

INTRA-IMPERIAL ASPECTS OF BRITAIN'S DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1900

ON March 7, 1873, the announcement was made in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Hon. Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen, parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies, that the self-governing colonies had assumed responsibility for their local defence.¹ Garrisons were to be retained only for the purpose of guarding imperial fortresses, such as Halifax and Esquimault. Great Britain was to continue to provide naval protection, however, and it was understood that the entire military and naval strength of the empire would be exerted in defending every portion of it against a foreign foe. Negotiations first begun by Earl Grey as colonial secretary in Lord John Russell's administration, 1846-1852, had thus been brought to a successful conclusion.² The question had "bristled with difficulties," but special factors had made it imperative to reach a settlement. Chief among these was, during the sixties, the necessity of providing an adequate military establishment for Great Britain in the face of a determined Liberal opposition to large expenditures on the army and navy.

The opening of the decade found the United Kingdom in the midst of what Cobden called "the Third Panic." It was commonly believed that Napoleon III was plotting an attack. Leading members of the ministry, including the prime minister, Lord Palmerston, shared this fear. A hostile Franco-Russian alliance was even considered within the range of possibilities.³ To meet

¹*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCXIV, col. 1528. An exception was made in the case of the Cape Colony, where local conditions made maintenance of imperial troops necessary; see A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (Oxford, 1912), vol. III, pp. 1256, 1257.

²For the negotiations leading up to the withdrawal of the imperial troops see Robert L. Schuyler, "The Recall of the Legions: a Phase in the Decentralization of the British Empire," *The American Historical Review*, vol. XXVI, pp. 18-36.

³Napoleon III and France occupied in the minds of the British in 1859-1862, a position analogous to that held by Germany in the years shortly before the outbreak of the Great War. See Richard Cobden, *The Three Panics* (London, 1884), pp. 47-704;

the threatening danger two lines of action were urged strongly: first, the concentration of all available military forces at the imperial base, and, second, increased appropriations for defence. The latter met with determined opposition from Gladstone as chancellor of the exchequer, 1859-1866. Firm in his convictions he carried on a spirited debate over this question with the prime minister and strained to the breaking point a life-long friendship with the secretary for war, Sidney Herbert.¹ He scoffed at the fear of a French invasion, and declared, "My mind is made up, and to propose any loan for fortifications would be, on my part, with the views I entertain, a betrayal of my public duty."² For the sake of economy he favoured withdrawal of the British troops wherever possible.³ This policy had also the support of military strategists, who considered scattered garrisons practically useless in case of war.⁴ Under the influence of these factors, among others, the House of Commons passed, without a dissenting vote, on March 4, 1862, a resolution favouring the recall of all imperial troops from the colonies which enjoyed responsible government.⁵

Nine years of negotiations followed. The French scare vanished, but the need for an improved defence system remained. The period which witnessed the rise of Germany saw also Britain's influence in international affairs at its lowest ebb. Especially during the Danish crisis, 1862-1864, Lord Palmerston's bluster and Earl Russell's angry despatches proved of no avail. Bismarck possessed an uncanny ability to estimate paper preparedness at its true value. A series of diplomatic defeats was generally attributed to Great Britain's weak military establishment. There were only 20,000 men for an expeditionary force and no breech-loaders.⁶

Hansard, 3rd series, CLIV, cols. 619-626 and CLV, cols. 702-704, speeches by Lord Lyndhurst and Sir Charles Napier, July 5 and 25, 1859; Sir Theodore Martin, *The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*, 3rd ed. (London, 1880), vol. V, pp. 256, 257; Lord Palmerston to Gladstone, April 29, 1862, in Evelyn Ashley, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston* (London, 1849), vol. II, p. 414.

¹The best account, with documents, of these negotiations is found in Lord Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert* (London, 1906), vol. II, ch. VI.

²John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, new edition (New York, 1911), vol. II, p. 44.

³Stanmore, *Herbert*, vol. II, p. 266.

⁴*Hansard*, 3rd series, CLV, col. 394.

⁵*Ibid.*, CLXV, col. 1060; the text of this resolution is given by Schuyler, p. 34.

⁶Arthur Irwin Dasent, *John Thaddeus Delane, Editor of "The Times"* (London,

When Gladstone became prime minister in 1868, he was committed to a policy of retrenchment.¹ And the colonial garrisons were still a heavy burden upon the exchequer. In favouring withdrawal Gladstone at this time had the support of the army reformers. Cardwell, afterwards Lord Cardwell, found the foreign service a serious obstacle to a successful working of his plan of building up large reserves through a system of short term enlistment.² He therefore gave Gladstone loyal support in regard to the recall of the troops.

That the military necessity was an important cause for the new policy is shown in a speech by Knatchbull-Hugessen in the House of Commons on February 28, 1873. Discussing the defence of the colonies, he said, "The policy lately pursued of withdrawing troops—a policy pursued by Conservative as well as Liberal Governments, and the reversal of which had never been attempted by the former when in office—had never been intended to weaken the ties existing between the Colonies and the Mother Country, nor to show any diminution on our part of regard for the Colonies; but the question was, whether in the case of a great insular Power like Great Britain, the concentration of troops in particular depôts would not in the long run prove most beneficial to the Colonies themselves, besides augmenting the general strength of the Empire."³

This disclaimer of any connection between the withdrawal of the troops and a possible desire to disintegrate the empire is of special significance. Many people in Great Britain considered the colonies a burden and an encumbrance. High officials in the government favoured casting them off. Bright and Cobden, both prominent members of the Liberal party, openly advocated separa-

1908), vol. II, p. 21; Ashley, *Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 431; The Earl of Malmsbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister* (London, 1884), vol. II, p. 319: "If, when the Prussians and Austrians entered Holstein as they said, only with the intention of preserving peace, we could have said: 'Well, we highly approve of this, and we will send 50,000 men and our Fleet into the Baltic', the gross robbery that was afterwards committed would never have been perpetrated" (General Peel to the Duke of Cambridge, Nov. 30, 1866, in Colonel Willoughby Verner, *The Military Life of H.R.H. George, Duke of Cambridge*, London, 1905, vol. I, p. 302). See also *Essays by the Marquess of Salisbury: Foreign Politics* (London, 1905); H. E. Egerton, *British Foreign Policy in Europe to the End of the 19th Century* (London, 1917), pp. 222-299.

¹See "Address to the Electors" in *The Times*, Oct. 10, 1868; General Sir Robert Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office* (London, 1904), p. 25.

