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Lieut.-Colonel Lord Raglan

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THE MILITIA IN 1897.

By Lieut.-Colonel Lord RAGLAN (Captain Grenadier Guards, retired pay), Royal Monmouthshire Engineer Militia.

Wednesday, February 10th, 1897.

General Sir RICHARD HARRISON, K.C.B., C.M.G., R.F.,
in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN:—My lords, ladies, and gentlemen, It is hardly necessary for me to say much in the way of introduction of one who bears such an historic name as Lord Raglan. There must be many in this room who will remember the circumstances of the Crimean war, how the First Lord Raglan, the friend of Wellington, having learnt the art of war in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, was entrusted, though somewhat advanced in years, with the command of the British Army that went to the East; how he succeeded in bringing honour to the British arms in the victories of Alma, of Inkerman, and of Balaclava; and how, later on, though oppressed by the want of organisation in the British Army and the unpreparedness of our country for war, he continued to struggle against difficulties, until at last he laid down his life on the altar of duty within sight of those ever-memorable trenches around Sebastopol. Ladies and gentlemen, it is the grandson of that great man who has been kind enough to come here and address us to-day on the very important subject of the Militia. He, also, is a soldier of varied experience. He has served in the Grenadier Guards, has seen active service against the Afghans in the north of India, and he is now second in command of what I know to be one of the smartest and most efficient Militia regiments in Her Majesty's Service. I can confidently commend what he is about to say to the attention and consideration of all present.

LECTURE.

FOR many years the country has taken but little notice of the Militia, and the efficiency of those battalions that attended the last Aldershot Manœuvres came as a revelation to both Press and Public, and even, it is said, to many distinguished soldiers. This appears to be a favourable time at which to discuss the general condition of the Militia, the directions in which it could be improved, and the means that could be taken to increase its utility. I propose, therefore, briefly to call attention to certain wants of the Force, and to make a few suggestions with regard to them.

It is as one who has known and belonged to the Militia force for many years that I am here to submit these suggestions to your careful consideration and criticism; but it seems only right that I should also tell you that from personal enquiries which I have made, I feel justified in saying that the views I hold and here put forward are those held—not perhaps by all

—but by the great majority of those Militia officers who, from their experience and position, are best acquainted with the needs and requirements of the Force.

The first point is the deficiency of officers, which is a great and growing one. At this moment there are over 700 vacancies, and for several years they have been growing more numerous. The earlier returns do not distinguish the officers of the Permanent Staff, and apparently include the medical officers now abolished; so I take the last ten years, *i.e.*, 1886 to 1895 inclusive, and I find that, on an average of those years, there is a deficiency of about 500 officers; or, taking it the other way, that the average number of officers the country can provide under present conditions is very little more than 3,000.

Though it is only of late years that agricultural depression has almost deprived the Force of the services of the local landowners, we must remember that there has always existed more or less difficulty in officering the Militia. I cannot find any year since 1859 (the first year of the annual returns) in which there were less than 300 vacancies—speaking in round numbers—and the deficiency has lately been larger. Even during the old French wars the Militia was never complete in officers.

Let us turn for a moment to the classes of young men who can afford the time and money for entering the Militia. Last year an eminent Volunteer brigadier made a bitter attack on the leisured classes for their apathy and want of patriotism. Now I do not know where this large leisured class, apathetic and unpatriotic, is. In former days the land-owning classes might fairly have been called leisured, and they officered the Militia almost entirely. Nowadays, all younger sons and most elder ones enter a profession or emigrate, as soon as they leave school or college, and have no time to devote to soldiering. By the time they have reached a position of independence, they are too old to begin a new trade, which, above all others, requires to be learnt in youth. On the other hand, those few young men who really possess the requisite leisure and means almost invariably join the Militia, the Yeomanry, or the Volunteers, but their numbers are not sufficient to fill the vacancies. If anyone who hears me will write down the names of those young men he knows, between the ages of 17 and 23, who have a certain amount of leisure and money, and who are not wearing Her Majesty's livery in some branch of the Auxiliary forces, he will find the list a remarkably short one. There are only two large classes of young men with leisure and a fair income or allowance: those who are cramming for the Army, and those at the Universities. The latter are largely debarred from entering the Militia by the fact that the trainings fall, generally, in the summer term, and we cannot expect any number of University men in the Militia till the times of the terms are altered, or special arrangements made to suit their convenience; and that is a question we cannot discuss here.

There remain to my mind only the lads who are cramming for the Army. If all officers had to enter the Army through the Militia, the problem would be solved at once, and all vacant commissions, anyhow in the subaltern ranks, would be filled, even if the establishment were raised

to two subalterns per company ; which it assuredly should be, to form a reliable reserve of officers for the Army.

I do not think the expense of entering the Army in this way would be greater than is incurred under present conditions, possibly not so great. Were all to enter through the Militia, and were the ranks of the latter filled up, the expense would be far less than it is now. At the present moment there are battalions with eight, ten, and even more vacancies, and either the expense must be enormous to the officers, or some must be attached from other regiments, who, however good they may be, cannot take the same interest in the regiment as if they belonged to it. The country has to pay for officers who do not exist, by this system of attaching strangers for the training ; so that one officer may, and often does, attend two or three trainings every year, of course receiving pay and allowances every time ; but not being capable of serving in two places at once, the effect if there was a general embodiment would be most serious. What would be the value as a military unit of a battalion with perhaps only two or three subalterns ? Yet this is the case with many regiments ; and according to the Army List of 1897, the Militia battalions of only two territorial regiments are complete in officers, and the condition of the Artillery is far worse.

The plan of making all officers join the Army through the Militia would have the following advantages :—

1. It would fill up the vacancies in the Militia.
2. The competitive examinations for both Woolwich and Sandhurst could be made almost entirely military.
3. A great number of young officers possessing a fair knowledge of drill, discipline, and interior economy, would be ready to join the Army whenever wanted.
4. The standard of military efficiency in the Militia could be raised by requiring all officers to receive more instruction on first joining.
5. The country would obtain valuable service from many hundreds of youths who now render none.
6. Even those young men who would be finally unsuccessful in their efforts to enter the Army, and who might then leave the Militia, would have the satisfaction of feeling that they have rendered some service to their country, if only in the Militia. At present they must feel that the years they have spent at a crammer's have been merely so much lost time, by which neither their country, nor themselves, nor any other human being, have benefited in the slightest degree.

I suggest that the age for a commission in the Militia be lowered to sixteen, that the age for Army examinations remain as at present, and that anyone be allowed to compete after one training with the Militia and four months' instructional drill. Successful candidates could serve the same periods at Sandhurst and Woolwich, on the same pay and on the same conditions as now obtain, but should be allowed to wear their Militia uniform. Those Militia officers who fail in the Army exam. should

be allowed to continue in the Militia, if they so desire, and all appointments of a military, or semi-military, nature in the Empire, should be reserved exclusively for them, except where they are given to Regular officers, who should be seconded in their regiments for five years, and at the end of that period would be called on to decide finally, whether to keep the colonial appointment, or return to the Militia. Applicants for Militia commissions, for whom there are no vacancies, should be appointed supernumeraries, but leave should be freely given to young officers who are just commencing their professional career in civil life, and the pay thus saved made over to the supernumerary officers.

Even if there are disadvantages in this proposal, when such a serious state of things—amounting to a national danger—arises as the present condition of the Militia commissioned ranks, no individual inconvenience should be allowed to override the interests of the Empire; and even should this plan deter some few young men from trying to enter the Army, the present huge competition renders this immaterial, and against this would be set the advantage of discouraging a number of youths from wasting the best years of their lives in vainly trying to qualify for a profession they can never hope to enter. As all will enter the Militia, all will serve their country, and though, of course, they will do so for only a short period each year in time of peace, still, in time of war, they would add enormously to the strength of our armed forces, all branches of which are perilously short of officers. I do not know if it has struck many people that in the last twenty-five years we have added 40,000 men to the Regular Army and have created a Reserve of nearly 80,000 men, and in the same period have largely reduced the number of our Regular officers. Whether in war-time the men unfit for service and the spare Reservemen are transferred to the embodied Militia, or whether they are formed into Provisional battalions, officers will be equally required, and subalterns can only be obtained from the Militia, with possibly a few from the Volunteers. The Regular Army at home is on a low peace footing, and in case of war would require many hundred subalterns; how many I do not know; but when officers for all the staff, for transport, signalling, mounted infantry, and possibly cyclists, are withdrawn from the regiments, there will be but few left for company work, and those vacancies must be filled, if they can be filled, from the Militia. How many subalterns will be left in the Militia under present conditions, after all these drains, it is impossible to say, but they will be easy to count when the time comes. There are only two ways of getting men for any job: You must offer advantageous terms or use compulsion—in other words, pay or press. I believe that nothing short of a large increase of pay would induce any great additional number of officers to enter the Militia. What the average young man of the right stamp is in search of, is a profession that will give him either a respectable income at once, such as he may find in civil life, or that giving but small pay for the moment, offers reasonable prospects of a respectable career, such as a commission in the Army. Now it is impossible to make the Militia into a career, therefore I repeat that you can only fill the subaltern ranks of the Militia by making all officers enter the Army through it.

The question of captains is still more serious, there being upwards of 150 vacancies at this moment, being sixty-three more than there were in January, 1896. The youth of most of the subalterns and their short service make it, in many cases, impossible to promote them. Every year large numbers of comparatively young officers leave the Army, whose services are lost to the country, but would be invaluable in the Militia. The attempt made to induce some captains to join the Militia, by giving half pay for ten years, has not been very successful. All officers who leave the Army receiving any pension or gratuity, should be liable to be appointed to the Militia if their services are required; but as this might cause some hardship, the deficiency could possibly be met by giving increased pensions to those officers who are entitled to them, and by giving half pay to those officers who receive a gratuity, or leave without becoming entitled to gratuity or pension, for so long as they continue to serve in the Militia. £120 a year to 150 captains would be but a small sum to ensure a certain additional amount of professional knowledge in the higher ranks of Militia battalions.

All officers, when they first join the Militia, in addition to the present two months' preliminary or recruits' drill, should be attached for two months to a Regular unit between their first and second trainings.

The question, however, of further instruction is difficult to deal with; at present little encouragement is given to officers to go through the various classes, while the difficulties are great and in many cases the Regulations appear to throw obstacles in the way. I have alluded once before in this theatre to the number of letters and length of time that must elapse between the despatch of an officer's application to go to, say, Hythe, and the receipt of the answer. In my own case the letter must go through eight hands, and all the way back, which makes with Sundays eighteen days at least, even if the letter goes on at once from each office. As some one is sure to be away in this long chain, it means probably a month before an answer can be received, and meantime the opportunity may have passed.

Surely there could be little difficulty in simplifying the Regulations. Certain schools and classes should be open to every Militia officer, who is willing and able to attend them. Every officer wishing to attend a school or class, should be given at the end of the training a letter from his C.O., countersigned if necessary by the G.O.C. the district, stating that he is recommended for leave to attend certain schools or classes. He should be able, by enclosing this letter, to apply personally to the head authority of any school or class, who should give him his answer direct. If only 100 officers go through a course in a year this would save at least 1,500 letters. No limit, either maximum or minimum, should be placed on the number of officers who may attend, as if there is no room in barracks they could draw lodging allowance, as is often done now under similar circumstances; and, on the other hand, these schools and classes should be always held on definite dates, even if only one or two officers apply to attend. It frequently happens that an officer suddenly finds that he has time to attend a class or school, and he

would thus be able to go to it at short notice if he has the qualifications. At the same time a keen officer would not, as now, be liable to repeated disappointments, because there are not enough applicants to form a class.

On the other hand, officers should not be ordered to classes or counter-ordered at a few hours' notice. After all the Militiaman is not a professional soldier; he does not get a living out of his work, nor has he invariably unlimited leisure and a large income. He cannot sit outside the regimental orderly-room during the whole eleven months of the non-training period waiting to know what is to happen to him. He has his own arrangements to make in many cases, his own profession to attend to, and serious inconvenience and expense are inflicted on him if his arrangements for months are upset at the last moment.

Officers should receive full pay and allowances whenever they go through a course, subject, as now, to their passing the final examination. The Militia is not, nor does it pose as, an unpaid Force; but under present regulations the Volunteers, who are by way of being unpaid, receive grants for passing examinations which Militiamen have to attend gratis.

I should like to see all infantry officers permitted and encouraged to attend the field fortification class at the S.M.E., Chatham. If sufficient surveying were added to teach them enough to read military maps easily and do a simple road report, it would be an additional advantage.

All officers should be encouraged to attend the course at Hythe, which might be shortened, without detriment, by omitting all the learning by heart of lectures, etc., and also the extra subjects, except, of course, for those officers who wish to obtain the post of I. of M.

More encouragement, even to offering extra pay, should be given to officers to go through a course of signalling. In many units there must be old soldiers once acquainted with this art, who, by annually refreshing their knowledge under a competent instructor, would make fairly efficient signallers.

These courses, together with the present authorised instruction would suffice to bring the infantry officer fairly up to date, and at all events would largely increase his present stock of knowledge.

With regard to artillery and engineers, in addition to some of the before-mentioned classes and schools, the officers should go through the long course of gunnery and engineering, receiving extra pay for a certain number of years, but being required, after a certain time, to go through the course again to furbish up their knowledge, as is now done in the Regular branches of those arms. It would be difficult, to insist upon all officers of these branches going through these long courses, but they should be encouraged to do so in every possible way, though at the same time all consideration should be shown to those officers, whatever branch they belong to, who are prevented, by the calls of their civil professions, from giving the requisite time for those schools and classes.

I now come to the position of the commanding officer, especially in the non-training period.

There are several people in authority over a Militia battalion :—

1. The commanding officer, who only commands for twenty-seven days, although he is nominally responsible for what takes place the rest of the year.
2. The colonel commanding the *depôt*, who is in actual command the rest of the year.
3. The adjutant, who is officially considered responsible for all parade work outside the training, and who is in actual command during the whole non-training period if the headquarters of the unit are not at a *depôt*.
4. The district recruiting officer, who is responsible for the recruiting.

No human being can say where the authority of any one of these officers begins or ends; and as results are good or bad, it is in the power of any one of them to take the credit or disclaim the responsibility.

On the Saturday the regiment is dismissed the C.O. becomes a non-entity. He has nothing to do with the Permanent Staff, and nothing to do with the obtaining or drilling of recruits. His time is taken up in signing a vast quantity of returns he has no opportunity of verifying, and a large number of receipts he cannot check. He is told that he is encouraged to visit his recruits, yet he has no *locus standi* at the *depôt*, and could be ordered out of barracks by the colonel commanding; and I believe that he cannot, during the non-training period, order his own Permanent Staff or recruits to parade for his inspection if either his own adjutant or the colonel of the *depôt* chooses to object. His whole position is anomalous, and if things were carried out logically he would have to salute his own adjutant during the non-training period.

