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The Organization of Our Military Forces

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Evening Meeting.

Tuesday, February 14th, 1871.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HON. SIR JAMES LINDSAY, K.C.M.G.,
Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, in the Chair.

NAMES of MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 6th and
14th February, 1871.

LIFE.

Nicholson, H. Whalley, Capt. 62nd Regt.

ANNUAL.

Skrine, Harcourt, Lieut. 43rd Middle-	Rose, W. M., Ensign late 32nd Regt.
sex Rifle Volunteers.	Gardiner, R. M., Com.-General.
Smith, Carlton, Capt. 1st Royal Surrey	Campbell, Wm. M., Captain Royal
Militia.	Engineers.
O'Connell, H., Lieut.-Col. Madras Staff	Farrell, H. C., Capt. R.A.
Corps.	

THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES.

By Lieutenant-Colonel ARTHUR LEAHY, R.E.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have much pleasure in introducing to the meeting Lieutenant Colonel Leahy of the Royal Engineers, who proposes to-night to read a paper upon "the Organization of our Military Forces." It may be in the recollection of many of the gentlemen present, that two years ago Colonel Leahy,—who was somewhat in advance of his time,—read a paper in this Institution on the same subject. It received very great attention, was very much considered, and, in many respects, much approved, and it did him very great credit. The subject upon which he proposes to dilate to-night is one which has engaged the attention of military men for a very considerable period. If people will look back at the papers which have been read in this Institution, and at articles which have appeared in the United Service periodicals, they will find that "the organization of our forces" has been much discussed by military men, but it is only lately that the interest in the question has been enhanced to a considerable extent, owing to the recent occurrences upon the Continent. The subject has been so forced upon public attention that Government has taken it up, and Parliament will be asked to pass its opinion upon the subject.

Lieut.-Col. LEAHY: The object of this paper is to revive a discussion* on The Organization of Our Military Forces and Reserves, which was commenced in 1868.

The propositions on which a discussion is to be taken, have been already explained in a paper, read in April, 1868, on the† “Organization of Our Infantry Forces and Infantry Reserves,” to which was appended‡ a project, worked out in detail, for adapting to our Regimental System the principle “of allowing soldiers, after a short service “in the Army, to leave its ranks, subject to the obligation of returning “to them when required.”§

The suggestions in this paper had, during the previous year (1867) been privately printed|| and submitted for consideration, in contradistinction to proposals for the re-engagement of soldiers who had completed ten years’ service, and for providing reserves for the regular regiments from the Militia.

It is hoped that by means of the discussion, information will be gained as to the points in which the actual organization is defective, and the opinions of military men elicited on the technical arrangements necessary to produce the best possible defensive result from the application of the principle of “short service.”

In the previous paper it was observed that the subject of Army Organization has to be considered under three heads:—

A. Political.

Under this head may be considered—

The object for which the military Forces are maintained.

The constitution of such Forces.

The persons liable to military service, and the conditions of such service.

The general control or checks to which the executive, charged with the management or command of the Forces, and with the expenditure of public moneys set apart for military purposes, shall be liable.

B. Military.

The numbers, organization, and training of the combatant troops.

The regulations under which they shall be called out.

The determination of the numbers to be annually embodied, and whether for permanent service or for a certain number of drills or days’ training.

C. Administrative.

The government of the Forces.

[The references, when not otherwise stated, are to the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.]

* Vol. xii, pages 337—358.

† Vol. xii, pages 310—337.

‡ Vol. xii, Appendix, p. 337, Tables I, II, III, IV.

§ See “Report of Royal Commission on Recruiting, 1866,” Appendix Y.

|| “Proposals for an Improved Military Organization, and for the Formation of a Reserve Force,” 1867.

The organization by which the supply of all things necessary for the efficiency of the combatant troops is regulated.

The accessory arrangements, made with the object of increasing their defensive or offensive powers.

Under the political head, I would only observe, that it will be the duty of the military authorities to give effect to such general plan as the Crown, on the advice of Parliament, shall approve.

If it were proposed to make military service compulsory on all able-bodied youths, an arrangement under which, according to the writer of the recent article in the "Edinburgh Review," about 260,000 men* annually would become liable to a chance of military service; it is scarcely necessary to say that the problem of raising recruits, whether for the regular or auxiliary forces, would be very much simplified.

If, on the other hand, it be decided that the time has not arrived for adopting such an extreme and possibly unequal system of personal taxation, it will be desirable to consider whether, by combining with the voluntary system a careful and comprehensive adaptation to the regular forces of the principle of short service, and by arrangements for a more perfect training of the militia, the military forces of the country cannot, at a reasonable cost, be placed in a position to fulfil all conditions of offence and defence necessary for the fulfilment of imperial engagements and for national safety.

I would suggest that the discussion at this Institution should, so far as possible, be limited to the points comprised within the second head, and which are chiefly, if not entirely, technical, viz., the *numbers*, *training*, and *organization* of the combatant troops.

Opinions are therefore invited on the military and technical questions involved in the following propositions:—

- I. The reform of our military organization should be such as to enable an army of about 200,000 infantry, with a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and train, to be placed in the field for home defence.
- II. In order to effect this object, it is necessary that there should be a suitable adaptation to the Regular forces of the principle of "short service," with liability to afterwards serve in the "Reserves."
- III. There should be an appropriate expansion of the regimental organization, so as to bring recruiting and army reserves under the regimental system.
- IV. The Militia battalions to be trained and organized so as to be at all times ready to take their place in the Defensive Army. A Militia Reserve to be formed.
- V. Each military district to be provided with the nucleus of a complete staff for an army corps. One or more divisions of Regular troops, complete in all arms and requirements for active service, to be quartered in each military district.
- VI. The General Officers of districts to supervise all reserve and

* Review on "The Military Forces of the Crown," No. 271. p. 220.

auxiliary forces within their districts. Brigades of the Regular and auxiliary forces in each district to be annually encamped and manœuvred, with due proportions of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and train.

I will now, without reiterating arguments frequently advanced, explain as briefly as I can the foregoing proposals.

Some of them have been so long and fully discussed, both by the press and at this Institution, that they may be accepted without dissent. No claim is made to originality of principle, but it is believed that details worked out in 1867-68 would be the means of promoting many of the objects which are admitted to be desiderata in any general scheme for Army reform.

I. With regard to numbers:—

It was shewn* that in 1867-68 the military establishments which it was within the power of the Crown to enrol for the defence of the realm, or of the possessions subject to Her Majesty, and which therefore came under the supervision of the Home, Indian, and Colonial Governments, amounted nominally to no less than 1,300,000 men; of this number about 350,000 were trained, and more or less organized. About 380,000 were trained, but not organized (men with muskets), and about 570,000 were neither trained nor organized (men on paper).

Deducting the forces in India (180,000), the Trained Bands (200,000), and the Colonial Reserves (300,000), the British "*establishments*" available for immediate re-organization amount to about 150,000 Regular troops, about 250,000 Reserve and Militia troops, and over 200,000 Volunteers; total, over 600,000 men.

I must observe that the establishments† are not complete.

In order to work out a project, it is necessary to assume a certain object to be attained, but as the objects for which our forces are maintained have not as yet been definitely laid down by Parliament, or other final authority, it will be excusable if the numbers proposed for the field forces should not command unanimous approval.

I have taken those for which I believe there is the best military authority, and as they correspond very nearly with the available "*establishments*" of regular and militia forces, they cannot be put down as extravagant.

I believe them to be sufficient to prevent periodical invasion panics.

II. Short Service:—

A general and comprehensive application of the principle of "short service" in the regular Army, with a liability to afterwards serve in its "Reserves," is a necessary condition of an elastic and economical military system.

All first enlistments should be for "short service," by which should

* Vol. xii, pages 313—319.

† A detail of the strength and composition of the British Army, 1868, will be found in Appendix lxix, p. 579, vol. i, "Military Forces of the Crown."

be understood, an engagement for not less than *one* or more than *three* years' continuous service in the regular infantry.

In the regular cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the period of service may be extended to such time as is necessary for training soldiers in the efficient performance of their special duties.

There should be no obligation on the part of men on their first engagement to serve out of Europe in time of peace.

An attempt to combine the short service engagements with service in the Colonies or in India, or arrangements which would give the recruit at first enlistment a positive option of serving continuously for longer periods than indicated, would, it is believed, be fatal to the "short service" system.

To remain in the Army should be a reward for those who by their conduct and attention to military duties during the period of short service show themselves worthy of the privilege.

Pensions should be granted not only, as now, to old soldiers, but to short service men who fulfil their engagements in respect of subsequent service in the Reserves. The pensions of the latter need not, however, commence before 50 years of age.

Service in India and at military stations abroad should be provided for by a second and supplementary engagement, which should not in any case be made until the recruit had completed one year of his short service engagement.

As a rule, the engagement for service in India should not be made with men of less than two years' service. This is necessary to ensure the Army in India being composed of seasoned soldiers of proper physical quality, and carries out one of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Recruiting, 1866.