²Biddulph, *Cardwell*, pp. 26, 27.

³*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCXIV, col. 1118; see also Sir Charles Trevelyan, *A Standing or Popular Army* (London, 1869), p. 15.

tion. Colonial independence, it was thought, was not only inevitable, it was desirable. The Liberal prime ministers of the sixties did not, however, support this view.¹ Lord Palmerston appreciated the value of the overseas possessions. In his opinion, separation would benefit neither the colonies nor the mother country. "We should be each to one another a source of mutual honour and mutual strength."² To Earl Russell, "it would be a sad spectacle, it would be a spectacle for gods and men to weep at, to see this brilliant Empire, the guiding star of Freedom, broken up."³ Gladstone believed that the colonies would ultimately become independent, but he did not wish to hasten the separation. Speaking in the House of Commons on April 26, 1870, he declared, "Freedom and voluntaryism form the character of the connection, and our policy is not to be regarded as a surreptitious or clandestine means of working out the foregone purpose of casting off the Colonies, but as the truest and best, if not the only, means of fulfilling our obligations to them."⁴

To many in the colonies, however, the separation advocated so openly by Bright, Cobden, and others, seemed to reflect British official opinion. The clamour of the "Little Englanders" drowned so easily the plaintive utterances of resigned pessimists like Earl Russell. Little was known in British North America and in Australasia of the real factors which determined the decisions of the statesmen at home. Nor was it to be expected that the people of the colonies could appreciate the European situation. They knew the anti-colonial agitation. When the House of Commons decided to recall the garrisons "in order to develop the spirit of self-reliance in colonial communities," and to save money, the arguments were believed to clothe the desire to renounce all responsibility for the dependencies. The hundreds of thousands who daily face innumerable hardships on the far-flung frontiers of the empire were doubtless conscious of the fact that they needed no lessons in self-reliance from Downing Street. Their

¹A convenient summary of these views is given by H. Duncan Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (London, 1920), pp. 45-50; see also George Peel, *The Friends of England* (London, 1905), pp. 140-143.

²*Hansard*, 3rd series, CLXVIII, col. 873: speech in the House of Commons, July 25, 1862.

³John Earl Russell, *Recollections and Suggestions* (London, 1875), p. 201. Similar views were expressed by him in his great speech on colonial policy in the House of Commons, Feb. 8, 1850 (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CVIII, col. 548).

⁴*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, col. 1902.

own economic needs were great. Britain seemed to them infinitely better able to bear the burden of the cost of defence. Besides, the home government controlled foreign policy. Danger might threaten the colonies for the sole reason that they were parts of the empire. An immediate result of the new policy was, therefore, dissatisfaction with the mother country and a strengthening of the separatist tendencies then existing in Canada and Australia.

Several colonial statesmen, prominent among whom were Thomas D'Arcy McGee in Canada and Joseph Howe in Nova Scotia, believed in the essential unity of the empire. To these two it was absurd to make distinctions between English and colonial. The empire was one and should be treated as such. "Canada is itself the Empire in North America," said McGee.¹ To look upon the self-governing colonies from a profit-and-loss point of view seemed sordid. It was the philosophy of shopkeepers, not that of an imperial nation.² Richard, afterwards Sir Richard, Cartwright, writing in the *Canadian News* of December, 1871, expressed the opinion that Britain had no intention of defending Canada against the United States.³ The time for recalling the troops was considered ill-chosen. Dangers threatened Canada from the United States and from the Fenians, both of which had been caused by imperial policies.⁴ This dissatisfaction was one of the factors in producing, about 1870, a separatist movement of considerable strength. Among its leaders was found the later high commissioner, Sir Alexander Galt.⁵

New Zealand objected because the British troops were withdrawn while a Maori war was still undecided.⁶ "Ugly talk of

¹Thomas D'Arcy McGee, *Speeches and Addresses* (London, 1865), p. 202.

²"Canadian Defences" speech by McGee in the House of Assembly, Quebec, March 27, 1862; McGee, *Speeches and Addresses*, pp. 199-205; *The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe*, ed. by J. A. Chisholm (Halifax, 1909), vol. II, p. 388.

³Sir Richard Cartwright, *Reminiscences* (Toronto, 1912), pp. 363, 364. The evidences of colonial dissatisfaction were presented by Robert Torrens in a speech in the House of Commons, April, 26, 1870 (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, cols. 1817-1836).

⁴When the Canadians failed to secure compensation from the United States for losses sustained by the Fenian invasion, they claimed that the imperial government ought to indemnify them because the trouble had originated from an imperial cause. See Campbell to Young, Sept. 10, 1870 (*Sess. Papers*, 1871, V, no. 46, pp. 27, 28).

⁵Oscar Douglas Skelton, *The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt* (Toronto, 1920), p. 444.

⁶*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, cols. 1827-1832. The irritating and rasping tone in some of Lord Granville's despatches was also resented by many persons in the Dominions.

separation" was heard in Victoria. Leading men, among whom were Charles, afterwards Sir Charles, Gavan Duffy and George Higinbotham, later chief justice of Victoria, favoured reducing the connection with Great Britain to a mere personal union, so that Victoria would occupy a position similar to that of Hanover under the British crown¹. A royal commission in the colony reported in favour of guaranteed neutrality in case of war.² Resolutions passed the legislative assembly to the effect that communications with the home government should pass, not through the governor, but through the colonial secretary of state.³

In the opinion of Sir Charles Adderley, "the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the Colonies appeared to be one main subject of dissatisfaction."⁴ The situation created by the discontent was deemed serious. Faced with the possibility of separation, those favouring maintenance of the colonial connection were aroused.

On April 26, 1870, Robert Torrens moved in the House of Commons "that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the political relations and modes of official inter-communication between the self-governing Colonies and this Country, and to report whether any or what modifications are desirable, with a view to the maintenance of a common nationality cemented by cordial good understanding."⁵ The motion led to an important debate on colonial policy. Opposed by the government, it was defeated 67 to 110.

Another evidence of the awakened interest in the overseas possessions was the organization in 1868 of the Colonial Society, later called the Royal Colonial Institute. Its object was to spread general knowledge of the colonies and to work for a better understanding between them and the mother country.⁶ A year later this organization presented plans for the convening of a colonial conference in London. Lord Granville, then colonial secretary, forwarded the proposal to the colonies, but at the same time stated his objections to it. He was averse to anything that might

¹See quotations from a speech by Gavan Duffy in the parliament of Victoria, Nov. 1869 (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, col. 1822); see also H. G. Turner, *A History of Victoria* (London, 1904), vol. II, pp. 149, 150.