It is of the utmost importance that the commanding officer should be in real and effective command all the year round. He should be made exclusively responsible for obtaining officers and recruits, and for the training of both. A comparatively small addition of pay would make it possible for him to exercise sufficient supervision, without having, as now, to do it, if he does it at all, at his own expense, feeling all the time that he is interfering with another man's work; and, perhaps, being pretty plainly told so. His adjutant should be chosen by himself, and should be his assistant and secretary as well during the non-training period as in the training; and the colonel commanding the *depôt* should interfere as little as possible with the interior economy and discipline of the battalions that are under his supervision. The commanding officer should not have to take or retain any sergeant on the Permanent Staff of whom he does not approve. At present, if he complains about a N.C.O., he is told to take the first opportunity of trying him by court-martial. Everyone knows that a man may be useless, or worse, as a N.C.O., and yet may never commit an offence he can be tried for.

It would be a great advantage if the C.O. had the power of at once dismissing bad characters. At present he must apply to the G.O.C. the district after the training, which gives the man every opportunity to give

trouble during the training; and we all know how much trouble and expense one bad man can cause.

The best results can never be obtained from any organisation which is under divided, and constantly changing, authority; and by making one man exclusively responsible, the efficiency of the Militia must be largely increased. That man can only be the C.O., more especially as no two regiments are precisely alike; and the little local differences, the state of trade, the character and industries of the resident population, must be better known to a man who has been many years in the regiment than to any officer, however good, who is merely attached for a short time.

Warrant rank should be restored to the sergeant-majors. The backbone of the Militia is the Permanent Staff. They, under the adjutant and quartermaster, do the whole work of the regiment for eleven months of the year, and have most important work to do during the training. They do most of the recruiting for both Army and Militia, and much of the general work of the depôts. They are, in all parts of the Kingdom, more in touch with the civil population than any other body of men in Her Majesty's Service; and they should be picked men, who are thoroughly satisfied with their position, which should be an object of envy to the civilians around them. Instead of this, they are, in some cases, worse paid than the corresponding ranks of the Army, and their head—the one man who should be placed in the best possible position—is labouring under a perpetual and loudly-expressed grievance. It is a hardship on the man himself, it is a slur on the position of sergeant-major of a battalion, and it tends to lower the status of the whole Permanent Staff and to discourage the best men from joining it. We can all understand what the feelings of a commanding officer of Militia would be, were he not permitted to rise beyond the rank of major; and the position is just the same with regard to the sergeant-major and the warrant rank.

Surely it would be possible so to arrange matters, that the warrant-officers should not clash when there are two or more at a depôt. If the depôt sergeant-major was made a separate rank, senior to all battalion sergeant-majors, the difficulty would disappear; and, after all, little was heard of any friction previous to the establishment of the warrant rank in 1881, when for many years depôts had gone on peacefully with all the sergeant-majors holding the same rank. The remaining N.C.O.'s of the Permanent Staff should be put in a proper position as regards pay and allowances, and could then be more carefully chosen. It should be the object of the C.O.'s of the Regular battalions to send good men to the Militia, from which they in most cases receive directly such a large proportion of their recruits, and by the assistance of the Permanent Staff or which they receive nearly all.

The Militia non-commissioned officers not on the Permanent Staff have a thankless task to carry out, and are most insufficiently paid—3d. extra *per diem* to a corporal, and 9d. to a sergeant, naturally is utterly insufficient to attract good men and induce them to put on the stripes. This trifling pittance in the case of a sergeant will just pay his batman and his subscription to the sergeants' mess. These men are expected to

assume the responsibility, and do the hard and disagreeable work, of a N.C.O., and to keep up discipline among men who are their own comrades in civil life, for the sake of literally a few pence.

It is no use expecting first-class work for second-class pay. If a man does certain definite work he ought to get the proper pay for doing it, whether he does it all the year round or only for twenty-seven days. Moreover, in civil life, a man who is temporarily employed generally gets higher wages than a man who is in permanent work. There is no reason why these non-commissioned officers of the Militia should not receive the same daily pay as the corresponding ranks and arms in the Regular Army, just as the Militia private receives the same daily pay as the Regular private.

Some officers say that they are not worth any more pay; but if you want a good man you must offer good wages, and you will get him.

At present it is most difficult to obtain N.C.O.'s, and many of those obtained are bad; but when they are fairly treated, and get respectable pay, as is the case in the Engineer Militia, they are wonderfully good considering the drawbacks they must necessarily labour under.

The establishment ought to be the same as the Regular Army; if forty corporals, assisted by as many lance-corporals, are required for a battalion of the Line, how can the work be done in the Militia by thirty-two corporals, and in the Militia there are no paid lance ranks? As a matter of fact, the duties are really severe on both sergeants and corporals, and an addition to the establishment of both ranks is absolutely necessary.

The bad pay militates against the proper training of N.C.O.'s, as their numbers are so small, and the training is such a rush, that it is only during the preliminary, or recruits', drill that there is time to instruct them in their duties, and the pay is so small and the position so indifferent that there is often great difficulty in getting them to come up with the recruits. Again, the system of only calling up a certain number is detrimental, as a man is never certain that he will be taken on, and the whole matter gives rise to endless correspondence and trouble both to the Militia N.C.O.'s themselves and to the Permanent Staff.

All the N.C.O.'s should have the right to come up for the preliminary drill or to attend at the dépôt for two months during the non-training period. They should be allowed to join the Saturday before the men come up, and go down the Monday after, should they so desire, and by this would not have to travel, often long distances, with the privates. They should never be billeted in the same house as private Militiamen, and in camp every three or four sergeants should have a tent to themselves, to lift them out of the rank and file.

As regards their better instruction, they should be required to do the long courses of gunnery or engineering if they belong to the artillery or engineers, and three months' duty with a Line regiment, preferably at a camp of instruction if they belong to the infantry.

I should much like to see the C.O. empowered to occasionally promote a Militia sergeant on to the Permanent Staff, should he wish to do

so. An exceptionally good man could thus be rewarded in the best possible way, and this would provide a great incentive to all the rest to do their duty well.

By these means any inefficient N.C.O.'s could be improved or replaced, and the present vacant posts filled by respectable men, who, though they could not under ordinary conditions be equal to Regulars, yet would have substantial inducements to do their duty to the best of their ability, and would, with a short embodiment, be equal to any demand that could be made on them.

I believe that many men, who leave the Army as N.C.O.'s and settle in the large towns, would gladly enter the Militia of their native counties provided they could have their railway fares paid to and from the regiment, as they would thus be enabled to visit their friends at no expense to themselves. These men would be of additional value, as they would not mix with the privates during the non-training.

The question of deficiency of men and the causes thereof is too long to go into fully now, but I would point out some important facts.

First, the numbers have not kept pace with the increase of population in England and Wales. From 1871 to 1891 the proportion of Militiamen per 100,000 male inhabitants fell from 579 to 441, or, to put it another way, in 1891 we should have had to raise some 20,000 more Militiamen to get back to the proportion of twenty years before. Though the actual numbers have slightly increased since 1891, yet they have barely, if actually, kept pace with the estimated increase in the population since that date. Again, the differences between neighbouring counties apparently identical in character are most surprising. The following examples show the proportion of Militiamen present and absent with leave in 1891 per 100,000 male inhabitants of the county according to the census of that year :—

Staffordshire	518	} difference 141.
Warwickshire	377	
Nottinghamshire	474	} difference 193.
Derbyshire	281	

All these counties have a similar population, chiefly employed in mining and manufacturing. In the following cases they are purely agricultural and have no large towns :—

Dorsetshire	*526	} difference 204.
Wiltshire	322	
Herefordshire	1012	} difference 554.
Shropshire	458	

* Providing besides some 40 or 50 men for the Hampshire Artillery.

Again, the smaller the county the larger the proportion of Militiamen, which proves pretty conclusively to my mind that recruiting is, as a rule, conducted unsatisfactorily at any distance from headquarters. The large towns furnish but few Militiamen in proportion to population—the Metropolitan district being in this respect far and away the worst in the British Isles—not so much from unsuccessful recruiting, as from the

enormous amount of absentees, which are upwards of 15 per cent. of the enrolled strength.

One more fact I wish to draw attention to is the steady disappearance of the old class of civilian Militiamen. It appears from the returns that for many years, while the number of men under twenty years of age has been slightly, and of those over thirty enormously, increasing, the number of those between the ages of twenty and thirty has steadily decreased. The civilian Militiaman is the man between twenty and thirty. He never has been a soldier and does not want to be—but he likes Militia life for a variety of causes, he possesses any amount of *esprit de corps*, and he is an excellent and valuable man and represents a distinct class. The men over thirty are mostly old soldiers, and the lads under twenty go on to the Army in large numbers; but the old-fashioned pure civilian Militiaman is disappearing from the Force, and is more often to be found in the Volunteers. I do not wish to limit either of the other classes, on the contrary, I wish we had more of both, because as far as my experience goes the old soldier makes an excellent Militiaman, and also I fully recognise that one of our duties is to feed the Army as much as possible; but I wish that we could recover the pure civilian.

It must be left to experts in recruiting to suggest a remedy for the present unfortunate state of things, but I must add that the Volunteers have for many years failed to obtain their recruits from the middle classes, and have, if I may say so, poached on our preserves—the labouring classes. I constantly hear distinguished Volunteers lament the present state of things, and if any means could be devised whereby the middle classes could be restored to the Volunteers and the labouring classes to the Militia, both Forces would be greatly benefited.

I now come to what, in my humble opinion, is a vital point, namely, the suggestion that the time has come when the Militia should be enlisted for general service in time of war, instead of only for service in Great Britain and Ireland. This, of course, would do away with the necessity for the Militia Reserve, and it would be allowed to die out.

The whole system of immobile localised forces is obsolete. At the date of the resuscitation of the Militia on the basis of the ballot, the Empire had hardly begun to exist, and our foreign garrisons were limited to Gibraltar, Minorca, New England, and the West Indies. The only possible enemy was France, with or without the help of Spain; and the only possible danger, a French invasion accompanied by a Jacobite rising, or a Jacobite rising assisted by French troops. But few years before, the country had been panic-stricken by the successes of Prince Charles Edward, rendered possible by the absence, on the Continent, of nearly all our small Standing Army, and some additional Force, as a protection both against foreign raids and against home rebellion, was loudly called for. The ballot could only lay hold of those men who had settled abodes, who were, therefore, of a far superior class to the average Regular soldiers at that time. In those days an order to proceed on foreign service, even in peace-time, was equivalent to a death sentence on the vast majority of the men. The losses by disease were appalling. A tour of foreign garrison duty

practically annihilated a regiment, and it was evidently impossible to condemn to this terrible fate the respectable conscripts who filled the ranks of the Militia. Every effort was made, therefore, to keep the *personnel* of the Force separate from that of the Regular Army. Militiamen were not allowed to join the Army, nor were men of unsettled habits allowed to serve in the Militia; and it was not till the time of the great French wars at the end of the last century that the whole system of the Militia was altered by allowing the men to volunteer into the Army. When, in the Peninsula, we finally put forth our strength on land, the Army was fed almost entirely by Militiamen, who were induced by a mixture of bribery and bullying to transfer their services. Since that time the links between the two Forces have been constantly drawn closer. The Militia infantry forms part of the territorial regiments—the Force holds 30,000 of its best men at the immediate disposal of the Army, irrespective of locality—and public opinion has advanced so far, that it now seems to be taken for granted by everyone, that in the event of war the Militia will at once volunteer for garrison duty abroad, and may even be employed actually at the front.

This being so, the existing condition of things is unfair to both officers and men. At present the Force is enlisted purely for service at home (with the exception of the Militia Reserve), and yet we know that we are expected to volunteer for foreign service in the event of war. Every man will be told that he need not go, in the event of his not wishing to volunteer; and yet what officer, or even what private, will have strength of mind to refuse to volunteer when all his comrades do? It is unworthy of the military regulations of a great country to force or trick men into service for which they are not engaged; and though extensively resorted to in our grandfathers' time, was on a level with the other dubious courses pursued to keep up the fiction of voluntary service, while practically filling both Navy and Army compulsorily.

I do not believe that the enlistment of all men for general service in the event of war would exercise an adverse effect on recruiting. On the contrary. I am convinced that the change would give the Militia a position such as it has not hitherto held in the eyes of the public, and that this must act beneficially on the recruit-giving classes.

At present every qualified man, with hardly an exception, applies for the Militia Reserve, which shows that foreign service, even with a strange corps, has no terrors for him; and under the new conditions, he will know that most probably he will serve in his own regiment under his own officers. A slight addition to, and a re-arrangement of, the present bounties would prevent any man losing money by the abolition of the Militia Reserve.

Under present conditions, if embodied for home service only, he must lose his civilian employment and be separated from his family, as regiments cannot remain at their headquarters, nor can hundreds of wives and children be dragged all over the United Kingdom.

Enlisting the Militia for general service gives advantages to the country and to the military authorities, which are incontestable. The

former could by a stroke of the pen add some 80,000 men of all ranks to its disposable Army, and the latter could at once make arrangements for strengthening any of our foreign garrisons, without having to dislocate any expeditionary Army Corps which could remain intact, while the Militia reinforced our coaling stations. A Militia regiment could be embodied in far less time than it would take to call out, and incorporate, the Reserve of any Regular regiment.

Possibly some few officers would be unable to continue to serve with this new obligation hanging over their heads, but they must, like the men, lose their civilian employment if embodied, and we are all at this moment serving with the knowledge, that we shall be asked and expected to volunteer for foreign service at a moment's notice, in case of war, while we have not the advantage of knowing exactly what we shall be wanted to do; and apart from the Militia Reserve, in appearance we add nothing to the offensive power of the Empire. By openly accepting the obligation to serve abroad, we shall merely convert a secret liability into an acknowledged one, and we shall henceforth occupy our true position as the real Reserve of the Army.

One word to call attention to a remarkable omission. The duty of enforcing the Militia ballot is not one of those transferred to the county councils, and the responsibility apparently still rests with the lords-lieutenant and their deputies. How a rate can be made to raise the money for the expenses of the ballot, or pay the fines in case of the quota falling short, I do not quite see; and the position is still more curious as regards the new borough counties, as they possess no authority to carry out these duties themselves; and it is to be presumed that the lords-lieutenant of their parent counties, upon whom the obligation still rests, would have no jurisdiction.

An act to regulate and revise the application of the ballot seems absolutely essential. It may be said that we shall never again resort to such a mode of raising troops, as the country would not stand it; but I would point out three facts: 1. That it is impossible to say what the country might be forced to stand. Forty years ago a man who suggested the application of conscription in the United States would have seemed mad; and yet we all know that during the great War of Secession, it was heavily enforced on both sides, and that in a country far more divided in opinion than ours, and with a far weaker central authority than we have. 2. That we have now most extensive land frontiers to defend. We march in America with the United States, in Asia with France, Russia and China, and in Africa with nearly all the Great Powers. 3. That with the exception of the Crimean war, which had special features, we have never, since we were a nation, attempted to engage in a European contest relying entirely on voluntary service, either for the Army or the Navy. Even during the Crimean war our voluntary system broke down, and we were forced to enlist large bodies of foreign mercenaries; and, as this resource is now entirely closed to us, any prolonged war with a Great Power would oblige us to fall back on some system of compulsory service.