At certain stations abroad, infantry battalions should be replaced by Royal Marines.

By reducing the term of service to what is really necessary for the proper training of soldiers, and encouraging, so far as consistent with reasonable efficiency, arrangements with the object of preventing an interference with the industrial occupations or education of young men who volunteer for military service, an increase of the number, and a superior class, of recruits, may fairly be expected.

The inducement would be still greater, if military service were a road to Government and parochial employment.

But even if no such increase took place, a proper application of the principle advocated would enable one-half the men who now enlist to be placed in reserve so soon as their military training is complete; and we should at once arrive at the great desideratum of creating a competition for retention in the ranks of the regular Army.

By having a separate and supplementary engagement for India and garrisons abroad, the number of men annually required for long service would be reduced to less than 10,000, a number much less than the ordinary supply of recruits.

The period of service abroad could then be defined and adapted to the climate of each station.

If one in ten of the 260,000 men who annually attain the age for

military service could be induced to engage for short service, with a liability to subsequent service in a reserve force, and if one-third of the men who so engage (or one in thirty of the whole), were, after being trained, taken on for Indian and Colonial Service, the Army and its reserves could, at a comparatively small cost, be kept up to any probable requirements.

The adoption of a system of drill in all State and rate-aided schools would tend to shorten the period of military service, and, consequently, the cost of the military force.

The question of relative cost of long and short service was fully entered into in the paper read in 1868.* The financial conclusions arrived at were adopted by Sir Charles Trevelyan, and I believe they were substantially correct.

The annual pay and personal allowances of an infantry recruit amount to about £32 per annum; those of a re-engaged soldier to £40 per annum. This is irrespective of pensions.

If pensions be taken into consideration, the average pension being £20 per annum, the average annual cost will be†—

1. Of a re-engaged soldier during his second period of service, about £65 per annum.
2. Of a long service soldier, during 21 years' service, £48 per annum.
3. Of a short service soldier, during 3 years' enrolled service, about £38 per annum.
4. Of a Reserve soldier during service in Reserve, £6 per annum, *in addition to such retaining fees as may be necessary to secure his occasional presence with his corps.*

It may be observed that over 40,000 soldiers were re-engaged between the 1st July, 1867, and 31st December, 1868. Of these probably over 30,000 will survive to earn pensions at the completion of 21 years' service, and the pensions will probably average not less than £20 per man, so that unless some immediate steps be taken to introduce a system of reserve service, such as I have indicated, a very large addition, probably not less than half a million per annum, may be expected to the non-effective charges, after the year 1880.

In the Army Estimates 1871-2, just made public, provision is made for over 66,000 non-commissioned Officers and men, on the establishments of the infantry battalions and depôts at home.

If the views I advocate be correct, these regimental establishments may be increased by 50 per cent., or to over 100,000 men, without an increase of charge. Of this number, over 50,000 would be constantly present with the regiments, and 100,000 would take part in the annual manœuvres.

I make this statement deliberately, and with a knowledge of administrative details acquired during a long period of service at the War Office.

* Vol. xii, pages 327, 328.

† The calculations are based on the Government Annuity Tables (Money Returnable) in the "Postal Guide."

I therefore submit that the proposals are worthy of careful consideration and discussion.

III. Regimental Organization :—

In order to adapt our present battalion arrangements to the system of service proposed, it will be necessary that the head-quarters of every regiment shall, in time of peace, be at home, that the enlistment and training of recruits and supervision of army reserves shall be conducted regimentally.

In fact the regimental organization should be extended, so as to develop individuality, in order that it may be said of all in regimental authority, their "hearts are in the service."

Each regiment should consist of two or more battalions, one battalion being usually on Indian or Colonial service, and made up to its quota by periodical drafts of volunteers from the home battalion. To the home battalions should be attached reserves of men who had served in the ranks of the corps, sufficient to make up both battalions to the war establishment.

The Officers commanding regiments should be made responsible for the recruiting of their regiments, and be entrusted, subject to proper checks, with the management of the reserves, which are held in readiness to fill up the ranks of the corps in the event of the occurrence of war or other contingency requiring it to be placed on a service footing.

Subject to approved regulations and to supervision of the Generals of districts, they would determine the time and place at which each reserve soldier should undergo his annual training, and probably regulate the retaining fee accordingly.

They would, in fact, be generally responsible, not only for the drill and discipline, but also for the establishment and administration of the regiments.

This increase in the extent and duties of a regimental command, should be followed by an increase of position and pay.

This could be done by creating a new regimental grade of "Colonel" corresponding to that of Colonel of a brigade of Artillery, or of Colonel Commandant of a division of Marines. The appointment to this grade and through it to regimental commands, should be made by selection.

The cost of this grade could be met by reduction of recruiting staff due to conducting the recruiting regimentally.

Regiments should be allowed to form recruiting connections in such localities or locality as may in each case be approved.

The connections to be kept up by the men in Reserve;—by occasionally encamping or quartering the corps in a locality with which it may have special connections;—and in some cases by establishing recruiting relations with particular corps of militia.

"Local connections" may thus be maintained in all parts of the United Kingdom without localizing regiments; and without creating a difficulty in respect of nationalities, a difficulty for which those who have advocated a general fusion of the line and militia have not so far, as I know, proposed a solution.*

Extract from Report of the Royal Commission on Recruiting (1866).—"We would

By establishing the head-quarters of each regiment permanently at home, the changes of station need not be frequent, and facilities could be afforded for the useful employment of men whose time may not be fully employed at drill.

The several regiments could be encouraged to produce or manufacture many articles of food, clothing, and equipment, which have now to be purchased.

During the summer months battalions could be moved into camp with their service equipment.

During winter the men, especially those who had acquired, or desired to acquire, a knowledge of crafts, could be employed on productive work with profit to themselves and to the administration.

In place of deteriorating as workmen, young men could learn, without cost, crafts for which they would otherwise have to pay fees of apprenticeship.

It may be said that these are mere theories, but to those who are in doubt as to what can be done in the direction indicated, I would suggest a visit to the School of Military Engineering, where the recruits for the Royal Engineers are trained, and to the head-quarters of divisions of Royal Marines, especially of the Royal Marine Artillery, where the productive powers of the men are profitably developed, and certainly without loss of military efficiency.

Details of the composition of regiments and battalions formed under the principle advocated will be found in the appendices to this and the previous paper.

These details can be modified to meet a new distribution of the forces.

Eight company battalions are proposed as affording a larger number of cadres and as having other advantages.

It is, however, proposed to allot four battalions to a brigade, in place of three.

The system of regimental organization worked out for the infantry would, with some modifications, be applicable to the artillery and

"by every means encourage enlistment at head-quarters of regiments, and it seems to us that if soldiers going on furlough were empowered to beat up among their friends for recruits, for whom they would receive the regulated bringing-money, some desirable additions might be made to the ranks of their respective regiments.

"We have examined various witnesses as to the benefits which might result from localizing different regiments, or connecting them with special counties or districts; but we cannot say that this would be a desirable or expedient course.

"On the other hand, strong evidence has been laid before us showing the advantages resulting from recruiting from a local connection being maintained between individual corps and certain localities. Men enlist much more freely in corps which already contain a number of their friends and acquaintance; and such connections should, therefore, we consider, be in every way encouraged. Much may be done in this direction by strengthening the relations that exist between particular corps of the Army and particular Militia regiments, whether arising from county denomination or other circumstances, and the object might also be facilitated by the line regiments supplying good non-commissioned officers to the corresponding Militia regiments, and by directing the volunteering from each Militia regiment to one, or even two or three, regiments of the line."

cavalry, but should be accompanied by arrangements for a reserve of horses.

For 100,000 regular infantry there should probably be not less than 13,000 enrolled and 19,000 reserve cavalry.

The present number of trained cavalry horses (less than 7,000) appears very inadequate.

The proportion of cavalry for the militia has also to be organized.

For the field artillery I should propose a further increase of field batteries.

I would, with deference to artillery authorities, suggest that it would be desirable to have 4 gun batteries;—numbering about 100 Non-commissioned Officers and men, and 60 horses;—as a Captain's command.

Two of such batteries would form an appropriate command for a Field Officer, and be the proportion for a brigade (4 battalions) of infantry.

Each battery should have a duplicate equipment in reserve, and a proportion of the Non-commissioned Officers and men in reserve (say 50), and of the reserve horses (say 30), should be liable to appear at the annual manœuvres.

The number of the batteries at home have recently been made up to 56; of 6 guns each; total 336 guns.

I would convert these into 84 batteries, of 4 guns each; total 336 guns, and provide each battery with a reserve. During the summer manœuvres, 500 guns could be brought out, and arrangements matured for making up the total number of guns to 672.

The Engineer Reserves might consist—

Of Non-commissioned Officers and sappers, who, not being skilled artificers, had gone through a full course of instruction at the School of Military Engineering.

