

#### IV.—DEFINITION AND PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

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THE process of Definition may be supposed by this time to have been exhaustively handled. This is so far true in theory, although derelictions in practice are frequent enough. In Reid's preliminary chapter to his first Essay on the Intellectual Powers, the nature of definition is stated in accordance with the usage of logicians; while yet he is convicted by Hamilton of confounding *verbal* and *real* definition. The following note (p. 220) is appended by Hamilton to his remark that individuals cannot be defined. "It is well said by the old logicians, *Omnis intuitiva notitia est definitio*;—that is, *a view of the thing itself is its best definition*. And this is true, both of the objects of sense, and of the objects of self-consciousness." Which of the old logicians originated this formula I cannot say; I have never seen it quoted in any other place. Hamilton's rendering, strictly interpreted, gives it a somewhat limited scope. He would seem to mean by it the actual presentation to sense of the thing to be defined; an interpretation, however, incompatible with his including the objects of self-consciousness: these, it is well known, cannot be shown except in a roundabout, indirect fashion.

It is now generally understood that definition is inapplicable to ultimate notions; a limitation, however, not observed hitherto by our dictionary makers. A further limitation is the case of notions in their nature, composite or derivative, but not explicable by means of their components. Thus Life, Death, Health, Disease, Combustion cannot be defined except by reference to concrete examples known to those addressed. Considering, then, definition in its wider and vaguer meaning of rendering intelligible truths conveyed by language,—as, in fact, an instrument of popular explanation rather than a process of science,—its scope might be assigned under the operation of bringing about an agreement among different persons as to the thing denoted by a given name. If, from any circumstances, people in general conceive precisely alike what is intended by the use of a given word, that word is defined for the purposes of mutual understanding, and for the explication of any complex meanings wherein it plays a part. That there are many such names, is shown by

the possibility of addressing intelligent discourse to large masses of mankind. No doubt, in technical and abstruse subjects, names are used belonging to the ordinary vocabulary of life, but with certain special restrictions, which have to be previously comprehended by the listeners to instruction in those subjects. Indeed, in every department of knowledge that has been reduced to scientific form, it is necessary to prepare an introduction, in order that the names employed may be freed from any indistinctness contracted in popular usage. The expositor of a science gladly avails himself of all such names as have no ambiguity in themselves, that is, are understood, in exactly the same way, by all the persons that have to be addressed. Such words would be the suitable medium of explication of difficult and abstruse terms that otherwise are not clearly or unambiguously interpreted.

The foregoing observations are more or less applicable to the entire vocabulary of Mind as employed in Psychology. A certain number of terms belonging to that vocabulary are self-explaining and need no definition; the sole and sufficient reason being that they refer to facts or phenomena so familiar, and so little ambiguous, that we are all at one as to their meaning. They become therefore the stepping stones to the definition or explanation of the other class of terms, still more numerous—those expressing important generalities of high range, and more or less abstruse signification, for which all the resources of methodical definition are requisite. We shall exemplify both kinds, after stating the exact drift of the present article, which is to be occupied with the consideration of the leading term "Consciousness".

For many purposes, and on numerous occasions, this word is remarkably free from ambiguity, as well as being intelligible to ordinary understandings. It, however, becomes involved in a number of subtle and difficult problems; and thereby takes on applications not so easy to unravel. Its import is so wide, that it seems to include in its grasp the whole of our mental life; being a sort of generic word under which our various mental functions are so many species. Such being the case, we might readily suppose that all the great psychological issues are bound up with it. Yet great though its scope may be, there are good reasons for not making it the central term of all Psychology; as will become apparent in the course of our examination of its sphere. We propose to show that there are certain definite issues better connected with the name than with any other name;

while we shall have occasion to allude to certain problems more properly and advantageously associated with a different selection from the vocabulary.

Let me now briefly exemplify the two classes of terms formerly alluded to, as entering into the vocabulary of mind. Among those of the first class—universally understood in the same sense—the foremost to be quoted is the all-important couple, *Pleasure and Pain*. Assuming that we are so far observant of what goes on in our introspective consciousness as to be aware that we are at times pleased, and at other times pained, we find ourselves in agreement with one another upon these facts of our experience. We do not confound a pleasure with a pain, nor with a state of mind that is neither the one nor the other. The properties of the Object world, with all their explicitness, are scarcely more clear or less mistakable than these two leading properties of our truly mental life; consequently by the use of those terms, which need no definition in themselves, we can introduce exactness of meaning into the less certain terminology of the mind.