Had we 100,000 men ready to send anywhere at short notice, with another 100,000 to follow, a heavy blow dealt in the earlier stages of a contest might obviate this necessity; but as things are now, we are only prepared to send out our troops in mere dribblets, as compared either to the strength of foreign Armies abroad, or to the large armed force we ourselves keep idle at home. What we require to supplement the Regular Army is a large Reserve Army, not only efficient, but above all mobile; and the country can obtain this at small expense by seriously turning its attention to the increase, training, and development, of that ancient and well-tried Force—The Militia.

Colonel FREDERICK C. HOWARD (Lieut.-Colonel, retired pay), 3rd Bn. Yorkshire Regiment:—I could have wished that I had not been called upon first to speak in the presence of so many distinguished officers; but having the honour of commanding a battalion, I could not altogether sit silent during the discussion. With regard to what Lord Raglan has said of the officers, I think that the age of sixteen is a little too young for an officer to join. At the same time, I think his suggestion that all officers should go from the Militia on to the Army is an excellent one, though I consider what we chiefly want are permanent subaltern officers, as we have in the field rank and among the captains. Captains of the Army being offered the advantage of a pension, has induced some few to come into the Militia; but it is not altogether very successful; and I think if the amount of pension were raised, we should get far more captains from the Army. With regard to the permanent staff, Lord Raglan has said that it is the backbone of the Militia. That, of course, is the case; but the Militia non-commissioned officers are only a part of that backbone, and from experience I think I can say they are not by any means what they ought to be. Lord Raglan mentioned that they had very arduous duties. I do not think that their duties are very arduous, simply because they do not know them. The duties of non-commissioned officers are chiefly assumed by the colour-sergeants of the permanent staff, and the consequence is that the colour-sergeants have more than they know how to get through with in their work. As an example of the difficulty of getting sergeants, I may say that I always find very great difficulty in getting a provost-sergeant; and the reason, I am told, is that a provost non-commissioned officer is really afraid of doing the duty. It is said that when they come down from the training the men make it so unpleasant that they really do not care about it. I think that is an example of all. The non-commissioned officers want to be on a better footing with the men, and from a better class and paid better. There is one point on which the lecturer has not touched at all, that is the question of musketry. Musketry in the Militia is simply a rush, and nothing else. It is absolutely impossible to teach men how to shoot in what is really but thirteen days. You cannot take very much more, and it is absolutely impossible to teach musketry in that time. I therefore humbly suggest that the Militia training should be extended to at least thirty-four days. Another point on which Lord Raglan did not touch is the not unimportant one of dress. You cannot make a soldier proud of himself unless you dress him properly; and I think the way in which the Army Clothing Department consider that any sort of garb is good enough for Militiamen should be taken some notice of. The abominable frocks I have seen issued to my quartermaster are enough to make one's hair stand on end. The same may be said with regard to the great-coats. Then there is another thing that I had the honour of putting before the Inspector-General of the Reserve Forces—namely, the want of boots! How can a man be expected to get on for twenty-seven days with only one pair of boots? If he gets wet, where is he? I should therefore suggest that the authorities should allow two pairs of boots: one pair to be given to the men at the close of the training, and one pair to be re-issued at the following training with a new pair; thus a man would always have a pair for training. With these few remarks, I will leave the question of com-

manding officers to other authorities. I do not feel called upon to give an opinion upon that subject. If it is considered that a commanding officer is to be for 365 days, except the twenty-seven days, a nonentity, that perhaps rests with them. It is too delicate a subject for me to touch upon, holding that rank myself. I think that all the reforms which Lord Raglan has so ably put before us are simply a question of money. But I hold that England possesses in the Militia a magnificent Force, if it were only turned in the right direction. What the Militia sorely requires is reform.

Colonel T. MYLES SANDYS, M.P. (late Captain Royal Fusiliers), 3rd Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment:—As a commanding officer of a Militia battalion, and one who has had the privilege of twenty years' service in the Army before joining the Militia, I perhaps may be allowed to say a few words on the organisation of the Force at the present time. Before offering the few remarks which I shall venture to do on the present occasion, I think I shall only be expressing the feeling of those who have had the privilege of listening to the very able lecture which has been delivered to us by Colonel Lord Raglan, in saying how very important it is, and how, if I may use the expression, "brimful," it is of valuable suggestions for improving the Militia force. There are so many points raised in this question of Militia organisation that I feel in the very few minutes which I may claim for the remarks which I have to offer that it is impossible to go into them at any length and to do them justice. But one may say that the question of Militia organisation is so intertwined with that of Army organisation, that it would be hardly possible to deal at length with the one without going to some extent at any rate into the other; and I take it in doing that on the present occasion I should not be in order in speaking on both these points. There are, however, general principles embodied in the lecture which, perhaps I may be allowed to advert to. In the first instance, the Militia has been referred to as the old Constitutional Force of this country; and that, as we know very well, is the case, as the Militia existed in the United Kingdom for hundreds of years before the Regular Army was formed—in fact, from the time of King Alfred, although in rudimentary form. And so the Militia force not only has the traditional and prescriptive right of being the old Constitutional Force of this country, but has also the additional advantage of being an extremely inexpensive Force. It is capable, if it is taken judiciously in hand, at the present time, of an almost indefinite expansion. It is an elastic Force; it is inexpensive in peace-time; it is capable of a considerable expansion in the time of national danger; and it can be much improved at once by some little attention to its organisation, and by according to it that measure of public support and approval which is so well merits; and it can, without much difficulty, be made to fulfil its true position, which is that of the second or supporting line of our Regular Army. But it seems to me that the point which Lord Raglan has placed first on his paper, namely, the deficiency of officers, is a point to which we should address ourselves before we can very well deal with other parts of the question; therefore, the remarks which I shall venture to offer will deal mainly with that particular point. I may say, perhaps, that I am entirely in accord with Lord Raglan's views as to the advisability of letting all officers of the Regular Army pass through the ranks of the Militia force, and being favourably reported upon before they are allowed to go up for their Army examinations. At present our subalterns in the Militia force are almost entirely—I will not say entirely, but in some regiments entirely—composed of young officers on their way to join the Army, and the system has been found to work extremely well so far—that is to say, in peace-time. But in the event of war, what would happen? The first thing that would occur would be that the whole of these subalterns who are on their way to join the Army would be at once taken from the Militia officers' ranks, at present not at full strength, in order to be passed forward into the Line; and you would have the officers' cadres of Militia battalions left with its field officers, possibly with a short allowance of Militia captains, and with no subalterns at all. Now, if

all officers who are going to join the Regular Army were passed through the ranks of the Militia, there need not be any limit to their numbers till the regimental cadres were full, and there might be a sufficient number of subalterns attached to every Militia regiment, to allow a certain percentage of these young officers being withdrawn in order to fill up the vacancies as required in the Line battalions, and still allowing a certain proportion of subalterns to be left in the regimental cadres, so as to enable the Militia to retain enough subaltern officers to do the work which would be cast upon it with additional severity in war-time. I will give that as one reason for wishing to pass all young officers in future through the ranks of the Militia. Other advantages of this plan are clearly touched upon by Lord Raglan in his paper just read, and therefore I will not trouble you with anything more upon that point; but I would say further, with reference to Militia officers generally, that I think it would be advantageous that they should be encouraged to qualify themselves in the knowledge of their professional duties by having the classes and schools of instruction thrown open to them in the manner suggested by our lecturer. At the present time, if an officer wishes to qualify himself in signalling, or in that most important branch, viz., field engineering, which might prove to be of great importance if Militiamen were required to take part in any field operations, I will not say that he is actually discouraged in attending these classes, but the difficulties which are put in his way are so great, that although permission has been accorded to Militia officers to join classes for instruction, yet, practically, they are never able to do so. I think an improvement in this respect might be made (I am now only touching upon the broad questions, without going into details). Then, with regard to the question of enlisting men in the Militia force, for serving abroad when they are required in time of war to do so, I am convinced that not only would that be exceedingly popular among the men throughout the whole of the Militia force, but I think it is not improbable that it might make some addition—I will not say a very large addition, but some addition—to the means of filling the commission ranks in the regiments, owing to the popularity which the Force would derive if that Order were passed. I am strongly in favour of enlisting the Militia force for service wherever it may be required to serve in war-time. I am sure it would be popular in the Force. It is well known at the present time that the Militia are ready to undertake any duty which they may be called upon to perform; but if it were made part of their agreement on enlisting I think it would add materially to the general efficiency of the Forces. I do not propose to touch at much length upon other points, but I think the withholding of warrant rank from the sergeant-majors of the Militia is a point which should be considered, and that the difficulty should be removed. With regard to the subject of the number of non-commissioned officers of the Line attached to Militia battalions on the permanent staff, I may say that I have written officially and have taken opportunities, when they have been afforded to me, to press that there should be two Line non-commissioned officers per company for company work in every Militia battalion. At the present time some of those non-commissioned officers are withdrawn from the companies for certain other battalion duties, and this ought not to be, as it is requisite for the discipline and efficiency of the Militia force, considering the extreme youth and inexperience of our subalterns that every company of a Militia battalion throughout the Service should have one or two sergeants free for company duties alone; and that the number should not be allowed to be interfered with under any circumstances whatever. It would necessitate the granting of four extra Line sergeants per battalion for battalion duties, and would mean so much extra cost. But I can only say that it is impossible to get any efficient working military or other machine without spending a certain amount of money upon good working details, and the amount of money spent upon this would bear no proportion to the good which would result; and I feel quite sure that in this way the efficiency of the Militia force could be added to by the expenditure of the public money in the direction which I have pointed out.

Major R. HOLDEN, 4th Bn. Worcestershire Regiment :—I am sure we are all very much indebted to Lord Raglan for his interesting paper. No one in this room knows better than I do the amount of trouble that he has taken in collecting the information upon which he has based his suggestions. It is very difficult in the short time at one's disposal to refer to all the subjects one would wish to, but I will do so as briefly as possible. With regard to the deficiency of officers, Lord Raglan's proposal would, no doubt, at once remove the present difficulty; but as, in my opinion, there is no likelihood of the authorities adopting such a proposition, it would be well for us to suggest some other less drastic measure. To my mind the greatest difficulty is in regard to the subaltern ranks. Commanding officers can, by means of attaching officers of other battalions, get on somehow in time of peace, and in the event of embodiment there would, judging from previous experience, be no difficulty whatever in getting any number of retired Army officers willing to accept companies. In this respect it is interesting to compare the Army Lists before and during the Crimean war. In 1853 there appear a large number of vacant companies, but in 1855 there is scarcely a vacancy; in some regiments every single captain being an ex-Army officer. I would prefer to suggest as a remedy for the present dearth of captains, that all officers of the Army drawing retired pay, or belonging to the Reserve of Officers, should be required to serve a certain term of years in the Militia. Were this suggestion acted upon, and were the authorities to increase the number of commissions given to Militia subalterns, I certainly believe that the commissioned ranks of the Militia would soon be filled up. We have been told that the officers are the weak spot in the Militia, and that they are not up to their work. If that is the case, the blame rests not with us, but entirely with the authorities. Certain qualifications for the various ranks are laid down in the Regulations; and these qualifications are fixed by the military authorities themselves. All Militia officers are required to pass examinations before boards of officers of the Army in the subjects fixed by the authorities, and if they come out of the ordeal successfully they are entitled to claim that they are qualified for the ranks which they hold. If the standard is not high enough, it is the business of the authorities to raise it. It is not the duty of Militia officers to run about the country and attend voluntary examinations, at their own expense, in subjects which they may fairly assume are not essential to their efficiency, or they would be made compulsory and not left to voluntary effort. If the authorities think our present standard of efficiency not high enough, let them raise it, and I can assure them that we shall not be found to object. I am strongly of the opinion that warrant rank should be given to sergeant-majors of Militia battalions, and that if commanding officers are to get the most out of the permanent staff sergeants they should have something to say to their selection, and a great deal more to say to their removal for inefficiency. There need be no difficulty nor friction about the granting of warrant rank to Militia sergeant-majors; indeed, if the authorities care to economise and ensure the more harmonious working of the dépôt system, they might dispense with the dépôt sergeant-major altogether. The senior Militia sergeant-major could perfectly well perform the duties. The Militia sergeants, or what are generally called the "Volunteer sergeants," are our greatest difficulty, and in this matter I do not agree with Lord Raglan. I think that, as a body, they are useless, and that any further money spent on the same class would be money wasted. It is just possible that a little improvement might be effected by increasing their pay, and dressing them better—by no possibility could they be worse dressed than at present. But I think the authorities had infinitely better turn their attention to attracting ex-Army sergeants to the Militia; and in this respect commanding officers of Line battalions can, I am sure, help us. With all deference I submit that the latter do not sufficiently lay before sergeants leaving the Army the advantageous terms upon which they can join the Militia as non-commissioned officers. Under paragraph 544 of the Militia

Regulations, men who have been discharged from the Army as non-commissioned officers can be appointed sergeants in the Militia, and receive an annual bounty of £3. But if good men are to be attracted, they must be better treated in regard to uniform than at present. In regard to the rank and file of the Militia, I think that Lord Raglan has under-estimated the number of what he calls "civilian" Militiamen. Speaking from memory, I believe that about 45 per cent. of the rank and file are re-engaged men, men who have re-enlisted after completion of their engagement, or soldiers discharged from the Army. And I feel sure that there are quite 40 per cent. still of purely "civilian" Militiamen in the Force. If the Militia is to be increased in popularity, it is absolutely essential that employers of labour should interest themselves more in the men, and that the dress and equipment of the Force be improved. It is very hard that men should be turned out of their work by employers of labour because they belong to the Militia. I am told that Militiamen are not accepted under the Post Office, which, if a fact, is not creditable to the authorities, and should be enquired into. The dress and equipment of the Force is a subject to which the authorities must pay some attention, if the rank and file, and the classes from which our recruits are obtained, are to hold the Militia in any respect. In my battalion we are still compelled to wear the old brown belts and valise equipment which was condemned by a Board as rotten in July, 1895; and during the Aldershot manœuvres last year we had men constantly at work sewing on the "D's" which were continually coming away from the rotten material. The clothing of the Militia is still very bad, so bad, indeed, that it has become the subject of ridicule throughout all branches of the Service. To show you the extent to which this is the case, I will repeat to you the words of a comic song which I heard recently at a military smoking concert. The song was called "I can't change it," and the chorus to one of the verses, which referred to the men's tunics, ran as follows:—

"I can't change it! I can't change it!

There are spots of grease in front and back!

It fits me like a blooming sack!

I can't change it; it ain't no use to try!

So I'll chuck it and join another force in the sweet by and by!"