²Keith, *Responsible Government*, vol. III, p. 1155.

³G. W. Rusden, *History of Australia* (Melbourne, 1897), vol. III, pp. 271, 272.

⁴*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, col. 1864; Edward Jenkins, "Imperial Federalism", in the *Contemporary Review*, XVI, pp. 165-188, January, 1871.

⁵*Hansard*, 3rd series, CC, col. 1847.

⁶See *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol. I, p. 1; vol. VIII, p. 445.

lead to a standing representation of the colonies in London. Nor was the plan well received by the colonies. Several of them resented the interference of the Royal Colonial Institute group.¹ The effort failed, but the work for unifying the empire continued. "By 1871 the early Imperial Federation Movement was in full swing."²

The next thirty years witnessed a gradual drawing together. Steamship lines and submarine cables linked the remote dependencies to the centre of the empire. Travel became easier and more common. The people of Great Britain and of the Dominions learned to know and appreciate each other. In a period of great pan-racial movements, it was natural that the peoples of Anglo-Saxon origin should come together, especially those who owed allegiance to the British crown. But the greatest centripetal force was the realization of mutual interests and common danger. When strong and aggressive foreign nations broke the isolation of the Dominions, these looked to Great Britain as the mother country, for protection. Great Britain, on the other hand, began to realize to what extent her imperial position depended upon retention of the colonies. The keen commercial and industrial competition enhanced their value. With the growth of military and naval rivalry among the powers and of powerful alliances, the United Kingdom began to look to her great self-governing dependencies for support in time of need. Gradually the question of organizing the empire for defence became the greatest of the problems of intra-imperial relationship.

The responsibility for maintaining internal order and security rested with the colonies. Local military establishments for this purpose existed already in several of them. As the foreign situation grew more threatening these were improved. By the end of the century Canada and the Australasian colonies could muster considerable bodies of fairly efficient troops. In the development of these forces the home government was always interested and always ready to assist by placing military experts at the disposal of the colonial governments. But no attempt was made to dictate policies. The attitude of the Liberal party

¹The resolutions and correspondence are found in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1870, XLIX, C-24 and C-51.

²Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations*, p. 54. See also G. B. Adams, "The Origin and Results of the Imperial Federation Movement in England" in *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin* (Madison, 1899), pp. 93-116; A. L. Burt, *Imperial Architects* (Toronto, 1913), pp. 115-119.

in Great Britain to this question was clearly stated by Gladstone. In answering a question on the defence of Canada in the House of Commons, on July 18, 1872, he said, "We do not think it is our function . . . to insist on this or that particular measure with respect to the defence of Canada, as we recognize the full competency and capacity of Canada . . . to perform what the Dominion Government may think to be its proper duties, and as we believe it to be the best judge of those duties."¹

The Canadian militia was reorganized during the Civil War in the United States,² and Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, who as colonel commanded two regiments of the force in the Red River expedition of 1870, testified to its excellent qualities.³ An agreement with the imperial government of 1865 bound the colony to spend about one million dollars per year on its military establishment.⁴ This agreement was later made binding upon the Dominion, and the militia system of united Canada was extended to the other provinces. However, a period of neglect followed the recall of the imperial troops.⁵ Little was done until 1896, when Canada, alarmed over the prospects of an Anglo-American conflict, began to improve her defences. Provisions were made for the annual drill of the whole active militia. Only graduates of the Royal Military College could serve as officers in the artillery, and steps were taken towards the organization of cadet corps in the high schools, normal schools, and collegiate institutions of the provinces. The military budget rose from an average of \$1,200,000-\$1,600,000 for the period 1894-1898 to \$2,500,000 in 1900. In this reorganization the needs of the empire as a whole were considered, and the reforms formed a part of a general plan for improving the defence system of the empire.⁶

¹*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCXII, cols. 1365, 1366.

²The reorganization was effected by the Militia Act, 1863, and through the work of General Patrick MacDougall, who was sent over from England for that purpose. See Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life* (Westminster, 1903), vol. II, pp. 145-149. For an historical study of the Canadian military defense system see C. F. Hamilton, "Defence," in *Canada and its Provinces*, edited by Adam Short and Arthur G. Doughty (Toronto, 1914-17), vol. VII, pp. 379-468.

³Wolseley, p. 150.

⁴Cardwell to Monck, June 17, 1865 (*Sessional Papers*, 1867-68, IX, no. 63, p. 17).

⁵Although some improvements had been effected by the Militia Act of 1883 the mobilization of the force, for the purpose of suppressing the Northwest rebellion, 1885, disclosed grave defects. See *Debates*, Canadian Senate, 1886, p. 666; *Canada and its Provinces*, vol. VII, pp. 430-435.

⁶*Debates*, Can. H. of C., 1900, III, cols. 8229-8252; *Sess. Papers*, 1900, no. 19, p. 27; *Canada and its Provinces*, vol. VII, p. 442.

In New Zealand the necessity for providing protection against the Maoris brought about the development of local forces previous to the withdrawal of the British troops.¹ Australia, on the other hand, had no serious native problem. Here the interest in defence most clearly reflects the foreign situation, particularly that in the Pacific. Volunteer forces had been organized in Victoria and New South Wales during the Crimean War.² Some anxiety was felt in the sixties when the French relations seemed alarming,³ but the colonies were not thoroughly aroused until 1877-1878, when the outbreak of an Anglo-Russian conflict was considered imminent. Meanwhile, the British government showed considerable interest in the Australian defence question. Two imperial officers, Lieutenant-General Sir W. T. Jervois and Colonel Scratchley, inspected and reported upon the defences of these colonies.⁴ A reorganization took place in several of them. Among the more important changes was the abandonment of the volunteer system and the substitution for it of a "paid militia."⁵ Gradually the Australian isolation was broken. Foreign powers invaded the South Pacific. The German occupation of New Guinea, French activities in the New Hebrides, Russian expansion in Asia, all tended to emphasize this. Lord Carnarvon, visiting the colonies in 1886, warned them of possible dangers.⁶ And the later inspection and report by Major-General Edwards convinced men like Sir Henry Parkes that Australasia must unite for protection.⁷ Federation became the all-important question in the nineties. The defence problem was allowed to rest until the Commonwealth had been established.

