

pronounced than for the second to the third day. This the authors attribute to the influence of habit rather than to facility gained by practice, for the former exerted in the control of disturbing processes reaches its height under such conditions quicker than the latter. Practice quite generally in the experiments shortens the time of perception and, according as the inclination is to misreadings or omission, causes a decrease of the former or latter. Fatigue, which appears to stand in close relation to practice, develops the opposite effects, yet, on account of the changing conditions of work and the short time of the experiment, its effect was limited.

From the results obtained conclusions are drawn as to the different influences which determine the formation of the process of apprehension. Such influences are: (1) quickness of perception, which determines the distinctness of the impressions; (2) articulation of apprehension, which determines the clearness of the constituent parts of the impression; (3) sensuous precision of perception and influence of ideas, which affect the reliableness of apprehension; (4) the more or less striving or effort to make the best possible record, which leads to the suppression of readings felt to be erroneous; (5) practice and fatigue; (6) memory, noticeable in the frequent return of the same misreading in the same word.

The combined effect of these conditions occurring with different strength in the individual observers determines the aptness of apprehension. In closing, a characterization of the different subjects is made on the basis of the proportion and combination of those influences appearing in the investigation.

E. C. JONES.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

Aussenwelt und Innenwelt, Leib und Seele. JOHANNES REHMKE.

Rektorats rede Univ., Greifswald. Greifswald, 1898. Pp. 48.

Zur Parallelismusfrage. G. HEYMANS. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Bd. XVII., Heft, I.-II., S. 62.

Die erkenntnisstheoretische Stellung des Psychologen. RUD.

WEINMANN. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Bd. XVII., Heft 3, 4, S. 215.

Professor Rehmke has given us, in his inaugural address of last spring, what is designed as an exhaustive statement of the possibilities of general theory touching the relation of mind and body, and a decision on logical grounds in favor of interaction. In a preliminary historical sketch his aim is to show in their simplicity the logical motives that have forced the development of theory. In his direct treat-

ment of the problem the distinction between the thing or (more generally) the existence, and its properties, furnishes the basis. Ancient materialism regarded the mind as a thing, modern materialism as the property or peculiarity of a thing—the body or brain. The Platonic teaching and the author regard it not as a thing but as a separate immaterial existence. Solipsism regards the body as a property or peculiarity of the mind. Spinozism (a name that Dr. Rehmke gives to modern parallelism in general) accounts mind and body as equally properties or peculiarities of a substance which manifests itself in them. Experience tells us that mind and body are connected. Experience tells us also that the connection of ‘things’ is causal. If mind and body are both ‘things,’ they interact. But the mind is not a thing; the grounds need not be here repeated. In that case, it is held, it cannot be a party to interaction, for only natures alike in kind can interact. How then shall we understand the evident connection? Shall we say with modern materialism that the body (or brain) is the thing and the mind the property? But in no case, as here, can a thing be to all appearance fully conceived without its property, and its property without the thing, and against this as against the view that the body is a mere property of the mind the testimony of experience to the distinctness of mind and body in our world of reality is final. Are the two connected then as properties of a third somewhat? The Spinozistic doctrine merely repeats the fallacy of Occasionalism; it resorts to an alien substance to do what it has pronounced impossible. Experience does not show us a quality changing punctually of itself whenever another quality of the same existence changes. The connection of quality with quality must then on this view be causal. But two qualities of the same existence do not stand in causal relation to each other, nor an existence in causal relation to its qualities. We must recognize the following pair of first principles: (1) Only a separate existence suffers change; qualities cannot suffer it. (2) An existence suffers change only when there is another existence involved as the active condition of the change. (Reference to author’s *Lehrbuch d. Psych.*, S. 41–45, and *Zeits. f. imm. Phil.*, Bd. II., S. 349 ff.). Mind and body are accordingly separate existences interacting. The rule that all interacting existences must be alike in kind is a hasty generalization from the fact that interacting *things* are alike in kind. But is not the quantity of motion (Dr. Rehmke rejects the term ‘energy’ as vague) unalterable? How then can non-physical things produce it? The answer is that the law, which is universal, applies only where thing moves thing, not where a non-physical existence causes a

thing to gain or lose motion. How far, if at all, the brain loses motion when the mind is affected, and the mind parts with power (in any sense) when the brain is affected, we are not yet in a position to determine.

