

DISCUSSION.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

To anyone acquainted with recent psychological literature, an attempt at a critical definition or reconstruction of such terms as mental, conscious, and psychical, taken in a purely empirical and scientific sense, will not seem inopportune. There is no well-defined theory as to the precise limits of their meaning. Data, however, are available which offer a basis for at least a tentative mode of conception somewhat less open to objection than many that now pass current. Such apparent normal phenomena as dreams, mental lapses, absent-mindedness, the supposedly subliminal sensations, action upon suggestion, the sense of familiarity and the familiar experiences of trying to remember, the so-called subconscious phenomena of hypnotism, post-hypnotic suggestion, and double personality should certainly furnish material for some intelligible hypothesis as to the nature of consciousness and its relation to, or its distinction from, purely automatic processes.

In the inquiry here proposed, we have no interest in any philosophical or quasi-philosophical question. We wish simply to offer such a conception of the nature of consciousness, the term of ordinary psychological parlance, as will render intelligible such happenings as are mentioned above. All that we shall have to say will have no bearing upon the question of consciousness as an ultimate entity. In fact, we are quite prepared to agree with Professor James that in this sense it does not exist.

In its briefest form of statement, the problem is that of stating the relation between the conscious and the so-called subconscious, or unconscious, of seeking a conception which will organize the well-known facts of their manifestation. It is recognized at the outset that the best statement which can be offered can be no more than a working hypothesis, the validity of which can be established neither by an examination of the

brain itself nor by introspection. That neurology cannot furnish direct evidence goes without saying, and introspective evidence is impossible because, by definition, one of the elements to be considered is beyond the pale of introspection. If it could be so examined, the problem would cease to be. But even if direct verification is impossible, a working hypothesis is legitimate for even the most exacting experimentalist. Perhaps the ideal course would be to frame no hypotheses which cannot be directly proved. The fact, however, that we do make just such assumptions implicitly, if we avoid them explicitly, should be sufficient excuse for what is here proposed. There is a tendency on the part of psychologists to be somewhat chary of the subconscious, as if a good deal that passes under that category is open to suspicion. Certain phenomena are discounted, because to accept them fully seems to lead to dangerous consequences. The utterly unscientific and in the highest degree fanciful theories of a subconscious mind with extraordinary powers, an apparent recrudescence of the savage notion of the soul, which have of late years been advanced by certain pseudo-psychologists, have made us fearful of going too far. It is, however, because the psychologist has had no clearly scientific theory of these phenomena, that he has often in his own statements given ground and even authority for just the extreme views he wishes to avoid.

Let us note in the first place the outcome of some recent discussions of the subconscious. Professor Jastrow, in his article 'The Status of the Subconscious,'¹ attempts chiefly to relate what he regards as authentic subconscious happenings to the facts of ordinary waking consciousness. He refers to the well known phenomena of subliminal sensations, holds that the subconscious is analogous to the normal dream consciousness, and, in general, maintains that the most pronounced subconscious phenomena are really of the same species as our common mental lapses, cases of absentmindedness and of habit. We get no clue from his discussion as to just how he conceives the relation between clear consciousness and these subliminal events. The net outcome is that there *are* certain occurrences which

¹ *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XIV., July-Sept., 1903.

may be called subconscious and which are not objectively different from the events of ordinary conscious experience. Of course the problem still remains of how the existence of these facts of common experience and the supplementary ones of kindred nature brought to light by the experimentalist affect our general theory of consciousness.

Professor Stratton¹ also holds to the theory of habit, neural and mental, as furnishing the safest explanation for most cases of the so-called subconscious. He holds that there is insufficient evidence in the case of memory for the supposition that ideas can persist as a low degree of the activity characteristic of consciousness, and that the past must be thought of as influencing the present through some sort of neural or mental dispositions. Thus, "The former acts themselves are dead and gone, and what remains is not even a pale image or copy of them, but * * * the person in enacting them formed a habit or disposition by which such acts could as often as he pleased be reënacted, but never literally preserved." As to the phenomena of the threshold, he feels that the evidence is insufficient for subliminal sensations, but with reference to the discriminative threshold, it is somewhat more convincing. His discussion need not be repeated here. We are concerned rather with his conclusion which is as follows: "The results are not in favor of unconscious ideas, but rather of unconscious materials out of which conscious ideas arise. They lead us to acknowledge that there are indiscernible occurrences in the mind of a very definite and non-mythical character, comings and goings of dim sensations, subtle variations in the strength and the quality of certain constituents, which are sufficient to destroy the equilibrium and produce transformations in the whole mental state."²