Another unambiguous fact of the Subject world is the process known as *Discrimination, Sense of Difference, Feeling of Difference, Consciousness of Difference*; all which designations belong to our strictly mental operations, and express something that cannot be mistaken or confounded with anything else,—say *Pleasure and Pain*. This too is above the necessity of being defined; it is intuitively known and is so specific and clear that it means the same to all intelligent beings.

The operation named *Feeling of Resemblance, Similarity, Recognition, Sense of Agreement*, is also a perfectly definite fact of our mental nature, which we do not confound with anything else. When we say that two things are to our apprehension similar, we indicate a truly mental act, and our hearers accept the statement precisely as we intend that they should.

Another name that represents a well understood process, which we take note of from early years, and find ourselves at one with our neighbours upon, is the process called *Memory, Remembering, Retaining in the Mind*. This is a process truly mental, highly distinct and characteristic, and serving to cover a very large part of our mental being. Our language provides numerous equivalents or synonyms for this grand function, and most of them are intelligible and unequivocal. Such are, *Learning, Forgetting, Acquiring, Getting by Heart, Lessons, Drill*, and so on. The use of any one of those names conveys to all hearers a familiar

fact of their experience; they need no dictionary definition, they carry within themselves a reference to each one's familiar experience, and are understood accordingly.

We are not done with our enumeration of terms, belonging to the Subject world, so completely unambiguous as to be above the possibility of being misunderstood. In the names Action, Activity, with the opposites Passive or Passivity we have also a basis of common agreement in stating mental facts. Action is no doubt applicable to the powers of the material world, but it is also a term for the mental world, which the other use does not render obscure.

We shall presently see the importance of another familiar and unmistakable couple of terms, belonging to our mental as well as bodily life—the couple Sleeping and Waking. Upon the meanings of those terms, there can be no dispute.

Such being a few of the chief members of our stepping stone terminology, it is necessary merely to mention, by way of illustrative contrast, some examples of the other class:—Consciousness, Feeling, Emotion, Will, Intellect, Thought, Presentation, Perception, Idea, Ideal, Cognition, Belief, &c.

Our present handling is intended to bear on the name “Consciousness”. In fully considering its definition, we shall adduce the problems most suitably attached thereto; the attachment being justified by the fact that they benefit by its being correctly defined. There are such problems; while others could be cited that would not be affected by the same means, however plausible might be the connexion.

In arriving at the desired definition by the instrumentality above described, we may lead off with the couple last cited in the enumeration of contributing terms, namely, Sleep and Waking. While Sleep, unaccompanied with dreams, is the abeyance of Consciousness, becoming awake is its resumption. The awakened consciousness may be very various in its degree and in its contents. It may be so feeble as to possess no specific quality in prominence; it may rise to every gradation of intensity; while its modes may be as various as the recognised operations of our mental being. The term is properly applicable under all these fluctuations. It gives no indication of the special mode of mental activity; it means only that the mind is alive and at work in some of its manifestations, and not in suspense or dormant. Reasons will have to be given for not subdividing and classifying our mental manifestations under the name as a genus; some other name or names being assignable as better suited for that purpose.

While sleep and waking constitute our first and best

approach to a common understanding as to the scope or meaning of consciousness, we may derive a further contribution from other occasions of producing the unconscious state. Such are brain-concussion, anæsthetics, temporary prostration or exhaustion of the powers, cerebral paralysis, —all which repeat the effect of sleep, and render the meaning of consciousness intelligible and familiar from its privation. Up to this point, we may safely affirm that there is no term in the psychological vocabulary better agreed upon than Consciousness, all-comprehensive although it may seem to be.

