

nants and birds. The aged females occupy a dominant position in many animal and human societies. We cannot say that these specific customs are inherited by man from the animal species which have them. The instances that crop out along various branches of the biological tree are not found in a consecutive line. But, on the other hand, does not the homotypy suggest strongly a similar cause? It wears now among human societies the appearance of religious custom. "The truth is that with man, as with the animal, the fact may depend on many other causes. The explanations given are constructed after the phenomena; they should be rejected. I confess, for my part, that the real cause remains for me unknown. I do not even see how investigation should be directed in order to discuss it." In the case of æsthetic phenomena the author draws a conclusion adverse to their alleged social origin. The bird decorates the bower; the primitive man decorates his cave with shining objects or gathers a store of bright stones. Sometimes this serves sexual ends, sometimes it merely affords pleasant sensations. "The æsthetic phenomenon is in nowise social in its origins; like property it is a something brought by the individual animal to the group to which he joins himself as integrant part. It becomes social with him; it is not such by its proper nature or by its origins." On this three comments may be made. (1) M. Petrucci draws very sweeping inductions from data in a single art. Song, music, dance, myth, story, are not reckoned with. (2) Few if any advocates of the social origin of art would wish to maintain this in a sense that excludes sex relationship from social factors. (3) What the present writer, for example, has maintained is, not that man as individual has not sensations pleasantly stimulated by color, sound, smell, and touch, nor that he does not adorn his person to provoke the passions of sex. It is rather that the detachment and the objectivity characteristic of the æsthetic, as compared with appetite and passion, is strongly aided if not entirely caused by the social as *versus* the individual attitude; and further that in the profounder æsthetic consciousness the idea of expression, of communication, of sharing, is an important factor.

J. H. T.

*L'échange économique et l'échange affectif.* F. PAULHAN. *Revue Philosophique*, 1906, LXII., 358-399.

The chief difference, as found by the author, between the economic exchange and the exchange of feeling, lies in the definite character of the one and the vague, indefinite nature of the other. In the economic exchange, the values are easily appreciable in numbers, the obligation is fulfilled by one act of a highly specialized kind. On the

other hand, the idea of measuring the value of a friendship has in it something repugnant. Neither is its obligation fulfilled by the return of a favor; it implies a promise of future acts and a complex variety of services. It therefore engages more of the personality. It is, however, always an exchange. The mother gives affection and care; but the child furnishes a soft, lovable object on which to expend devotion — a real exchange, since it gives pleasure to the mother. The exchange of feeling is also a real exchange in the sense that it implies a real obligation, failure to fulfill which, as in ingratitude, is censured as dishonesty would.

The two spheres are not after all wholly dissimilar. Money has an influence on health, on fame, on pleasure, even on the procuring of affection. It is not the sole cause, but may provide fostering conditions. One dislikes to consider a friendship in economic terms, yet many people would give up some friendships for the sake of a fortune. It is even possible that a legacy may deaden the grief at the loss of a parent. And friendships which seem to us beyond price may be measured in terms of other friendships, which in turn may be valued in money. Moreover, feeling comes to play a large part in economic exchange, particularly in small towns. Especially is one's feeling towards the social conditions of one's country affected by countless small economic exchanges.

The economic exchange corresponds to greater specialization and a more advanced organization of society. Hence, in times of peace and prosperity exchange tends to become more exact and less influenced by feeling. This is true even in personal relations of friendship; the greatest harmony results only when each knows exactly what he may expect from the other. Until this is attained, there is always danger of misunderstanding. The economic exchange therefore represents, when completely reached, the highest advance of which a given organization is capable. On the other hand, any sudden crisis tends to recall the exchange of feeling. A man who objects to what he considers excessive taxes, will die for his country in time of war. The activity of feeling indicates a period of stress, of disorganized life, and marks the beginning of a new progress. It corresponds to invention and will and all phenomena in which automatic routine is broken. When the stress is over, the new life immediately begins to organize itself along lines of economic exchange.

The change here is not from altruism toward egoism. Altruism and egoism only exist where there is a conflict of desires. In the pure economic exchange, both parties are absolutely satisfied. The

purchase of a postage stamp is an act neither of egoism or altruism; it is rather a suppression of both. It is in the same way a suppression of what are usually termed moral considerations, in favor of considerations of utility.

Each kind of exchange supplements the other; both are modes of progress. The economic exchange marks the end evolution in a particular system; the exchange of feeling enlarges and transforms the system, which the economic exchange again proceeds to regulate. This account is, however, only schematically correct. In reality, the two sorts of exchanges are infinitely complicated and intertwined one with another and an absolutely defined sequence, such as has been indicated, is perhaps never found.

A. L. STRONG.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*Nature et Société.* S. JANKÉLÉVITCH. Paris, 1906. Pp. 188.

For M. Jankélévitch the particular social sciences may furnish the data for sociology, but are useless unless permeated by notions of unity and interdependence drained from sociology considered as their philosophic source. This position he holds as a criticism of the naturalistic sociology developed through Spencer, Marx and Durkheim.

The author first marks off what he styles natural from social phenomena. The first deal with judgments of existence; the second with judgments of value. Sociology, since it has to reckon with these judgments of value, contains a peculiarly human element which vitiates conclusions of the statistical method applied to social phenomena. After a brief historical sketch of the application of the conception of evolution to sociological studies, we find the author's criticism of the naturalistic sociology which arose from this application. To him social development is partly conditioned by environment, because this development is the result of man's reaction on this environment, but the element in the situation by virtue of which development occurs is the human will. Since every reaction is thus a unique synthesis, one term of which is the human will, sociological laws cannot be discovered as are natural laws. Having pointed out what he feels to be the peculiarity of social phenomena, he is prepared to give a definition of society. Society is organization for defense against external nature. This organization, however, cannot have its origin in biological forces, because these lead not to organization, but to struggle and disunion. Not finding its source in biological forces this organization must have its origin in man as a "conscious being capable of opposing his desires and needs to the action of natural forces" (p. 137). It is need-