To the present writer there is much ambiguity in this last statement. How shall the clause that the evidence is against unconscious ideas be reconciled with the following one that 'there are indiscernible occurrences in the mind of a very definite and non-mythical character * * * dim sensations, etc.?' We may well agree with what he says regarding unconscious

¹ *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, p. 74.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

ideas for the expression itself is meaningless unless we take ideas to mean something quite different from what they are ordinarily supposed to be. Suppose, however, that the very essence of the idea is not that it is conscious, that it is an entity of some sort, a psychic something if we please, which may or may not be conscious, but which may in any case remain an idea. Upon what sort of evidence would such a theory of ideas rest? Manifestly not upon introspection and if not upon that, what remains? Certainly there is no way for the observation of another to furnish proof. The greatest refinement of the means of observing and testing can reveal only more and more refined physical processes.

But notwithstanding the first part of his statement as quoted above, Professor Stratton seems to hold to a belief in something that is psychical, or mental, and yet unconscious, for he says we are led 'to acknowledge that there are indiscernible occurrences in * * * dim sensations,' etc. Thus if there are not unconscious ideas we are at least led to infer that there is at any rate something psychical out of which ideas are formed, shreds of ideas, as it were. For what else can occurrences *in the mind* be if not something psychical or mental? The apparent ambiguity in Professor Stratton's statement is typical of much of the present thought upon these topics. There certainly are activities and events that may be called subliminal. The problem is as to how they shall be conceived and their relation to consciousness be stated.

Dr. Boris Sidis in his recent work, *Multiple Personality*, suggests the most thoroughgoing answer in terms of his theory of 'moments consciousness.' His thought, in brief, seems to be that one's psychic life at any time is made up of several moments (of) consciousness of varying degrees of intensity. Each of these moments has a definite center of interest with various contributing elements organized about it. A moment consciousness is fundamentally a system, within which are synthesized various psychic states.¹ Is the moment (of) consciousness to be conceived as something over and above the psychic states synthesized? He says explicitly that 'the psychic individuality

¹ *Multiple Personality*, p. 231.

cannot be regarded as a series of independent physical events," but that it is made up of psychic events, which are unconscious until organized into the 'moment consciousness.' It is further held that 'a moment consciousness must not be considered as something apart from its content,' that it exists wherever and whenever psychic states are synthetized; it *is* the synthetized psychic material.² Apparently then, he also believes in the existence of a psychic material previous to its appearance in consciousness. Dr. Sidis then proceeds to show that various subconscious activities, the phenomena of double personality, etc., may be conceived in terms of the emergence of one or another system of psychical elements. The system of moment consciousness may be really unconscious in the ordinary sense of the word for the author is careful to distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. There is a self-consciousness threshold beneath which 'moments consciousness' may still exist. There are a good many passages that seem clearly to indicate a belief in a psychical substratum beneath self-consciousness.³ Thus the author in one place speaks of 'the dissociation and disaggregation of systems of central neural elements with their concomitant psychic systems or moments consciousness.' Again, 'In the first cycle of multiple consciousness none of the moments are well organized, each of the leading functioning moments can maintain itself above the threshold of personality only a short time.'⁴ "The higher moments, on account of their absence during the state of disaggregation, have no memory for the experiences of the lower moments. A dissociated moment consciousness can remember only its own experiences."⁵ "When the higher moment of self-consciousness becomes disaggregated and a lower type of moment takes its place, a break occurs between the two moments, the experience of the lower moment is not transmitted to the higher moment."⁶

Dr. Sidis' theory of consciousness as a synthetizing activity is most significant, as is also his contention that different organ-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

² *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 232, italics mine.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 307, 8.

izations of neural elements may exist in relative independence. We shall take issue with him on the point as to whether there can coexist more than one center, or moment of consciousness, and further, whether there is a psychic substratum to self-consciousness, for it is to be remembered that he distinguishes between consciousness and self-consciousness.

