

sive, the impression of the moment calling forth an immediate response; in the later stages (represented in relatively reflective human action) the simple impulse has to deal with competing impulses, and action is the result of their interplay. The characteristic of the more developed person, then, is that each of his acts is participated in by a wider variety of activities. As such it shows the various sides of his character, the hasty, superficial, impulsive reaction telling of but a single side. In this Professor Dewey discovers the basis for determining the moral value of what we do; an act is morally good in so far as it represents a perfect coördination of all sides of our character; so far as it represents only one side of our character it is wrong. Now what our author criticises is not Professor Dewey's doctrine itself but its claims to represent the standpoint of psychology. In Professor Dewey's view the real man is represented only in a perfect coördination of all his impulses; but for psychology all the activities of the man, many-sided or one-sided, mutually consistent or inconsistent, are equally expressive of his real nature. Professor Dewey's standpoint is, accordingly, the standpoint not of psychology, but of the metaphysical doctrine of absolute idealism. As a result of this standpoint he ignores the difficulties of the ethical problem. Assuming that the direction of coördination is somehow exhibited in the empirical character of the impulses themselves he fails to state in concrete terms how the ideal coördination is to be effected or in what it consists. Accordingly, he fails to show the connection between the real self, represented in perfect coördination, and the imperfect self, represented in the empirical conflict of impulses. Thus, by leaving evil actions essentially unconnected with the real person, he takes away all moral responsibility for such conduct.

WARNER FITE.

*L'évolutionnisme en morale, étude sur la philosophie de Herbert Spencer.* JEAN HALLEUX. Paris, Felix Alcan. 1901. Pp. 228.

As announced in his title the author takes Herbert Spencer as his type of evolutionary moralist. His treatment of evolutionary ethics reduces itself, therefore, to an analysis and criticism of the evolutionary hedonism presented in the 'Data of Ethics.' His analysis of the Spencerian theory, which occupies the first part of the book, is reasonably clear and objective. His criticism proceeds apparently from the standpoint of the Catholic theology and does no more than repeat the argument with which the evolutionary conception was greeted at its

first announcement by theologians generally. He holds that human life cannot be conceived as a further development of animal life; and that the course of history does not point to the future condition of universal human happiness which hedonism expects. Mr. Spencer's system fails, moreover, as an ethical theory, to satisfy our moral consciousness and to explain our sense of duty. And, finally, from a practical standpoint, it offers no sufficient motive for moral effort. The author makes no attempt toward a systematic formulation of his own view, but from occasional remarks it appears that his philosophical system (which is also a system of theology) is practically identical with the idealistic view known in ethics as the theory of self-realization.

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*Les Maladies du Sentiment Religieux.* E. MURISIER, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Académie de Neuchâtel. Paris, Félix Alcan. 1901. Pp. 175.

This is not a clinical study of religious maladies, but an essay on the nature of religion. It is based, however, upon analysis of certain religious abnormalities under the theory that, just as the progress of dementia reveals the nature of the mind by destroying its functions one after another in the inverse order of their evolution, so the self-destruction of religion in its extreme forms may be made to reveal the essential nature of the religious impulse. Two such extreme forms, ecstasy and fanaticism, occupy substantially the whole of the author's attention. These are studied almost altogether at second hand, that is, through biographical and historical literature.

The main thought of the essay is the reduction of the contemplative and active types of religion respectively to egoistic and social impulses and the exhibition of the inner unity of the two. The contemplative type, beginning in an unsocial withdrawal from the world, culminates in ecstasy, which tends to the dissolution of the individual consciousness, while the active type leads to a fanatical effort after social uniformity and ends by destroying its own goal. The nature of religion is shown in both types, but more clearly in the mystical or contemplative life. Here three stages of the progressive dissolution are noted: First, social relations are lost from consciousness; then intellect ceases to function, and there is left, finally, the characteristic affective state of the ecstatic with its tendency to unconsciousness. From this the inference is drawn that the affective element in religion reveals the true character and the primordial rôle of the religious im-