

Drews looks on Hartmann as the greatest of all philosophers, the Bismarck of speculation. Perhaps the resemblance goes deeper than he thinks. Bismarck was before all things an intriguing diplomatist, a master in the art of securing alliances and of setting declared or suspected enemies by the ears. In like manner Hartmann is always playing off the intellectual tendencies of the age against one another, or cleverly combining them in the semblance of a new synthesis, pessimism with evolution, mechanical with teleological causation, Hedonism with self-devotion, religion with materialism. And he interprets nature itself as a result of the same intriguing policy. Reason, without any power to act, sets Will at variance with itself, and is thus conducting it to final self-annihilation. But the weapons of Prussian statecraft are ill-fitted for the investigation of truth, being apt to break in the hands of those who use them for that purpose. Nor can such pure abstractions as 'Will' and 'Reason,' or 'the Logical' be set to do the work of concrete realities, even when they are wired together by a third abstraction and labelled 'The Unconscious'. Even such a phantasmal occupation as 'setting time at right angles with itself' implies activity and will. And the world-will, to be convinced of its unreasonableness in wanting to be, must have some reason after all (see *Beauty and the Beast*). But if so it would never have begun to be, and we should have been spared all this misery. The only real necessity for anything of the kind was that the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* should be written—and that was only a necessity for its author.

It would be rash to limit the possibilities of proselytism in a country which has produced Hartmann and Prof. Drews. But from a mere English point of view this ponderous volume would seem unlikely to increase the reputation of its hero. As an expositor the author is not to be compared with Kuno Fischer; indeed for clearness and elegance his style is much inferior to that of the master whom he has undertaken to interpret. Some sections, particularly in the second half of the book, are made nearly unreadable by the extreme condensation of the ideas and the uncouth phraseology in which they are clothed. And where the meaning comes out more clearly the system can only lose by having its self-contradictions brought closer together and exhibited in a more glaring light.

A. W. BENN.

*Psychologie des Willens zur Grundlegung der Ethik.* Von HERMANN SCHWARZ. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1900. Pp. vii., 391.

Mr. Schwarz's standpoint is that of Voluntaristic Apriorism, and involves two main tenets: (1) The independence of the will; (2) The authoritativeness of the act of choice. These, in the author's opinion, constitute the indispensable corner-stones of Ethical Theory. Our author's first effort is accordingly directed towards proving by close psychological analysis the independence of the will. This thesis he supports by showing that approval and disapproval, the pure original acts of will, do not, like pleasure and pain, vary in quality; nor do they vary in strength or intensity; they vary only in a way that is entirely *sui generis*, viz., in degree of saturation. In complete consistency with this thesis of the independence of the will, Mr. Schwarz insists further on its 'objectless' character. The will is indeed directed towards certain values, is not directionless, but these values are not its objects. And yet these primitive acts of will, though *sui generis*, are not unmotivated. The first part of the present book is in fact devoted to elaborating

under three heads, the Natural laws of the will, laws according to which the movements of the will are determined.

The second part deals with the Normal laws of the will, and centres round the conception of choice or preference. Here, again, Mr. Schwarz's main endeavour is to show that choice or preference are not acts of Reason or Judgment, but acts of Will. Preference is a volitional act governed by normative laws, laws, that is, which guide us in determining what is better and what is worse. It may be either analytic or synthetic. In the case of analytic preference all we do is to *sanction* the better course; in the case of synthetic preference we *dictate* it. Such dictation becomes imperative when we have to decide between values of different orders. In every such act of preference our decision is regulated by two principles, the one bidding us love our neighbours better than ourselves, the other bidding us love ourselves better than our pleasures. These principles do not merely ratify rules held good before, but provide out of their own normative essence an entirely new conception of what is the better. The distinctions of moral worth which they make originate from themselves. In a word, they create morality. The study of Ethics, as our author conceives it, is based on these two laws. As based on the one, it becomes the Theory of Moral Self-Assertion; as based on the other, the Theory of Moral Self-Denial.

Restricting our criticism to an essential point, we may question whether our author's concern to secure the authoritativeness of the laws of synthetic preference by making them authoritative in their own inalienable right is really well-advised. The ultimate question 'Wherein consists the sanction of these ultimate laws?' is a question that will not be put by. Must we not ask, 'What is the end towards which human nature by its very constitution is destined to strive?' and is not this end the ultimate standard of action rather than the bare fiat of certain solemn irresponsible laws?

The main gap in this striking work is the author's neglect to consider in his criticism the standpoint of modern Idealism, and yet Mr. Schwarz displays at every turn keen critical capacity. He has also the constructive gift; his distinctions are fine, his illustrations numerous and excellent. The *Psychologie des Willens* is the work of an earnest and gifted thinker; it is stimulating and suggestive, and can be cordially recommended. It is a first instalment. Mr. Schwarz promises us the *Ethics* to which this Psychology is but the prelude.

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*Experimentell-Psychologische Untersuchungen über das Urtheil. Eine Einleitung in die Logik.* Von Dr. K. MARBE, Privat-doцент der Philosophie in Würzburg. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1901. Pp. 103. Price 3 m.

The author rightly emphasises the fact that logical treatises at present contain a large quantity of psychological matter, much of which is too often the result of very casual introspection. What is by nature psychological ought to be examined without prejudice under conditions which ensure accuracy of observation, and these conditions he has attempted to attain in certain investigations upon the Judgment. He does not confine this name to true or false propositions, but regards as a judgment any mental process which can be characterised as correct or incorrect (*richtig oder falsch*). This assumption determines his whole procedure. Not only sentences can "become judgments," but words,