Gentlemen, it is really no laughing matter, that Englishmen who join Her Majesty's Service should be subjected to the ridicule of their own comrades of the Regular Army, in consequence of the manner in which they are clothed by the authorities. The question of the enlistment of the Militia for foreign service is one, I think, of the very greatest importance to the Army; especially since we have lately been told by the highest authorities that an invasion of this Kingdom is practically impossible. If this be the case, our occupation in the Militia, beyond being utilised as a recruiting agency for the Army, would appear to have gone. But we, in the Militia, know perfectly well that in the event of war, our battalions will be required to serve in the Mediterranean. Yet, strange to say, the authorities have made no arrangements, beyond mere chance, to secure this being successfully carried into effect. It is presumed that the same course will be followed as during the Crimean war. Then a circular was issued to every commanding officer, his battalion was assembled and harangued by him in a spirit-stirring speech, and the men were invited to volunteer to serve in the Mediterranean. Each man on volunteering was allowed a bounty of £8; so that the ten Militia battalions which served at Malta, Corfu, etc., in 1855-56, cost the authorities not less than £50,000. In the opinion of every single person who knows anything about the Militia, all recruits for the Force could be enlisted for for foreign service, in the event of embodiment, without in any way injuriously affecting recruiting¹; so that it would be unnecessary to offer any bounty in time

¹ I sounded the men in my battalion last year and in 1891, and very few have the remotest idea of the area of their service, and they care less. When embodied, they would every bit as soon serve at Gibraltar, or Malta, as in England, Ireland, or Scotland.

of embodiment. The battalions could be ordered at once to the Mediterranean or elsewhere as part of their ordinary duty ; and what an additional strength it would be to the military authorities ; and what a saving of money ! During the Crimean war, 32,186 men volunteered from the ranks of the Militia to the Regular Army, each man receiving a bounty of £7, so that in this manner £225,302 was expended ; when if the men had originally been enlisted to serve abroad, they could have been induced to go to the front for a mere nominal sum, or probably merely for the asking. At least this is the opinion of those who have studied the subject ; and those who know the men which compose the Force in 1897 believe that were the men *enlisted* for foreign service, they would willingly volunteer, without any bounty, to go straight to the front. The arguments for and against this proposal will be found in a lecture which I was permitted to deliver in this Institution in 1890.¹

Captain Sir JOHN COLOMB, K. C. M. G., M. P. (late R. M. A.) :—I came here to listen rather than to speak. It is so long since I was associated with the Militia that it would be hardly proper for me to enter into the details of this subject, as you are much better judges of it than I am. All I can say is, that my recollection distinctly confirms what has been said by Lord Raglan and those who followed him, especially with regard to non-commissioned officers and the sergeant-majors. As to the suggestion of passing officers through the Militia, it occurs to me that there would be an advantage in it altogether outside the Militia, and for this reason : it would give you some opportunity of testing the military aptitude of the candidates before they go up for theoretical examination. I am bound to say that I do not think that your system of competitive examination actually gives you any test of the military aptitude of men, which is an essential qualification ; and I therefore consider that the advantage the Army would derive would be probably considerable if, in the first place, a certain standard of military qualification were insisted upon before competitive examination, and if a candidate carried up to his competitive examination marks for military aptitude. The only other point I wish to speak upon is this : With regard to the application of Militia to the service of the State, to my mind a great deal of what you may call the "twilight" position of the Militia is responsible for a great deal of the difficulty of getting officers, and the difficulty of keeping the Militiamen, to that state of efficiency which we all desire. I feel very strongly that it is too much forgotten by the authorities of this country that a position has been forced upon the Militia, not through their action. We went through wars with the Regular Army and the Militia force only. Down to the Crimean war these were the only two military Forces. Now the Volunteers, created by the spontaneous action of the nation, imposed upon our military system another Force—the Volunteers—which has grown to huge proportions. Between the Army and the Volunteers the Militia has been crushed out. Looking at the requirements of the Empire, I say we have to face that position. We went through the old war moving Militia about this country, but the conditions of the movement of troops are completely changed. When I remember that you can move a Militia regiment from Halifax in Yorkshire to Halifax in Nova Scotia, or from Wales to Bombay, or from Scotland to the Cape, with much less inconvenience and in a much shorter time than during those old wars you brought the Donegal Militia to Dover, I think limiting Militia service to the United Kingdom is misappreciating the power that steam has given us with regard to the possible extension of our Militia power. Therefore I came here to listen, because I have been constantly told when I talk about extending the area of service of the Militia that it is a dream, for it would immediately stop the recruiting of the Militia. I do not believe so. I never have thought so. I rejoice, therefore, that Lord Raglan, with his experience and knowledge comes forward, and at a large and influential meeting of the United Service Institution boldly grapples with what I believe to be the weak point of our military system at this moment, viz., your want of mobile power in service

¹ JOURNAL, R.U.S. Institution, Vol. XXXIV., p. 745.

over the sea. I only venture to say that while I am a strong advocate for making it the main feature of our present military policy to extend the area of the service of the Militia, I am not at present convinced that you can carry that to its extreme limits. My own belief is, that you should free the Militia forces from restrictions confining it within the United Kingdom, and that you should extend it to within the Empire. I merely throw this out, because I do hope to hear some discussion on that point. We move by slow degrees. I put it to you as a question that Militia officers of experience should discuss. I very much fear that if you try to take too long a jump you may be defeated altogether. If you say "general service," I think you may be defeated; but I do say that in my belief the time has come—and the speeches we have heard to-day, and what Lord Raglan has told me, confirm that belief—when a new departure in the military policy should be made in order to give that military strength and power of movement over the sea which is so essential to us, and that the first definite practical step to take now is the extension of the service of the Militia beyond the United Kingdom, but within the limits of the Empire.

Colonel J. ALEXANDER MAN, 3rd Bn. Gordon Highlanders (commanding Local Forces, Trinidad and Tobago):—I rise in answer to your call, Sir, with considerable diffidence, because, although it is 36 years since I first put on the uniform of the Militia battalion to which I still belong, and although I had the honour of commanding that battalion for three years, yet the greater part of my life has been spent in military service of another and more active kind. But I think with deference, that this fact cuts two ways, and that I am enabled all the more easily to approach the subject of this admirable lecture from the standpoint of the good of our common country. I find myself, I am happy to say, in entire agreement, and seeing eye to eye, with Lord Raglan. His points are not only admirably put, but I hold that they are just those upon which we should keep our attention fixed if we are to do any good by this discussion. In the space of ten minutes allowed it is impossible to touch upon more than the fringe of the subjects with which Lord Raglan has dealt. I shall confine myself to one or two of the more salient points. As regards the officering of the regiments and battalions, my view certainly is that for the supply of *the majority* in the junior ranks we must look to young men who are being brought forward to make military service their walk in life. Lord Raglan wishes to see all commissions in the Regular Army filled from the Militia. Well, Sir, when abroad not very long ago I saw it stated in the home papers that a War Office high official had put forward that very view. There cannot be the least doubt of one thing: the plan would at once put an end to any difficulties as regards the subaltern ranks. As regards captains and field officers, I entirely agree with Lord Raglan. I think that—with *well-defined exceptions*—we should look for our supply to men who have served in the Line. I cannot for the life of me see why those who leave the Service with gratuity or otherwise, rendering it necessary for them to join what is called the "Reserve of Officers," should not show forth that Reserve as something tangible by giving Militia battalions, if possible, those of their own counties, the benefit of their knowledge and experience. As regards the rank and file, I was particularly struck with a passage in our gallant lecturer's paper about what he calls "Civilian Militiamen." I know very well what he means, for it happens that, at the time of the late Mr. Stanhope's famous committee, I wrote a paper pointing out that this particular class would be bound, under the new regulations, to disappear from the Force; and I gave my reasons why I believed it. It is not necessary for me to go into that now, but I am sorry to find that my prognostications have so soon been verified. I have been absent from the Militia for the last five years, but Lord Raglan tells us that the class in question has almost disappeared already. I am quite sure that he is right, however, in believing that, though it has disappeared from the Militia, it has not altogether disappeared from the Service of the country. It has simply gone over to the Volunteers. That is so

in my own county to a large extent. Whether the change is advantageous, is not a question to discuss here. For my own part, I am content to regret it. Of all the points put before us to-day, I think the most important is the proposition that the Militia would be improved if the terms of enlistment were altered and if its soldiers were made frankly available for general service. I commanded my battalion, as I have said, for three years. In the presence of an officer who knows that battalion well, who took interest in it, and who understood it, I venture to say of it that it was not a bad battalion. Now, Sir, that battalion, during those three years I am speaking of, was largely raised in numbers, and I myself keenly entered into the details of its recruiting. Well, I say deliberately, and with as much force as that experience enables me to give to the statement, that to ask men to take on for general, instead of local, service would not lose you one desirable recruit. On the contrary, I am convinced that such a raising of the status of the men, *vis-à-vis* the people with whom they associate, would be of benefit to recruiting. A man would go up to the dépôt to be drilled beside his Line comrades—and in my regiment I am proud and happy to say that there has always been the greatest feeling of love and *camaraderie* between us and our Line comrades—he would go up to the dépôt, I say, with enhanced prestige, and with a position which would tend not to hurt recruiting, but to make recruiting much more popular than it is to-day in a district where recruiting is always a difficult matter. What I have said about raising the status of the Militia recruit brings me to the last paragraph of the lecture. Lord Raglan says that we require to supplement our Regular Army by a large Reserve, and he looks to the Militia—of course after the first-class Army Reserve—as that Reserve. Quite so. By allowing the Militia to re-occupy its old place as a part of your Reserve, and by working it up so that it shall be fit to occupy that place, you will make the whole question of Militia recruiting, for officers as well as for men, easier. Of that I am assured. There appears to me to be all the difference in the world between an Auxiliary and a Reserve. An Auxiliary is something which is in evidence : and in evidence the Militia cannot be. A Reserve must of necessity be out of sight : which the Militia is. To give you a very homely illustration : take the Army and Navy Stores here in Westminster. The reserve from which those stores are supplied is not seen ; the auxiliary stores which assist them are just round the corner. But I take it the reserve stores are quite as necessary as the auxiliary. The things wanted to raise the Militia in public estimation—to take it from the position which I am sorry to say it holds to-day on the side of the road, so to speak—and restore it to its proper place in the hearts of its countrymen, are : first, to alter the terms of the men's service, so that they shall not be asked to go to the Mediterranean on occasion, but shall be bound to go there or anywhere else if so ordered ; and, secondly, to see that the officers are compelled, and not merely requested, to know their duty.

Major-General Sir FRANCIS W. GRENFELL, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces:—I think that the point on which we are most interested is the dearth of officers, and as regards that question I can say with truth that since the time I have been at Head Quarters we have tried—and I may say up to the present time vainly tried—to provide a remedy for this complaint. Although the numbers of officers deficient are, as Lord Raglan says, 700, still that is based on the full establishment of the Militia ; and as 19,000 men are still wanting to that establishment, the absolute dearth of officers, though very disquieting, is not so bad as perhaps at first sight it might appear. Lord Raglan's proposal is one which I fear it would be very difficult to carry out, and for this reason : we have a large opposing establishment at Sandhurst, and in order to carry out Lord Raglan's views, whether they be right or wrong, you would have to do away with Sandhurst ; and I know there would be great opposition to this proposal, both from those who prefer to send their sons to that place, and also perhaps from the authorities, who would have that very large and important military college

thrown on their hands. I can assure you that it is an absolute fact that the numbers of the officers of the Militia go up or down automatically with the numbers of commissions given to the Militia for the Army. I think the Artillery Militia has shown it in a very curious way. At one time a large number of Army commissions were given to Artillery Militia officers, and the Artillery Militia was nearly filled. It was then reduced, and it went down correspondingly. I am very glad to say that the authorities have now consented to give ten commissions yearly to the Artillery Militia. I have advocated this increase for some time, and I was met, as a rule, with the statement that the officers of the Artillery Militia were not so highly educated as those at Woolwich. Curiously enough, the Deputy-Adjutant-General of Artillery has stated that he has gone into the confidential reports of all the officers of the Artillery Militia now serving in the R.A., and he finds that they are quite equal to the average officer who is educated at Woolwich. With that statement we were able to make this change, and I think you will see in a year or couple of years there will be a very large augmentation in the ranks of the officers of the Artillery Militia. The only other point I wish to speak upon is the relation of the commanding officer to the *dépôt*. Lord Raglan has presented to us a most dreadful picture of divided authority. It is my business to inspect the *dépôts*, and also when the Militia get together to see as much as I can of that body, and I have constant communication with the commanding officers. I must say I do not think that there is any absolute desire on the part of the commanding officers of the Militia to absorb the whole of the duties of their Militia battalions. They have their adjutant, and although Lord Raglan talks of the difficulty of access, I know from my experience that, if a commanding officer wishes to see his recruits, or to take an interest in his regiment—he would invariably be welcomed by the officer commanding the district. But in order to accentuate that, we have arranged that for the future travelling allowances shall be granted to the commanding officer twice a year, in order to induce him to go to visit his recruits. It must be remembered that the commanding officer has his own staff-officer in the adjutant. He should work with him on all points connected with the welfare of the regiment; and he does, as a rule, so work with him. The adjutant certainly has a double responsibility to the officer commanding the regimental *dépôt* and to the officer commanding the Militia regiment. But, I think, except in cases where there is a tactless officer commanding a Militia regiment, or a tactless officer commanding a regimental district, the two apparently, as far as I have seen, seem to get on and hit it off remarkably well. Lord Raglan spoke of signalling. With the difficulties of getting in musketry and educating the Militiamen, I really think that signalling might almost be left out. Should we in war trust to signalling which had been taught under these circumstances? You can hardly get through the musketry and the drill in the time. Lord Raglan made one slight error, and perhaps I may be allowed to correct it. He complained of the lack of power of commanding officers with regard to bad characters. If he looks at the Regulations he will see that bad characters can be dismissed during and after training. According to the Regulations there is no time of training in which you cannot get rid of a bad character. I thank Lord Raglan for his lecture and also for the very interesting statistics which he kindly supplied to the War Office with regard to the percentage of Militiamen to the population.

