

to the theory of evolution, although it leave natural selection exactly where it was before, only defining its sphere of application as wider or narrower, as the case may be. None of these new determinations, it seems to me, can ever overturn natural selection, since that is a statement simply of the difference of fate which must overtake organisms as long as there are different conditions of living, differences of endowment, and different phases in the cycles of life. But just in as much as these determinations truly describe the creatures which survive, it is they, and not alone the mere ordeal which they may have survived, that is of positive value for evolution science.

In conclusion, it is of interest to note—and of very peculiar interest to psychologists to note—as Professor Poulton does, that both Darwin and Wallace declare in their correspondence, each for himself, that it was the study of Malthus on population which led to the discovery of the principle of natural selection.

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VISION.

Eine neue Theorie der Gesichtswahrnehmung. K. UEBERHORST.
Ztschr. für Psychol. u. Phys. der Sinnesorgane. XIII., 54–65.
1896.

The author proposed a new theory of visual perception in 1876, which he now perceives to be erroneous; and, in the course of years, he has composed the one which is here published and which was read before the International Congress of Psychologists at Munich last summer. He states his present theory at once, and in these terms: Visual perception, like perception in general, is neither sensation nor knowledge, but the product of a special psychic activity, whose essence consists in the binding together into a peculiar unity of a sensation given by an organ of sense with another sensation, idea, or memory image which is present to the soul at the same time, which two factors are conceived by the unconscious intelligence as signs of one and the same object. When we enter a room that is well known to us perception proceeds far more rapidly and completely than if the room is unfamiliar; this is usually explained by saying that in the former case a crowd of memory-images are called forth by the present impression and unite with it, and thus a clear idea of the content of the room is produced. This explanation is near to being the correct one, but nevertheless it does not exactly hit it off; the supposed fusion is not

what takes place, but the real process is that, first, an intelligence which is unconsciously present in us, or, in Kantian phrase, an *à priori* knowing, refers the present impression and the memory image to one and the same object; thereupon the intuition function becomes active and produces out of the two the new form, the present clear perception, as a peculiar unitary thing. The author admits that this thought will not instantly dawn upon one, but he believes that the reader will be convinced of its truth and value by the consideration of those illusions by which we see certain plane drawings as solid forms. He discusses a number of these illusions, but it seems to the reviewer that he underestimates the difficulty of leading the reader to see that his explanation differs, except in words, which represent fictions, from the explanation usually given. All this, he says, after describing a number of common illusions, is a union effected by the Unconscious Intelligence between the present sensation and the idea which is in the mind; but it is difficult to see that there is anything in the instances chosen which throws light upon the question at issue—whether the fusion is effected by the Unconscious Intelligence, or whether it just takes place, without the aid of that mythical creation. The idea that there is something in the mind which does everything is not so much in favor among the psychologists as it was once, and merely stating it as a belief is not enough to carry conviction. Nor does it seem well-advised to devote a good portion of a paper to a diagram for showing that two points which are, to a single eye, in the same direction when looked at directly are not so when looked at peripherally—a point which most text-books (that of Norris and Oliver, to mention the latest) are content to dispose of in a line; moreover, the difference is so slight that it can only be effective for points which are very far removed from each other, and it is certainly of no moment in determining the solidity of ordinary objects, and cannot therefore furnish the complete basis for our notion of the third dimension. In conclusion, the author affirms that, since Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, no one has any right to doubt the existence of the Unconscious Intelligence, and hence that no one can find it unjustified if he seeks to take cognizance of its activity in the production of the perception.

Ueber Erythroopsie. ERNST FUCHS. Archiv für Ophthalmologie, xlii. (4), 207-292.

This is an extremely careful piece of experimenting and also of reasoning, and, on account of its connection with recent theory, it is worth while to report it at some length.