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**Rodier's *De Anima of Aristotle Aristote. Traité de l'Ame.*  
Traduit et annoté par G. Rodier, Maître de conférences  
à la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Bordeaux.  
Paris. E. Leroux. 2 vols. 1900. Pp. xvi. 269, 589. Frcs.  
25.**

H. M'Leod Innes

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for a guess. As for the assertion that the Holkham codex agrees too well with that described in the old Cluni Catalogue to be any but it, I have argued against this in the above-mentioned lecture, and shall not repeat what I said there; but I must deny that the Holkham MS. is 'bien nettement décrit' by the words of that description *Volumen in quo continetur Cicero in Catillina et idem pro Quinto Ligario et pro rege Deiotaro et de publicis litteris et de actione idemque in Verrinis*: a point however which is quite separable from the other, and on which opinions will doubtless vary. I may observe that M. Delisle whose judgment on

the smudged *titulus* would be invaluable, does not appear to have seen it: yet the matter cannot be decided until the MS. has been submitted to the eyes of a great many palaeographical experts. But Mr. Peterson has quite decided this point to his own and Mr. Clark's satisfaction; he has reiterated 'the Cluni MS.' or 'Cluni' nearly twenty times in one paper (*Classical Review* 8. 401-406), as if a thing resting on little or no evidence could be proved by reiterated assertion. Against any such hazardous conclusion, I conceive myself bound once more to offer a determined and emphatic protest.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

## REVIEWS.

### RODIER'S *DE ANIMA OF ARISTOTLE*.

*Aristote. Traité de l'Âme.* Traduit et annoté par G. RODIER, Maître de conférences à la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Bordeaux. Paris. E. Leroux. 2 vols. 1900. Pp. xvi. 269, 589. Frcs. 25.

THE amount of work that has been bestowed on the *de anima* during the quarter of a century since the second edition of Trendelenburg might be taken to justify a new edition which did no more than put the results of those and earlier labours in an easily accessible form. M. Rodier's notes contain a copious record of the opinions of the scholars who have preceded him: but apart from this the independence and moderation of his own judgments make his book a valuable addition to the literature of the subject.

It is of course easy to suggest improvements. The notes are often on such a scale that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees, and there are many cases where particular interpretations are discussed at a length quite disproportionate to their merits. Wallace for instance is frequently treated with a ceremony which one would hardly have expected from the curt sentence with which he is dismissed in the preface. On the other hand, for all the wealth of detail there is little attempt at a general treatment of the subject. The book is nothing but text translation and notes: and I think that even at the cost of increasing its already formidable bulk an introduction might have been very useful, while there are many

questions which could be more satisfactorily treated in appendices than in notes.

The translation of a book like the *de anima* is often inevitably rather paraphrase than metaphor, if it is to be of any assistance to the understanding of the text. M. Rodier has attempted to combine the two by the method of inclosing in square brackets the words which do not form part of the literal translation. The effect is not always happy, as for instance in the following translation of B 5 417<sup>a</sup> 30-<sup>b2</sup> ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν—τρόπον 'Les deux premiers sont donc, l'un et l'autre, savants en puissance, mais l'un [devra, pour passer à l'acte, avoir été] modifié par l'étude et avoir passé, plusieurs fois, de l'habitude contraire [à la science], tandis que ce sera d'une façon différente que l'autre passera, de [l'état qui consiste à] posséder la sensibilité ou la grammaire, sans les exercer [actuellement], à [celui qui consiste dans] l'acte [même de sentir ou de mettre en œuvre la science grammaticale].'

Perhaps the most marked characteristic of M. Rodier's work is his conservative treatment of the text and in particular his steady refusal to admit dislocations. I think he sometimes carries this conservatism to an extreme point; but there are many passages where his defence of the vulgate appears to me successful. Instances may be found in A 3. 406<sup>b</sup> 2, 3 (where he retains κατὰ τὸ σῶμα and ἐνδέχεται, while in the main accepting Bonitz's criticism): in A. 4 408<sup>a</sup> 24-29 (where he points out very forcibly in opposition to Bonitz that the close re-

semblance between the *ψυχή ἁρμονία* theory and Aristotle's own makes it natural and appropriate to indicate before leaving the subject that the *ἁρμονία* theory really does give an answer to some of the most difficult problems involved): and in Γ 3, 427<sup>b</sup> 14 ff. Instances might be multiplied. But I think it will be more useful if instead of indicating the many passages where I think M. Rodier is right I refer to some of those in which I find myself unable to agree with him.