Of men on the Ordnance Survey, and of artificers belonging to crafts not employed in building operations, for whom suitable employment could be found in Government or private factories.

Of men of less than 50 years of age who had served a full period of home and colonial service.

IV. Militia:—

With regard to the Militia, objections present themselves to plans for localizing regiments of the line,* or to such a general fusion of the regular and militia forces as would do away with the distinction which now exists between our "offensive" and "defensive" forces.

It is therefore conceived that the Militia reform should be regulations as to training such as will bring the force up to that state of efficiency which will enable each battalion to fill up the place assigned to it in an Army brigade or division.

In order to do this, a proportion of Militia Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men might be annually trained with the regular regiments.

I deprecate proposals for using the Militia as a training school for the line. There are over 3,000 Officers and over 9,000 Non-commissioned

* See Extract from Report of Royal Commission on Recruiting. Page 8.

sioned Officers on the Home Establishment of the regular infantry, a number sufficient to train any probable number of recruits.

The present establishment of the Militia of the three kingdoms is 120,000, with power upon invasion, or imminent danger thereof, to raise it to 180,000 men.*

Arrangements therefore should be made for organizing a Militia Reserve (under this term is to be understood a reserve *for* the Militia, not a reserve for the Army to be taken *from* the Militia) to enable the force to be made up to the larger numbers.

This reserve should consist of men who had served a full period in the Militia, or of soldiers who have served in the regular Army and who are not enrolled in the "reserve" of their regiments.

With regard to officering the Militia, arrangements have been suggested for taking all, or a considerable proportion of, the Officers of the Militia from those who had served in the regular Army.

Any arrangement that will provide an outlet from the grades of Subaltern and Captain in the Army, and thus reduce the proportion of Officers seeking for service in the higher grades, will be attended with advantage to the regular Army and ought to conduce to the efficiency of the Militia.

There should be an outlet for two-thirds of the Officers who join the Army, and this outlet would most appropriately be, to officer the Militia and Volunteer forces.

I take for granted that the officering and command of the Militia will be transferred to the Military Administration.

V. Military districts:—

The next point is the organization of "Divisions" and "Army Corps."

The administrative unit should be the military district containing two or more divisions of infantry, and one or more brigades of cavalry, with due proportions of artillery, engineers, and train. Each district will thus contain the nucleus of an army corps.

A proposed distribution of districts is illustrated by a map, on which are shown suggested positions of the head-quarters of districts and brigades, and the camps.

In this plan the districts are arranged mainly in reference to the railway communications and existing barrack accommodation, the head-quarters being conveniently situate, in reference to the outlying brigades and stations.

Thus the southern division, with its head-quarters at Aldershot, (which would contain the nucleus of an army corps of 50,000 infantry

* The original and additional numbers are—

For England (by 15 and 16 Vic., c. 50).....	{ 80,000
	{ 40,000
For Scotland (by 17 and 18 Vict., c. 106; 23 and 24 Vic., c. 91) ..	{ 10,000
	{ 5,000
For Ireland (by 17 and 18 Vic., c. 107; 23 and 24 Vic. c. 94)	{ 30,000
	{ 15,000

for the defence of the South Coast), would have the command of the South-Western Railway and its branch lines.

VI. Annual Manœuvres:—

It would be the duty of the Generals commanding districts, and of the Brigadiers, to supervise all reserves and auxiliary forces located within their districts, and to conduct the annual manœuvres. They should make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the whole of the defensive resources and requirements within their respective commands, including the arrangements for transport, the means of procuring at short notice additional horses for the cavalry and artillery, the positions to be entrenched, and all the numerous arrangements necessary for turning the forces under their supervision to the best possible account in the event of war or invasion.

The arrangements for the management, repair, or destruction of the railway communications within the district should be carefully prepared by the Royal Engineers, in concert with the officials of the railway companies, and of officers of the Volunteer Staff Corps who have taken up that subject.

The outlying brigades and the Militia should take part in the annual manœuvres.

Places should be assigned in the field force to battalions of Volunteers which come up to the necessary standard of efficiency.

With a peace organization and distribution of the Regular and Militia forces such as indicated, and a corresponding organization and distribution of the cavalry, artillery, and engineer corps, there would be no difficulty in putting into the field a defensive force of the strength suggested in the condition of our problem, viz., 200,000 infantry, with a due proportion of the auxiliary arms, nor would there be any delay or difficulty in sending abroad an expeditionary corps of (say) 80,000 infantry with a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

If a larger expeditionary corps was required it could be organized within a few weeks.

There are many points connected with the organization of our military forces which have been purposely omitted from this paper, with the object of bringing the points for discussion within reasonable limits; for instance—

Garrisons of Fortresses.

Colonial Reserves.

Purchase.

Army Administration.

Some of these subjects have been referred to in the previous paper, but they are purposely excluded from the present discussion.

Colonel OUYER, C.B., late 9th Lancers: I should wish to make a few observations on the paper which we have just heard read, and in which the subject is explained in the most clear and lucid manner. I think that as there really is only one recognized law among nations, namely, "the law of the strongest," it behoves us to look to our own safety, and see that our Army has such an organization as will enable it to meet successfully any aggression which possibly may occur. In order

to form a proper notion of the number of men requisite for defence and offence— for, as Col. Lecky has justly remarked, one is part of the other—we must look to the state of the armies of other continental nations, and regulate our own accordingly. The amount of force should not be greatly inferior to that of others, always, of course, having a due regard to geographical or other natural peculiarities.

I should be sorry to advance my own unsupported opinion of the proposition which we have heard concerning the Militia, but finding it in unison with that of the man whose experience is the greatest, and whose views are of more value than those of any other living Officer, I allude to Count von Moltke, I will simply quote his words. "The difference between a Militia and the Prussian system consists in the fact "that one is merely an armed raw levy, while the other is a nation in arms trained "to habits of military discipline and obedience."

There cannot be the slightest doubt that all wars of the future will be conducted by enormous levies, and the nation which has failed to supply the proper element for such large levies in peace time, before the war breaks out, will have to take the consequences, which probably would be defeat. Now if such are the conditions required to render a nation secure under present circumstances, it behoves us to see how we had better set to work. We have here a proposition before us by Colonel Lecky, and, first of all, under the conditions in which we live in England, we must see how the people would acquiesce in it.

A writer in the *Fortnightly Review* remarks "that a tremendous power has been "evolved and a ruthless ambition been manifested by the Prussians throughout the "war, and no nation is safe."

No nation is safe, certainly, which does not make the necessary preparations in peace time, and with regard to this, another writer in the *Fortnightly Review* says:—

"But the Prussian system is impossible in England; England will never consent "to undergo Bismarckism. Any attempt to force the working man into the ranks "will be resisted even to the '*ultima ratio populi*, no blood tax shall ever be levied "in England.' If such is attempted there will be an end to the ruling classes and "the monarchy."

Now I only ask how is it possible to organize under such an ignorant impatience of performing a natural duty, as is evinced in the above quotation, a natural duty which is submitted to by all other nations?

If the people of this country decline to submit to the sacrifices necessary for their own defence, then they may experience the fate of the nation of old, which cried for *panem et arcenes*, and let the defence of the country shift for itself. The grand evil may not come in our time, but we may see England sink into a second Holland, and be blotted out for ever from among the great powers of Europe.

General SCHOMBERG, R.M.A.: I should like very much to make a few remarks as to my great regret at hearing that the localization of regiments is to be entirely thrown aside. My belief is that the whole success of our system of reserves hangs on localization. The lecturer, to whom we are so very much indebted, was good enough to instance the Marine divisions as types of pretty good order and success in organizing artificers' work. I had the honour of commanding the Marine Artillery for three years, and can speak on this subject. Now, I believe the reason we are instanced for our success in organizing military labour is simply because we are localized; it gives us time to look about us. And we certainly do our foreign work as well as our neighbours. When I had the honour of commanding the Marine Artillery we had about 1,400 to 1,600 men at head-quarters. We embarked a regiment yearly, 500 or 600 men; we had no difficulty in getting men to embark. Embarkation was considered rather a boon than otherwise. I am sure localising regiments would not make them too fond of their homes. Moreover, you would never be obliged to send a married man abroad at all. You might send your men after two years on foreign service, and bring them back at the end of seven years. I am sure you will never get regimental schools in good order, nor will you succeed in organizing and working military labour, unless you localize corps. I fear the great objection is the expense of building barracks. Now I believe if you placed regiments in their own counties the men would build their own barracks with the help of our friends the engineers,

and that in three years you would pay all the expense of your barracks, and save not only public but private pockets. I think if the system of local organization is knocked on the head, the system of local reserves will go with it.

With regard to instruction. Englishmen are rather given to fall into particular grooves. If an Englishman is a sportsman he is exclusively a fisherman, or hunts or shoots exclusively—he does one thing in particular; and I think we follow exactly the same plan in the Army. The infantry man is exclusively an infantry Officer, and the cavalry man knows nothing whatever about infantry, and the artillery man ditto. An attempt has been made to cure this in the Staff College, but what are they among so many? Officers should be trained to know all three arms and to see them work together.