We wish to ask, first of all, whether, assuming that some sort of neural activity is always present with conscious processes, it is also necessary to assume that wherever there is neural activity there must also accompany it some sort of dim consciousness. Marshall, in his *Instinct and Reason*, makes such an assumption. Every neurosis has its psychosis, according to him. Whether he means by this a dim fragment of consciousness, it is hard to say. If he does not mean this, but distinguishes between the psychic and the conscious, his whole position is a mere conceptual fiction. The same is true regarding the distinction, above referred to, between consciousness and self-consciousness. We know in ourselves only conscious states, and these are also states of self-consciousness in so far as they are conscious at all. We hold that is meaningless to use consciousness in any other sense than self-consciousness. If there is little of the one, there is, in proportion, little of the other. In the nervous systems of others we can conceivably observe only physical processes. Where, then, is there any evidence for psychic states, other than those which are consciously experienced?

Dr. Sidis, as well as Marshall, holds that there is something psychical in even the simplest forms of animal life, and that this is an elementary form of consciousness of the same type as that consciousness of man which is not self-consciousness. The question may well be raised as to whether this view is not as extreme as that of Descartes, with which it is contrasted, viz: that all animals are merely automata. What if we cannot tell definitely where consciousness ends in the animal series, are we then forced to conclude that it is at least dimly present in all forms of animal life? To be sure, this assumption is not precisely equivalent to that of Marshall's, to which reference was made above, namely, that every nerve element when active

has its accompanying psychosis. According to this latter view, complete consciousness would apparently be the sum, or resultant, of the activity of all these psychic atoms. On such an hypothesis the problem would arise of how, if there are given to start with discrete elements within a single organism, there can be built up the unity of intention and purpose with consciousness certainly means to most of us. The objection to Marshall's theory, is, in a word, that the psychic atom is purely a conceptual fiction, which may be a legitimate fiction, but, if such, it must prove its worth in explaining the data furnished by introspection. Here it is conspicuously deficient in a most vital particular, viz., in that consciousness, as we know it, is something unitary. It certainly conveys no suggestion of being composed of discrete elements.

Dr. Sidis, in his theory of the 'moment consciousness' apparently avoids this difficulty by defining consciousness as a synthetizing activity, or as the 'synthetized psychic material,' but no matter how synthetized or organized, the elements seem to be still upon our hands. The analogy of the physical organism will make our objection clearer. The various members and organs are organized into one body, but the parts are still *there* objectively. The moment consciousness is, however, a unique experience, the parts of which, if there are such, are transformed by being organized and no longer exist as elements. If such is the case, we assert again that the psychic element is a fiction, the necessity of which in our conception of consciousness has not as yet been proved.

Aside from the particular objection, urged above, to the theory of psychic elements, both it and the other theory, that all forms of animal life have some degree of consciousness, are to be criticized for conceiving consciousness as something existing *per se*, independently of any functional relation to action. That is, just *because* there is a neural process, it is assumed that there *must* be a conscious or a psychical process. There is certainly good reason to believe that there is automatic nervous action in ourselves, and, moreover, consciousness, as far as we are concerned, *does* seem to have such a direct functional relation to action. Is it not then much more in accord with the

facts of experience to assume that neural action is accompanied by psychical processes only when there is some necessity for them?

In the theory, which we wish here to outline, there is assumed, as a background, a continuum of neural processes and tensions. Such a condition certainly exists in the complex nervous system of the human being. Like a delicately adjusted mechanism, it is constantly affected in varying degrees by the infinitely varied changes in its environment. There is no reason for supposing that much of this activity of our nervous systems is in any appreciable degree organized or unified. It is simply a great mass of more or less isolated responses to all kinds of stimuli. If there is any grouping in these responses, it must be along the lines of preëxisting instinct or acquired habit. Now, it is to be noted, under some circumstances consciousness appears in connection with this mass of neural disturbance. As already stated, we are not here concerned with any theory of the ultimate relation existing between consciousness and matter, nor with the philosophical problem as to whether consciousness is an existence or not; we simply note the empirical fact that sometimes there is consciousness and sometimes there is not, and we are seeking to define the objective conditions of its appearance.