In B 1, 412<sup>a</sup> 16-17 M. Rodier does not seem to me to have fully grasped the argument. He appears to have taken the text in l. 17 as *οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἢ ψυχή* for he translates 'l'âme ne doit pas être le corps,' though he prints *τὸ σῶμα ψυχή*. But neither reading is satisfactory in view of the following words, *οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένον τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ὑποκειμένον καὶ ἄλη*, which give a reason neither for the proposition that the body is not soul nor for the proposition that the soul is not body; but for the proposition that the body is not form. The argument as I believe it must have stood may be stated as follows:—

In the case of body which being alive is not mere body but a substance composed of form and matter, the body cannot be form; for body is not predicable of a subject but is rather the subject or matter; the soul therefore must be the form of the composite substance.

The paraphrase of Themistius gives the argument substantially as I have given it, ending with the conclusion *ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ οὕτως οὐσίαν ὡς εἶδος*. It then proceeds *ὅτι γὰρ οὐ σῶμα ἢ ψυχή οὐδὲ ὑποκειμένου χώραν ἔχει....* This appears to me to suggest that in his text the conclusion that soul is the form was based on the two propositions (1) that body is not the form, and (2) that the soul is not body. If this was so, our text would seem to have preserved only the second of the two propositions together with the argument used in support of the first. However this may be, I feel clear that some such words as *οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα εἶδος* should replace the words *οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχή* in their present position.

In A 1, 402<sup>b</sup> 5-7 where the question is raised as to the possibility of defining soul as a whole, and in B 3, 414<sup>b</sup> 19-28 where it is taken up and answered, M. Rodier devotes considerable labour and ingenuity to showing that the objection to a single definition is that the kinds of soul are not

co-ordinate but subordinate, *i.e.*, that the nutritive soul is comprehended in the sensitive, and so on. As he summarises it (p. 20) 'l'âme n'est pas un genre, et il n'y en a pas, à proprement parler, de définition, parce que les diverses sortes d'âmes ne sont pas des espèces coordonnées; qu'il y a, entre elles, de l'antérieur et du postérieur.' So again, (p. 217) 'Aristote ne songe pas à la question de l'existence des genres; il dit seulement que l'âme n'est pas un genre.' I think this involves a misconception of the two passages in question and perhaps of the position of universals in Aristotle's theory of knowledge. What Aristotle says in B 3 is not that 'l'âme n'est pas un genre' at all: but that in the case of kinds of soul as in that of geometrical figures the only general notion which will fit all is one which is not proper to any particular kind of soul or any particular figure, and that it is absurd to look for a general notion in these *as in other cases* without investigating the infimae species. He does not base the argument on *τὸ ἐφεξῆς* at all, but brings that in subsequently as a mere note of the closeness of the analogy between geometrical figures and the kinds of soul. The point of the words *οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.* is not peculiar to classes of which the components are in series, as may be seen in *Met. Z. 13. 1038<sup>b</sup> 10-1039<sup>a</sup> 2*: nor I think would Aristotle recognise it as accurate to say that *σχῆμα* and *ψυχή* are not genera (see for instance *Met. B 3. 999<sup>a</sup> 10-12*). The case is in fact a particular application of the doctrine that in strictness the object of knowledge is the form which is common to all individuals of a species, not the genus.

In Γ 2, 425<sup>b</sup> 15-17 *εἴτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἢ τῆς ὀψεως αἰσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσιν ἢ αὐτῆ τισ ἔσται αὐτῆς* M. Rodier translates 'En outre, alors même que le sens de la vision serait autre [que la vue], ou bien il faudra aller à l'infini, ou bien ce second sens devra se sentir lui-même.' The obvious translation of the words *ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον—αὐτῆς* seems to me however to be 'either the series [of senses each having its predecessor for object] will continue to infinity or some one of the series will have itself for object.' And the logic of the argument also favours this view: for strictly the necessary alternative to the continuation of the series to infinity is not that the second of the series but that some one of the series should be its own object.