It is easy to quote other terms that carry consciousness with them ; in other words, that specify conditions which, when occurring, suppose the mind to be awake, and not in any form of suspense. Most prominent of these is the couple—Pleasure and Pain, so distinguished for their universal intelligibility. True, there are certain subtleties, in the way of theory, that to a certain extent obscure the limits of their signification ; yet, in point of fact, such subtleties apart, the ordinary understanding has no sort of difficulty as to their meaning. There may be processes truly mental that carry but little consciousness with them, that may accomplish effective thought-transitions on the verge of unconsciousness, even if not entirely immersed in that condition ; but pleasure is not pleasure, if not conscious ; the measure of the pleasure is the measure of the consciousness : a greater pleasure or a greater pain means a greater consciousness. In the region of Will, the proportion does not apply in the same unqualified form ; it applies to the incidence of motive, in other words, to Feeling, but not necessarily or fully to the expenditure of energy in execution. The process named Habit, one of the well known and unambiguous mental terms, is the enemy of Consciousness, while, at the same time, leading to a mental result. The intellectual trains, in so far as Conscious, involve a certain energy or degree of Feeling or of Will ; they also become conscious according as Habit has not supervened to give them a mechanical or automatic flow.

‘Attention’ would be properly included among the terms that in ordinary speech give rise to no ambiguity. This happy immunity from doubt is somewhat interfered with by the employment of the term to designate mere conscious intensity, with or without voluntary prompting. Nevertheless, the degree of attention is a measure of the degree of consciousness ; total inattention would mean total unconsciousness with reference to some special solicitation for the time being.

The further consideration of the mode of defining Consciousness will be taken along with the critical problems to be adduced for elucidation.

*The Object Consciousness.*—That our recognition of the so-called external and extended world is a mode of consciousness is not denied. The question that has given rise to controversy relates to the meaning or import of what we are conscious of, and not as to the distinctness of mode, whereby this form of consciousness is put in contrast with the various modes designated under the generic name Subject. Our purpose at present does not involve any further reference to the well-known contrast of object properties and subject properties.

*Truths of Consciousness.*—This phrase has a meaning only when we add to the designation Consciousness something not implied in the mere notion of awakeness. That when we are awake, or conscious, we are really so, must be assumed as certain. We cannot be mistaken in that fact. Even the wide compass of mental derangement hardly includes the circumstance that any one under some form of conscious manifestation—pleasure, pain, will, thought—regards himself as in a state of profound slumber. It is only when further questions are raised, such as the intuitive knowledge of an absolute beyond the import of present consciousness, that there is any matter to work upon. When such questions are really agitated, they should be kept apart from the term Consciousness and related to some more special designation. The supposed certainty of consciousness attaches only to the limited sphere of our strict definition, beyond which certainty must be sought in other ways.

*Consciousness in contrast to Mind.*—While Mind must be understood to cover the entire storage of mental impressions including the position that they hold in the cerebral organisation when absolutely inactive, or exercising no mental agency, the term Consciousness refers purely to the moments of mental wakefulness or mental efficiency for present ends. All the permanent products stored up in the mental organisation have found their way there through a period of Consciousness; they serve their function in the mental economy mainly during a return to full consciousness. Consciousness thus resembles the scenery of a theatre actually on the stage, at any one moment; which scenery is a mere selection from the stores in reserve for the many pieces that have been, or may be, performed.

Our next head also contributes to the elucidation of this great contrast.

*The Conscious Area.*—This designation expresses a feature of consciousness vital in itself and ramifying into many various issues. Taken at any one instant of time, the content of consciousness has a very small compass indeed.

The conscious area is known to be limited by the unity of the executive ; and its limitation is expressed by the common saying that we attend to only one thing at a time. The qualifications of this dictum are of first rate importance in Psychology, and are given in connexion with the several senses, more especially those of extension—Sight and Touch. Passing by this important consideration, what we have to say of consciousness is that every conscious impulse leaves a stamp behind it, after it has ceased or after the agency is withdrawn. Upon this stamp, or permanent hold, depends in the long run our entire compass of Memory or Retention. Its operation is far-reaching ; but what concerns more directly the play of consciousness is the ready and immediate recurrence of what has just been in consciousness for the temporary constructiveness of the Mind. It is like the different pieces of clay thrown off by the potter, and momentarily laid aside, till a sufficient number are prepared for a special design. Along with the consciousness of any one instant, we have a number of recent states just out of consciousness, and constantly tending to recur in a more or less irregular fashion ; the irregularity being only apparent, and the circumstances governing the recurrence being duly assignable.

The narrowness of the conscious area is the peculiar limitation of the human powers, as contrasted with our notion of Omniscience. The stringency of the limitation is overcome by a certain power of rapid transition, by which constructive results can be gained, involving several successive phases of conscious representation. Owing to this circumstance alone, we have a difficulty in saying how much is contained in an absolutely instantaneous shock of Consciousness.