As a working conception, consciousness may be held to be definitely related to the facilitation of reactions and adjustments required by the life process but which the automatic arrangements of the organism cannot meet. When the automatic apparatus fails in a crisis and no new adjustment is forthcoming, the form perishes. In some organisms, however, something appears which we call consciousness, which rapidly mediates new and perhaps more adequate adjustments. What it comes from and what it ultimately is, it is not within our province to speculate. We only note that it is present under certain conditions and that it seems to perform certain functions. Now, in its function as an adjusting agency, it *does* synthesize acts and bring to bear upon them various portions of the past experience of the organism concerned. Hence, it seems reasonable to suppose that the neural changes lying back of a con-

scious process differ from the great mass, or matrix surrounding them in being somewhat more definitely organized than they. In other words, we at least so far agree with Dr. Sidis in conceiving of consciousness as a synthetizing process and further in assuming that the neural processes involved have a corresponding organization.¹

As far as a conscious process is concerned, it may be said to be best symbolized, for purposes of description, as a point. It does not have extent, neither does it consist of parts, so that, at any one moment, it cannot be said to contain elements of varying intensity. Although it may be true that objects do in varying degrees affect consciousness, or that many objects may be in consciousness at a given instant, it does not follow that it itself is composed of states of varying intensities, or that it could be represented, for instance, by a circle of gray, the center of which is white and the circumference black, with all intermediate shades of gray between these extremes. That is to say, consciousness does not shade off gradually into unconsciousness. It either exists or does not exist; it may be more intense at one moment than at another. It may even at some moments be said to be at a minimum. But at any one moment it is, for purposes of description, a unitary existence without parts which might be thought as clustering about a center with different degrees of intensity and adhesion. That is to say, the 'fringe' conception does not describe a characteristic of the edge of consciousness, in the sense that any conscious state possesses a psychic halo; it rather symbolically represents the fact that the *point of consciousness* is modified by outlying neural processes as well as by those most directly concerned in effecting the required adjustment.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 358.

² *Cf.* "The whole effect of these obscure contents of consciousness on the attention, fuses, according to the general law of the synthesis of affective components, with the feelings attending the clearly conscious contents, thus forming a single total feeling." (Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 237.) We hold that these "obscure contents" are not conscious in any sense except *through* the fact of fusion itself. *Cf.* also Angell, *Psychology*, p. 395: "There is a gradual fading out from a focal center of clearest consciousness toward a dimmer region of partial consciousness, which we may designate the zone of the *sub-conscious*. This subconscious area," etc. It is just this conception of conscious-

On the neural side we do have a mechanical system capable of spacial representation. There is an organized center with an outlying body of processes more or less directly contributing to the central movement, or tension. Thus there may properly be said to be a gradation in the neural changes according to their degree of connection with a central organization. We hold that it is a mistake to suppose that, since many neural activities may in different degrees contribute to the central activity, there are also varying degrees of consciousness clustering about a central and more intense state. It may be conceived as the concomitant of a certain organization of neural processes, each one of which contributes to its existence, not by furnishing a psychic atom, but merely by contributing to the central physical process. Consciousness is, then, not the sum or the organization of psychic elements, but rather the unique and single accompaniment of a peculiar organization of neural processes.

It is evident that each neural element will determine the complexion of consciousness in proportion as it contributes to the general trend of organized physical activity. If and so far as it is within the central system it has conscious value. If it is outside that system, or only remotely connected with it, it has no psychic value except in a prospective sense, that is, that it may be the raw material for some future system which shall be conscious. The chief reason for its being out of the pale of consciousness is its lack of organization with the adjusting center of activity. In the outer region, which is unconnected with the central organization, are all the neural responses to the vast mass of stimuli which for one reason or another fall in the field of inattention. There can be no doubt that their number is very large. Weakness of neural action is probably another cause of the failure of a process to affect consciousness. Here are to be classed the subliminal sensations referred to by Jastrow and others. Although not conscious themselves, their existence is proved by the fact that consciousness is, in certain instances, appreciably modified by them, because of their presence within

ness on the analogy of a field or zone that is here disputed. It suggests the notion at least that there are *bills* of relatively faint consciousness clustered about a center of intense consciousness.

the central plexus. As Miss Calkins, in her review of Jastrow's article suggests,¹ the subconscious, due to inattention, should be carefully distinguished from that due to diminishing intensities of stimuli. In the former case the neural process is outside the configuration which is correlated with consciousness, while in the latter it may be within the configuration but so subdued as to have, under ordinary circumstances no appreciable effect.

