Mujahedeen, framing them as a terrorist cult. They also refer to declarations by the Associatiion for the Support of Iranians Living in Albania (ASILA). Gazeta Impakt is the most active media outlet disseminating Iranian propaganda where it often reuses content and statements from the ASILA organization. Gazeta Impakt portrays MEK as being inivolved in terrorism, human trafficking, and drug traficking.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
79,Turkish Interests in Albania,Ongoing,2024,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Türkiye'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['Türkiye has expanded its media presence in Albania with propaganda targeting the leadership of Albania\'s Islamic community which is linked to Türkiye\'s association of the leadership with the ""Gulen network."" Türkiye views this network as a political threat. More recently, Albanian online media outlets have shown growing alignment with Turkish interests by publishing pro-Türkiye propaganda, protraying them as a regional ally while targeting their political opponents, such as Gulen-linked groups. Further concerns have grown about a possible increase in Turkish propaganda as there is now a cooperation between Albanian and Turkish broadcasters.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
80,Gulf States Funding of Albanian Religious and Media Activities,Ongoing,2010,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],"['Saudi Arabia', 'UAE']",['Digital Financial Tools for Manipulation'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['Some Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made economic investments and given funding for religious and media activities in Albania. Over time, this creates connections through soft power that could help align the local ideolgoies and interests of Albanians with the geopolitical goals of these states.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
81,Serbian Media Activities in Albania,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],"['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Serbia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Albania'],"['In September 2024, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Countering Disinformation and Foreign Interference reported that Serbian media is spreading disinformation. This information frames Albania and Kosvo in a negative light to target their regional stability.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Scidev'],[],,,,,,,,,,
82,Russia and China's Support of Maduro in Venezuela,Ongoing,2018,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],"['Russia', 'China']","['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']","['Localized Digital Attacks', 'Regional Digital Conflicts ']",['Venezuela'],"[""Both Russia and China have have endorsed Nicolás Maduro's administration despite possible electoral fraud. Maduro is the President of Venezuela, and in exchange for the support from Russia and China, the Venezuelan state-controlled media (TeleSUR) aligns with pro-Russia and China ideologies. Additionally, with Latin America, Venezuela carries out the same-patron and client relationship which allows them to have strong regional power.""]",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
83,Russia's Use of RT Deutsch to Influence German Elections,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Germany'],"['There was evidence of Russian interference leading up 2025 German elections. Despite, an EU-wide ban on RT Deutsch, the Russian state-controlled media platform has still reached Germans through doppelganger domains, content aggregator sites, and podcasts. Investigations found at least 20 new RT Deutsch mirror domains with multiple subdomains. The main topics that RT Deutsch focuses on are support for the far-right party (AFD) and their anti-immigrant narratives.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
84,China Targeting of Alabama Representative before 2024 US Presidential and Congressional Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"['Leading up to the 2024 US Presidential and Congressional Elections, the Chinese state-linked influence network ""Spamouflage"" targeted Republican Representative Barry Moore of Alabama along with other congressional candidates to influence  down-ballot races. The operation was carried out with several inauthentic accounts used to post negative content about candidates who had publicly spoken out against China. The network specifically spoke out against Moore\'s suport for Israel and used antisemitic language. The content was amplified by bot accounts. Tennessee Senator Marsha Blackburn, Florida Senator Marco Rubio, and Texas Representative Michael McCaul were also targeted.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
85,Chinese Firm's use of Newswire Service to Disseminate Propaganda in Arizona News Outlet,2023,2023,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"[""In 2023, the Chinese company Shanghai Haixun used a newswire service to distribute pro-China news articles onto the wesbsites of legitimate American news outlets, such as the Arizona Republic. The content appeared in at least 32 news outlets and attempted to portray the United States while praising China. Criticisms included Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, the US fentanyl problem, andd human rights and race issues. The content was often directly republished from Chinese state-controlled media or state-funded think tanks. ""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
86,Fake Local News Outlet in Arkanas used to Disseminate Pro-Russian Content,2022-2023,2022,2023,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"['A website posing as a local Arkansas news site sources stories from the Russian state-controlled media organization RT and attributed them to fake journalists. The outlet titled ""Little Rock News,"" focuses on news relevant to the city but also included content sources from RT. The profile photo for many of the article authors were generated by AI.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