In Γ 2, 426<sup>b</sup> 15-17 M. Rodier prefaces his own explanation by arguing chiefly on the strength of *de part. an. B. 10. 656<sup>a</sup> 27 ff.* that the organ of touch and the organ of the

common sense are identical, and also from *de an.* B. 11. 422<sup>b</sup> 34–423<sup>b</sup> 26 that flesh is not the organ of touch : and then proceeds ‘Aristote remarque donc ici que l’organe immédiat du sens commun ne peut pas être la chair. Et il en donne la raison suivante : le sens commun doit saisir la différence des sensibles qu’il discerne ; il faut donc qu’il les sente l’un et l’autre, ce qui revient à dire que l’organe du sens commun doit être affecté par l’un et par l’autre. Comme la chair n’est affectée que par contact, il faudrait, pour qu’elle fût l’organe du sens commun, que les sensibles visuels et sonores, par exemple, exerçassent un contact sur elle. ce qui, en fait, n’a pas lieu.’ This appears to me eminently unsatisfactory as an interpretation. If Aristotle is here assuming the correctness of the argument of B. 11 according to which flesh is not the organ of touch but a medium whose function in relation to the sense of touch corresponds to that of air and water in relation to sight hearing and smell, I do not see that there is any possible point in considering at all whether it is the organ of the common sense. On the other hand if, as the words *ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἀπτόμενου αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρίνον* to my mind suggest, the popular opinion that *σάρξ* is the organ of touch and that touch requires no medium is here assumed, the argument is consecutive enough : flesh, the organ of the fundamental sense of touch, cannot be the immediate organ of the common sense, for if it were, a judgment could only be passed by touching the object itself : nor indeed can a judgment involving qualities perceptible by different senses be formed by means of any of the organs of sense taken separately. I do not think the analysis of B. 11 is at all fatal to this view. Aristotle is quite capable of dissenting from the popular opinion and then returning to it and using it where his distinction is unimportant for the question under discussion. In fact he has already done so in regard to the argument of B. 11 in *Γ. 1.* 424<sup>b</sup> 27–30,

*καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἀφ᾽ ἧ αἰσθητὰ ἔστιν, ἦν τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες· ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἀπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἀπλοῖς, λέγω δ’ οἶον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι.*

An instance of conservatism verging on the heroic is to be found in *Γ. 6.* 430<sup>b</sup> 14–20. Prof. Bywater (*Journal of Philology*, vol. xvii. p. 58) has pointed out that the clause *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ—ἀδιαίρετα* (ll. 16, 17) and the following sentences are appropriate if not necessary as a supplement to the words *εἰ δ’ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν* (ll. 13, 14) : and his reconstruction of the passage, by simply transferring τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν—ψυχῆς (ll. 14, 15) to a position after *μήκει* in l. 20, and reading *ὁ νοεῖ* for *ὃ νοεῖ* in l. 16 appears to me quite convincing. M. Rodier keeps the order of the vulgate but in ll. 16, 17 reads *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐκεῖνα, διαίρετὰ ὃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἄλλη ἀδιαίρετα*, the only changes being the placing of the comma before instead of after *διαίρετὰ* and the substitution of *ἄλλη* for *ἀλλ’ ἦ*. He understands the sentence as referring to the *νόησις τῶν τῷ εἶδει ἀδιαίρετων*, and takes *ἐκεῖνα* as meaning *τὰ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετα*. His interpretation may be put shortly as follows : ‘the *ἀδιαίρετα τῷ εἶδει* are apprehended in an indivisible time and by an indivisible mental operation : the time and the mental operation can only be regarded as divisible accidentally, and not as in the case of *ἀδιαίρετα κατὰ ποσὸν* (which are *δυνάμει διαίρετὰ*) : and in all other respects they are indivisible.’ Apart from the question whether *ἡ ἐκεῖνα* and *ἄλλη ἀδιαίρετα* can bear the meanings assigned to them the result seems to me both clumsy in expression and inept in substance. It does not perhaps necessarily follow that it is not what Aristotle wrote ; but I cannot believe that it is.

In conclusion I would repeat that students of Aristotle owe M. Rodier a debt of gratitude for a really valuable book.

H. M<sup>c</sup>LEOD INNES.

### CHOLMELEY'S *THEOCRITUS*.

*The Idylls of Theocritus*. Edited with Introduction and Notes by R. J. CHOLMELEY, M.A., Assistant Master at the City of London School. London : George Bell & Sons. 1901. Pp. viii, 392. 7s. 6d.

PROBABLY in no country has Theocritus been

more diligently studied or had greater influence upon the native literature than in Britain. Yet though this study dates back more than three hundred years, the helps supplied to students by scholars have on the whole been curiously meagre. A goodly number of editions have appeared but com