Colonel H. H. A. STEWART (Lieut.-Colonel retired pay), late Donegal Artillery Militia :—The first observation I wish to make is on what Lord Raglan calls the "career," that is, that there is no career open to Militiamen. I submit, however, with great diffidence, that "career" is not an arbitrary or a positive term—it is a relative one. We talk of a boy's career at school, of a man's career at college, and so on. I say it ought to be represented to the authorities that a certain proportion of the adjutancies of the Militia regiments might with the greatest possible advantage be held by Militia officers. From

my own observation as a commanding officer of a Militia regiment for seven years, I can truly say that some of the adjutants sent from the Regular Army were not of a very high class. I can also say, with as great truth, that I have seen and known many officers in my own regiment who would have made most admirable adjutants. When Lord Wolseley was commanding the troops in Ireland, I was called upon to explain how it was there was such a dearth of officers, and how it could be obviated. I stated that in the very depressed condition of the agricultural interest throughout the country, at all events an inducement might be given to the cadets in the families of landed proprietors to join the Militia, with the opportunities of a possibility, or probability, of a certain proportion of them obtaining adjutancies in regiments. Another thing I consider, and I submit it also with the utmost diffidence, that certain staff appointments might be held with advantage to the Service all over the world by Militia officers; and from my knowledge of the qualifications and education of Militia officers, I believe that they would be prepared to pass any examination, side by side with officers of the Regular Army for any staff appointments that might be open to them. Another point, though a comparatively small one, is that the officers in the Militia are given after certain service only honorary rank. Now, honorary rank is usually restricted, or it used to be when I was a soldier, to officers in the non-combatant branches or retired officers. What do we see in a Militia regiment now? We see an old captain, a hoary-headed soldier of some forty-five or fifty years, made an honorary major, and he sits on a court-martial together with a young captain of Dragoons in his teens—and he sits below him. Now, that is not right.¹ Brevet rank, and not honorary rank, should be given to the combatant officers of the Militia. Another thing to which the lecturer alluded is the great need of getting rid of useless non-commissioned officers and members of the permanent staff also, and that trial by court-martial is the remedy suggested by the authorities. I confess that is not in my experience a remedy, and I think what I say can be proved from the correspondence I have had with the authorities. Lord Raglan, in his lecture, states that when a non-commissioned officer proves himself to be inefficient, and so on, the commanding officer is recommended to try him by court-martial. Now, trying a non-commissioned officer is not always a panacea. I remember a case myself where a non-commissioned officer, sent to me from the Regular Army, was the only one drunk on parade when my regiment was on the line of march coming to England. He was tried by court-martial and awarded an illegal sentence. He got off, though the sentence was confirmed by the general commanding one of the districts! There is another thing I wish to say with regard to Lord Raglan's lecture, and which I consider to be a most admirable one. He speaks of non-commissioned officers of the Militia "mixing" with the men, and he seems to deprecate that. I submit that that is not altogether correct. I think it is a very good plan for the rank and file and non-commissioned officers to mix together. I will illustrate what I say by giving you the opinion of an old commanding officer of a Line regiment when I was his adjutant in the Island of Bermuda about thirty years ago. Some case of insubordination occurred in the garrison, and the cause of it was supposed to be the absence of any sergeant from the room along with the men. My colonel said to me, "I may not live to see it; but you will find, Stewart, while you are still in the Army, cases of insubordination will occur owing to non-commissioned officers, sergeants especially, being withdrawn from association with the men." There

¹ Honorary rank carries with it no seniority for command. Brevet rank does. Let any reasonable examination of competency be demanded before granting the latter rank to captains and field officers of Militia. It seems ridiculous, yet it is a fact, that at present a captain and brevet lieutenant-colonel of, say, thirty years, or younger, and in charge of a company of Regulars, would take command or precedence of an honorary colonel, aged sixty, commanding, too, a regiment of Militia a thousand or more strong!—H. H. A. S.

have been a good many cases of insubordination of late in the Regular Army, as no doubt you have all seen. I should just like to be allowed to say, before I sit down, that the authorities are no doubt full of sympathy with the Militia, but I believe a little help is worth a great deal more than any amount of sympathy; and I believe most assuredly that the officers of the Militia, Yeomanry, and the Volunteers have the power to help themselves, and especially so in both Houses of Parliament. I do not believe there is any profession or business in the country so influentially represented in both Houses of Parliament as the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers. I believe, further—and with this I will conclude my remarks—that the Militia ought to have on the Head Quarters staff of the Army an officer of their own, or of the Volunteers, or of the Yeomanry, to represent them. I have often mentioned this to civilians in private life, and it is hardly believed that one-half of the land forces of the Empire—about 350,000 or 400,000 men—are absolutely unrepresented on the Head Quarters staff of the Army by a single officer of their own! Now, I do not want to have Sir Francis Grenfell removed, and if he were removed, no doubt another place would be found for him very soon which he would very worthily fill. I do not say that we ought to have a deputy adjutant-general placed above Sir Francis Grenfell, or whoever held the appointment; but I maintain we ought to have a man there of our own to represent the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. I will sit down by saying that the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers have power to help themselves, and there is an old adage that "God Almighty helps those who help themselves."

Major Theodore F. BRINCKMAN, 3rd Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regiment):—I will only say a few words on the subject. We have all seen in the newspapers a great deal about the Militia, which I hope will attract the attention of the authorities. We have also had papers read, but nothing has been done. There are several things that might be done. In the first place, the recruiting system is wrong. From my experience of seventeen years in the Militia, I fancy that recruiting was stronger and better when we had the old preliminary drill. When we go to the dépôt and see the recruits, we generally find them running about with coal scuttles. No interest is taken in them, as was the case when they were looked after by their own officers. There are very few of their own officers to look after them. The day before the training they come up as a body of men. One of the chief reasons why the Militia is not as efficient as it might be, is because there are only 28 days for training, and during that time 14 or 15 days are devoted to musketry; so that out of the whole of the 28 days the commanding officer has only 6 days left for drill. That, I think, is a great drawback. Why we are all dissatisfied about this is, that during a long period of years the authorities have overlooked the requirements of the Militia. Everything has been done for the Volunteers, but very little for the Militia. Until the authorities try to make the Militia more popular with officers and men, they will find the Force deteriorate, instead of coming up to the standard which it ought to reach.

Colonel M. MOORE-LANE (Lieut.-Colonel R.A., retired pay), Hampshire and Isle of Wight Artillery Militia:—I wish to make a few remarks on the artillery branch of the Militia, and in doing so I may mention that my Militia experience extends over a period of twenty-four years. I was first appointed adjutant, in 1873, of the Northumberland Artillery; then I was transferred to the "P.W.O." Norfolk Artillery, served seven years, till I was promoted to field rank. I joined the Hampshire Artillery Militia as Major in 1887, and took over the command of the regiment in 1889, so that my experience has been rather long and varied. I should advocate that the artillery be given appellations in accordance with the positions which they now occupy—I mean by calling them the Southern Artillery, the Eastern Artillery, the Western Artillery, and so forth, doing away with county titles. I am now speaking entirely from an artillery point of view. I should certainly utilise the Midland Counties, which are not now called upon to furnish

any recruits for the artillery, and I would apportion these counties to the different units. I advocate this, because in these counties there is a class of mechanics, artisans, and miners which would form a very valuable addition to the artillery; I speak, of course, in general terms. The details could be easily worked out if such a scheme were approved. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the present strength of the Artillery Militia is perfectly inadequate for the duties required, and which it would be called upon to carry out in a national emergency for home defence. I entirely agree with Lord Raglan with regard to the enlistment for general service, and I only hope that, should it be carried out, it will do away with the Militia Reserve; because in that case it would enable the units to turn out effective, efficient, and strong when embodied, which they cannot possibly do now. Some drastic measures must, I think, be adopted in order to overcome the annual waste which takes place in regiments, and also the great difficulty now experienced in obtaining recruits. The causes may be stated:—1. The alteration in the class of recruits now joining the Volunteers; 2. The movement of the large number of the agricultural population into towns; 3. The inducements held out to men to re-enrol are not sufficient as regards payment of bounties. To induce a better state of affairs, I should suggest:—First, increased recruiting areas for artillery, as I have already mentioned. Secondly, I do not see why the present D Section of the Army Reserve should not be done away with, so as to induce these men who are now serving under that section to join the Militia, giving them a retaining fee of fourpence a day during such service. In that way you would obtain men in the prime of their lives—at the age of 30 to 35. Their service would be seven years in the Regular Army, five years in the Reserve at sixpence a day, and seven years in the Militia at fourpence a day, still of course retaining the voluntary Militiamen who now enlist at the age of 17. I should very much regret if the civilian element, which is now disappearing very fast, should disappear altogether. Thirdly, advancement of part bounty to old soldiers enlisting as formerly. Fourthly, I should certainly recommend that the commanding officers be held responsible for the strength of their regiments as well as for their efficiency. Give them a free hand as regards the disposal of their permanent staffs during the non-training period for recruiting purposes. I do not see that this would in any way interfere with recruiting for general service. In fact, I am sure it would not. I think a great deal more encouragement should be given to officers to join the various schools of instruction, and especially the course as regards artillery of “coast defence and fire discipline.” If officers are recommended to attend such courses by their commanding officers, they should do so, receiving their pay and allowances. I quite agree with the last speaker, and I think what he brought out is very important. It is absolutely necessary at the present day that the Militia should be in far greater touch with Head Quarters and that we should be represented on the Head Quarters staff. I do not see why, in the first instance, an experienced Militia officer (there will be no difficulty in finding him) should not be appointed to the staff of the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, and he would be there to advise and assist him in all matters referring to the Militia. At present I believe the staff of this general officer consists of a clerk and a messenger! I hope this matter will receive the attention of the authorities, because I think it is very important, and I think through this staff officer we might work and get something done outside these walls. As regards the annual training, I think a month is far too short for artillery, and I should certainly recommend that there should be an extension to six weeks of training, say every alternate year.

Colonel H. B. HANS HAMILTON, Northumberland Artillery Militia:—In following my friend Colonel Moore-Lane, and offering a few remarks with regard to the Militia of this country, may I be allowed to say, Sir, that I think we are fortunate in having here to-day Sir John Colomb, who championed our cause last session in the House of Commons; and we may also congratulate ourselves that Sir Francis

Grenfell is present with us. Their presence has, I think, added greatly to the success of our meeting. It is difficult not to go over ground that has already been traversed by previous speakers. I would mention one small point which seems to have escaped the attention of the officers who have spoken. By Army Order 278, of 1890, the orderly-room clerk was disallowed the right to rise in rank, as he is able to do in the Regular Service. I felt this to be an injustice in my own regiment, and I would suggest that this Army Order should be cancelled, and that in future an orderly-room clerk should be permitted to rise in rank, as he was able to do before the year 1890. Every now and then we find, partly owing to the absence of an experienced Militia officer at the right hand of the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces (as pointed out by the previous speaker), little things are put upon us, which, although small in themselves, are extremely irritating, and very discouraging to the individual immediately affected. I endorse most fully everything that has been so ably said by Lord Raglan and other speakers with regard to restoring warrant rank to regimental sergeant-majors, which warrant rank was discontinued by Army Order 396, of 1889. It is worthy of note, that this opinion as to the restoration of warrant rank to sergeant-majors is held by the officer commanding every Militia unit in the Kingdom. I must say I felt the change myself very deeply. The great responsibility of the position of regimental sergeant-majors in the Militia Service demands that they should have warrant rank. These are two apparently small matters, but still it is the number of such small matters which, when recognised by the War Office, and promptly remedied, greatly strengthen the hands of commanding officers, and which impresses all ranks that the authorities are anxious to remedy mistakes, and do justice to each individual. I would also desire to be allowed to suggest, in order to obtain thoroughly efficient Militia non-commissioned officers, that men, after completing their Army and Army Reserve service, should be encouraged to join the Militia, and remain in it until they reach the age of fifty years; and that these men should be granted a small pension of, say, sixpence a day for such service. This would rid the Militia Service of a difficulty and a weakness it is now suffering from, and would greatly add to the efficiency of each unit. I sincerely trust the authorities will see their way to initiate a scheme on these lines. Although the regiment I have the honour to command is complete in all ranks, and has been complete for a number of years, my experience tells me this cannot be attained without the officer commanding devotes some part of every day of the year in keeping himself in touch with the non-commissioned officers and men, and taking an individual interest in them and their families in their own homes during the eleven months of the non-training period. It has been suggested by Lord Raglan in his able paper that the Militia Reserve should be done away with, and the Militia enlisted for general service in case of war and national difficulty. In this proposal I entirely agree, and it is the vital point upon which all other smaller suggestions pale into insignificance. Why should not the old Constitutional Force be enlisted on a fair and honest basis, and in accordance with the modern requirements of our country? Under the existing system of enlistment, the Militiaman is bound only to serve in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Although he is so enlisted, the country expects him to volunteer in case of national danger, and every Militiaman would volunteer if such an event happened. I maintain, however, that it would be more satisfactory to all Militiamen to be placed on an honest basis, and enlisted for general service, than that they should be expected to do what they have not originally contracted to do. I say, from my experience of nearly twenty-eight years, that this great change can be brought about without the slightest friction, if it is done judiciously, and in consultation with a committee of Militia officers who have made the individual character of the men who enlist in the Militia, their study. I need not now explain the increased strength this change would bring to the military resources of the country. I can only trust that those responsible for the re-organisation of the

Militia Service on a modern basis, will not delay in considering this vital matter—vital, not only to the welfare of the country itself, but also to the Militia Service, in which we all take so deep an interest. With regard to the apparent inability in some parts of the Kingdom to recruit Militia units to their full establishment under the present Regulations, I would refer you, Sir, to the Official Returns for 1895. I find the Militia establishment of all ranks amounted to 134,872, “wanting to complete 18,320,” “less supernumerary establishment 1,246,” we have a total of 17,083 required to complete the establishment. We deduct, therefore, from 134,872, 17,082; this leaves 117,789 “enrolled.” We must also deduct from this latter figure (117,789) the number of men absent (with leave and without leave), which in 1895 I find was 13,725. We have, therefore, the total of 104,064 officers, non-commissioned officers and men. Of this number we have privates, gunners, and sappers, 90,265. Of this number the Militia Reserve comprise 31,498, who are liable to be sent to the Army; and we must, therefore, deduct them also, in order to obtain the actual number of the Militia proper available. This total only amounts to 53,767! When, therefore, under the present system, the Militia Reserves are called out, the Force is denuded of its best men and nearly the whole of the Militia non-commissioned officers! I do not think that the country appreciates at all that it only possesses 53,767 Militiamen, in the event of the Militia Reserve being called out. I have quoted these figures also to explain my proposal for recruiting the Militia up to its “establishment,” and, in addition, we have also to recruit men to fill up the places of those absent. These two figures, 17,083 plus 13,725, equal 30,808 deficient in 1895. My proposal is, that those officers commanding units, who *are* able to keep their units complete, should be permitted to recruit, first of number of supernumeraries equal to the estimated number of absentees, and secondly, that they should also be permitted to recruit as supernumeraries, say half the number of the Militia Reserves of this unit until the 17,083 required to complete is cancelled by an equal number of supernumeraries. At present, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has an establishment on paper of 134,872, and the country expects the authorities to provide this number; but the finance committee only estimates for 104,064 present at the annual training, and he only pays for this number. In other words, the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not pay for 31,808 who do not in fact exist in the form that they can be paid for. I maintain the military authorities are bound to make some attempt to make up this figure, and I believe the proposal I have made is the way to do so. The authorities do not seem desirous of increasing the establishment of any unit, wherever the officers commanding *can* provide the officers and recruit the men; although the Chancellor of the Exchequer is saving the expense of 31,808 men per annum. This seems a curious anomaly. Seeing these facts from the returns, viz., that the expense of 31,808 men was being saved every year, and that I found I could provide officers and men for an additional company, I applied for an additional company, but the authorities regretted they could not sanction it. The inference therefore to be drawn is, that either the authorities do not desire to increase the establishment, or that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not wish to spend any of the money he is saving every year by the Militia force being 31,808 men short of the establishment. My proposal does not necessitate an increase of establishment. To each company you can add an equal number of the supernumeraries you have been allowed to recruit, without the addition of extra officers and non-commissioned officers. In the Militiaman the country possesses excellent fighting material, and he is the cheapest soldier I believe in the world. I have taken out the total cost of an Artillery Militiaman spread over the six years he is engaged for, and I find he costs the country £6 5s. 10½d. per annum. This figure includes everything, the uniform, rations, pay, and travelling expenses of a gunner in the Northumberland Artillery. Is it not worth the while, therefore, of the authorities to make some attempt to complete the establishment of the Militia, and enable the Chancellor of the

Exchequer to pay the amount the country expects him to pay, instead of his being obliged to estimate for some 31,808 short? I am certain from long experience and the daily study of the Militia force, the country possesses a splendid system; but that this system requires re-organisation on an honest basis, and in accordance with the extensive and extending dominions which Her Majesty's Forces in modern times are called upon to safeguard and to defend.