87,Fake Local News Outlet in San Francisco used to Target Harris Presidential Campaign,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],"['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms', 'Video Platforms and Streaming Services']",['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"[""Leading up to the 2024 US Presidential Elections, the Russian-linked influence network Storm-1516 created a website posing as a San Francisco news outlet to disseminate fake content and target Vice President Kamala Harris' campaign. In September 2024, the website KBSF-TV published an article claiming that Harris was involved in a 2011 hit-and-run in San Francisco that paralyzed a 13-year-old girl. The article even included a video of someone in a wheelchair who was a Russian paid actor and x-ray scans. The video reached millions of views.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['The Alliance for Securing Democracy'],[],,,,,,,,,,
88,Doppelganger Operations in Polish Presidential Elections,2025,2025,2025,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Poland'],"['Before the vote for the Polish presidential election, the Doppelganger network disseminated 279 tweets to interfere with the electoral process. Some of the main themes of the tweets promoted anti-EU, anti-Ukraine, and anti-Polish government ideology. Additionally, there were tweets on subjects such as healthcare and immigration to try and create further division within society on domestic issues. The operation used 43 articles from 13 different Polish publications to gain a total of 1,547,221 views and 256,549 shares, but the shares are believed to be from inauthentic accounts. ']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Alliance4Europe'],[],,,,,,,,,,
89,Fabricated Voting Instructions from President Biden,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],[],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"['Before the 2024 US Presidential election, a fabricated audio message of President Biden discouraged New Hampshire voters from voting in the primary by telling them to save their vote for the official election day in November.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,"['Generative AI, Democracy, and Human Rights Paper']",[],,,,,,,,,,
90,Cambridge Analytica's Foreign Interference ,2013-2018,2013,2018,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['United Kingdom'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],"['Nigeria', 'Trinidad and Tobago', 'Kenya', 'Malaysia', 'Philippines', 'USA']","['From 2013-18 Cambridge Analytica conducted information influence campaigns by microtargeting individual voters and spreading disinformation. Cambridge Analytica was mainly started to influence US voters in favor of the Republican party and was a legal subsidiary of SCL Group which worked for the British military in the 1990s. The firm collapsed due to its violation of user privacy laws in the US and UK as they acquired user data without their consent. However, the firm has returned under the new name of Emerdata.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,"[""Cyber Information Operations: Cambridge Analytica's Challenge to Democratic Legitimacy Paper""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
91,PRC-Linked Property Developer Donations to Australian Political Parties,2017,2017,2017,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],['Digital Financial Tools for Manipulation'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Australia'],"['Australian Labor politician Sam Dastyari developed ties to PRC-linked property developer Huang Xiangmo after he made substantial donations to the Labor and Liberal parties in the country. He resigned in 2017 after the scandal came to light and, since then, Australia created the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 to restrict foreign donations to political parties']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Foreign Interference and Australia Electoral Security in the Digital Era Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
92,Chinese Hackers Targeting Australia's Parliamentary Network,2019,2019,2019,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Australia'],"[""In 2019, Chinese government hackers were able to hack into the Australian government's parliamentary network. The hackers gained access to MP's emails and party databases. While the total impact of this cyber attack was not completely clear, the information the Chinese government had access to could have aided them in disinformation campaigns.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Foreign Interference and Australia Electoral Security in the Digital Era Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
93,PRC-controlled Media Propaganda on Tiktok in Taiwan,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Taiwan'],"[""As the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted grey zone activities around the disputed Kinmen Islands in the Taiwan Strait, the PRC spread propaganda on TikTok. For example, Chinese state-controlled media China News Service (CNS) published a video to amplify PLAN's military capabilities, while challenging Taiwan's sovereignty and generating fear among their citizens.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""TikTok: China's Glaring Trojan Horse Paper""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
94,PRC Media Accusing the US of Starting COVID-19,2021,2021,2021,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Geopolitical Influence and Strategic Gain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['USA'],"['A TikTok user published a series of three videos that claimed the COVID-19 virus was created by Ralph Baric,who is a biologist at the US National Academy of Science. The video originated from the official account of the Fuyang City Bureau of Justice who sourced the video from a sock puppert account of the PRC-controlled China Central Television (CCTV).']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""TikTok: China's Glaring Trojan Horse Paper""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