Lately I have been fortunate enough to get a book issued by the Prussian Government just before the war, dated June, 1870,*—the last instructions issued before the war—for outpost duties and grand manœuvres. The duty of the three arms is beautifully drawn up in this book; we have nothing to compare to it.

We have many things to learn, but there is one thing which we have to unlearn—that is centralisation. We have taken all the powers out of the hands of our Commanding Officers. The Captain of the company can do nothing; the Colonel very little; and the Brigadier or the General goes into the field in war totally unaccustomed to the feeding of his own troops or providing them with necessary stores. In this reorganization of our forces I do hope the Commanding Officers will have a little power. I believe a Prussian Captain, who answers pretty much to our Lieutenant-Colonel, can give a man seven days in the cells.

The *Fortnightly Review* was alluded to this evening. I think it is a great pity when we are discussing a subject of so great national importance that anybody should apply hard words to classes or individuals. A writer of great repute has spoken in very harsh terms of the English army in this *Review*. He says (I read the article a few hours ago) that the Officers of the English Army are “*proletaires*” and the men “*pariahs*.” I think these expressions cruel and unjust. I am not a linesman, so I may speak freely. I think the services of our line have only been equalled by the Roman army. I think in the history of the world no troops have ever had so severe a foreign service as the English Line. They have done their duty well whenever they have been called upon; they have not surrendered in thousands. I think it is very hard that these expressions should be used of our Officers and men. The same idea has not always been held about the Army. There is a book which we were taught to reverence when we were children; in this book a soldier's name is always mentioned with respect, and centurions are, in all instances in which they are mentioned, held up as men of religion and good conduct. I think the English Army is not inferior to the Roman.

The Duke of MANCHESTER: I should like to make a few remarks on this subject, as one in which I have certainly for a great many years taken a great deal of interest. Though I was greatly interested in, and in the main agree with the whole scheme of Colonel Leahy, there are some details in it in which I think he does not go as far as I should like. I may also mention, the two last speakers have both referred to points in which I entirely agree. The first speaker intimated that it was his opinion that it was the duty of every Englishman to take part in the defence of his country. That is the point with which I would start. When I have suggested that in conversation, I have always been met by the answer that it cannot be done. Well, we have not to do here with legislation; we are discussing a subject, and endeavouring to arrive at the principles on which we may hope that legislators will act, and I do not see why we should cry “*stinking fish*” by, in the first instance, saying we never can persuade Englishmen to do their duty. I fancy it is quite possible, especially now, when as the gentleman who first spoke remarked, evidently more than ever, success goes with great battalions, the English nation must feel more or less that their opinion has not that weight in Europe which it once had,

* Title, “Regulations for the Instruction of Troops in Field Service, and for Great

and they must attribute that in a great measure to the weakness of our forces. I think Englishmen are patriotic enough to be willing to make some sacrifice for the increase of their strength and for raising a force adequate to their position in the world, when so small a state as Switzerland has an organized force, not merely men in arms, but a fully organized force, of 200,000 men. If I may be allowed to allude to a personal matter to illustrate my position, I would tell you that on the 14th August last I was at Herry, in France; at that time the King of Prussia's headquarters were there, and Count Bismark was talking to me about our engagement to support the neutrality of Belgium. He turned round and asked me suddenly what army could we send to support Belgium. I said I understood we could send about 40,000 men. At that time there were 500,000 men pouring into France, while France had some 200,000 or 300,000 men. What would our 40,000 men have done against them? It was a humiliating position for an Englishman to be in. Yet we have 30,000,000 in the United Kingdom, and if we take the British race in the colonies, we have some 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 more. The population of France is 38,000,000, and that of Germany about the same. Why should we not have forces equal to them? Our wealth is equal to theirs, and I should have hoped our patriotism was equal. The ballot system has been advocated by Lord Elcho very ably, but I am opposed to the ballot. I think it is unjust and partial. If you have substitutes it gives an unfair advantage to the very rich; if you do not have substitutes it is an unfair burden upon not only the very rich, but the middling rich classes, because of course the burden of service is heavier upon people who derive greater profit from the occupation of their time than upon the poorer classes; therefore, if a man is obliged to serve, whatever his position in life, it is a heavier burden to a rich man than to a poor man. I think the only way in which it can be done fairly, is to make every man serve, that is, to learn drill; to be drilled rather than serve, for a short time. My opinion is, that you should call upon every man to be drilled, say for two years. There I differ from Colonel Leahy. I would say that the *dépôt* of a regiment should be in the district from which it is recruited. I must say I think there is a very great advantage that the regiment should be localized. One great advantage of that would be, that the Militia battalion should be part of the regiment—a Militia battalion of a definite regiment, and a volunteer battalion another part of the same regiment. I would therefore call upon every man to drill in the *dépôt* of his regiment, in his own district, near his own friends, within easy reach of his own home, where he is not separated from his home influences, where, while he is serving, he may get comforts and clothing; and other things from home, and may get short leave to go home during his time of drill. After he has served his two years, I should suggest that he should then be given his option of being posted to the Militia battalion, merely for service at home say, or if he was inclined for more service than that, he might be enlisted for the reserves of his regiment. Then he should have another year's permanent drill and be liable to be called out for more periodical drill during the time of his service; or he might enlist for permanent service in the regular Army. One advantage of that would be, that you would have a great many men. I do not wish to call them bad names, but there are a great many loafers and people who have no particular occupation in the country, and are too fond of independence and of pleasing themselves, to settle to anything definite, and who might make very good soldiers, and probably would, if they could be got into the Army any how. By this system you would force every young man on attaining a certain age to be practically in the Army for two years, and I think a great many of these men when they tasted military service, would probably be very willing to continue what they found to entail no great hardship, and even a very comfortable sort of life. Many of them who have no particular resources, and are very badly off for clothing, and have no definite home, would find those provided for them in the Army. You may call them scamps, but scamps do not make bad soldiers if you once get them disciplined, drilled, and organized. Then on the other hand, the one object to consider would be that this permanent drill which you call upon every young man in the country to perform; should not press too heavily on what I may call the better classes, those who make a greater profit by their professions, and derive large incomes from the

occupations they intend to follow. In the first place, I do not think two years would be a very heavy burden on a young man who had finished his education before he began his profession; but I think you might make it lighter even than that, because if a young man had attained a certain degree of education, you might either by his passing an examination or having gained a certificate in some school or college, allow him to serve for a much shorter time at his own expense, to find his own clothing, to pay for his own food, and to find his own lodging during that time of drill, say for nine months or a year. You need not oblige him to live in barracks with the common men, but he must do his duty as a private soldier for that time, living among others of the same position in life as himself, but drilling in the ranks. By that means every man, whether he was to be a private in the regular Army or in the reserves, or the Militia, or Volunteers, or an Officer in any of the forces, would have served a certain number of months, perhaps a year, in the ranks, and I do not think there would be any great disadvantage in that. Perhaps that is all I need say on that point. I am afraid the time allotted to me has expired, but I should like to say a word about organization. I think it is most important that the whole force should be organized into *corps d'armée* with proper distribution of the different arms, and when that is done, I believe no good will be done until you imitate war in peace by having manœuvres across country, not previously laid down but depending on the features of the country; not in fixed camps, but produced by two equal forces moving against each other from a distance. There the intelligence of each individual Officer would be exercised. Those manœuvres would be an examination as well as an instruction to every Officer. By that means you will find out who are the most intelligent Officers, and you will be practically deriving the experience of war without bullets.

General RUSSELL, C.B.: I understood General Schomberg to say that localization was a great benefit, and was the means by which the Royal Marine Artillery were so successful in raising recruits, and in having their men so willing to go abroad on foreign service. Now I have attributed that to the free ration when on board ship, and I have not the slightest doubt that our own men would be as delighted to go abroad and serve as the Royal Marines are, if they had their rations free. I have always been a linesman, and have been recruiting in London in conjunction with the Marines, and I thought the advantage they had over us in the line was the fact of this free ration on board ship, that the Marine went away for three or four years, came back with plenty of money, went home to his friends in the country and was a gentleman for six weeks following, whereas our linesman goes on furlough on 8*d.* a day, and instead of helping his old parents and his brothers and sisters struggling through life, he is a burden upon them during his furlough. Besides that, it is no inducement to friends to urge a young man to go for a soldier, because from that moment they know that they can never hope to have the slightest advantage from his help in their poverty and distress. The Marines do assist their friends, whereas our men are so paid that they cannot do it. I think one disadvantage of localization in the line is this. In my regiment in Jamaica we lost every third man in six weeks from yellow fever. Now if that regiment had been recruited from a small area, could you expect to get fresh men for that regiment? We were fortunate enough to escape cholera in India, but the 86th lost, I think, 126 men in one night at Kurrachee. What hope would that regiment have had of recruits, if localized?