The great practical question, as now hinted at, consists in setting forth, in the most appropriate language, the motives or rousing influences of consciousness, and the sources of preferential attention or concentration amid competing elements. It is here that we have to decide on the respective merits of the proposed terminology for conscious action, with which is implicated the further question of the inter-causation of the three great components of the Subject Mind. Which of all the three fundamentals of Mind is to be considered as the initial motive in making us mentally alive ? Do they each operate in their turn as primary causes ?



*Consciousness as essential to Memory.*—It is certainly true in the main that, in order to make permanent acquisitions, or to associate trains of ideas, such trains must, in the first instance, have been started in consciousness. It is a recognised condition of retentiveness, that the things retained must have had the full occupation of our conscious moments, for a longer or shorter time, and that the more intense the conscious flame, the more rapid is the adhesive growth. Of this as a general principle there can be no sort of doubt; it being the basis and ruling circumstance of our effective education. It is somewhat qualified by the physical state of the nerves at the time, which may chance to be more favourable to excitement than to the permanent growth of the associating links. This, however, does not affect the main thesis. The seeming exceptions are of a different kind. There are undoubted appearances in favour of the operation of adhesive growth outside the conscious area. In stating as a fact of infant growth, that the reflex and spontaneous activities are confirmed by repetition, we assume an extra-conscious region of our education. It is no doubt the case that, in this region, the consecutive acts are already established, and merely want greater fixity. But whether two movements originally disjoined could be in the first instance brought together out of consciousness is a different matter: there is nothing to lead us to suppose that this is in any way practicable. When we have to deal with impressions of the various senses, and with their aggregation, into groups and trains, we must pronounce without scruple that such groupings require to begin in consciousness, and have their pace determined by the conscious intensity.

Here, then, is one of the problems decisively implicated with the name Consciousness and not so well placed under any other name: whether or not there be important mental modifications arising in the intervals of our consciousness, as during sleep, or momentary distraction from the matter in question.

*Immediate Physical Conditions of Consciousness.*—The vast problem of the connexion of Mind and Body, the depths and ramifications of which pass beyond our most sanguine hopes of future research, assumes a more compassable form, when we restrict the inquiry to consciousness proper as we have defined it. The transitions from sleep to wakefulness, from feeble to intense consciousness, although not understood in their whole extent, are yet allied with a variety of palpable and explicable physical changes that are clearly statable and of the greatest practical moment. From such



alliances of the mental and the physical, we draw very decisive inferences regarding the great question of the connexion of mind and body in their entire compass. The accompaniment of movements of Expression with states of Feeling is known to hold in measured concomitance, and is a key to the mode of nervous actuation that consciousness probably requires.

*Reflex Actions and Consciousness ; Animal Automatism.*—In the usual classification of Reflex actions, we begin with those where consciousness has no part, as breathing, and end in those where consciousness participates, and is to a certain extent regulative, but is only partly essential, as in withdrawing the limb from a hot contact. For this situation, the terms 'unconscious' and 'conscious' are strictly and properly applicable; and the reference to them contributes to fix the characteristic meaning of the words. It further illustrates the connexion of consciousness with our truly voluntary activities in their full play. Actions properly voluntary lose their character, under two extremes or gradations—on the one hand, their shading into the Reflex, and on the other hand, their passing into the Habitual. In both cases, they part to a corresponding degree with their conscious character, as is seen by their giving room for other occupants of the conscious area.

The problem of Consciousness is stated in a new aspect when we put the question—Are animals automata? It is supposable that the nervous system, by its complications and adjustments, could perform all the acts that animals are capable of, without consciousness, as well as with. The obvious difficulty is that in our own experience we have two classes of mental activities,—one with and the other without consciousness; and that animals can reach to the higher as well as the lower kind. With us, consciousness is a requisite of acquired powers; by it we are learners from experience, and not mere machines performing an ingrained and routine part. The lower animals too learn from experience in the same way, and it would be a gratuitous departure from fair analogy, if we were to suppose that their acquired powers are unconnected with consciousness. With us, intensified consciousness hastens permanent impressions and the education resulting therefrom. The same thing is presumed and acted upon in our artificial training of animals. Thus it is, that we seem shut in to attribute to them the same consciousness as we find in ourselves, with modifications that can be partly conceived by referring to the various gradations of our own conscious experience. We see in the dog the

same fitful changes of attention as in ourselves, the same lapses of consciousness of purpose, with the same facility of recovery under the conditions known to ourselves. If we hesitated to apply to animals the distinction now supposed, we should have to adopt an entirely new variety of descriptive language for their mental operations.

