

παρὰ τῷ ἀρχιμαγείρῳ, instead of παρὰ τῷ ἀρχιδεσμοφύλακι, which seems to be a closer rendering of the Hebrew text, בֵּית יֵרֵר הַטְּבָחִים.

On the margin, close to the edge of the leaf, I noticed the letters *σμε* in small uncials. It was then the Long Vacation in Cambridge; but a few scholars remained, and I asked some of them what the mystic letters might mean, showing them at the same time the MS. I suppose that their eyes were, like mine, too closely riveted on the central text to observe that there was a column of small words on the margin of each page, entangled amongst the loops of the closely written upper Arabic script; and it was only after I had sent photographs of the two pages to my friend, Dr. Nestle of Maulbronn, that I was informed of the full value of the fragment. Dr. Nestle says—

‘The manuscript, from which the photographs of two pages have been placed in my hands, is important for three reasons—

‘1. Because uncial MSS of Genesis are few; Sinaiticus and Vaticanus being defective for the greater part of this book.

‘2. Because its texts appear particularly good, confirming Gn 40⁸, the reading of Philo, ἀρχιμαγείρῳ, which had been changed by the latest editors of his works (Cohn-Wendland, ii. 211) into the reading of the Codex Alexandrinus, ἀρχιδεσμοφύλακι. The true reading was known till now only from the Coptic and Syro-Hexaplaric Version and from six cursives of Holmes.

‘3. Because it contains marginal readings from the Hexapla of Origen, adding to those collected by Field some which were hitherto unknown, as 40⁷, *κακα* and *πονηρα* for *σκυθρωπα*.’

Within the last few years other parts of the Hexapla have been discovered by Messrs. Grenfell

and Hunt, and by Dr. Taylor, Master of St. John’s College, Cambridge. Dr. Taylor’s fragment was in the collection brought by Dr. Schechter from the Genizah in the synagogue of Old Cairo. But mine is from a different source. There are indications that before the year 1868 it was lying in the Library on Mount Sinai. How it was taken from that place, and what vicissitudes it has undergone, are beyond my power to investigate; but I may refer your readers to Professor E. T. Palmer’s narrative in the *Desert of the Exodus*, vol. i. p. 70. I hope to give all the texts which form its under-script in No. xi. of *Studia Sinaitica*.

It is indeed surprising that a small book of 162 leaves, each measuring 19 centimetres by 12, should contain such a variety of subjects: selections from Athanasius, Chrysostom, Theodosius, Theodorus, Mar Ephraim, Mar Isaac, Mar Jacob, the apocryphal story of the Virgin Mary, two specimens of Peshitta Gospels, two specimens of very early Corāns, a private document, Syriac texts from Exodus and Isaiah, a beautiful Syriac hymn, and a leaf of the Septuagint, with variants from the Hexapla. The occurrence of Christian writing on the top of Mohammedan is of itself sufficiently singular. But the chief lesson which it conveys to me, as to all other owners of MSS dating between the seventh century and the eleventh, is, that we might try a harmless chemical, hydro-sulphuret of ammonia, by way of experiment, over a few of the margins which appear to us to be perfectly blank.

Since the above was written I have shown the fragment to my friend, Dr. Rendel Harris, who assigns it to the sixth century, or possibly to the beginning of the seventh. If the script is like that of Codex Sinaiticus it is also like that of Codex Bezae.

The New French School of Theology.

BY THE REV. J. DICK FLEMING, B.D., TRANENT.

IN the death of M. Auguste Sabatier the new Paris school of theology has lost its chief exponent. If this were the place for personal reminiscences, the writer might speak with a sense of personal gratitude of the sterling qualities of M. Sabatier as a professor in the Protestant College

of the Boulevard Arago, and of many a theological causerie, in which the professor became a student among his students and with the utmost freedom from professorial reserve discussed Neo-criticism or Ritschlianism, or any other ‘ism’ that flourished at home or abroad. But the main interest of

English readers must be confined to his literary work, and his contributions to what is called, for want of a more pleasing name, 'Symbolo-Fidéisme.'

One of the latest critics of this school of theology, Dr. G. Lasch,¹ seeks to give an estimate of its significance for France. He considers that the ground had been prepared for it in the general movement of literature, as well as of religious thought. The sceptical idealism of Renan could satisfy only an aristocratic few; the 'religion of humanity' based on Positivism had borne little fruit; while in literature there was many an indication of a return to the mystical and romantic. On the other hand, the narrow dogmatism of scholastic Protestantism had lost its hold. Such a work as that of the school of Paris was called for, to revindicate the Christian religion and to restate its doctrine in harmony with the intellectual needs of the time. Dr. Lasch characterizes Sabatier's *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion* as an epoch-making apologetic contribution, and confidently predicts of the whole movement that, as it unites strict scientific method with religious fervour, it will prove fruitful in evangelical preaching, no less than in the development of French theology.