Mr. CHADWICK, C.B.: I beg to solicit attention to some of the organic conditions which some military authorities concur in regarding as the basis of Army organization, namely, widely different qualities and values of different units, ranks, and files, the bases of force. Whilst all attention is impliedly concentrated on the Prussian system, there is one great example which is beginning to attract public attention that has not hitherto been noticed in this discussion, which is even more important for consideration, viz., that of a nation with two millions and a-half of population, which within two days after the opening of the war, had on its borders an army perfectly equipped of 30,000, and in four days 40,000 men, and in a fortnight it would have been ready with an army of 200,000 men—just the total amount of defensive force proposed for Great Britain. I mean the army of Switzerland. I have heard English Officers who have inspected the army there, and their opinion

was that the unit of force, the rank and file of the Swiss Army, at all events, whatsoever it might be with the commands, was quite as good as any brought into the field by Germany. And I am assured that the Swiss Army was seriously examined ten years ago and six years ago for a purpose by Prussian Officers, who reported that it was highly to be respected, and might hold its ground against their own. And yet this army of acknowledged first-class discipline and efficiency (proved indeed in portions of foreign service, and highly valuable for trustworthiness) is raised, without the three years', or even the one year's continuous service spoken of to-night as essential. Its discipline is imparted to the rank and file by really not more than a month of drill and exercise in the adult stages, produced to a great extent in some cantons by early drill in the school stage, which I have been advocating in this country. The last report of the military authorities of Switzerland was, however, that to smarten their force and bring it up to what was requisite—having regard to the standing army of France on one side, and of Prussia on the other, they desired about two weeks more of drill and field exercises, as a manœuvring field force. The basis of the Swiss system in some of the cantons is in the general drill of the population in the school stages, and hence an educated and intelligent unit force. In a paper which I had the honor of reading at this Institution, I cited a great deal of important and, what I submitted as I think, very conclusive English military testimony as to the vast difference that there is between the educated unit and the uneducated unit. It was brought out, I believe, by that testimony most clearly that an educated force, putting it as a simple proposition, is superior to an uneducated force in the proportion of three to two for the purposes of war. That was before the great Continental war. And, looking at the action of the comparatively better educated rank and file of Prussia as against the less educated rank and file of France, I submit that proposition has been verified on the largest scale that was ever presented to observation. Good education in the school, imparts intelligence, obedience, patience, more thoroughly than it is ever imparted afterwards. Bad education, or no education, leaves unintelligence, passion, and wildness. Some military authorities attribute the efficiency of the Prussians to the long service in the barracks. We attribute it to the intelligence imparted in the school, for the schooled force have beaten the longer barrack-trained force, three to one, and even two to one with inferior weapons, the needle-gun against the Chassepôt, and overthrown them in fair fight, infantry against infantry, against almost all military opinions in this country. Well, you have that instance of the great efficiency of the educated unit of force. Our proposition is that that may be had without that extent of long continued service, which is yet talked of as essential, since it is had without it in Switzerland, and why cannot we have it here? I must say, speaking generally, the the Officers of our English Army, high and low, are almost exclusively used to one unit of service, namely, the uneducated rough, the man to whom the lash may be applied ("No, no"). No? Why look at the last report of the military governors of military prisons: they say, one after another, that the lash being abolished, was a fatal mistake, and that without some equivalent punishment is to be got, the discipline of the English Army is not to be relied upon. ("No, no.") What do you say to 25,000 court-martials in a year in that force, and to 8,000 imprisonments, and between one and two thousand permanent markings in one year, and the treatment of these conditions as normal conditions of the Army?

The CHAIRMAN: You must adhere a little more to the propositions of Colonel Leahy.

Mr. CHADWICK: Now as to the character of that force and of the line generally, there are particular exceptions, and I have known of great exceptions. I was informed of one, a Scotch regiment, the Colonel of which regiment offered a wager that he would go upon parade and borrow £1,000 from the pirates.

The CHAIRMAN: We are diverging from the paper.

Mr. CHADWICK: But the paper assumes as the basis of organization a unit of force, of a common quality, which assumption, I submit, is in respect to efficiency, fallacious. Let me say that Officers who have had charge of different kinds of forces, military Officers of extensive experience and observation, who have had charge of

the police force, say that two of their men are worth any three of the ordinary soldiers, for effective purposes and efficiency considered, are cheap at higher pay; and I have heard Sir John Burgoyne maintain, and I believe he maintained with success in evidence, that the Sappers and Miners, though they are a higher paid force than the rank and file, and the Officers are on the whole—efficiency considered—not a dear if not a cheap force. But the question is what you can produce in training without the ballot being long continued and compulsory. What did Lord Haldinge say before the Sebastopol Committee? He said he could prepare soldiers in sixty days. Now, if he can prepare an uneducated man in sixty days, what can you do with an educated rank and file to begin with, as they begin with in Switzerland. The Swiss army costs £2 per head all the way round; that is for a month of service.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Chadwick is diverging to a considerable extent from the matter before us. He is entering into the question whether the Army should be an educated Army or not, and Colonel Leahy's lecture is how you will organize a certain number of men in the best mode for the defence of the country.

Mr. CHADWICK: Allow me to submit that my point is, that to organize an educated force, is a widely different operation from organizing an uneducated force, which Colonel Leahy's paper assumes, and it is that assumption which I challenge, as an unsound though a common foundation.

The CHAIRMAN: I must say, as Chairman, you are diverging from the question before you.

Mr. CHADWICK: All, then, that I would say is, that on the Swiss system we could raise 400,000 at £5 per man, for a month or six weeks' service, at two and a half times the expense incurred in Switzerland, a price declared to be sufficient to raise a force as efficient as the German rank and file, upon the volunteer principle we now raise 20,000 men for the line, and if the question of the great difference in the quality and the economy of the unit of force be not the foundation of any stable organization of military force, I, with others who have examined the subject as economists, am very greatly mistaken. In obedience to your ruling, I forbear to press the question further.

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN: We have all observed with great satisfaction the rapidity with which public opinion has matured on this subject all-important to our nation. We are substantially agreed on the main principles; we are virtually working on the same lines; and this is owing in very small degree to the Parliament, composed of Queen, Lords, and Commons. The whole nation has sat in Parliament on this subject, which so greatly concerns its most vital interests. Private conversation, the newspaper press, pamphlets, more than any, the discussions in this room in which we are sitting, have produced this result. The value of our discussions has been owing in a great measure to Colonel Leahy. I shall never forget the impression which a single sentence in his first paper made upon me. It seemed as if we had found the solution of the whole problem. It was agreed that our Army was totally insufficient in number; it was agreed that a much larger Army was necessary; but a much larger Army, constituted on the same principle, would have cost an impossible sum. Colonel Leahy simply said "one long service soldier costs as much as ten reserve men." That simple enunciation spread through the length and breadth of the land, and from that point the discussion took a fresh start. I differ with great reluctance from Colonel Leahy as to the limited extent to which he would carry the principle of localization; nevertheless, although a civilian, I must express my opinion. I agree with the Duke of Manchester and General Schomberg, that the key to the position, is the localization of the line regiments. There are various reasons, but I will only mention one. It is only in this way that the regiment can be made a home to the youth of the country. It is only in this way that the retired men can form a regimental reserve, settled, for the most part, in the neighbourhood of the regiment. Colonel Leahy admits that the reserve must not be a general reserve, scattered all over the country, but a regimental reserve. The west of England furnishes an interesting illustration. General Schomberg knows that the Marines are extremely popular in Devonshire and the western part of Somersetshire. We have all a home feeling there towards the Marines. The

