

values, the rhythm of emotions, hope and fear, pity and hatred, the semi-logical satisfaction from the movement of the plot—all produce equally an intensification of the value of the personality involved, and a consonance in the merely intuitive processes. Even ethical values in the presentation become simply elements to enhance the value of the æsthetic whole. Though Hamann nowhere indicates as much, the ideas of tragical guilt, of fate, of poetic justice, which appear so constantly in the classical drama and have often been conceived as essentials of the tragic, would presumably be interpreted by him simply as means among others to produce the æsthetic consonance and necessity of the drama, at a time when they were profound beliefs, and not an essential part of the ethically tragic.

The undoubted basis of this fundamental distinction between the tragic and tragedy is an ultimate distinction between the ethical and the æsthetic. As a provisional differentiation this is important, and the distinction between the tragic and tragedy is, therefore, valuable provisionally. It has also to recommend it, the ease with which much of modern tragedy is explicable under this formula. The reviewer does not feel, however, that Hamann has done justice to the ethical meaning of tragedy, meaning by tragedy the union of the ethically tragic and the æsthetic psychosis. 'Tragical elevation' is itself an ethical sentiment and of ethical significance. The healing of the breach would follow only from a study of the ethical meaning of the æsthetic experience itself. This, of course, was not the writer's problem, and his provisional distinction is enlightening.

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PERCEPTION OF TIME.

Perception of Change and Duration. G. F. STOUT. *Mind*, IX., 1-7, January, 1900.

This is the presidential address delivered before the Aristotelian Society, November, 1899. It discusses the question as to how far and in what sense it is necessary, when we perceive a temporal process, that representations of prior parts of the time series should be present to consciousness in the perception of succeeding parts. Green and Hodgson are cited in support of the view that in perceiving a time sequence the presentations of prior stages must persist in later stages. This may be called the memory-image theory.

The views of two recent German writers are stated and criticized. Meinong defends the memory-image theory, but on theoretical rather

than on introspective grounds. He maintains, for example, that a melody is not presented until the last note of it is heard. Mr. Stout admits that "we must have *some sort* of apprehension of the terms related in order to apprehend a relation," but denies that these terms must necessarily be presented as distinct memory-images.

Schumann, on the other hand, holds that for psychical elements to form a whole they need not be presented together. The accompanying process which makes such perception possible need not be a memory-image; it is sufficient to assume a physiological or psychical disposition. As Mr. Stout puts it in his *Manual of Psychology*, "The persistent traces of past experience may modify present experience and be modified by it, without reappearance of the content of the past experience in the actual moment of present consciousness. * * * Successive series of a rhythmic character can at their close be apprehended as a whole without mentally reproducing and discriminating in the moment of apprehension the several sequent parts which compose them" (pp. 78-79).

The clue to Mr. Stout's own view seems to be found in the following sentence: "To 'form a single whole' means to act as a whole." This accords with his teaching also in his *Psychology*. It is because a given succession of sounds, for example, stimulates an incipient response on the part of the organism that this series of sounds is apprehended as a whole. This incipient act of the organism requires such a series for the maintenance of its conative unity and continuity, hence this is the point of view from which to interpret the perceptual process. The time unit is always ultimately the activity, as represented in the interest or end. This explains why "a man may be able to estimate lapse of time with a fair amount of accuracy, and yet not have established an accurate relation between his subjective estimate and time as measured by the clock" (p. 387).

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APHASIA.

Weiterer Beitrag zur Kenntniss der Beziehungen zwischen Aphasie und Geisteskrankheit. Privatdocent Dr. KARL HEILBRONNER, Halle a. S. Zeitschrift f. Psychologie, Bd. XXIV., 83.

The present article is a continuation of previously published examinations of an individual case (Wernicke's *Psychiat. Abh.*, Heft. I., and *Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie*, Bd. LV.).

The patient was a man who, in consequence of an acute mental disturbance, with hallucinations, etc., superficially giving symptoms