95,TikTok's Amplification of PRC Narratives,Ongoing,2023,,TRUE,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['Global'],"['TikTok\'s ""For You"" page algorithm is able to amplify PRC propaganda and pro-China narratives while negative content through shared server codes of ByteDance and Douyin. ByteDance\'s willingness to comply with Beijing is due to their restriction on downloads of their news app Toutiao in 2016.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""TikTok: China's Glaring Trojan Horse Paper""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
96,Foreign Interference in 2024 US Presidential Elections,2024,2024,2024,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],"['Russia', 'China', 'Iran']",['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['USA'],"['Russia, China, and Iran all attemped to interfere with the 2024 US Presidential Elections. Russia was in favor of Trump due to his stance on Ukraine and anti-NATO commentary, while Iran was against him based on his past policies that put pressure on Tehran. With China, it was not clear that they were trying to influence the election in the favor of any specific candidate. All three actors disseminated AI-generated and other forms of digital content to undermine electoral integrity and create a distrust of the system within the American population. Also, the common practice of exploiting sensitive topics such as LGBTQ+ rights and immigration was used to create further social polarization.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['The Future of Democracy: Lessons from the US Fight against Foreign Electoral Interference in 2024 Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
97,Russian Disinformation during Protests in Mali,2020,2020,2020,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Mali'],"['When protests began in Mali in 2020, Russia started a disinformation campaign that accused France of neocolonial interference with internal affairs in the country. They also accused the UN of occupying the country and supporting terrorist groups.']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Feeling the Pulse: Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in Africa and the Western Balkans Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
98,Chinese Bot Accounts Spreading Propaganda in Serbia,2020,2020,2020,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Serbia'],['Twitter in Serbia took down a network of bot accounts who were supporting the ruling party and president but also promoting Chinese aid. The network appeared to still be active later and continued to praise the Serbian government for their actions against COVID-19.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Feeling the Pulse: Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in Africa and the Western Balkans Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
99,Chinese Propaganda on Czechia Senate President,2020,2020,2020,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,FALSE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']","['China', 'Switzerland']",['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Czechia'],"[""After the new Senate President in Czechia, Miloš Vystrčil, went through with former President Kubera's plans to visit Taiwan, an email was sent to several Czech newspapers by Swiss consultancy, RefinSol Advisory Services. The email claimed that Vystrčil received a payment of $4 million USD for his visit to Taiwan. Since then, he has been the target of disinformation and propaganda. The content originates mainly from China Radio International as well as interconnected Czech disinformation sources and websites.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Hacking Minds and Machines: Foreign Interference in the Digital Era Report'],[],,,,,,,,,,
100,Russian Links with Bulgarian Nationalist Political Party,Ongoing,2014,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations '],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Bulgaria'],"[""The nationalist, right-wing political party in Bulgaria, Vazrazhdane, is known to be a pro-Russian actor. They actively disseminate Kremlin information and align with Moscow policy in Bulgarian domestic politics. For example, the party would not vote in favor of an official parliamentary declaration condemning Russia's war in Ukraine and does not approve of sanctions against Russia. They have also organized protests calling for Bulgarian neutrality in the war and condemning any Bulgarian military aid to Ukraine.""]",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Hacking Minds and Machines: Foreign Interference in the Digital Era Report'],[],,,,,,,,,,
101,Operation Cuckoobees,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['China'],[],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],"['EU', 'North America', 'Asia']","[""In May 2022, the US-Israeli cybersecurity firm Cybereason disclosed a campaign where hackers were able to extract hundreds of gigabytes of data from around 30 different multinational companies worth trillions of US dollars. They mainly targeted the intellectual property data of these companies and it is believed that the Winnti Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group is responsible. Western intelligence suggests that they are affiliated with China's Ministry of State Security (MSS). ""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Hacking Minds and Machines: Foreign Interference in the Digital Era Report'],[],,,,,,,,,,
102,Russian Cyber Attack on German Wind Power Companies,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],[],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Germany'],"['After its invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched a cyberattack against German wind turbine manufacturers Nordex and Enercon and wind farm maintenance company Deutsche Windtechnikin what could be seen as an possible attempt to influence foreign policy.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Hacking Minds and Machines: Foreign Interference in the Digital Era Report'],[],,,,,,,,,,