Recognizing the exposed position of the white settlements in

¹New Zealand's defence expenditures before 1887 totalled £7,152,938, a sum larger than that expended by all the other Australasian colonies taken together (*Parliamentary Papers, 1887*, LVI, C-5091- I, pp. 291-293).

²*Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Melbourne, 1909), vol. II, pp. 1075-1081, contains an historical survey of the military defence system.

³Sir Henry Parkes, *Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History* (London, 1892), pp. 117-120.

⁴For the Australasian defence policy, see "Second Report of the Royal Commission on Defence," March 23, 1882 (*Parliamentary Papers, 1887*, LVI, C-5091-I, pp. 315-328).

⁵*Official Year Book of Australia*, vol. II, p. 1078.

⁶Parkes, *Fifty Years*, pp. 528-530.

⁷Major General Edwards's report is found in *Parliamentary Papers, 1890*, XLIX, C-6188. Upon examining it, Sir Henry Parkes arrived at the conclusion "that nothing short of a Federal Executive can carry out the General's recommendation" (Parkes to Cockburn, Oct. 31, 1889, in Parkes, *Fifty Years*, p. 589).

South Africa, the imperial government did not recall the entire garrison from the Cape Colony.¹ Disturbed conditions on the sub-continent during the years 1876-1880 caused this colony to make special efforts towards improving the local defences, chief of which was the passage of the Levies Act, 1878, which established the principle of universal liability to military service,²

Gradually forces of considerable strength grew up in the self-governing colonies. Statements prepared for the Colonial Conference of 1887 showed that these colonies and Natal possessed wholly or partially trained forces totalling 78,000 officers and men, with large reserves.³ At the time of the outbreak of the Boer War the military and naval forces in the colonies were estimated to number 86,486.⁴ Although raised under local Acts and for local defence,⁵ they protected important sections of the empire and therefore added materially to its military strength.

Naval defence continued to be a charge upon the imperial exchequer. Several efforts were made to interest the colonies in this branch of the service. It was expected that the Colonial Naval Defense Act of 1865 would lead to the creation of local naval establishments which should form a part of that of the empire.⁶ But the results were disappointing.⁷ Occasionally a war-ship was presented to a colony to be used for training its youths in seamanship. Some of them, like the *Charybdis*, given to Canada in 1880, were old hulks which brought the recipient

¹Keith, *Responsible Government*, vol. III, pp. 1256, 1257.

²Sir Charles Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain* (London, 1890), p. 662. Sir Thomas Upington reported at the Colonial Conference, 1887, a defence expenditure for Cape Colony equivalent to £450,000 a year "or between one-sixth and one-seventh of the whole of our resources" (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091, p. 405). See also John Martineau, *The Life of Sir Bartle Frere* (London, 1895), vol. II, pp. 368, 369.

³*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091, p. X.

⁴General Sir Frederick Maurice, *History of the War in South Africa* (London, 1906-08), vol. I, pp. 93, 94.

⁵Whether forces raised under local Acts could be used outside of the colony was the subject of a spirited debate between Lord Cairns and Henry Sewell of New Zealand. See the *Toronto Weekly Globe*, June 14, 1878.

⁶29 and 29 Vict., C 14. The Act empowered the colonial legislatures to apply the public money for providing vessels of war and the raising of men and commissioning of officers. The colonial vessels might be placed at the disposal of the crown, but were not to involve any charge upon imperial revenue. The most important provisions are found in Keith, *Responsible Government*, vol. III, pp. 1271-1273.

⁷See statement by the colonial secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in the House of Commons, July 24, 1879 (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCLVIII, col. 1171).

nothing but expense.¹ New South Wales received the *Wolverine*, and manned it occasionally on holidays and at Christmas and Easter. The *Cerberus* and the *Nelson*, owned by Victoria, were left to rot peacefully at the wharves. No youths volunteered for training.²

Apart from the cash contributions, which will be discussed later, the participation of the Dominions in naval defence before the end of the nineteenth century was limited to Canada's taking over the fishery protection service,³ and to the acquisition of a few gun-boats and torpedo boats by Australasian colonies,⁴ to be used only for strictly local purposes. It was made clear by the Australasian Inter-Colonial Conference at Sidney, 1881, that "the naval defence of these Colonies . . . should continue to be at the exclusive charge of the Imperial Government."⁵ Still a sentiment favouring an Australian navy existed.⁶ It was desired by many in Great Britain. *The Times* declared in a leading article on October 27, 1887, "The time is not far distant when an enemy in the Pacific will be called upon to reckon with colonial ships of war as well as with those of England, and when, in all probability, the mother country may even commit the defence of the Pacific to her great dependencies and reserve the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for herself." As Federation appeared within reach, this feeling grew stronger. It is significant that the naval conference at Melbourne, 1899, prepared plans for a naval reserve force to be controlled and paid by the Commonwealth. Action was considered imperative in view of the proximity of naval bases belonging to foreign powers. It was hoped that the small local naval establishments would form the nucleus for an

¹*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091, p. 275.

²*Official Yearbook of Australia*, vol. II, p. 1084; Turner, *History of Victoria*, vol. II, p. 136.

³At the time of the Fenian raids Canada first chartered, and later bought, two steamers that were used as gun-boats on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence (*Sess. Papers*, 1867-8, VII, no. 37; 1869, VI, no. 75, p. 142; 1871, V, no. 46, pp. 31, 32). The first appropriation for the fishery protection service was made by Canada in 1856 (*Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada*, 1856, XIV, pp. 716, 717). This service was considered an imperial obligation because it was necessitated by treaties in the making of which Canada had had no share. The entire cost of this service was taken over by the Dominion about 1885 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1907, LV, C. 3523, p. 139). Provisions were made in the Militia Act of 1883 for a marine force to be raised in a way similar to that of the militia (*Statutes of Canada*, 45 & 46 Vic. c-11).

⁴*Official Yearbook of Australia*, vol. II, pp. 1084, 1085.

⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091-I, p. 213.

⁶See statement by Deakin of Victoria upon returning from the Colonial Conference, 1887 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1908, LXXI, C. 4325, pp. 23, 24).

Australian navy.¹ When the Commonwealth of Australia came into existence on January 1, 1901, the hope seemed nearer its realization. Nearly nine years were to pass, however, before any definite steps were taken.²

Co-operation for defence had been the dream of those who early hoped and worked for consolidation of the empire. As the colonies grew stronger, the pressure from without greater, and the dependencies showed no desire to separate themselves from the empire, plans for insuring this co-operation were eagerly discussed. The Defence Resolution of 1862 had affirmed the principle that the colonies should assist in their external defence. However, a quarter of a century passed before this was actually realized.