The arguments for animal consciousness may be summarised in the following heads: (1) The cerebral structure so closely resembling our own, in the higher species more particularly, and accompanied with no serious gap until we reach the invertebrates, with whom the plan of cerebrum is considerably modified. (2) The manifested expression under exciting agencies of the class that in human beings are accompanied with pleasure or pain. (3) The effect of the same agencies upon movements of pursuit or avoidance, that is to say, such voluntary activity as they would give birth to in humanity. The cumulative force of these arguments has always been accounted a strong case in favour of animal consciousness, as opposed to a mechanism typified by reflex activity, notwithstanding any supposable degree of complication.

It seems to me, however, that stronger than any of these arguments is the consideration, above adverted to, of the absolute necessity of consciousness in order to acquisition. No fact of our constitution is more irrefragable than this; to refuse to apply it to creatures susceptible of education is gratuitous and unwarrantable. Instead of lightening our difficulties with regard to Animal Psychology, it aggravates them in an extraordinary degree. As an argument, the fact now given is the crown of the three foregoing analogical proofs, and outstrips them all in cogency.

It is often a matter of speculative curiosity, what is the nature and amount of the consciousness in any given member of the animal tribe. Even human beings, in endeavouring to penetrate each other's consciousness, are liable to a certain amount of error, being never entirely sure that the same symptoms mean precisely the same thing—the same conscious mode. Such, and no other, is our fundamental difficulty with the animals. Employing the four classes of indications we have assigned we are entitled to infer both the mode and the intensity of the conscious state in any one case. Probably the most effective measure of conscious endowment is what we have chiefly laid stress upon, educability. Vehemence of expression and of voluntary pursuit or avoidance are manifested in the lowest as well as in the highest orders—in an insect or a fish, as well as in a mam-

mal. The meaning of these symptoms taken apart is very uncertain and misleading. They accompany the lowest brains no less than the highest. It must, however, make a very material difference whether, or to what extent, the individual possesses the great foundations of intelligence—Discrimination and Educability. The kind, if not the intensity, of consciousness must rise nearer and nearer the human type, according as these functions predominate. With all our own varied experience of conscious intensity or wakefulness, we may be unable to fathom the precise nature and degree of the lowest invertebrates possessing sensibility and responding, both by expression and by movement, to sensible agents. This of course effectually obscures the question as to the precise point of animal development at which consciousness is first manifested. We may fairly presume its presence when expressive gestures and voluntary pursuit are coupled with the smallest assignable portion of educability. As a problem of evolution or development, the genesis of consciousness is apparently beyond our means of resolution. It ranks with the question as to the relative priority to be assigned to movements of Expression and Volition: which again is not far removed from another insoluble issue,—the source or commencement of our Reflex adjustments,—whether they are the confirmation of experienced or acquired actions; in which case they would pre-suppose a stage of consciousness, instead of being in advance of it.

*Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.*—The term “Self-Consciousness” opens up a very wide discussion, and is implicated in some of our gravest controversies. The name Consciousness standing single, and viewed as in the foregoing survey, is intelligible and free from ambiguity. The addition of the prefix “Self” entirely changes the situation. Self, taken apart, has diverse meanings; the same diversity must needs enter into any compound wherein it enters.

When Consciousness is coupled with a qualification, it is commonly to limit its generality or comprehensiveness to some special content: in our waking moments we have ordinarily a variety of things present or accessible to our view, while only one or a small number can be in the consciousness at the same instant. There may be a convenience in specifying which of the various solicitations of any moment is attended to, and which neglected; of the one we may be said to be conscious, and of the others unconscious. So long as these alternatives are of a simple, unambiguous character, the coupling with the word Consciousness does not detract from the intelligibility of the language. A man

in a momentarily absent fit is unconscious of things before his eyes or within the compass of his hearing. He may even be unconscious of physical pains. Still greater complications might be supposed without detracting from easy understanding of the names consciousness or unconsciousness, so qualified. Another example of the admissible qualification of consciousness, by referring it to a special topic, is the somewhat rhetorical phrase *mens conscia recti*. There is nothing misleading in this use of the name, although a larger word would be preferable. The rectitude of a person's intentions and demeanour is not adequately cognised in a single instant of consciousness; it needs the comparison of a good many such instants, and hence the larger term "knowledge" would be preferable. To speak of consciousness as the test or evidence of our intuitions is open to a similar criticism. We may have intuitions, and they may possess any amount of validity; yet such validity cannot be attested by any single moment of consciousness; and consciousness cannot carry memory with it without exceeding its legitimate scope.