103,Chinese Interference in 2021 Canadian Elections,2021,2021,2021,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Undermining Digital Democratic Processes', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['China'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Canada'],"['During the 2021 Canadian election campaign, China used diplomats and local proxies to spread the narrative that the Conservative party in Canada was to critical of China and would enact harmful policies if elected. The attempt was to suggest that the party would take an approach similar to Donald Trump and would ban Chinese students from Canadian education programs.']",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Foreign Interference Online: Where Disinformation Infringes on Freedom of Thought Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
104,Russian Interference in Italian Energy Sector before 2022 Elections,2022,2022,2022,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,FALSE,['Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],[],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['Italy'],"[""Leading up to 2022 general elections in Italy, a cyber attack linked to Russia targeted the country's critical energy sector. There was a hack into energy company Eni as well as Gestore dei Servizi Energetici, which is the agency that runs the Italy's electricity market. These entities were important to help in Italy's transitions away from Russian energy sources. ""]",FALSE,FALSE ,TRUE,['Democratic Defense: How Italy can Lead the Fight against Russian Disinformation'],[],,,,,,,,,,
105,Operation Matryoshka,Ongoing,2023,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Localized Digital Attacks'],['France'],"['Operation Matryoshka is pro-Russian information campaign created to undermine the credibility of media outlets, public personalities, and fact-checking units. The campaign makes use of deepfakes, doppelganger pages of Western media outlets and institutions, Telegram channels, and content from previous operations. The campaign mostly focused on anti-Ukraine narratives, but also targeted French politicians supporting Ukraine, other French politicians, and the Olympics.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,['Russian Malign Acitivities in France Since 2022 Paper'],[],,,,,,,,,,
106,Operation EcoBoost,Ongoing,2024,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['Global'],"['In August 2024, The American Sunlight Project (ASP) discovered a malign influence network sharing grassroots support for left-wing, pro-environmental causes, imitating several of Matryoshka’s operating tactics. The network  seems to have been active in at least five languages (English, Spanish, French, German, and Arabic) since mid-June 2024. The main goal of the campaign is to generate division and anger on X by posting ofen-provocative content around environmental- and technology-related issues on posts related to environmental policy, naural disasters, AI, and climate change. The tactics involve mass replies to posts from media outlets, public figures, international governing bodies and environmental organizations. By doing this the aim is to evoke strong emotions from people on both sides of the political spectrum. Most of the accounts had British, German, Spanish, French, Canadian, or American locations while a small number were from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Australia. ']",FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['American Sunlight Project Report'],[],,,,,,,,,,
107,Recent Reliable News (RRN),Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']",['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts'],['EU'],['Recent Reliable News (RRN) is a disinformation campaign connected to the first months of the Doppelganger campaign and was exposed by Meta in September 2022. The campaign disseminated pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian news content in multiple languages after sanctions were laid down on Russian state-controlled media. An FBI investigation found that the same personas were used in some cases to register both RRN and Doppelganger mirror sites. Eventually it seems that both campaigns became delivery mechanisms for Social Design Agency (SDA) information influence operations.'],TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""Lund University's Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency Report""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
108,War on Fakes,Ongoing,2022,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE,"['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems', 'Strategic Geopolitical Influence in the Digital Domain']","['State-Sponsored Digital Influence Operations ', 'Non-State Digital Proxies']",['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Global Strategic Digital Influence'],['Global'],"[""War on Fakes is a pro-Kremline media campaign started to target Ukraine and legitimize Russia's invasion with false fact checking practices. For example, it denied any war crimes were committed in Ukraine. The content from the campaign was amplified by at least 65 official Facebook pages and Twitter accounts from the Russian diplomatic network. There were also close links to RRN sharing the same new stories, links, amplification methods, etc. Their domain was purchased by the same persona as RRN and some of the Doppelganger sites. The campaign although likely not created by SDA, is linked to it and also to Dialog and Structura.""]",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""Lund University's Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency Report""]",[],,,,,,,,,,
109,Operation Undercut,Ongoing,2023,,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,TRUE,FALSE,['Destabilizing Public Trust in Digital Information Systems'],['Non-State Digital Proxies'],['Russia'],['Social Media and User-Generated Content Platforms'],['Regional Digital Conflicts'],['EU'],"['Operation Undercut has been running since December 2023 and in November 2024 it was attributed to the SDA. The tactics overlap with those in the Doppelganger and Overload campaigns. In the campaign, 500 social media accounts on multiple platforms disseminated 1,190 pieces of AI video content along with SDA-sourced images from Western news outlets out of context. The main purpose of the campaign was to weaken support for Ukraine and increase tensions around the 2024 US elections. The three mentioned operations have some shared infrastructure.']",TRUE,FALSE ,FALSE,"[""Lund University's Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency Report""]",[],,,,,,,,,,