As may be inferred from what has just preceded, we propose to conceive of the subconscious, not as dim consciousness, nor as something psychic, and yet not self-conscious; but rather as a physical mass of neural dispositions, tensions, and actual processes which are in some degree, perhaps, organized; the remnants of habits, experiences, both those which have lapsed from consciousness and those which have never penetrated to the central plexus. Here also are hereditary traits and tendencies which have never chanced to be sufficiently relevant to the trend of processes which lay back of consciousness to succeed in contributing to them. We believe that this theory of the conscious and the subconscious is capable, with possibly slight modifications, of explaining all the phenomena that are usually discussed under these heads. The possibility of such application we shall now try to show.

When consciousness is present, the neural processes involved are much more intense than otherwise. Whether the relationship between intensity and consciousness is one of causality or of concomitance, we need not say. It is probable that the relatively great activity of the central system tends to inhibit, or to reduce to mere dispositions all other neural processes. The ordinary dream-consciousness is, on our theory, a condition in which the central activity is so subdued or dissipated that more or less fragmentary or isolated neural dispositions are aroused, or, perhaps better, liberated. In the hypnotic sleep the center of activity is shifted in a greater or less degree, resulting in the temporary lapse from consciousness of some processes and the incorporation of others which were previously mere neural dispositions. In double and multiple personality there are one or more unusually well organized potential sys-

¹ PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, September, 1904.

tems of neural elements which, under appropriate stimuli, can separately become sufficiently active to be conscious. The last stages of the case of Mr. Hanna, recorded by Dr. Sidis, apparently necessitate our assuming that there can be two or more coincident conscious systems. But the evidence is not conclusive. The mere fact that the two personalities could emerge at once, indicates that they had in so far begun to be organized into a single system.

Such phenomena as those of post-hypnotic suggestion, so-called unconscious cerebration, and the like, bring to light an important characteristic of this matrix of neural dispositions, namely, the possibility of a certain amount of elaboration, of combination and recombination among them, independently of the assistance of anything psychic. It is certainly not unreasonable to suppose that many combinations may be effected automatically, in part, over the pathways of habit, and in part through the agency of hereditary predispositions to certain forms of organization. Thus a sense impression may be taken up by some neural system, which is, for the time being, without the central plexus, changes may result in the system, combinations of processes may be brought about, which would otherwise have remained separated, nervous force may be redistributed, until such an arrangement of elements and an accumulation of tensions may result as will bring about a connection with the center which is accompanied by consciousness. The only way to account for the appearance in consciousness of fully formed ideas, which apparently have no antecedents, is to suppose that in some neural system, determined either by habit or hereditary tendency, there have been a succession of changes which have eventually led to a connection with the center, or that in the center changes have occurred, which have brought it into closer relation with some unconscious neural system, with the result of raising it to consciousness.¹ If our descrip-

¹ The writer is willing to admit that there is normally even less automatic activity in the outlying neural dispositions, than is here assumed, especially in view of the evidence adduced by Dr. Prince in his recent paper in this journal. Dr. Prince, however, cites nothing which is inconsistent with the theory here presented, *i. e.*, of consciousness as a point rather than as a complex of psychic atoms, although his own theory of the matter is not the one

tion seems too fanciful, we may say that all we care to insist upon is simply that neural action is not confined to the central plexus, but that, even without it, there are changes and seemingly important combinations effected.

Turning from this conception of the subconscious as merely a mechanical mass of neural dispositions and subdued neural processes, let us note further the extent to which it may be conceived as having a certain amount of organization, and how, if it is so regarded, the many evidences of a precisely opposite character may be interpreted.

In the first place, the phenomena of the 'fringe' as discussed by Professor James in his *Principles of Psychology*, are striking evidence that the subconscious is more than a scrap-heap. It is true that here he does not appear to connect the fringe with the subconscious. In fact they are shown to be radically unlike. The latter is called the 'tumbling ground for whimsies' while the former has a perfectly definite significance, and certainly affords no basis for capricious opinion. In other words, with its feelings of direction and the like, which seem to guide one, in a train of thought, from one idea to another, the fringe is obviously closely related to logical processes.