Dr. Rehmke's subtle and dexterous treatment of this much agitated question may be described as scholastic, if relentless logical analysis entirely without psychological analysis of the terms is the typical scholastic tendency. The argument seems to depend wholly on the finality and exhaustiveness of the distinction, as applied for instance to the mind, between a 'separate existence' and its 'properties.' It is curious to see so assured an idealist as Dr. Rehmke so confident of this. His remarks on parallelism, in part fruitfully suggestive, are vitiated by his confounding the modern theory in all its forms with Spinozism. Were Clifford and Fechner (themselves far enough apart) believers in a 'substance' of which mind and body were the 'properties'? Moreover, when the author speaks of the hypothesis that when a pin produces a wound, and through it a cerebral discharge, the pin's psychic counterpart produces the psychic counterpart of the bodily disturbances and then the pain accompanying the cerebral discharge, as a fancy too mystical to be entertained by the modern parallelist, he is tossing aside what many regard as of the essence of their principle. To substitute 'the conservation of motion' for that of energy, as though the former would be acknowledged tantamount to the latter, or more generally regarded as true, is a serious error. It should be remarked, too, that an author who uses the term 'the solipsists' to designate one of the schools of philosophical opinion should inform us who these thinkers may be and where they are to be found.

The best comment on the artificial method of Dr. Rehmke's essay is furnished by the second on our list; the article of a fellow-idealist defending 'monastic' parallelism from the attacks of Professor Stumpf and more recent writers. Dr. Heymans calls attention to many misunderstandings of the theory, rejects Spinoza's substance, and in a lengthened exposition explains that it is only from the convenient point of view of the human mind, which makes an independent enduring world of its own perceptions, instead of conceiving the world in the true terms of outer mind-stuff, and so doubles the facts, that there is any parallelism at all. The remainder of his article consists of acute replies to the recent assailants of the theory. The objections to it on the score of evidence he does not fully face. This essay is the most closely and carefully reasoned of the three before us.

The article on the epistemological position of the psychologist is

a vigorous defence of realism by psychological arguments. The author advances to battle with a light heart, and lays about him with boyish confidence against the whole host of contemporary German phenomenists, Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern, Kaufmann, Mach, Rehmke, Leclair, Laas, Cornelius, Avenarius; that is to say, the school of 'immanente Philosophie,' the strict sect of Avenarius, and certain detached kinsfolk of these. "The psychological compulsion which drives us to apprehend that which we are conscious of, which we experience, as objective, is no mere jest which our Psyche perpetrates, but an instinctive indication of the view to which the purely philosophical and logical consideration of the matter of experience by rightful consequence leads." Various departments of psychology are drawn upon to show the underlying realistic assumption of the science. Much is made of the argument that idealism does away with the distinction between psychology and other sciences. It can hardly be said that the article exhibits a delicate sense of the besetting difficulties of the long-vexed problem or a complete grasp of the opinions it condemns. It is a philosophical instance of the illusion of simplicity.

D. A. MILLER.

PHILADELPHIA.

NEW BOOKS.

Social Elements. C. R. HENDERSON. New York, Scribners. 1898. Pp. ix + 405.

Le Rôle Social de la Femme. Mme. A. LAMPÉRIÈRE. Paris, Alcan. 1898. Pp. 175. Fr. 2.75.

La Psicologia contemporanea. GUIDO VILLA. Bibliot. di Scienze Moderne. Turin, Bocca. 1899. Pp. 660. Lire 14.

Report of U. S. Commissioner of Education, 1896-7. W. F. HARRIS, Vol. 2. Washington, Govt. Press. 1898. Pp. vii and 1137-2390.

L'Instabilité mentale. G. L. DUPRAT. Paris, Alcan. 1898. Pp. 310.

Wild Animals I have Known. E. S. THOMPSON. New York, Scribners. 1898. Pp. 358. \$2.50.

A delightful series of chapters on animal genius-heroes. Mr. Thompson ought to tell us more explicitly, however, just what incidents the psychologist may quote on his authority as a naturalist!

J. M. B.