Lieutenant-Colonel OLIVER T. DUKE, 5th Bn. The Rifle Brigade:—We Militia officers are all greatly indebted to Lord Raglan for the immense amount of labour, trouble, and care that he has taken in producing his paper. We have heard eloquent speeches delivered as to the various wants of the Militia, we know the support that Lord Raglan's views have met with; and we must now ask ourselves, What is to be the outcome of it all? Is anything good to be hoped for from this great gathering? Is anything coming from the opinions that have been expressed? Is anything good to come of the plans that have been drawn out by Lord Raglan? I think that Lord Raglan puts in the wrong place the vital point of this paper. After giving us particulars of, and pointing out in detail the defects of the Militia: in the first place the deficiency of officers, with a statement of the plans he proposes for dealing with that evil; after stating that the question of instruction was very difficult, after noting the anomalous position of the commanding officer, after pointing out the grievances of sergeant-majors, and after reflecting on the status of Militia non-commissioned officers, he came to what he called the vital point of his paper. I think that vital point of the paper should have come first, for on it turns the whole question of the Militia. Lord Raglan says that the vital point is the question as to whether the Militia should be enlisted for general service in time of war. Major Holden in speaking just now laughed at the idea of invasion. I do not know whether the bogie of invasion, as it is called, has taken refuge entirely with the Militia forces and has been driven out from the United Service Institution. Admiral Colomb has done his best to drive it out, but I fancy that we Militia officers believe still in the possibility of invasion. We look upon ourselves at the present time as serving with a probability, or at any rate a possibility, of being called upon at some future time to resist invasion. It, therefore, seems to me that the point we have to get cleared up is, What is the position of the Militia in the scheme of National Defence, of which we have heard so much? We have been told by the Duke of Devonshire, speaking at the Guildhall, that Naval Supremacy is the first principle of Imperial Defence. Many long papers have been written on that small text, which it seems to me was totally misinterpreted. The Duke of Devonshire was speaking entirely in reference to our Colonies, and he said that the Navy had undertaken to render impossible organised invasion of our Colonies abroad. He said nothing about Home Defence. Admiral Colomb filled on this subject some pages of the *Times* with very eloquent writing, in which he laughs at all of us who have thought that invasion might still be possible. We noticed of late that the gentlemen, in discussing the political position, now commenced their arguments with the apologetic remark, "Of course, we do not believe in the idea of invasion; you must not suppose that we think that is possible." It was considered that all idea of invasion had been knocked on the head. However, Mr. Brodrick has, within the last few days, made a speech in the House of Commons, and has introduced a Bill which is to provide a large sum of money to be used for the defence of the country, in view of the possible occurrence of an invasion; it is evident, therefore, that the Government are in strong agreement with the views expressed by Lord Wolseley in Edinburgh, that invasion is possible. We have then to ask, What is our position with regard to the defences of the country? I think we may venture to take it that the views recently expressed detrimental to the Volunteer force are not acceptable to the country, that the country still considers it necessary to maintain the Volunteer force (Constitutional "Local Militia"), to promote its efficiency, to increase its strength, to perfect the details which have

already been worked out, with regard to the location of particular Forces in case of invasion; in fact, the country means to keep the Volunteer force, and does believe that it is required in case of invasion. What then, is the position of the Militia?—the “Regular Militia” of Constitutional History. I think that Lord Raglan has touched the vital point, when he says that it ought to be made effective as a part of the Regular Army, by being enlisted for foreign service in the time of war. We know perfectly well that all true defence must be of an offensive character, if it is to be effective; and, although it may be necessary to have a system of passive and immobile defence, the real policy for defending the country is an offensive-defensive system. We know that our Army is totally incapable of undertaking an offensive-defensive policy at the present time. We have that on the word of the Commander-in-Chief, and, practically, this view is accepted throughout the country; I take it that such is the acknowledged condition of things. But, if the Militia were drilled and trained up to the high level it ought to reach, in one moment, so to speak, our Army could be made fit to take up an offensive-defensive position. Now, if the country did accept that position, with regard to the Militia, it would naturally demand that the Force should be made fit for its duties, and then would follow the solution of the questions that Lord Raglan has insisted upon, officers would be looked out for and would be properly trained. I venture respectfully, to disagree with Lord Raglan’s idea, that all officers should go through the Militia. I would rather say that all officers should go through Sandhurst, before they are allowed to come into the Militia. We want more education for our officers. The country would see that the officers are properly trained, if it trusted the greater part of its safety to the Militia, while the commanding officers’ position would then be reconsidered. The sergeant-majors would be made contented. In fact, all the evils which Lord Raglan has pointed out would be remedied, if once our position in the defensive Forces of the country were fully recognised. In the very able paper read by Major Williams, in June last, he suggested that there was not a proper relation at present existing between the Militia and Regular Army; and many officers of great experience present at that meeting strongly upheld the idea that a Royal Commission should be asked for, to enquire into the position of the Militia, with regard to the defensive Forces of the country. I think if, as the result of this meeting, the authorities at the War Office and at the Horse Guards should come to consider the broad questions, not minor questions, as to whether a commanding officer is conveniently situated with regard to his men, but the broad question as to what is our position, that they will see that it is necessary to appoint a Commission to adjust our relations to the Regular Forces in carrying out an offensive-defensive policy. I hope that may be the outcome of this meeting—I trust that the authorities will see that we are asking for a broad consideration of our position, that we are placing ourselves at their disposal to carry out a great military policy, and that they will not despise our humble efforts.

Captain J. C. W. MADDEN, 5th Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers :—With regard to the question of officers, I think that the lecturer has certainly hit the point. You will not get officers to fill the vacancies in the Militia unless you increase largely the number of candidates going through the Militia into the Army, or else do what has been suggested by the lecturer and make everyone go into the Army through the Militia. As to our present Militia officers qualifying as far as they can to make themselves efficient, I want to show how the authorities help us at the present time. First and foremost, take the Schools of Instruction. When we join the Militia first we are generally told by the adjutant that we must either go up for two months’ preliminary drill, or be attached to a Line regiment for two months before our first training. Then when we come up for training the colonel says, “You must go to a School of Instruction—that is indispensable”; and, if we do so, we go there without pay or allowances, and, of course, this prevents many from going to a School of Instruction who otherwise would. Captains of Militia are allowed

to go up from the 15th to the end of the month, but they have to get a field officer's certificate, and they have to do so without pay or allowances. That is wrong, and it is a curious anomaly that if you wait till you are a major, and go up then, you get the full pay and allowances of a major. It would be thought that it would be the desire of the authorities that every Militia officer should go to Hythe and qualify in order to be fit to instruct his company. On the contrary, when I joined my regiment for three years I applied to be sent to Hythe in the August course, as my work prevented my going up at any other time. In each case I was told, after sending in my application, to get my eyesight tested (this at my own expense). I did so, and then I never heard a word more about it. Personally, I think that the post of instructor of musketry ought to be done away with in the Militia, as it has been in the Army, and that captains of Militia should be compelled to go to Hythe and qualify themselves to instruct their own companies. I believe in that way you would get instruction in musketry much better done. For there is this curious fact, that at present a second lieutenant of two years' service may go to Hythe and get a certificate and be made an instructor of musketry, and then practically he is supposed to tell a captain of twenty years' service what he is to do with his company when it comes to musketry. That is altogether wrong. Now as to tactics. No facilities are given to officers to enable them to go up for tactics at present. I can only say that, in my own case, I applied to go up for tactics, and asked for leave to be examined in London. After about three weeks I was asked why I wished to be examined in London. I replied that I was living there, and could not go over to Belfast. Two weeks after that I received an order saying that leave was granted for me to be examined in London, and that I was to find out from the D.A.A.G. for Instruction the time and place. I could not go to the Horse Guards that day, but I went the next, and was told that the examination was over. That is not the way to encourage Militia officers to go in for the various certificates. We cannot, as the lecturer very forcibly said, be always sitting on the doorsteps of our orderly-rooms during the non-training period waiting for orders. I should like to back up what has been said by others—that it is most important that sergeant-majors should have warrant rank. I think it is a great injustice taking it from them. If any friction was caused at depôts by sergeant-majors of Militia having warrant rank, surely either a depôt sergeant-major could be made to rank senior to battalion sergeant-major, or the depôt sergeant-major could be done away with; and the senior sergeant-major of Militia, having headquarters at the depôt, could carry on the duties of depôt sergeant-major during the non-training period; and during the twenty-seven days he has to be away with his regiment a colour-sergeant could do those duties. That would get rid of the depôt sergeant-major and his expense, and would give employment to the Militia sergeant-major during the non-training period. Now as to what has been said as to N.C.O.'s. I had the pleasure of being attached to the 4th Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment during the manœuvres at Aldershot last year, and I found two corporals short in my company. There were no lance-corporals, as no one would take the post. I picked out some of the best men, but they refused to become corporals. I then told the colour-sergeant to bring me any man who would take the post. He brought me three of the youngest boys in the company. One of them looked about seventeen years old, and I told him to go back and grow. The other two had to be made corporals, and they were no use after they were, for they had no authority at all with the men. If boys like that attempted to talk to older men than themselves—men who had probably been in the Army—they would not be listened to. That was the case all through with the non-commissioned officers in the Militia. You cannot get good sergeants, as you do not pay them well. For 3d. extra a day a good man will not take the responsibility of corporal, and the risk of unpleasantness after the training if he does his duty. I also feel strongly that commanding officers of Militia should be given power to reduce to the ranks sergeants or corporals found to be of no use. At present, you

have to wait till a N.C.O. commits himself, as you cannot court-martial him for stupidity. There was one case, I may mention, that occurred at Aldershot. I had a sergeant who was perfectly useless, and I should have called him a bad private in the ranks ; but he could not be got rid of. At last he got drunk, and the colonel at once had him tried by court-martial, and he was reduced to the ranks. Now, there should be no necessity to wait for this. I think it would be a great advantage if Militia N.C.O.'s could be promoted to the permanent staff, if they were really good. It would help us to get the right class of man. I forgot to say one thing I wanted to about the officers. If the authorities bring into the Militia a large number of half-pay officers from the Line to fill up the list of captains, when a vacancy occurs for a majority or a lieutenant-colonelcy these officers ought not to have the preference over purely Militia officers because they have been in the Army, and perhaps seen service. To give them such preference would, in my opinion, be unfair, and prevent many men from accepting a commission in their county regiments. Now as to men. The authorities seem to do one thing or the other—that is, they either always leave you at your headquarters, or else they always send you away to large camps like Aldershot ; and neither of these things is good for the Militia. If you always send a regiment away from its headquarters it is bad for recruiting, and if you always leave it there it is bad for efficiency. During the manœuvres last year, on account of the wet and hard work, I heard many men say, "This is not good enough" ; and I have no doubt, if the same regiments were sent to manœuvres again this year, it would be bad for their recruiting. The question is, What ought to be done ? One year a regiment should be kept at its headquarters, and every now and then, say once in two or three years, sent to manœuvres, or brigaded with other regiments, otherwise it cannot be efficient. In the case of my own regiment, for twenty-one years we have never been moved away from our headquarters, and have never seen a regiment alongside of us. That, I think, is wrong. For sixteen years we were always in barracks and billets. Suddenly, in 1893, it was found out that there was a good camping ground about a mile from headquarters, and there we have been encamped ever since. Now we have been ordered to give up the range ; and judging from past experience, we shall train away from headquarters for some years to come. I do think this happy-go-lucky policy is not the most suitable for the Militia. There is one thing I would say most strongly before sitting down, and that is this : the great point in Lord Raglan's lecture is his recommendation to do away with the Militia Reserve, and enlist Militiamen for general service. This is a most important matter for the Militia, and should be inquired into most carefully, and, if possible, carried out. It is an extremely unfair thing if, whenever a row occurs, all our best men and non-commissioned officers are to be taken away and sent to the Line. If the authorities will insist on retaining the Militia Reserve, let it be done in this way : When, for example, a hundred men are wanted to reinforce either the 1st or 2nd Battalion which is at war, let the colonel of the Militia battalion they are to be taken from tell off three officers to command them ; and then, I think, both officers and men will be able to give a good account of themselves when they get to the Line battalions. The best thing to do, however, is to do away with the Militia Reserve altogether, and enlist for general service ; and to use the money you will thus save by either increasing the present bounties, or in some other way for the benefit of the Militia. When a man engages at the present time to go into the Militia he does not think, nor does he care, whether it is for general service or for service in this country only. What he thinks is : "What bounty am I to receive at the end of my training ?" "What pay am I to get ?" and "Am I likely to have a good time with my regiment while I am away ?" If these three things are right, he will join. I can only say that I believe that, if the authorities adopt the changes recommended by Lord Raglan in his lecture, which practically represents the feelings of the vast majority of Militia officers on the subject, they will greatly benefit the Militia Service, and

will find in time of need that they have in the Militia the very finest Reserve for the Army that can be maintained on so small an expenditure.