In his critical exposition of this theology, Lasch has properly confined himself to a study of the two works, Sabatier's *Esquisse* and Ménégoz's *Publications diverses*. Sabatier's work furnishes us with the philosophy and general theological principles; Ménégoz's book deals, unfortunately only in a fragmentary way, with particular dogmatic questions. It is to be hoped that M. Ménégoz, who has proved an acute and original thinker, may yet give us a complete and systematic presentation of Christian doctrine from the standpoint of the new school. This would be the best answer to the charge repeatedly made, though strenuously denied, that Christian beliefs are reduced by this school to matters of indifference, and that faith is treated as quite independent of them.

The theoretic basis is furnished by Sabatier; and, accordingly, Lasch devotes himself to a thorough exposition of the *Esquisse*, allowing himself a more logical arrangement of the material. Sabatier has treated his subject under the three

heads: (1) Religion, (2) Christianity, (3) Dogma; but, strangely enough, relegates to the end his theory of knowledge and his doctrine of symbolism. Lasch adopts a more scientific arrangement, and places in the foreground the fundamental theoretic principles, as governing and throwing light upon Sabatier's view of the origin and nature of religion.

Sabatier's theory of knowledge is a modified Kantianism. He accepts the distinction of the two inseparable elements—an *à priori*, furnished by the necessity of thought, and therefore, he maintains, essentially and wholly subjective ('the principle of causality, for example, is *not in the things, but in the mind*'); and an *à posteriori*, furnished by experience. By the conjunction of these two elements the world of science arises, the world of phenomena, where the causal nexus is unbroken, and determinism reigns. No doubt is to be cast on the reality of this world of phenomena; Kant's 'thing in itself' is to be rejected as meaningless; Sabatier appeals to the discovery of new planets proved to exist before they became actually visible, and to the power that man exerts upon nature by his knowledge, as proofs that the world we know is the real world existing without us. (Query—Does not the rejection of Kant's 'thing in itself' involve the rejection of the analysis of knowledge which makes that supposition necessary? Lasch holds that the 'thing in itself' must be retained, and that only by retaining it is there room left for the postulates of the moral consciousness. Rather we should revise an analysis which so opposes subject and object, that the object becomes unknowable, and the subject is imprisoned within the necessities of its own subjectivity). But this phenomenal yet real world is not the only world. Besides this world, governed by the enchainment of causes and effects, there is the world of self-consciousness, of moral effort and freedom. The physical sciences deal with the first world, employing there the category of causality, and pronouncing *judgments of existence*; the moral sciences deal with the second; their supreme category is 'the good,' and the judgments they pronounce are *judgments of dignity and value*. In this world, where the spiritual activities are supreme (the æsthetic faculty, conscience, religion), our knowledge is necessarily subjective. Our judgments are judgments of worth, and they make only a limited and cir-

¹ *Die Theologie der Pariser Schule*. Von Lic. Dr. Gustav Lasch. Williams & Norgate. Price M. 1. 80.

cumscribed appeal. The good is only revealed to goodness; beauty to those who have the æsthetic sense; God to the pious and pure in heart. And our knowledge is necessarily inadequate and symbolic. The creations of art are but symbols; attempts to enclose the ideal in the real, to express the inexpressible; they are more or less perfect according as they convey not exact ideas, but true spiritual impressions. So the language of religion is symbolic. Exact thought is the province of science, and of the understanding working with the things of sense and space and time. We have no modes of thought equally adequate to the supersensible world; the proper language here is a parable.

Lasch finds that there is in Sabatier's working out of these principles considerable exaggeration. Value-judgments and existential judgments need not be exclusive; the judgments of religious thought are judgments of existence no less than of worth, and we cannot accept the dictum that the existential judgments of religion are the product of value-judgments, or are the outcome of mere emotion. Take one of Sabatier's own examples. 'In presence of some grand spectacle of nature, man, feeling his weakness and dependence over against the mysterious power there revealed, trembles with fear and with hope. This trembling is the primitive religious emotion. But this emotion implies necessarily for thought a certain relation between the feeling subject and the object that produced the feeling. Now this thought, once awakened, will necessarily express this relation by an intellectual judgment . . . he will cry out, for example, "God is great," to mark the infinite disproportion between himself and the universal Being that makes him tremble.' Here, then, we have a religious thought, a value-judgment. But it is not subjective in the sense that it is a mere expression of pious emotion, or in the sense that it is a mere value-judgment and nothing more. The pious emotion does not produce it; the intellectual notion which Sabatier himself declares to be essentially different in nature, accompanies the emotion, but has its own intellectual roots. Nor is this intellectual judgment a mere value-judgment; it is clearly at the same time a judgment of existence, and must have its grounds in some rational interpretation of experience. But, further, the symbolic character of religious judgments is overstated. It finds its philosophic basis in the