When, however, we come to defining these feelings of relation with care, the antithesis between them and subconscious phenomena is not so evident. Of course, in so far as the fringe is present in consciousness it is not *merely* neural. As already pointed out, the central configuration of neural elements may be and is surrounded by other elements which contribute in varying degrees to the onward movement of the center. They may modify the activity of the center sufficiently to appear above the threshold as 'feelings of direction,' but, as stated before, they are not themselves to be thought of as furnishing a dim psychic halo about a central point of intense consciousness. The 'halo of relations' possessed by each idea or image, is merely the immediate neural setting of the idea. It is certainly much simpler to regard this setting as a part of the subcon-

here presented. The point of this paper is that what is not in self-consciousness is a physical tension or process. Dissociated ideas are not psychical affairs at all.

scious neural activity, to which reference has been made, than to attempt a separate explanation. The chief difficulty, according to our previous conceptions, of classing them together, is the seeming incompatibility of a chaos and a high degree of logical consistency. If, however, there is evidence for a good deal of organization among entirely unconscious neural processes, the difficulty would seem in a measure to disappear.

It has already been suggested that the principle of habit furnishes a basis for a certain amount of organization in the processes not immediately connected with the center. It is well known that the reasoning process is guided largely by habit, preformed dispositions, emotional preferences and the like. The trained reasoner differs from the naive chiefly in the sort of a background from which he works, not in the way in which he is affected by it. Previous experience is never merely haphazard, and a train of rational thought may be conceived as merely a conscious redefining of limited portions of preëxisting but spontaneous organizations of the elements of experience.

The seeming chaos of the subconscious is more apparent than real. We know it only as its processes chance to form connections with the center, or when the center is so disorganized and dissipated that they can effect a synthesis which is conscious. Under such circumstances they seem by contrast with normal consciousness to be simply masses of rubbish, disconnected tendencies, irrational, uncontrolled impulses. We have already called the central neural configuration, with its concomitant of consciousness, the adjusting point of the psycho-physical organism. Naturally, here all the canons of logical thought have been evolved; the very fact that it is the adjusting center proves that reasoning is its special prerogative. It is *the* center of control. The subconscious is thus apparently a region without a logic and without control. Within limits this is true, but it is equally true that there is another aspect of subconscious activity. As it has here been considered, *it* may represent more adequately the character of its possessor than does the central configuration of any one moment. Hence under certain circumstances there may be a certain corrective value in falling back upon these marginal tensions.

Professor Leuba has given an excellent description of some extreme forms of this in his article entitled 'The State of Death.'¹ It appears in less marked degree in the ideal of self-abasement, dying to one's self, humility, the cultivation of the spiritual life, etc., as these conceptions are held by the ordinary member of the Christian Church. The results aimed at under cover of these terms are real and have a certain value with reference to the rest of consciousness. Professor James put the matter tersely when he said, 'The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy subliminal might remain ajar or open.'² We need not and do not suggest with him that some supernatural agent might communicate with the devotee through the fringe regions. It may still be true nevertheless that within these regions there is a certain healing virtue. Its tensions represent, or are in part, the sublimation of the values out of all previous experience. The conscious center, in so far as it is an adjusting apparatus, is inadequate as an index to life as a whole. From its very nature its view must be partial. Thus it may at times be worth while to permit the focus to be dissipated that the outlying regions, in so far as they represent one's life in a truer perspective, may assert themselves. The religious notion of dying to one's self and obtaining instead a divine life is by no means meaningless, even if we reject its mystical interpretation. It is certainly a good thing, sometimes, for one to stop striving and let past values come in as correctives of present stress. Life as seen from the point of stress is bound to be distorted.

It seems to the writer that many of the critics of the latter part of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* have, in their haste to discredit James' suggestion regarding the possibility of extra personal influences through the subliminal, missed an important point in his discussion. May not his really vital point be just here, that the view of life from the center of the struggle is distorted and needs correction from the emotional values which life as a whole has left us?³

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¹ *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XIV., July-September, 1903.

² *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 241.

³ The MS. of this article was received May 9, 1905. — ED.