Colonel JOHN DAVIS, A.D.C., 3rd Bn. The Queen's :—I should like to take this opportunity of offering my grateful thanks to Lord Raglan for the extreme care and attention that he has paid to this very important subject, and for the excellent paper that he has brought before us. I know somewhat of the trouble of getting up a paper of this kind, for some years ago I was much struck with the importance of endeavouring to increase the ranks of the Militia, and I wrote a pamphlet, which I intended to send to all the great employers of labour, asking them, instead of depreciating the Militia or hindering Militia recruiting, to help it, in order to enable the Government to get a much larger Militia Army; which I thought then and still think, at a time of great national danger, is wanted. I cordially agree with nearly all the points that Lord Raglan has brought out. There are one or two other points I think that we ought specially to consider. Of course, the two main points are the deficiency of officers and the deficiency of the men; and our attention should be especially and earnestly directed to the removal of those two grim defects. I believe the remedy for the deficiency of Militia officers would be the raising of the status of the officers by making them liable for service in case of any great national emergency. I am certain that the gentlemen of this country who would then be drawn to the ranks of the Militia would not like to join a Force in which there would not be an opportunity given them to distinguish themselves before the enemy. If the Force were rendered liable for foreign service, I am convinced from what I have heard from gentlemen in all parts of the country that the Militia officers' ranks would be complete. With respect to the men, I think that something should be done, when they are brought out of civil employment, to house them and feed them better. Of course, a Regular soldier is comfortably housed in barracks. A Militiaman whenever he comes out, whatever the weather is, has to go through the whole of his training in the discomfort and the trouble of a tent. Regular officers may say, "If you give them any better conditions of service in the camp, it is not service conditions"; but I submit that when the Militiaman comes out he ought to be made more of than he is, and ought to be given better accommodation in the camp than he has at present. I think if this were done it would very much help our recruiting, and would help to make the Militia much more popular with the class which we wish to recruit from. Then I think a little consideration should be given in order to ascertain whether something could not be done to again attract to our ranks the old civilian element. When I joined the Militia, and got command of my company, I was immensely proud, and took every opportunity of showing the inspecting officer how many chevrons I had of re-engaged service in my company. There are very few re-engaged men now, I am sorry to say, and that is an indication of how the proper men in the Militia do not re-engage. I would submit to the authorities, whether something might not be done in the way of an extra gratuity for every re-engagement, or some medal or ribbon that a man might show to his friends in civil life when he returned, to indicate that he had done a long service in the old Constitutional Force, and had earned honour and reward. I think that is really worthy of the attention of the authorities, and I believe it would very much tend to attract again to our ranks the good old-fashioned Militiaman, who would be proud to carry his four or five chevrons for long service on his sleeve, and carry into civil life by a long-service medal some indication of his value in the tent. With respect to the general service of the Militia, there is one thing I have always taken much interest in, that is the musketry. I am afraid it is too late to touch upon that, but I believe if we could get the financial secretary to sanction the expenditure to extend our service another week, so as to give the very important subject of musketry instruction a more extended service, it would be of an immense advantage to the Force. I trust, and I believe, that the authorities are turning their

attention to the subject, and I hope the time for service may ultimately be extended. I thank you, Lord Raglan, for your paper, and hope sincerely that the good work you have done will bring its reward to you and to the Service.

Major L. W. PEAD, 3rd Bn. The Royal Fusiliers:—I will only detain you a few minutes; it is now very late, and most of the wind has been taken out of my sails by other speakers. If soldiers of the Militia enlisted for service abroad, it would be a first-rate thing for the Service in every way. I am certain that three-fourths of the men in the Militia do not know that they are not liable to foreign service. As far back as 1871, I remember a Militia regiment going to the Autumn Manœuvres, and the—

“Women are weeping and wringing their hands

For those who would return at the end of a month.”

I asked a colour-sergeant what was the meaning of it all, and he said to me: “The fact is, that half the men think that ‘Autumn Manœuvres’ is the name of some foreign country where they are going to fight the enemy.” Then as to some permanent service for Militia officers, I think it is a grand idea that Militia adjutants should be appointed from the Militia itself. The duty of adjutant is no longer scotching up the colonel when he slips his duties or drill and office routine. I know that there are plenty of officers of Militia capable of taking adjutancies. They might hold them for five years, and, if the colonel approved, another five, and so on. I also think that officers of Militia should have to pass the same examinations before promotion to the rank of field officer as the Regulars have to pass for their rank of field officer. I am certain that if encouragement, instead of discouragement, were given to those officers who have done it—there are only about twelve in the whole Service—other officers would follow the example. Or it might be minimised in this way: let officers pass the same thing as the Regulars in tactics and in military law, and let them know enough field fortification and enough topography to enable them to understand the works they would have to throw up; and to read maps used in tactics. I think Lord Raglan’s idea of passing all officers through the Militia into the Regular Army is a very grand one, and I do not understand how it would do away with Sandhurst—I think it would rather glorify Sandhurst, because I understand that all officers, after obtaining admission to the Militia, before being transferred to the Regular Service, would have to go through the usual course of artillerymen and engineers at Woolwich, and of linesmen at Sandhurst. I am sure we should all be extremely grateful to Lord Raglan for having so thoroughly thrashed out this subject, and for what we have heard from those officers who have come here and thronged round him to-day. It shows us that although some may think that the Militia is a moribund Force, there is plenty of life in the old dog yet.

Lieut.-Colonel ROBERT ap H. WILLIAMS, Royal Anglesey Engineer Militia:—With regard to the dearth of officers in the Militia, I think Lord Raglan, in his able paper, has omitted to mention that some of the few inducements to officers to join the Militia that formerly existed have been taken away. One rather considerable inducement was, in old days, to exempt Militia officers from serving the office of High Sheriff. There are many men, even of large means, who particularly dislike that office, and who would join the Militia, and stick to it for a long time, merely for the purpose of escaping it. In my own case, after I had been in the Militia a good many years, I pleaded the old excuse that the Militia were exempted from serving the office of High Sheriff, but I was told that that exemption no longer existed; and I had to serve the office of High Sheriff, just as if I had not already served my country to a considerable extent, though in a different way. With regard to officers going through courses of instruction, I venture to say that, if you will only have your courses of instruction at times of the year which are convenient to the officers, and pay their out-of-pocket expenses, there is no number of courses of instruction which you may impose upon them that they will not cheerfully go through. In my corps of Engineer Militia there are only two times when such a

course is open. One of these begins in April and lasts six weeks, and the chances are that the course is not over before the regiment goes out for its training. The only other time when the officers can go up for a course of engineering to Chatham is the 1st of September; and in the case of many who are country gentlemen, there are other attractions in the country at that time which they hardly choose to give up for six weeks. With regard to foreign service, I have talked to many men in the Militia, and I have never found one who was not ready to go abroad in time of war, and who would not take a pride in going along with his officers. The general opinion was that the Government ought to provide for their families whilst they were away, and that if a man did not wish to go abroad he should join the Volunteers. With regard to the status and quality of the Volunteer non-commissioned officers, I may say that during a service of a good many years as a sub-altern or a captain of a company, I found that there often was an amount of *esprit de corps* and zeal amongst them which simply amazed me. If you took them in the right way and encouraged them with a little praise and commendation, they were generally anxious to improve themselves. They then found that they were looked up to by the other men, and they were really very useful. In my company, on more than one occasion on parade, when none of the sergeants, either staff or Volunteer, were present, and the only non-commissioned officers were the corporals, I have found that the work was well done, and that there was thoroughly good steady drill. Still, if you want to make sure of getting good non-commissioned officers for the Militia, you must pay them a little better than at present. Their work is much harder, and their pay ought to be as good as that of the non-commissioned officers in the Regular Army. Indeed, I venture to say that, not only ought their pay to be as good as that of the other non-commissioned officers, of their own rank, but the bounty they receive at the end of each training ought to be a great deal higher than that of the ordinary Militiaman. If there is to be an improvement made in the efficiency of the Militia, I suggest that it should not be done by lengthening the annual training. In our regiment we find that six weeks' training is as long as the men can be spared from their civil employments. There is already a difficulty to get men to join the regiments, and more of them would require to be excused if the training were increased. But I think you might with advantage lengthen the preliminary drill by a couple of months at the beginning of the year, when the days are still short and work is rather slack. The recruits would then be better grounded in musketry and field fortification, and when they came out for their annual training there would be no danger that they would ever forget what they had then learned.

Colonel J. MOUNT BATTEN (Brev.-Major, retired pay), 3rd Bn. The King's (Liverpool) Regiment:—I wish that the debate could have been adjourned for one week, and the lecture circulated amongst commanding officers of Militia, with a view to more extensive debate on the subject. With regard to the making of non-commissioned officers of Volunteers, officers commanding regiments know very well the great difficulty there is in getting privates to accept stripes. A previous speaker has told you the experience he had when attached to my regiment at Aldershot. One reason is that in a local regiment, such as I have the honour to command, the men and non-commissioned officers are thrown together so much during the non-training that a small or weak man is afraid to take the stripes and do his duty. It seems to me there is one simple remedy for that, and unless there is some very strong constitutional reason why that remedy should not be applied, I see no objection to it. Why should not non-commissioned officers and men be under the same law (the Army Discipline Act) as officers are all the year round? Then, if a private during non-training uses violence to a non-commissioned officer, he could be taken before the magistrate and sent to the dépôt to be tried by court-martial for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. It would be a great help to obtaining good non-commissioned officers, if we were assured that they would be protected during non-training. It applies much more

in large cities, where many Militiamen live in one town, even in one street, and work at the same trade, than it does in a county, where a non-commissioned officer may be at one end of the county and a private at the other end. Many suggestions have been made with regard to improvements but most of the suggestions I see carry with them an idea of extra expenditure. I am very much afraid that we shall find, when we go to the Treasury, that it is a dry pump, and that we shall get nothing out of it. We should, therefore, confine ourselves as much as possible to using the material in our hands, and endeavour to make practical suggestions without touching the pockets of the taxpayer. I think a good deal of the cause of the trouble of getting officers to join is, that the Militia are always under canvas. That we should go under canvas once or twice in six or seven years is reasonable, and very advantageous; but to be continually under canvas, whatever the weather is and whatever the time of the year may be, is, I think, bad for the recruits and officers, and we could carry out discipline much more perfectly if we were in barracks.

Colonel J. BONHOTE (late Lieutenant 84th Regiment), 3rd Bn. Royal West Kent Regiment:—I desire to accentuate one point that does not seem to me to have been sufficiently brought out, although it has been mentioned by several speakers; that is, the great importance to the Militia that, if possible, the period of training should be lengthened. It is a moral impossibility to do effectually in twenty-seven days the work that we strive to do. It is a perpetual striving after the unattainable. I thought it my duty officially to request this year that my battalion might be granted an extra week's training; but this was found impossible for financial reasons. I believe that the matter was looked upon chiefly from the point of view as to whether the extra expense would bring adequate additional value in the shape of recruits for the Regular Army, the question of the increased efficiency of the Militia battalion being apparently regarded as a quite subordinate consideration. I do not mean to say that the authorities do not *at all* look at that point; but I think it deserving of their *first* consideration. With regard to the rest of the lecture, I thoroughly agree with Lord Raglan on all the main points, and I am sure we owe him a great debt of gratitude for the suggestions he has brought forward, especially the point of making the Militia available for general service. I desire to add my voice to that of other commanding officers in thorough approval of that suggestion, because I am sure it would tend to raise the status of the Militia and to increase its efficiency and popularity.

Colonel F. G. D. WATSON (Late Isle of Wight Artillery (Southern Division R.A.):—I did not intend to say anything to-day, but for the remarks of the gentleman on my right about wishing the regiments not to come out every year under canvas. A good deal is to be said for and against it. There is no doubt that discipline can be kept up as well under canvas as in barracks, but we should bear in mind that Militiamen come out for twenty-seven days in the year, or six weeks at the outside, and have to give the remainder of the year to their own work. We have no right, I think, to sacrifice their health, or to run the risk of sacrificing it, by bringing them out at uncertain times of the year and putting them under canvas so that they run the risk of getting rheumatism and other things, and so incapacitate them from doing work during the remaining eleven months of the year. I felt it strongly in my own case when I commanded a regiment in the Isle of Wight. We were brought out under canvas every year. The men never grumbled, but still I think it did interfere very much with recruiting. I applied through the Southern District at first for huts, mentioning certain huts that were in existence in the Woolwich marshes, and not being used. I was told that there were no huts. After correspondence for about a year and a half, I managed to get an interview with Lord William Seymour, and directly he saw me coming into his office he said: "I know, Colonel, what you have come for; you have come about those huts." "Yes, Sir," I said, "I am; and I am going to get them." They were promised. I went away, and within a week the huts began to arrive, and the recruiting increased at once. Instead of the men

being brought out under canvas, they were kept from the inclemency of the weather. You cannot treat a Militiaman who only comes out for six weeks as you treat a Regular soldier who is out all the year round. I do not wish to occupy your time further, except to tender my thanks and the thanks of every Militia officer present to Lord Raglan for his very excellent lecture. I only hope that the result of it will be for the good of our Force.

Colonel LONSDALE A. HALE (late R.E.):—Might I ask Lord Raglan kindly to give us a little explanation with regard to his proposal, which has been received with unanimous approval, that everybody should go through the Militia? This is a big scheme. At present candidates can enter the Army either by obtaining through commanding officers of Militia a commission in their battalions; or else without asking a favour from anyone, they can simply go up to the ordinary examination at Sandhurst; they do not want nomination from anyone. These are the two roads into the Army; colonels of the Militia hold the gates on one; on the other the doors stand always wide open. Are you colonels going to say, "Nobody is to come into the Army except on our nomination"? That is rather a difficult point to get over. If everybody is to go through the Militia, who is to give the commissions? And are we to have an increase in the officers of the Militia, so that the large number of candidates now going up for Sandhurst can all receive commissions in the Force? I should be glad if Lord Raglan would also say what sort of an examination they would undergo in order to enter the Militia. When is the examination they now have—the literary examination—to take place?

General Sir WILLIAM GORDON CAMERON, K.C.B.:—I was anxious to hear the views of the Militia officers themselves, and therefore postponed saying anything on the subject of this valuable lecture until they had all spoken. For this, however, there appears no time; but perhaps the chairman will permit me a few remarks before we separate, as having commanded the Northern District prior to its partition, and containing forty-nine Militia battalions or corps of all arms, numbering over 40,000 men. Of these forty-nine battalions, I inspected, in most cases every year, all but two of them which trained outside the district, devoting considerable time to each. When commanding at Shorncliffe, and as an Aldershot brigadier, it was also my endeavour to see as much as possible of the Militia, so I ought to know something about the Service, the great importance of which in the defensive system of our country has been so strangely overlooked for many years. I have listened with very great interest to all that Lord Raglan has told us, and as far as my experience goes I think I can endorse nearly everything he has said in regard to the defects requiring remedial measures, especially the lamentable deficiency in the number of officers, and their want of sufficient training both in the higher and lower ranks. When inspecting a Line regiment, and calling out subaltern after subaltern, I have always made it my duty to ascertain whether they came direct from Sandhurst or from the Militia. Though taking the greatest interest in the Militia (indeed, I defy a Militiaman himself to feel a keener or more lively interest in its welfare), I must confess that under the present system the young subalterns I refer to were very indifferently trained, and I think you will find that most commanding officers of Line regiments generally have to send these officers to what is called recruits' drill. That only proves the necessity, as Lord Raglan pointed out, of a greater amount of training. With regard to passing all officers through the Militia into the Line, of course there is what Colonel Lonsdale Hale has pointed out for our consideration, and there is also the fact that the country now demands open competition for commissions in the Regular Army, and you have to secure this open competition. As far as I can understand, if the whole of the candidates for the Army were passed through the Militia, you would not have such open competition, and you would not have that much higher education that is demanded by the whole military world in these days. Proficiency does not mean nowadays just knowing one's little bit of drill and the mere elementary part of the business. It is demanded

now from every officer that he should be a thoroughly efficient leader of men on a European battle-field. The little bit of drill is only the instrument : it has to be practically applied. The military profession now demands very high qualifications. Ask our Continental neighbours what they have to say about it. Ask any of the military *attachés* here what their officers and soldiers have to do. It is a very big and serious affair. I quite agree with Lord Raglan as to the additional training-time required for young Militia officers, and that they ought also to be attached to a Line regiment for two months. We constantly attach Militia and Volunteer officers to Line regiments, but they learn little or nothing from the ordinary routine. The only thing is to insist upon their being attached to companies going through the "annual course of military training." That is the only way in which there can be any training worthy of the name, and it is no use attaching officers on any other system or at any other season of the year. The difficulty is the interruption to the course of study to prepare for the literary examination. At this late stage of our proceedings I will only venture to refer to one or two other points in the lecture. With regard to the subject of warrant officers, there was this difficulty. It was found in a great many instances at the depôts, that unless the dépôt sergeant-major, who presides at the sergeants' mess, and is largely responsible for drill, discipline, and general good order in barracks, was placed in such a position that his authority was unquestionable over the other staff sergeants, everything went wrong. I think it is admitted in the lecture that it would be necessary to give the dépôt sergeant-major some status which would render his position absolutely supreme, and this is not so easy if all the Militia sergeant-majors were also made warrant officers. With regard to Militia non-commissioned officers, what has been stated as to the difficulty of getting them to serve, or getting them to exercise discipline, as discipline ought to be understood, is perfectly true. Instances have been brought to my notice over and over again of these non-commissioned officers being assaulted when the training was finished by the men they had been the means of punishing. I was in hopes this practice had died out very much in the Militia—in fact, that it was a thing of the past. A fellow who does such things should be taken before a magistrate at once ; for if there is anything, not only unsoldierlike, but altogether un-English, it is paying off old scores in this fashion ; and it certainly ought to be put a stop to. I do not suppose there is any law to reach those men now.