Joseph Howe was one of the earliest advocates of joint responsibility in defence. This was indeed a necessary corollary to his views in regard to the essential unity of the empire. Writing to Charles Adderley, afterwards Lord Norton, on December 24, 1862, he said, "I hope to live to see the day when the outlying Provinces of the empire will as freely send their contingents for the defence of these islands, as they have this year sent their treasuries to your Crystal Palace."³ Four years later he suggested, in a letter to Earl Russell, that a tax should be levied by imperial statute, the proceeds of which should be used for the maintenance of the imperial army and navy.⁴ Another colonial, Fitzherbert, treasurer of New Zealand, offered in 1869 a plan whereby the cost of the imperial fleet in the Australian waters should be shared equally by the colonies and Britain.⁵ Among other representative colonial statesmen who expressed themselves in favour of co-operation for defence we find Sir Julius Vogel, of New Zealand⁶ and Sir John A. Macdonald of Canada. The latter, however, advocated aid only "in any wars of defence."⁷

¹Richard Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (London, 1905), pp. 103, 152, 153, 175-177.

²Keith, *Responsible Government*, vol. III, pp. 1283-1291.

³Howe, *Speeches and Public Letters*, vol. II, p. 390.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1868-69f XL, no. 307, pp. 496, 497.

⁶"If the great colonies are to continue parts of the Empire, it is utterly unreasonable that they should be free from all contribution towards national expenditure. The fleet belongs to the nation, it is essentially for the service of the nation, and nothing can justify freeing the colonies . . . from contribution towards its cost, except the intention to free them from the nation" (*The Nineteenth Century*, July, 1877, I, p. 827).

⁷A general promise made at a meeting of the Imperial Federation League (The Marquis of Lorne, "The Unity of the Empire," *The Nineteenth Century*, XVII, p. 397, March, 1885).

Nor did the question fail to engage the attention of imperial statesmen. Earl Russell favoured a cash contribution from the colonies towards military and naval expenditures.¹ Lord Eustace Cecil introduced a motion into the House of Commons, March 7, 1873, declaring that in order to relieve the British tax-payers "each Colony should be invited to contribute, in proportion to its population and wealth, such annual contingents of men and money towards the defence of the Empire as may, by arrangement between the Home and Colonial Governments, be hereafter deemed just and necessary."² After a debate the motion was withdrawn, but it furnished an opportunity for a statement of policy by Gladstone. "What we wish," he said, "is not that the Colonies should under pressure from this country be brought to make, probably not insignificant, but at any rate grudging, contributions towards the expenses of the Empire; what we wish is to see the growth of the true spirit of freedom in the colonial communities which would make them not only willing, but eager, to share all the responsibilities of freedom and to take a part in the common burdens."³

The discussion of this question brought to light the divergent views of Gladstone and Disraeli concerning the empire. To the former the relations between Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions were based on sentiment and "voluntaryism." Consciously or unconsciously, he had grasped the new orientation in colonial policy—the gradual movement towards the old Greek idea of the relationship between colony and mother country. In his opinion, the substance of this "relationship lies, not in despatches from Downing Street, but in the mutual affection, and the moral and social sympathies which can only flourish between adult communities when they are on both sides free."⁴

Disraeli, on the other hand, influenced by the prevailing ideas of the value of federations and written constitutions, put his trust in the legal formula as a connecting link. This is clearly seen in his famous Crystal Palace speech of June 24, 1872. "Self-government," he said, "when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It

¹*Recollections*, p. 200.

²*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCXIV, col. 1520.

³*Ibid.*, col. 1534.

⁴"England's Mission" in *The Nineteenth Century*, IV, p. 572. Similar views were expressed in his article, "Germany, France, and England" in *The Edinburgh Review*, CXXX, p. 303.

ought to have been accompanied by an Imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the Sovereign as their trustee, and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the Colonies should have been defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the Colonies themselves."¹ Imperial consolidation was thus taken up as a campaign issue by the astute leader of the Conservative party. The Royal Colonial Institute groups supported these views,² and federation for defence was one of the chief arguments presented by those who later organized the Imperial Federation League.³ The question was apparently widely discussed: *The Times*, in its comments upon the Crystal Palace speech, said that it contained "nothing startling."⁴

Few official actions were taken by the British government to insure colonial participation in imperial defence prior to 1887, apart from the passage of the Colonial Naval Defence Act already mentioned. During the Disraeli ministry, 1874-1880, the question was brought up at least twice for serious consideration. First, it came up in connection with the annexation of the Fiji Islands and the proposed annexation of New Guinea, both of which were urged strongly by the Australasian governments. Lord Carnarvon then attempted to secure acceptance of the principle that the colonies should share in the expense connected with the application of policies which they had advocated. It was his belief that such acceptance would demonstrate "the readiness of the great Colonies to accept their membership in the common duties of the Empire."⁵ He met with little encouragement. In the opinion of the ministry of New Zealand, "there was an anomaly in contributing to the cost of the Government in which no control was to

¹*The Times*, June 25, 1872. In 1850 both he and Gladstone voted in the affirmative on Molesworth's motion favouring that the relationship between Britain and the colonies should be clearly defined (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CX, cols. 1192, 1193). Some of the fundamental ideas contained in the Crystal Palace speech are found in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, July 25, 1862 (*Hansard*, 3rd series, CLXVIII, cols. 867, 868).

²*Proceedings, 1877-1878*, IX, pp. 362, 363, 405; *Papers and Addresses by Lord Brassey*, ed. by R. J. Beadon and Arthur H. Loring (London, 1895), p. 41.

³Jenkins, "Imperial Federalism," in *The Contemporary Review*, XVI, p. 177.

⁴Leading article, June 25.

⁵"Correspondence relating to New Guinea" in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, LIV, C-1566, p. 86.

be permitted to the contributors"¹—a revival of the cry, "no taxation without representation." The question was considered a second time in connection with the investigations carried on by the Royal Commission on Defence of 1879. This commission was to study the defence of empire as a whole, and also "in what proportions the cost of . . . measures of defence should be divided between the Imperial Government and the Colonies to which they relate."² The colonies, it was believed, would grow relatively more rapidly in wealth and population than the mother country. And, consequently, their power to take a fair share of the defence of the empire would be constantly on the increase. The commission, in its report of July 22, 1882, recommended colonial participation in the cost of imperial defence.³ But no definite action was taken until it had been demonstrated that the British subjects across the seas were ready to support the mother country in time of need.