Kantian doctrine that our theoretic knowledge is limited to experience; which Sabatier interprets in this sense that all our conceptions of supersensible objects necessarily express themselves in terms of sensible, time, and space experiences, and therefore inadequately. The very fact, however, that we are conscious of the inadequacy of these representations of the supersensible proves that we have some intuition or notion of the transcendent after all. How then do we come in touch with this supersensible? According to Kant, we do stand in some intellectual relation to it; the theoretic reason yields us at least the idea of God, and the practical reason enriches our conception, and guarantees the reality of it. Similarly, Schleiermacher, while denying the adequacy of our conceptions, or the possibility of gathering our thoughts of the supreme unity into a coherent whole, nevertheless argues that the reality of God is a presupposition both of the theoretic and the practical reason. Both the leader of modern philosophy, therefore, and the leader of modern theology, maintain equally that we stand in some intellectual touch with the Supreme Being, and deny that we are entirely imprisoned in the images and categories of sense-experience. Even Ritschl, who abandoned the theoretic proofs of God's existence, held to the knowability of God through the practical reason and by the help of revelation. But Sabatier, in presenting his doctrine of symbolism, is strangely silent as to the power of reason to transcend the understanding. It is to him as though when the human limited mind deals with God, it deals with a something it cannot really handle, and overshoots itself. It is doubtless because of this underlying scepticism as to the adequacy of our thoughts of God, that Sabatier prefers, instead of the more definite language of the Christian faith, the vague and mystical expressions (the 'principle of our being,' '*l'être universel*') which have brought upon symbolism the charge of pantheism.

There is then, according to Sabatier, no intellectual bridge leading us to God. How then do we really come into touch with the Divine? The answer is given by Sabatier in his *Theory of the Origin of Religion*. Religion has not its spring in any intellectual need, or sense of the infinite, releasing emotions of adoration, but solely in the emotions awakened by the contradictions of life. We have the sense of moral freedom, and ideals

that demand to be realized; but there lies before us a world of mechanical law, opposing and thwarting us at every step. From the smart of this conflict religion arises, affording a practical solution. The spiritual nature takes instinctive flight to the universal being, the principle and end of life; and uniting itself with that principle by an act of moral energy, it attains peace and is strengthened for further conflict. Religion is thus, as Sabatier admits, an example of self-preservation, or spiritual self-realization in the presence of the contradictions of life. This theory is good so far as it goes; but it is not comprehensive enough. The struggles of life, with the obstacles that lie without and within, are doubtless an all-important factor in religion, and in all human progress. At different stages of his life man has to struggle with nature for his subsistence; he stands face to face with moral ideals unrealized, with problems of freedom or destiny he cannot solve. But to find in this struggle the origin of religion and of the consciousness of God, is to lead us back to the theory of Feuerbach, that God is created by our need. Sabatier sets religion upon too narrow a basis. The contradictions of life have doubtless a large part in the development of religion, and they are present at the very birth of it (when indeed have they been absent?); but there are harmonies in life, and a moral order, which may also have some part in leading us to fellowship with the eternal Being. But the fact is that Sabatier has closed every avenue to God that proceeds by the way of the intellect. The reason has nothing to do with the origin of religion; and though it comes in later to serve with its poor symbols to express the various phases of the pious consciousness, its province is wholly secondary. This neglect of the intellectual factor avenges itself in the vague and shadowy God that Sabatier describes; and while it enables him to look with philosophic sympathy on all the religions that have traversed the stage of history, its effect must surely be to weaken the vision to the great variety of content, the light and shade, the height and depth of religious experience.

For the particular dogmatics of this school, we have to turn to the various contributions furnished by M. Ménégoz in his *Publications diverses*. Except for the fact that the doctrine of symbolism