circumstances of the marine head-quarters at Plymouth, and of the favourable conditions of service on board ship, are known in every village, and the state of feeling there in respect of this branch of the service is such as might be produced in every county in England in reference to its own line regiments. The same state of things existed in regard to the artillery in a large district in the north of Ireland, owing to peculiar circumstances connected with the recruiting. I think we are all agreed that the local Militia regiments should be affiliated more or less to the line regiments. There is another point on which I am persuaded that Colonel Leahy would agree with me, that, in order that a man may become a soldier, it is necessary that he should learn, not only drill, but discipline. In an assembly like this, it is quite unnecessary to explain what discipline includes. It includes, first of all, self-confidence, founded on full professional training—confidence of the soldier in himself; next, confidence in his comrades, his right and left hand man; and, above all, confidence in his Officers. Now, to say nothing of gymnastics, drill, musketry, and all the hundred things a soldier has to learn, it is simply impossible that a Militia man can learn discipline in one month; and, no matter how often that month is repeated year after year, the chain is broken, he is always learning, and never coming to a knowledge of the truth, and never becomes a soldier. For this reason I strongly hold that every man who enters the regular Army, including Militia as well as line, should go through a year's, or, some would say, nine months' *continuous* training. More than that, I am of opinion that the Militia regiments should not only be affiliated to their respective local line regiments, but that they should actually form second and third battalions to them. Now that purchase is going to be abolished, that is not necessary to my argument. I will say, if purchase is going to be abolished, it will become quite practicable to have only one cadre of Officers and one line of promotion for each county regiment, including the Militia battalions, as well as the line or general service battalion; and then the natural course of service would at once take place between different classes of Officers. The younger unmarried men who wished to see the world, would go to India, or wherever else they were wanted, and as they married, or as the young men of fortune succeeded to their property, and wished to engage in county business, and so on, they would retire into the Militia battalions of the regiment, receiving pay only while they were actually serving. I said that every man should be trained for a year, and at the end of the year he should take his choice whether he would return at once to civil life as a Militia man, subject only to a few days exercise in the annual field manoeuvres, or whether he would enter the line for a limited term of years. As the great difficulty is to get a young man away from his home and under the colours, and as it is found by experience that when a young man has once been trained under the colours, and accustomed to military habits and military associates, he easily goes on for a further period of service, I think there would be no difficulty about recruiting. Of course every facility would be given for transferring trained men from the Militia to the line; and, on the other hand, the matured, seasoned men, who had served their three years in the line battalion at home, or in the Mediterranean garrisons, or their seven years in India, would return into the reserve of their regiment. We are all agreed that all branches of the service should be under the General commanding the division, and that the great northern division, containing so many millions of inhabitants, should now be split up into four or five separate districts, each with its own Army corps. No form of conscription is at present necessary. I am persuaded that if the Army is properly re-constituted, and if, to a certain extent, according to the plan I have submitted, the Army is constantly embodied in the face of the population of each district, in connection with their relations, friends, and acquaintances, and if certain other inducements are offered which would be highly conducive to the efficiency of the public service, there will be no difficulty whatever in getting a sufficient number of recruits. This nation has always shown a strong military spirit, which is not likely to be diminished by the example of recent events.

Captain WALTER: I should like to make a few remarks upon this subject. I think most of the speakers, and Colonel Leahy too, have rather begged the question to a certain extent. He has assumed that it will be easy to get men to organize. Now everybody here knows perfectly well that there has always been the greatest difficulty

in the world in procuring them. The one great difficulty with the English Army has been that of getting recruits. That is a subject which may be fairly taken into consideration to-night; and I have one particular reason for asking you to consider it, because it affords me an occasion of stating that there will be perhaps another opportunity of entering into it to-morrow, when any gentleman who can come will hear Lord Derby make a speech on a subject which cannot fail to engage great public attention, and certainly will be brought on in the House of Commons, I hope with success. Our plan is simply this. In order to induce recruits to enlist, you shall throw open to them the whole of the civil appointments in the service of the State. These civil appointments amount to at least 100,000 comfortable situations, ranging from £50 to £150 a year. In addition to these 100,000 situations under Government, which from time of memorial have been the spoil of political parties, you have at least 150,000 more of a semi-official character which might properly be given to soldiers, and held out as a reward to them. I am convinced if that is done, you will simplify the whole question very considerably. It is very little use talking about organization until you have something to organize. At the end of the Crimean War we were 60,000 men short of the number voted by Parliament, and really it seems to me a perfect farce to hear men calling themselves statesmen talking about reserve forces, when you have not got such a thing in the country. What is the use of having 500,000 Militia and 150,000 Volunteers if the Guards or the Rifle Brigade are 100 men short of the number they want to face the enemy? Not the slightest use in the world. I say no man is to be looked upon as a soldier in the best and most extended sense of the term unless he is able and ready to go anywhere at five minutes' notice. That is the utmost time any good soldier requires. I say a man who means soldiering must be ready to do this, and I venture to say there is hardly a gentleman in this room now, however old he may be, who will not endorse this opinion. This is not foreign to the object of this meeting, and I think, therefore, before you enter very much into the subject of how you are to organize men—whether you are to get them from one particular county to go into a particular regiment, or not—we should consider the best means of getting them. There is no doubt that the men are fit for the civil places I have referred to, and, if not, you may depend they will make themselves so.

The CHAIRMAN: Remember that the subject before the meeting is "organization."

Captain WALTER: I am in the hands of the Meeting. I think so far it is part of the subject, because, in one of his paragraphs, Colonel Leahy has alluded to the possibility of opening out the Civil Service. I have had something to do with the management of men for some years past, and I have come to the conclusion that there is really only one way of managing them, and that is by making everything their interest. It is not a difficult matter to rule men without guard-rooms and flogging. My system is similar to that which has been observed in the Life Guards with the greatest possible success for many years, and should be adopted throughout the whole Army, *i.e.*, the immediate expulsion of every disreputable character.

The CHAIRMAN: I must appeal to the Meeting again, and to the honourable gentleman; I think he is diverging from the paper Colonel Leahy has read.

Captain WALTER: I have stated nearly all I wish to say. I believe there is not an Officer in this room who does not heartily wish that the road to the Civil Service should be thrown open to our soldiers and sailors, and, if so, let them do all they possibly can to encourage it.

Captain EVANS-FREEKE AYLMER: We have heard a very able paper from Colonel Leahy, but it has chiefly been confined to supplying the unit of the service. We have not had much said about what we are to do with the unit when we have got it. He remarks at the end of his paper that he can put under his system 80,000 infantry in the field as an expeditionary corps, while a larger one can be organized within a few weeks. He does not say how it is to be organized. I think before we try to catch our hare we should be prepared to cook him. We have only now in England about 80 battalions, and if they were increased by any system of reserves, either the Duke of Manchester's or Colonel Leahy's, or any other, to the fullest extent, they would only represent about 80,000 men, while in the field they would be a good deal

less, because through the exigencies of war they could not be kept up to the full strength. Now this force is perfectly unsuited to the warfare of the present day. If we go any length from our base of operations, the length of line must be protected, our supply, convoy, transport, and everything must be protected, and prisoners must be guarded (I hope we shall take some). Under those circumstances I say that 80,000 men is too small a number, and with our military forces organized as they are, or as Colonel Leahy proposes, I do not think we could put into the field, without using the Militia, more than 80,000 men, no matter how good the system of reserve might be. The Militia we cannot use for this purpose as they are at present constituted, and we have no other cadres which we could fill up, no matter how strong the reserve, and this is, in my opinion, our weak point. This is the point first to be considered; before we think of getting the men we must first see how we are to use them. There has been one system suggested by Lord Elcho in one of his letters, by which certain Militia regiments should be allowed to volunteer for service abroad, but this, I think, is wrong in principle, because the Commander-in-Chief, or the War Minister should be able to say exactly how many men he could put into the field at any given moment. That is the first thing necessary, and if he leaves it to the volunteering of Militia regiments to say we will go or not, he is never able to declare how many men he can put into the field. Taking then as my standing point that it is necessary for a War Minister to be able to speak thus, I say I hope we shall have some system which will give us a greater number of battalions, or a system by which a greater number of battalions can be formed when required. Colonel Leahy by his system proposes, after bringing up his first reserves, so as to put 80 regiments in the field, to bring up his other reserves in a few weeks, and to form new regiments. Now, that is almost an absurdity under the circumstances, because with all our Officers, and Non-commissioned Officers in the field, it could not be done. There is another system which I should like to bring before this meeting, which I think a far preferable one, and which has been supported by Lord Derby, namely, doubling the Militia regiments, by giving to each, another battalion, one battalion being officered by retired and half-pay Officers, and enlisted for service abroad, the other officered as at present, for service at home. Under such a system we should have our 80 line regiments as the first line, and as our second line, 130 battalions of infantry Militia (for that is their present number), for service abroad. These men, of course, might have a little extra training, and more attention paid them. Beside, they would be officered by Officers retired from the Army. Therefore, we should have 80 line regiments in England, and 130 battalions of Militia, or 210 regiments which would, of course, represent a force of about 200,000, and that would be without weakening our defensive forces in the slightest. Lord Elcho's system of letting Militia regiments volunteer on the system practised during the Crimea, by which individual men, the units of the Militia, were allowed to volunteer into the Line, is simply robbing Peter to pay Paul, robbing the defensive force to increase the offensive, and that is a most rotten system, because a Commander-in-Chief can never say how many men he can be certain of for any particular duty, but has to look to volunteering at the moment that he wants them. We have left this, the chief point, out of consideration, and I think it requires more attention than any other, namely, how we can place our men in the field when we get them. I will just say one word about localising corps, because I mentioned my opinion on the subject to one of the Council, and although I know it is contrary to the views entertained by a great many here, still I think it would be cowardly if I refrained on that account. I think localising will never do with our Line regiments, for this simple reason. The recruits got in different places are very different, one regiment raised in Yorkshire, and recruited in Yorkshire, will get fine stalwart agricultural labourers, while another located in Manchester will get the very opposite style of men, whose morals, principles, and everything else, have been ruined by living in towns. I think localising would never do for this reason in the first place, and besides as certain regiments only can be used in war, while some are in the colonies, these will suffer while the others in India, Canada, and elsewhere will not suffer at all, consequently the whole weight of the suffering of the war would be thrown on certain districts, and so for regular service I think localizing will never do.