Few opportunities to demonstrate attachment to the empire presented themselves until towards the end of the nineteenth century. Australians and British North Americans had indeed shown both during the Crimean War and at the time of Indian mutiny that they were willing to serve for Britain. But little aid had been called for or accepted.⁴ Another opportunity for testing their loyalty came in 1877-1878. The Australian colonies, fearing for their own safety, made preparations for defence. Canada, on the other hand, had little to fear. Nevertheless a sufficient number of volunteers presented themselves to create the belief that a force of 30,000 men could be raised in the Dominion in case of war.⁵

¹*Ibid.*, p. 81. See also Robinson to Carnarvon, Nov. 26, 1875 (*ibid.*, p. 69).

²*Ibid.*, 1887, LVI, C-5091-I, p. 297.

³*Ibid.*, p. 338.

⁴The 100th Royal Canadian Rifles was raised in Canada during the Indian Mutiny. The colony furnished officers and men, and Great Britain paid the expenses (*Canada and its Provinces*, vol. VII, pp. 394, 395). A Canadian volunteer artillery corps also offered its services to the empire in this crisis. Lord Palmerston favoured acceptance of the offer, but the military authorities objected on the ground that volunteer corps would ruin the army. See Palmerston to Labouchère, Sept. 23, 1857, and the Duke of Cambridge to Panmure, Sept. 25 (*The Panmure Papers*, edited by Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay, London, 1908, vol. II, pp. 433, 435). For the attitude of the Australasians see Charles E. Lyne, *Life of Sir Henry Parkes* (London, 1897), p. 105; and W. L. Rees and L. Rees, *The Life and Times of Sir George Grey* (London, 1892), pp. 255-257.

⁵*Toronto Weekly Globe*, Jan. 1, 1877, and March 29, 1878; *Proc. Royal Col. Inst.*, 1877-78, IX, p. 395.

Various problems in the foreign relation of Great Britain, in 1884-1885, deeply interested the colonies. Germany's annexation of New Guinea, the Anglo-Russian dispute over Afghanistan, and the Soudan disaster were important, especially the two former, to the Australians. The last, which could have had no serious consequences for their safety, nevertheless brought forth a remarkable demonstration of loyalty from the various parts of the empire. Victoria placed her new gun-boats at the disposal of the admiralty.¹ And the other colonies vied with one another in offering military aid.² Of these only the first offer, that of New South Wales, was accepted, and a small body of troops was sent to the Red Sea at colonial expense.³ The demonstration may indeed be partly attributed to the unique position which General Gordon occupied in the hearts of all Britons, and to the sorrow evoked by the news of his tragic death. But the imperial government was doubtless right in also considering the offers a sign of loyalty to its cause. And this was the interpretation put upon them by the imperialists in England. The colonies had shown willingness to make sacrifices for the empire. They ought to be admitted into its councils. The Imperial Federation League, organized in 1884, was active, and counted among its supporters leading men from both parties. James Anthony Froude, the historian, made a tour of the colonies in 1885, and in his *Oceana*, published in 1886, he wrote enthusiastically about them, and called attention to the need for making secure the extremities of the empire. The time seemed, indeed, propitious for a step towards imperial consolidation.

Apart from the conviction that the colonies were now willing to share the burden of imperial defence, and the necessity for striking while the iron was hot—factors that would naturally appeal to the party of Disraeli and Carnarvon—there were other elements that made it desirable to attempt a consolidation of the empire. The foreign situation was far from reassuring.⁴ The investigations of the royal commission to inquire into the de-

¹*Hansard*, 3rd series, CCLXXXIV, col. 1335.

²Even native princes in India offered aid (*ibid.*, CCXCIV, cols. 902, 903; CCXCVII, col. 1647; Froude, *Oceana*, pp. 165, 170, 171; Parkes, *Fifty Years*, pp. 419-422).

³The Soudan contingent cost the colony £121,835 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091-I, p. 291).

⁴Sir Charles W. Dilke claims that the calling of the conference was closely connected with the French activities in the New Hebrides ("The Present Position of European Politics" in *Fortnightly Review*, XLVII, pp. 825, 826, June, 1887).

pression of trade and industry revealed that Britain's hold, even on the colonial markets, was slipping. Germany in particular was proving a dangerous competitor.¹

A favourable opportunity for bringing representatives of the colonies together offered itself in connection with the Queen's Jubilee, 1887. In issuing the call for this, the first, Colonial Conference, it was stipulated that defence was the primary question to be considered. The time had now arrived, in the opinion of the government, "when an attempt may fairly be made to attain to a better understanding as to the system of defence which may be established throughout the Empire."² At the conference at least two plans for insuring military co-operation were discussed. Sir H. T. Holland, the colonial secretary, attempted to secure the acceptance of an agreement by which the colonial forces, with the consent of their respective governments and at their expense, should "aid Her Majesty in any wars in which she may be engaged,"³ and Jan Hofmeyr of the Cape Colony suggested the imposition of an imperial customs tariff, the proceeds of which were to be used for the protection of the empire.⁴ To the former plan Canada's representatives objected on the ground that the Dominion had expended annually on its defences more than was required by the agreement of 1865. In addition, it had constructed at its own expense a transcontinental railway which had added materially to the defensive strength of the empire.⁵ The second plan does not seem to have secured much attention. An Australasian naval agreement was, however, an important step towards imperial consolidation for defence.

Ever since the intercolonial naval conference of 1881 the Australians had been urging upon the admiralty the necessity of

¹Richard Jebb, *The Imperial Conference* (London, 1911), vol. I, pp. 114, 115.

²Circular Despatch of Nov. 25, 1886 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091, p. vii).

³*Ibid.*, p. 529.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 463-465. This plan was later taken up in Canada by Mr. Alex. McNeill in a resolution presented in the Canadian House of Commons, 1896 (see *Debates*, Can. H. of C., 1900, III, Cols. 8932, 8933).

⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091, pp. 271-275. "I hope Her Majesty's Government will, for a long time to come, consider that we have efficiently discharged our duty and made a very great contribution to the defence of the Empire by the construction of a great transcontinental railway, which is a very great Imperial as well as colonial importance."—Sir Charles Tupper in the Can. H. of C., June 3, 1887 (*Debates*, 1887, II, p. 764). See also his article, "Federating the Empire," in *The Nineteenth Century*, XXX, pp. 515-517.

strengthening the squadron stationed in their waters. But the British government demanded that the colonies concerned should pay the cost of any additional ships. They, on the other hand, requested that such a squadron should always be stationed in their waters and should not be moved without their consent. This would virtually have introduced a system of dual control. Admiral Tryon presented, in 1885, a report on the naval defence situation in Australia, based on investigations on the spot. He recommended the development of a sea-going fleet at the joint expense of the colonies. They, however, raised several objections to the plan, the chief of which were based upon unwillingness to consolidate the local vessels with the imperial fleet and to divest themselves of authority over local harbour defences. The agreement of 1887 embodied a compromise. The colonies agreed to contribute £126,000 a year for ten years towards the cost of the Australian squadron on the condition that this should be maintained at a certain strength, and that it should not be used outside the limits of the Australian station without the consent of the colonies concerned. An opening wedge had thus been entered. Overseas dependencies were now bound by a definite agreement to contribute to the external defence of the empire.¹

The succeeding ten years witnessed friction over the partition of Africa and the beginning of the scramble for Asiatic possessions. With the foreign situation at times threatening, the British government continued to consider defence the most important question of intra-imperial interest.² It was claimed that the policies of the dominions were the cause of strained relations between the empire and foreign powers, and that these made the maintenance of a large and expensive naval establishment necessary. Danger threatened, not so much Great Britain, as the colonies.³ The defences were in a disorganized state and the question of colonial contributions engaged the serious attention of the imperial authorities. Chamberlain, as colonial secretary, adopted a purposeful energetic policy which had for its aim

¹Documents connected with the preliminary negotiations as well as the final agreement are found in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1887, LVI, C-5091-I, pp. 213-262. See also *Hansard*, 3rd series, CCCIII, cols. 1482, 1483.

²*Parliamentary Papers*, 1897, LIX, C-8596, p. 7; Jebb, *Imperial Conference*, vol. I, p. 302.

³*Parliamentary Papers*, 1897, LIX, C-8596, pp. 7, 8: Chamberlain's speech at the opening of the Colonial Conference, 1897.

imperial consolidation.¹ Nor was he without encouragement from the colonies themselves.

When the Venezuela boundary dispute threatened to disrupt the friendly relations with the United States, the Canadian parliament declared, in no uncertain terms, in a resolution of February 5, 1896, its loyalty and firm determination to maintain unimpaired the integrity of the empire.² A year previously Sir Charles Tupper had advocated fast Atlantic steamers with the plea that they would be a means to carry Canadian volunteers to any part of the world "where the honour and interests of the Empire were threatened."³ Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the prime minister in 1897, declared, "If England at any time were engaged in a struggle for life and death, the moment the bugle was sounded or the fire was lit on the hills, the colonies would rush to the aid of the mother country."⁴

At the Colonial Conference of 1897 Chamberlain confessed openly his belief in the desirability of consolidating the empire both for trade and for defence, explained the foreign situation, and made a plea for schemes for common defense.⁵ Little was accomplished. The Australasian naval agreement was renewed. But Canada refused to make a similar arrangement. The only important gain was an offer by the Cape Colony of an unconditional contribution of the cost of a first class battle-ship. Natal also agreed to give yearly £12,000 to naval defence.⁶ Since both these gifts were unconditional, they mark an important step toward accepting joint responsibility with Great Britain for the protection of the empire.

The sentiment of imperial loyalty was clearly revealed in the attitude of the Dominion governments during the Boer War. This war was not connected with any threat to the safety of a colony outside of South Africa. The readiness with which the Dominions came forward to assist the empire is therefore astound-

¹Louis Creswick, *The Life of the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain* (London, 1904), vol. III, p. 35.

²*Debates*, Can. H. of C., 1896, I, cols. 1186, 1187.

³From a speech delivered at the Tyneside Geographical Society, Nov. 21, 1895, quoted by himself in the Can. H. of C., Feb. 5, 1900 (*Debates*, 1900, I, col. 38).

⁴From a speech delivered in 1897 quoted by himself in the Canadian H. of C., Feb. 5, 1900 (*Debates*, I, col. 64). In 1896 the Princess Louise Hussars under Lieut.-Col. James Domville offered their services for the Soudan (*ibid.*, 1896, II, cols. 4786, 4787).

⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1897, LIX, C-8596, pp. 5, 8, 9.

⁶Cape Colony's offer was later changed to an annual contribution of £30,000 (Keith, *Responsible Government*, III, p. 1472).

ing. Britain had hardly begun to move troops before offers of aid began to pour in and resolutions expressing sympathy with the British cause were passed by the colonial parliaments. At the time hostilities actually opened nearly all self-governing colonies had promised support.¹ Chamberlain seized eagerly this opportunity for a practical consolidation of the empire. Regulations concerning the equipment of colonial contingents and the proportion of the cost to be borne by the imperial and the colonial governments were drawn up.² Under these the colonies and volunteers outside of South Africa contributed 30,328 officers and men at a total expense of £859,218.³ In addition to bearing the cost of raising and equipping the troops and paying for their transportation to South Africa, the colonies also paid their men the difference between the imperial and the colonial rates.⁴

The aid contributed during the Boer War was doubtless more of a manifestation on the part of colonists of British descent of an emotional attachment to the land of their fathers than a tacit acceptance of a new principle in imperial relationships. It is true, Seddon, the prime minister of New Zealand, advocated participation in the struggle, "because we are an integral part of one great empire."⁵ But the Canadian statesmen avoided any reference to this question. Sir Charles Tupper, leader of the Conservative party, urged Canada to "aid the mother country to whom she owes so much, and from whom she expects so much."⁶ The prime minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, appealed to the French Canadians "to do from a sense of duty what the English Canadians were doing from enthusiasm."⁷ The attitude toward the war of the people in the colonies with a large non-English population seems generally to have been determined by their racial affilia-

¹The first movement of troops took place July 6 and the Boer ultimatum was dated Oct. 9, 1899. The colonial offers of aid, in chronological order, were as follows: Queensland, July 11; Victoria, July 12; New South Wales, July 18; New Zealand, Sept. 22; West Australia, Oct. 5; Tasmania, Oct. 9; South Australia, Oct. 13; and Canada, Oct. 14 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1900, LVI, C. 18).