Lord RAGLAN :—Only the law for ordinary assault.

General Sir WILLIAM CAMERON :—With regard to the general Service question, I quite agree with several speakers that a very large majority of men would have no objection whatever ; but then, how would this work with the ballot, which, of course, is a form of compulsory service? Would there not be an objection to enforcing the ballot if the men were enlisted for general Service, and liable to be sent abroad? Would there not be some little constitutional difficulty in the way? And would those Militia battalions remaining at home in war-time, as part of the Home Army we are so concerned about, really gain much, if anything, as regards the supply of men to the Regular forces at the seat of war?

Lieut.-Colonel Lord RAGLAN :—I find myself, thanks to your kindness, in the happy position of not having many criticisms to answer. It is a source of the greatest possible pleasure to me to find that the suggestions I have put forward meet with the practically unanimous approval of the Militia officers present. At this late hour, therefore, I will not detain you long, and I will only briefly allude to anything not mentioned in my lecture. Colonel Howard said that 16 was too young for officers to join the Militia. Possibly, 16 is too young ; but my object in suggesting that the age should be lowered was, that officers should not be too old when they join the Regular Army. The younger a boy joins the better. You want him to enter the Army between 18 and 19—and if he has to do one or two years previously in the Militia, he must join the latter soon after he is 16. Colonel Howard also said that the Volunteer N.C.O.'s did not have hard work, as they did not

know their duty, and, therefore, could not do it. They have a good deal of sentry-go and picket, and also as orderly N.C.O.'s, who have a great deal of running about, and I think that their work is hard. In my own regiment—which is an Engineer one—the work is so hard that they do not get to the works nearly as often as the sappers; and as regards the corporals, what they lose in working pay is not much more than made up to them by their extra pay as corporals. I dare say Lieut.-Colonel Williams can confirm me in this. I was exceedingly glad to hear Colonel Man—who has been supporting the Empire abroad so long—agree so thoroughly with me, as he has had more opportunities of viewing matters from the outside than most other Militiamen. Sir Francis Grenfell says that the dearth of officers is not so bad as it looks, as there is a dearth of men to correspond, which is like saying that two wrongs equal one right. I do not think we can be expected to agree with this. He also says that my proposals would do away with Sandhurst. I cannot understand why the highest military authorities seem to think, that under no conceivable circumstances, should Sandhurst be touched. As a matter of fact, I have never proposed doing away with it. I am sure we are all very glad to hear that ten annual commissions are to be given in the artillery. This is not a very great step, but it is one in the right direction. The commanding officer's position will not be rendered much more lucrative by the granting of travelling allowance twice a year to see his recruits; but I welcome this as the recognition of a principle. I may have exaggerated the practical effect of the position of the commanding officer; things run fairly well when they are carried out by English gentlemen, who have usually tact and *savoir-faire*; but I do not think it is right that our military system should be based on the idea that you will have archangels to carry it out. Regulations should be constructed for ordinary human beings. I am not a commanding officer, I occupy a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, as a distinguished statesman said. I can speak the plainer, and I must say that personally I should feel it exceedingly disagreeable to owe the privilege of seeing my own recruits to the good feeling of my own adjutant, or even of the colonel commanding the dépôt. The country ought to put its hand into its pocket and give the C.O.'s a little money. You would not require much; suppose you gave a C.O. even as much as £100 a year, that would come to only £16,000 for the whole Force. The Commander-in-Chief could then say to an officer, "I will put you in command of a regiment, and will give you this allowance, which will be ample for all purposes. I do not care whether you visit your recruits once a day, or once a week, or once a year, but I shall hold you responsible for the efficiency of the regiment." At present there is no responsibility at all for recruiting and drilling men, and for obtaining and instructing officers, or for anything else whatever. If an inspecting officer says that a regiment is bad, the C.O. would be justified in replying, "I have nothing to do with obtaining or drilling either officers or recruits; the regiment was handed over to me 25 days ago, and I have only seen it together three times since then; how can I be responsible for its efficiency?" That is the actual position of a C.O., and some change is necessary, if you wish to get the best results from the Force. With regard to signalling, I do not see any difficulty in having some men trained for the purpose in every regiment. I do not say it is a very important matter, but I think time could be found, in the case of men previously acquainted with signalling, to keep them fairly well up in the knowledge they have, and they might perhaps be excused musketry for the purpose. Sir Francis alluded to the fact that a bad character can be discharged at any time; but the necessary application to the general commanding the district causes great loss of time. I can mention a case in point, which occurred when I was commanding a company. There was a man in it who had committed every sort of atrocity, and finally departed for a fortnight's imprisonment. He had no bounty to come to him, and his kit was complete, so we made a special application to discharge him. As Sir Richard Harrison knows,

the number of days it takes to communicate between Monmouth and Devonport is extraordinary ; so to our intense horror, the man came out of prison before we got leave to discharge him. In these matters the general must of necessity go on the report of the C.O. What is the use, therefore, of bothering him with them? Why should not this power be delegated to the C.O., who would have his hands freed without detriment to discipline? while the general would save much time and attention, which could be devoted to more important matters. Major Brinckman has alluded to the question of fatigues at the dépôt, and to the recruiting being bad ; as I did not deal with these points in my lecture, I will merely say that I agree with him in everything that he said. Colonel Moore-Lane made the excellent suggestion, that Section D of the Army Reserve should be abolished. I am speaking from memory, but I think that if the returns are studied, it will be found that when Section D is open the number of old soldiers in the Militia falls, and *vice versâ*. Therefore, if Section D was abolished, and the encouragement to enlist into it transformed into an encouragement to enlist in the Militia, it would be an excellent thing. The same may be said of Colonel Hamilton's proposal to enlist men over the strength, if a regiment is full. Lieut.-Colonel Duke made a most pertinent remark. He asked, what good will come of this discussion? I believe it would do some good if a Commission were appointed to enquire into the state of the Militia. I do not think a Commission often does much good, but it would be better than nothing. Captain Madden said that half-pay or retired officers of the Army should not be put into Militia regiments over the heads of the civilian officers. That is a question that wants careful consideration, as civilian officers should receive every encouragement. I am glad to know that Lieut.-Colonel Williams, coming from the Anglesey Militia, confirms my opinion of the extraordinary excellence of the Volunteer N.C.O.'s in the Engineer Militia. I put this down to the extra pay they get—it is not magnificent, but it is decent, a sergeant gets 2s. 7d. and a corporal 1s. 5d.—and if it were possible to improve the pay of all non-commissioned officers, the result, I believe, would be the same as in the engineer branch. When I commanded a company, I had four as good Volunteer sergeants as I wanted to see. Besides being decently paid, our sergeants have a very comfortable mess, and they are supported and made as much of as possible. I should like to thank Colonel Mount Batten for suggesting that all Militiamen should be under the Military Act all the year round. I think this would be a most excellent thing. Colonel Lonsdale Hale asks me how I would find vacancies for all the Army candidates. To begin with, I see that in January, 1897, there were 548 subalterns short in the Militia. If you raise the subalterns to two per company—which assuredly should be done, if A company requires two, why should B company have only one—this will require 594 more. I find besides that 25 or 26 Territorial Regiments have no 4th Battalions, which were part of Lord Cardwell's scheme in 1870, which has never yet been carried out. For these 4th Battalions you would require 374 more subalterns ; so that I make the total deficiency 1,516 subalterns.

Colonel LONSDALE HALE :—I worked it out this morning from the October list that there are 518 subalterns short.

Lord RAGLAN :—Suppose you raise the number of subalterns per company to two, which is what they ought to be.

Colonel LONSDALE HALE :—It was merely to know who was to have the nominations.

Lord RAGLAN :—I fancy that 1,500 vacancies would absorb all the boys who are cramming. I have no means of knowing how many they are. Colonel Lonsdale Hale puts before us the point as to how the nominations are to be arranged. My answer is, that either you want officers in the Militia, or you do not. If you do not want officers, it does not matter ; if you do want officers, the only way to get them is to make all officers go to the Army through the Militia—there is no other way to get them, I am certain. How to work it out in detail, I am not ready to lay down at this moment. Sir William Cameron also alludes to

that sacred subject Sandhurst. I do not propose to do away with it. I think that every officer of the Army, after going through the Militia, should go through a course at Sandhurst. He also alluded to the difficulty of enforcing the ballot, if the Militia was liable to foreign service. I do not see why that question should be raised while the ballot is not in force. When the ballot is enforced, it will be for the country to decide whether the balloted men will be liable to foreign service or not. My impression is that if the ballot was in force for a local Militia (and having compulsory service you could then pay the men what you choose), you might then, by a small bounty, induce them to transfer their services to the Regular or Active Militia. I beg leave to thank you all very much for the kind consideration with which you have received my lecture.

The CHAIRMAN (General Sir R. Harrison): At this late hour it will be unnecessary for me to make many remarks. I believe it is usual for the chairman to wind up the discussion, gathering the threads together and embodying all that has been said by the various speakers. I was prepared to do this and to make some general remarks on the whole question; but, as time presses, I will ask you to excuse me. I should like, however, to say one thing: that in all questions of organisation, especially when it comes to a matter of reform, it is exceedingly important not to deal with the question piecemeal, but to deal with it as a whole. If you begin to pull to pieces one portion of a machine, you are liable to get another part out of gear, and the machine then ceases to work smoothly and well. I have thought for many years, and I think still, that in our Army we are badly in want of some system which shall find out where reforms are required, and then go carefully into the question and see how they can be carried out. This is a very large and important question that might well be debated in the hall. I am not going to dwell upon it now, except in its application to the Militia. Improvements may be suggested (as they have been suggested this afternoon), and may seem not only necessary, but feasible, in one branch of the Service; but when you consider them in relation to other branches of the Service, you may find that they are no improvement at all. I cannot illustrate what I have said by an example from the Militia, because there have been so few, if any, improvements made in the Militia for many years past; but I can give you an illustration which has been alluded to in the lecture. Lord Raglan says that "the Volunteers have for many years failed to obtain their recruits from the middle classes, and have, if I may say so, poached on our preserves—the labouring classes." Here is a case in point: the Militia have always, and do still, obtain their recruits from the *labouring* classes—the agricultural labourer, the town labourer, the mines labourer, and so on. The Volunteers, if they do what they were intended to do, recruit from a different class altogether; they should recruit from the mechanics, shop-keepers, clerks, and the like—the great middle class of England that has made England what it is. I believe that Lord Raglan is perfectly right here. I have heard it stated in many quarters that the Volunteers, instead of enlisting from their own field, are poaching on the recruiting field of the Militia. That must do the Militia a considerable amount of harm. That one illustration (and I could give you a great many more) shows how necessary it is to consider these questions *as a whole*. Now, in what I have said I don't want to run down the Volunteers or their system. I believe that the Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular soldier each and all have their place in the defensive machinery of Great Britain—in fact, that our voluntary system cannot get on without all of them. But it is absolutely necessary in administering these Forces never to forget the peculiarities of each, and never to allow one to injure the other. I will not trouble you further. We have had an able and somewhat long discussion, and we might probably have carried it on through to-morrow; but I hope sufficient has been said to show the authorities what an exceedingly important Force the Militia is, and how necessary it is to do everything possible for it, to improve it, and bring it to its proper position in the Army. Lord Raglan has,

no doubt, done many good things in his life ; but, as far as we are concerned, he has done two very good things : First, he has set an example to English gentlemen by joining that Constitutional Force, as it has been called, the Militia ; secondly, he has come here and given us an extremely interesting lecture. I will say no more, than to ask you to thank Lord Raglan and all who have taken part in the discussion for what they have done to-day.

Colonel LONSDALE HALE :—I rise to propose a vote of thanks to General Sir Richard Harrison, who has taken the chair to-day under peculiar circumstances. Lord Raglan and myself had a good deal of talk about this lecture. Bearing in mind that directly after the present Commander-in-Chief took office he made his *début* here as chairman for the Volunteer force, I thought it was desirable on an occasion of this sort that we should obtain for the chair some corresponding member (a civilian it might be) of the War Office, to give the Militia a lift up in the same way as the Volunteers had a leg up by Lord Wolesley. This, however, fell through, and then Lord Raglan asked General Sir Richard Harrison to take the chair. Sir Richard was going abroad, but he put off his journey in order to come here to-day. After the arrangement was made, it came to my knowledge that a certain high official had said, "I shall be happy to take the chair on this occasion." What was to be done? Sir Richard's name was on the bills. Fortunately, he and I were old comrades, and I knew my friend. I wrote at once to him and said, "Will you stand by and let me try this individual, and if he cannot come will you come?" Sir Richard said, "Go on ; I will stand in reserve." I communicated with the official. And if the Army Estimates, in which you are concerned, had not been down for discussion to-morrow or the next day, that official would have been here. When we found that he could not come, we turned to our friend ; and I am sure that, next to the high official, you could not have had a better representative of the Army. I beg to move that we thank him for his great kindness in taking the chair.

General Sir WILLIAM GORDON CAMERON, K.C.B. :—I beg to second the vote of thanks. I am sure we are all very grateful to General Sir Richard Harrison for taking the chair on this important occasion, and for the very practical remarks made by him at the close of the discussion.

LORD RAGLAN :—One word on a personal matter. I have to thank Sir Richard Harrison for the way in which he alluded to my grandfather. It adds one more to the many kindnesses I have received from him.