encourages a free criticism of Church doctrine, the modifications of doctrine proposed by Ménégoz—as to the Trinity or Eschatology, for example—do not remind us of the distinctive principles of symbolism or fidéisme; they form an independent contribution on the lines of a liberal theology, and stand or fall on their own merits. But the fidéist doctrine on which Ménégoz lays special emphasis, viz. that a man is *justified by faith, apart from his beliefs*, carries with it the same undervaluing of the intellectual factor in religion, as may be charged against the philosophy of Sabatier. It would be quite unwarrantable to condemn the theory on the ground that it makes faith independent of belief; for Ménégoz recognizes that faith is never found alone, that it lies embedded in beliefs and doctrines, and is frequently produced by them. But Lasch rightly demurs to the view expressed by Ménégoz that a man may be justified by faith, even though he has no belief in Jesus Christ, or in the working of the Spirit, nay even though he has no conscious faith in God. Is not faith in danger of being evacuated of all content, when such beliefs are wanting? Ménégoz's formula and his logical deduction from it are both attractive to a generous mind. If they only mean that God is gracious to every one that turns his heart Godward, or at least in the direction of what is good, what Christian could deny it? In every upward turning of the heart God is graciously present, making His goodness and forgiveness felt in greater or less degree; is not such a movement of the heart God's own movement and gracious work therein? Let it be allowed that every movement of the soul in the nobler direction is blessed of God. But there is faith and faith; there is grace and grace. There is the faith of the poor heathen which is embedded in error; and the faith of the Christian solidified by truth. And God meets each heart with the grace it is capable of receiving; giving to the one gleams of His mercy like rifts of glory through the clouds; giving to the other fuller supplies and a more abundant assurance. In short, we cannot ignore the intellectual element in faith, or minimise it at the expense of religious emotions and volitions. We can only accept the fidéist doctrine of faith apart from beliefs, if we are permitted to modify it so,—that a man is justified by faith independently of all beliefs, *except such as faith itself involves*.

These criticisms run more or less on the lines suggested by Lasch's detailed critical remarks. The exposition given in that work is thorough and clear; but the running criticisms, and the

remarks at the close as to the relation in which this school stands to Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Lipsius, and others, are too brief and disconnected to be of great value.

The Great Text Commentary.

THE GREAT TEXTS OF HEBREWS.

HEBREWS XII. 2.

'Looking unto Jesus the author and perfecter of our faith, who for the joy that was set before Him endured the cross, despising shame, and hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God' (R.V.)

EXPOSITION.

'Looking unto Jesus.'—It is not possible to express in English the thought suggested by the Greek verb *aphorōntes*, which implies that we must 'look away (from other things) unto Jesus.' It implies 'the concentration of the wandering gaze into a single direction.'—FARRAR.

'The author and perfecter of our faith.'—The 'faith' of which the apostle speaks is faith in its absolute type, of which he has traced the action under the Old Covenant. The particular interpretations, by which it is referred to the faith of each individual Christian, as finding its beginning and final development in Christ; or to the substance of the Christian Creed; are foreign to the whole scope of the passage, which is to show that in Jesus Christ Himself we have the perfect example—perfect in realization and in effect—of that faith which we are to imitate, trusting in Him. He too looked through the present and the visible to the future and the unseen. In His human nature He exhibited Faith in its highest form, from first to last, and placing Himself as it were at the head of the great army of heroes of Faith, He carried faith, the source of their strength, to its most complete perfection and to its loftiest triumph.—WESTCOTT.

'Who for the joy that was set before Him endured the cross.'—The joy that was set before Him was accepted as an equivalent (and more than an equivalent) for the sufferings which He endured. The joy was that of the work of redemption accomplished through self-sacrifice. The suffering was that of the cross, a death at once most painful and most humiliating.—WESTCOTT.

'Despising shame.'—Disdaining to shrink from any kind of shame, even that of being treated as a slave, a rebel, a blasphemer.—DELITZSCH.

'Hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God.'—The contrast of tenses is significant. *He endured . . . and hath sat down.* The fact of suffering is wholly past, but the issue of it abides for evermore.—WESTCOTT.

THE meaning is not that our Lord's throne is placed at the right hand of the throne of God, but that He sits on the right hand (of God, and with God) on the same throne.—DELITZSCH.

METHODS OF TREATMENT.

I.

Looking unto Jesus.

By the Rev. Henry Montagu Butler, D.D.

The eye sees what it brings the power of seeing. The star is one thing to the child, another to the mariner, another to the astronomer. What is the sight of Jesus on the cross to us?

1. One thing all must see—innocence. It was not an execution but a martyrdom. It was one of those moments known both to the heart and to history when evil seems good, and good evil; when bigotry, jealousy, pride, envy, etc. combine to rouse the mob-passions always in wait for the hour and the man. Pilate's act is a present parable. If these mob-passions rise in us, and we are tempted to cry with the crowd against some person or cause, 'Crucify, crucify!' let us look to Jesus, and remember that this was part of the 'shame' which He 'despised,' while He still loved them who shamed Him.

2. We see not only a righteous man. It is He who, the night before, said, 'I have overcome the world.' Can we see in Him the Conqueror of the world? Do we not see here the victory of goodness over evil by suffering? We are often depressed by the power of evil in the world, even in Christian ages. If Christ has overcome the world, why this flood of pollution? We cannot answer; but if we 'consider' Him who fought with evil even unto death, we may learn to win Christian triumphs, if not to solve Christian mysteries. How did He confront evil? He did not shun it, nor rage against it, nor palliate it. He tracked it to its root, and then died for it. And as we look to Him we learn that evil can be conquered no other way. We must suffer and die for it. Those who can say, in any measure, 'I have overcome the world,' are those who, like Christ, have made evil