²Circular Despatch of Oct. 3, 1899 (*ibid.*, p. 6).

³*Ibid.*, 1902, LVIII, C-990; *The International Year Book*, 1902, p. 672.

⁴*Parliamentary Papers*, 1902, LXVI, C-1299, p. 63; *Sess. Papers* 1901, no. 35a, p. 12. A strong group in Canada urged that the Dominion should pay all the expenses (*Debates*, Can. H. of C., 1900, I, cols. 46, 48, 49).

⁵James Drummond, *Life of Seddon* (London, 1907), p. 314.

⁶Speech at Yarmouth, Oct. 4, 1899, quoted by himself in the Can. H. of C., Feb. 5, 1900 (*Debates*, 1900, I, col. 28).

⁷Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, p. 18.

tions. Boers in the British South African colonies joined their kinsmen in the republics in very large numbers; and the French Canadians were almost a unit in opposing contributions to the imperial cause. A statement in *La Patrie* of Montreal, on October 10, 1899, doubtless reflected the opinion of a majority among the French-Canadians: "What have we to do with the affairs of South Africa? What interests have we in the Transvaal? Why should we take the money and the blood of the taxpayers of this country to squander them in these far-away regions?"¹

Sir Wilfrid Laurier carefully stipulated that the enrollment of Canadian volunteers for imperial service in South Africa was not to be a binding precedent for the future. Speaking in the Canadian House of Commons, on February 5, 1900, he said, "I claim for Canada this, that, in the future, Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act."² The British government nevertheless considered the colonial aid an evidence of the growth of the feeling of imperial unity. Chamberlain, discussing this topic said, that he considered the sending of colonial troops to South Africa "an expression of that growing feeling of the unity and solidarity of the Empire which has marked the relation of the Mother Country with the Colonies during the recent years."³ In his opinion, imperial federation was now within reach, and increased efforts were made to secure its realization.⁴

Defence and the questions connected therewith served to keep continuously before the colonies the fact that they were connected with and dependent upon Britain. Military stores were purchased in the United Kingdom; the commander of the Canadian militia was an imperial officer; high imperial officers were used

¹Quoted in the Canadian House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1900 (*Debates*, I, col. 31). See also *The Canadian Annual Review*, 1901, pp. 304, 305; 1902, p. 140; André Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada* (London, 1907), pp. 281-284.

²*Debates*, 1900, I, col. 72. In this speech Laurier quoted with approval Kipling's "Daughter am I in my mother's house,
But mistress in my own;
The gates are mine to open,
The gates are mine to close."

³Chamberlain to Minto, Nov. 15, 1899 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1900, LVI, C-18, p. 28).

⁴See Chamberlain's speech on the South African War, H. of C., Feb. 5, 1900 (*Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches*, ed. by Charles W. Boyd, London, 1914, vol. II, p. 67).

to inspect, report upon, and assist the colonial governments in improving their defence systems; members of the Canadian militia who had distinguished themselves in the service received medals from the home government; the instructors in the Royal Military College at Kingston were imperial officers; and a number of graduates of that institution secured commissions in the British imperial army.¹

In 1885 the Colonial Defence Committee was created. Ten years later this body became a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. To the latter was entrusted the duty of collecting information concerning defence and of giving advice and directions for defensive measures in every part of the empire,² an important step towards union for military purposes. The colonies, particularly those of Australasia, realized that while "the Law of the Jungle" prevail in international relations, "the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack." An appreciation of this fact gave vitality to the agitation for imperial federation, and aided in bringing the Colonial Conference into existence, thereby establishing a deliberative body for the entire empire that has proved of great importance.

Confronted with so many evidences of loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for the cause of the empire, the question remains, why were the Dominions so reluctant to make binding defensive agreements? In some of them local conditions were indeed unfavourable to a closer imperial connection. Canada had few foreign complications and little fear of invasion from the United States, and therefore lacked the primary incentive. Likewise, the presence of a large non-English element in the Dominion gave compactness to any opposition to a closer union with Great Britain.³ But there were other more far-reaching factors which made even colonies with an almost pure English population hesitate. In America, Australasia, and South Africa, small groups of people were confronted with gigantic tasks in their attempts to develop the resources of continents. Although possessing great

¹*Debates*, Can. H. of C., 1879, II, p. 1631; 1883, I, p. 529; 1884, II, p. 1161; 1896, II, col. 6918; 1886, I, p. 1304; 1900, III, cols. 8232, 8233. On April 1, 1900, 102 graduates of the Royal Military College in the imperial army were serving in South Africa (*Can. Ann. Rev.*, 1901, p. 295).

²For the power and duties of these committees see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1904, LXXIX, C-2200; 1907, LV, C-3524, pp. 16, 17.

³See Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada*, *passim*.

potential wealth the demand for capital in frontier communities must necessarily be greater than the available supply. They can ill afford to put their resources into non-productive military and naval establishments. The Canadian representatives made this the basis for their refusal to make contributions for imperial defence in 1887 and later. And in doing so they doubtless presented faithfully the point of view of a large percentage of the population both in Canada and in the other Dominions.

Another serious obstacle to co-operation for defence was of a constitutional character. Enjoying practically legislative independence, the colonies hesitated to tax themselves for imperial defence because they had no voice in controlling foreign policy. And it was admitted that the two were almost inseparable. Urged already in the sixties, when the colonies were urged to assume responsibility for their local defence, the argument had greater force against the demand for contributions to the defence of the empire.¹ Realizing this, Chamberlain promised voice in the empire's councils if the colonies shared its burdens. He hoped and worked for the consolidation of which Joseph Howe and other imperialists had dreamed, and for which the Imperial Federation League and other organizations had agitated. He failed. And the attempts to secure substantial co-operation for defence failed, because the Dominions across the seas had gradually developed a self-consciousness, a particularism, that made them unwilling to give up a portion of their autonomy for a voice in the councils of the empire. The thousands of miles of ocean which separate the most important colonies from the centre of the empire has aided in developing this particularism. Each colony or group of colonies had to meet its own problems. Failure to solve these in the way that seemed best, might indeed prove disastrous to the colonies concerned. But this also fostered the spirit of independence, and developed a "colonial nationalism" which militated against the closer organization of the empire even for defence.

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¹See *Hansard*, 3rd series, CLXXXV, col. 1191, debate of Feb. 28, 1867; *ibid.*, 4th series, CLXIX, col. 468; Hall, *British Commonwealth of Nations*, pp. 122-124.