THE DUKE OF MANCHESTER: I should suggest an alteration in what the honourable gentleman has said. Besides doubling the Militia regiments I should double the Regular battalions, and always have a dépôt battalion at home, which should drill the Militia, and form the dépôt of the battalion abroad.

A VISITOR: The gentleman who spoke so disparagingly of the Manchester men I think would alter his opinion if he saw the *physique* of the first volunteer regiment in Manchester.

Captain AYLMER: I may explain the word Manchester was only used as a *pour parler*.

THE VISITOR: I am very glad to hear it, because you have certainly not seen that regiment.

Major LEVESON: I wish to make a few remarks on localization. There are certainly great advantages which have not been brought to notice, that is to say, if a regiment abroad gains certain fame, all the men are individualized at home, and in their villages they are thought more of, and they themselves think a great deal more of being brought to notice in the county where they were born, and where all their friends hear of it. It also has the effect of stimulating their friends to join that regiment, therefore I think in many ways the recruiting might be carried on very advantageously in local districts. I think also with regard to regiments, each regiment might be formed of two battalions. We cannot at all approximate to the Prussian system; our Army must be of an entirely different formation, for this reason, that we have extensive colonies to defend, and a great portion of our Army must be away from England. In fact, the greater bulk of the Regular Army must be for the defence of our widely extended colonies, and that force must be supplied by volunteers. Instead of forcing men into the service we ought to offer certain inducements to make them wish to join the Regular Army abroad. It must not be supposed that the lower classes, or rather men in humbler spheres of life, are destitute of ambition; they like to roam about and travel as much as those who have means, and enlisting in the Army is the only means that they have of seeing foreign countries. It is a great inducement to men to enlist, provided they know they will be taken care of. There are many inducements for them to join the Indian Army; they can marry, and they have a chance of getting on in life which they do not meet with at home. I think our regiments might be very well formed of a line battalion for foreign service when required, and of a reserve battalion to transact all the recruiting, and to pass the men into the line, made soldiers. Then again I should divide the Militia into an Army Militia Reserve, that is to say, men who have enlisted on the understanding that they are to join the Army in time of war, and a second battalion of the Militia to be for home service, the whole four battalions to constitute a regiment. Militia are to all intents and purposes soldiers, but Volunteers we must look upon in entirely a different category. The late French war has shown us this. Men who can disband themselves, who can serve when they choose, and how they choose, whose time is their own, who are dependent upon their labour for their bread, cannot be expected to do the same as paid soldiers, and it is for that reason I think they must always be considered as of a different class, only available for the defence of the country. We must count upon these men for the defence of all our works. I think the greater part of our Volunteers ought to be infantry. Then again, the Army constituted at present being so very few, as compared to Continental armies, the great bulk of it ought to belong to the scientific branches—we ought to have a very large force of artillery, and a considerable force of cavalry. They are the salient angles, the bastions of the work, which we can easily fill up with infantry. They are the branches that take so long to form, and, consequently, their term of service must be longer than that of the ordinary infantry. There is no question about it with regard to infantry that they can very well be formed in six months. I am alluding to the mere use of arms and evolutions that may be required before the enemy. I am not speaking of infantry as it will become by service in the field, but I say that our men are not taught to live as they would have to do in the field. Men that live in barracks and homes are not at all accustomed to camp life. There is the great fault in our organization, that we do not accustom our men to live as they would live in the field before the enemy. Our men are not at home in their tents;

they may be at home in their camps of instruction or drill grounds, but they are not as if they were encamped in front of an enemy. Then, again, with regard to our artillery, we require a very large force of artillery compared to that of other nations, for this reason, that for the whole of our Indian Army, the artillery is furnished from the home Army; we have no native artillery there, and the consequence is we really have a very insufficient force of artillery. In case of war we should require in India alone a very large force of artillery, and as for our artillery in England at present, we talk about having 40,000 men, but certainly our artillery is even smaller in proportion than that; considering that at Königsgratz the Prussians and Austrians brought something like 2,200 guns into action, where should we be if we had to fight a general action with our possibly 60 guns horsed and manned as they are at present? I doubt whether the present arrangement, cutting off one end of the blanket to sew on to the other, makes it any larger. I cannot see that making the garrison artillery into field batteries increases our artillery. If we take the number of guns that we have on our fortifications in England, the number of field guns we have, or ought to have, in the field, we have not really now one efficient artilleryman to one gun. Why should we diminish our garrison artillery, why should we change them into field batteries when we have plenty of men that will make good artillerymen in time? I think this is a subject that requires great attention, that is to say the proper organization and maintenance of the scientific branches of the Army in their full numbers and efficiency. I am sorry I did not see any notice of this paper, or I should like to have gone further into the subject.

Major GEARY, R.A.: I would not have ventured on this occasion to have addressed any observations in the presence of Officers who are so greatly my seniors, but, from reading the newspapers carefully for the last six months, and from what has been said at this meeting, I find that everybody has decided the question of military organization, except the House of Commons. I suppose that will follow as a matter of course. I shall not attempt to go into the whole question of military organization, but merely touch upon those points which pertain to me individually as an artilleryman. Colonel Leahy has proposed that a battery should consist of four guns. That appears to me a sort of expedient rather pertaining to the theoretical than to the practical man, because it has been found from experience in the Peninsula and other places, that six guns is the largest number over which one individual can exercise a personal influence with advantage, and, therefore, I cannot see that it would be attended by any economy to the State to diminish that command from six to four, even although supplemented by a theoretical reserve of four guns, which are to be called upon in some way, which I could not exactly follow out. To return to the question of localization, without going over all the ground which has been so fully treated of by gentlemen here to-night, I will confine myself to it so far as it appertains to the artillery. I think the artillery may be broadly divided into field and garrison, and in their requirements they involve two very opposite things. The more you can knock field artillery about the better they are, but the more you can localize a garrison artillery for the defence of a place, the better. I think we have a very good example before us in the militia artillery of the Channel Islands. These men know every rock, every sounding, every physical feature of the ground, or the water over which they would have to fire. Now, I think if we could allow, out of the regular Army, say as many as two royal artillery gunners for every gun that is mounted in position, then our maritime defences might be entrusted to the artillery militia and volunteer artillery under the superintendence of Officers of the Royal Artillery, each corps being told off to the defences in their own locality. Moreover, the reserve artillery should be confined to the maritime counties. I would make men always work at those particular defences which they would be called upon to defend in case of invasion. I would even carry out the principle so far as this. If it was a very large work like Portsmouth, I would not say such a regiment of volunteers or militia is to garrison Portsmouth, but I would say, "You will go to No. 1 or No. 2 bastion, and there are your guns." I would suggest that when the Militia and Volunteers are called out for training, sudden alarms should be given occasionally, so that at a given signal every man might rush to his place. I am perfectly sure we should find by a proper system of superintendence of the Royal

Artillery Officers, that the greatest *entente cordiale* would spring up between the Royal and the reserve Artillery, and the reserve artilleryman would take as much pride in his gun as the horse artillery man takes in his position as a horse artilleryman. I made one remark which may be taken exception to by some of the gentlemen present, that I would confine the reserve artillery to the maritime counties. It is for this reason, I think it would be time and training thrown away to get up field batteries and horse artillery, as we have seen done in some places. It must take time to form an efficient field artillery. You must have horses and harness, and they cannot be called out for training for a month or two months in the year. The horses must be always in training, they must be always groomed, and their harness must always be kept in proper repair. Therefore, I think that work properly pertains to the regular artilleryman. But I believe if we were to have a properly organized system of militia and volunteer artillery for the maritime defences, so that in case of one of these sudden invasion panics, that occur about every three years we know every gun mounted on the defences round England and Ireland had its quota of militia and volunteer artillerymen ready to come and work it under proper superintendence of regularly trained Officers, that it would go a great way towards giving us a feeling of confidence. As for the large question of battalions of reserves, I leave that to the general Officers here present, who are far better able to deal with that subject than I am.

Captain HEATHORN, h.-p., R.A.: Allow me to say a few words straight to the point upon clause 5.

"Each military district to be provided with the nucleus of a complete staff for "an army corps, one or more divisions of regular troops complete in all arms and "requirements for active service to be quartered in each military district." We want more than the nucleus of a complete staff. *We want the nucleus of a complete material fit-out in each division.*

In all our military districts there are numerous Volunteers who, though intelligent, useful, and most excellent in their way, cannot be counted on exactly as regular forces, for soldiers are made more by discipline than by drill.

Three things make a soldier: drill, discipline, and the use of the material belonging to his arm of the service.