When, as a content of consciousness, we introduce the term "Self," the complication becomes very great indeed. In order to a clearance, we must indicate at once which of the acceptations of this term we have in view. Common speech makes often familiar with the phrase "self-conscious," the meaning of self being then our own importance, distinction, or merits, as regarded by others, and dwelt upon at times by ourselves. A vain person, in the moments when the feeling is indulged, and especially when attracting the attention of others, is said to be self-conscious. Or, the regard to self may take the form of morbid humiliation, in consequence of some act or circumstance that makes a bad impression on spectators, and is unfavourably judged by the individual. These two extreme forms represent the mode of Self that in current talk is perhaps most usually coupled with the name Consciousness. The more comprehensive meaning of Self as including all our life interests or collective valuables, is better denoted by the conjunction "Self-interest".

The word Consciousness, as admitted, covers the Object world, as well as the Subject. The opposition of the two modes is so marked that some qualifying designation is needed when one is mentioned to the exclusion of the other. Thus, when we purposely omit the object reference, we may signify the remainder by *self-consciousness*. (I think it unnecessary to refer to the old use of Consciousness for Introspection, or the source of our knowledge of the

Mind, corresponding to Observation for the Object world.) But, in the face of so many different acceptations of Self, this employment of the term is inadequate and unsatisfactory, although not altogether devoid of propriety. It is sometimes said that our feelings, cognitions, and volitions are all referable to self-consciousness, which is only a way of saying that they are the constituents of the subject mind. To use the name consciousness in this way is to overstep its province as being the expression of the passing phases of our mental being, and to confound it with the totality of Mind, which is the multiple of any such single phase a hundred thousand times over.

Besides the two modes of employing the coupling in question, I am not aware of any equally common application. It is up to this point so far devoid of ambiguity as to be serviceable either in common life or in psychological speculation.

When 'Self-consciousness' is given as the highest fact we know and as our "best key to the ultimate nature of existence as a whole," there is an entirely new departure in the widening of its significance. Neither of the two constituents of the compound would seem to be capable of sustaining this momentous issue. The utmost range or compass of self is the totality of our own being—mind and body; of that self, we may be said to be conscious in the sense of knowledge—a much more suitable term for such an all-comprehending aggregate. Suppose then that we use 'Self-knowledge' for the purpose of solving the ultimate nature of existence, what does its employment amount to? Simply this, that humanity taken as a whole—mind and body—is so fair a type of the creative and ruling power of the universe as to render a not insufficient or unsatisfactory explanation of the origination of the world, as we find it. In short, it would merely reiterate the long prevalent anthropomorphic explanation of nature. To prefer the couple "self-consciousness" is to detract from the efficiency of the statement, in so far as Consciousness, in its limitation to what is present and passing, is a narrower term than Knowledge, which covers the entire permanent storage or accumulation of all that has ever been in consciousness.

The "Self" of the combination in question is perhaps meant to be limited to Mind alone; that is, mind as a pure or abstract existence, distinct from the body although inseparable from it. The body, in fact, is an incumbrance in this speculation; having nothing corresponding in the supposed productive agency of the world: the dynamic efficiency

of mind is postulated without the physical apparatus in whose absence we have no experience of Mind as a genuine entity.

In the great controversy as to the sources of our belief in Reality as against Appearance, I do not see that the term we have been considering is in any way helpful. Indeed, if I rightly apprehend the present stage of that particular controversy, it is not often made use of as a leading term. If so employed, there ought to be a clear understanding between the combatants respecting its precise definition; or rather, I should say, it ought to be substituted by some other phraseology less thoroughly steeped in ambiguity.

Without pursuing further our main thesis, the definition and problems of consciousness, it is enough to wind up with the observation, which is justified by the closing references, that the critical examination of the compound "self-consciousness" readily gets beyond the pale of psychological adjustment.