On the latter consideration we ought to have in each division an organization of skeleton equipments, perfect in every thing but men, commanded by and intrusted to a field Officer, assisted by two or three subaltern instructors, with a few sergeants, and handy men for the instruction of volunteer Officers and privates. These field batteries, batteries of position, cavalry troops, pioneers, engineering and pontoon trains, tent and cooking equipments, &c., complete in all material, would be all absolute worth; always ready and efficient if wanted for active service, only requiring manning; they should go about from place to place and furnish instruction to Volunteers.

Volunteer chiefs, as soon as competent, should have charge and command on parade, until the time allotted for instruction in the locality finished, and the skeleton train moved off to give others a help on. This would be a great element of success.

Thus, a battery goes to a certain place. Volunteers would learn that it was composed of horses and material, the former to be shod, groomed, cared for, harnessed, looked after, and taught, according to a system. That each part of the harness had a definite use, and required fitting and adjusting accordingly; that the easiest draft of guns and waggons was subject to certain rules. They would learn to ride, to drive, hook in, and unhook their teams, mount, dismount, pack, and unpack their batteries; take their guns and carriages to pieces for water transport, and in a few minutes put them together again.

In a like manner pioneers would soon be up in the passing of obstacles, formation of attacks, loopholes, construction of obstacles, and destruction of cover; riding men would learn the use of cavalry weapons. Volunteer sappers would build a pontoon bridge, construct works, or drive mines, in emulation of the regulars, and all would soon be as well up in carrying, tent-pitching, and field-cooking as would be necessary for real work.

Volunteers would flock in for instruction such as this, for every Englishman is curious to learn; every volunteer will attend something new to be acquired.

When the skeleton troop or train had finished its allotted time in one locality, it should move off to its next station, so on, round and round the division. Strategy would dictate the best positions for the development of certain arms of the service. Towns and cities would have their sappers, the coast would furnish garrison artillerymen, riding troops, from our young farmers, who could not afford to enter the yeomanry, into our cavalry of reserve (helping the yeomanry itself if required), and each arm of the Volunteer army would have its legitimate development.

I bring these points forward as practical suggestions. Volunteers cannot spare time for much camp residence, therefore send them camp experience at home, get them as well up as possible in camp life and the use of material, and get a few field days out of them when you can.

Major WETHERED: I ought to apologise for intruding any remarks on a subject which I have not fully considered. I am certain if England should unhappily be drawn into a European war, that we must be prepared to act on the offensive. England, less than any other nation, can afford to carry on a defensive war. By so doing we should invite invasion and the destruction of our commerce. Neither can we depend upon our Fleet for the protection of our own shores. If our Fleet is to render efficient service, it must be free to come and go, to keep open the highway for our commerce, and to sweep the seas of every enemy's ship. Therefore, looking upon the question in that view, I think we must be prepared to carry on an offensive, as well as a defensive war, in other words, to strike with all our force, instead of waiting for the enemy's blow. I do not see how we can possibly succeed unless it be on some such plan as the lecturer proposes. If we are to have a large and an efficient Army, prepared at any moment to take the field for any purpose, we must have that Army a regular paid efficient force. We cannot call out our Militia and Volunteers and send out 100,000 or 200,000 to take the field away from our own shores. Therefore, to have a sufficient and an efficient force in reserve we must necessarily resort to short service, and by that means raise a home reserve of trained soldiers ready to swell the ranks of the regular Army. But that process, of course, will take some years to elaborate. If I mistake not the times are pressing. We have all been rather staggered at the overwhelming forces which have been thrown suddenly into the recent conflict. There has been a great deal of talking and writing, but I do not see that we have advanced one single step towards placing this country in a state of preparation even for defence. One previous speaker remarked that "we ought first to catch our hare." I consider that we have caught a pretty good hare already, but the cook has failed in his duty, and if we wait much longer we may catch a Tartar. When I look at that table of figures I see that we have some 400,000 men who have come forward voluntarily for the defence of their country. Is it not essential to make immediate use of the material at hand? Can we not without delay raise these men to the greatest state of efficiency? Why not call out our Militia for six months' training? It is a mere matter of money, nothing more. We should thereby create a source for supplying our Regular Army with trained soldiers. With regard to the Volunteers, as well as the Militia, they want more encouragement and greater inducements to attain efficiency. We have done very little for them. We have grudged every shilling laid out upon those forces. Let us now do what we can to raise these men to a state of efficiency; having done that we can sit down and talk calmly over our future plans. I am afraid that under the pressure of the times, the House of Commons will be induced to pass some measure that may prove injurious to the country. I should be very sorry to see Englishmen coerced into the service when they are ready to volunteer and be drilled for their country's defence. There is no occasion for that, for I am sure if we treat men properly we shall have volunteers enough to raise all the forces we need. At present our men are discharged in a way not at all calculated to bring them back into the service. These matters are not left enough in the hands of military men, consequently the feelings and views of soldiers are not considered. A certain reduction is ordered, and so many hundreds or thousands are struck out of the Estimates. The officials at the War Office, accustomed to these reductions, gather together and consult. With

them it is a matter of mere clerk-like proceeding. So many men represent so many pounds, and a large number of effective men are at once struck off the strength of the different regiments. These men are often dismissed long before the expiration of their term of engagement, and in a very inconsiderate manner, without due preparation for such an emergency, and at a season of the year when employment is difficult to be found. Some of these men, who had enlisted for a term of ten years, after having served about eight years abroad, returned to England from various causes, and naturally looked forward to completing the unexpired portion of their service at home, with the option of re-engaging within the last six months of the period of their term of service, and receiving a bounty, agreeably with the conditions existing at the time they enlisted, but when the last reductions took place these men were suddenly required either to re-engage at once, eighteen months or two years before the expiration of their engagement, under the altered condition of loss of bounty, or to be dismissed forthwith. The regulations existing when these men enlisted sanctioned the payment of 20s. on discharge, and this sum is still continued to the men who re-engage in lieu of the allowance they were supposed to be entitled to on discharge, but the men who were discharged, as above described, and all others taking their discharge on completion of their ten years' term, are sent away with only 5s. in their pockets, often having to beg their way: such treatment is not calculated to encourage enlistment, as these men go about the country giving to all with whom they come in contact, a very unfavourable impression of military service. I would say a few words about organization; that is a very large subject. As our regiments are at present constituted I cannot see the advantage of county localization. There are very few regiments that have any distinct locality. Men enlist from all parts of the kingdom and very often to get away from those localities in which they live, and with no desire to return. Therefore, it would not appear desirable to localize regiments as at present constituted. In course of time we might identify certain regiments with certain localities, by raising the men as far as possible from those localities. I do not see why regiments both at home and abroad should not have reserve depôts connected with certain districts, placed under the instruction of a thoroughly competent staff; such establishments might form a nucleus for the Militia and Volunteers of the district. By that means in process of time you might identify certain regiments with certain districts and home reserves of Militia. But at present we are not prepared for that. When we try to carry out any scheme we generally break down in detail. Take the case of *depôt* battalions, the idea was very good, they were established as schools for uniform instruction, but they broke down because the system was not carried out in detail. A *depôt* battalion was composed of the *depôts* of about eight different regiments concentrated under one staff, where recruits for these different regiments were drilled and instructed. Of course, if you sent your sons to any particular college you would take care to ascertain that a good and efficient staff of professors and instructors were employed, so that they might be properly educated for their profession. With these *depôt* battalions there was no proper provision made to secure efficient drill and instruction. And when you descended to the non-commissioned staff, instead of finding a *corps* of trained men, the very reverse was the case. The custom was, when a regiment was ordered to embark, all the good and efficient non-commissioned officers and men were selected for service with the head-quarters, leaving with the *depôts* the mere refuse men, in fact, unfit to proceed with the regiment; then out of this beautiful refuse the Colonel commanding the *depôt* battalion had to pick out his drill instructors, and non-commissioned staff to instruct the whole of the recruits for the regiment. By such a system it was simply impracticable to educate or drill men efficiently. We take, perhaps, from six to nine months to drill a recruit, why is it? Because the recruit does not get facilities for drill. Go to our large camps, and you will find in a climate like ours, perhaps for one-third of the year, the men cannot undergo their drill, there is no drill shed. It is a most painful thing in the winter to see the men standing out in the midst of the coldest frost handling their fire-locks, and going through their ordinary drill, as if it were open summer weather. All these things require to be considered, and if attended to, it would improve the Army very much. Take again the simple thing of clothing. We think more of appearances than anything else. I

will say nothing about the construction of the clothing, because any one can see that the men are not clothed for service, but for show. Look at the way in which they put on their clothing.

The CHAIRMAN : That hardly comes within the compass of this paper.

Major WETHERED : I wanted to remark that our soldiers, as a consequence of being supplied with their new clothing on the 1st of April, for the sake of appearance at the spring reviews, were literally more warmly clothed in summer than in winter. But as you have ruled that the subject does not come within the paper, I will sit down.

On the motion of General Sir William Codrington the meeting was adjourned to Wednesday evening, February 22nd.