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## THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA

*A Lecture delivered before the Society March 22, 1918*

By E. M. WRONG, M.A.

I HAVE been asked to speak on the constitutional development of Canada, and there is perhaps a danger in a lecture on this subject being given by a Canadian. We are all inclined to think the history of our own country of special importance, to claim that all men should study the chronicles of our own land, where they may see different principles in conflict more clearly than they will in the story of other nations; where they may learn solutions for modern problems, which if they will only apply them, will send a more efficient and more peaceful world spinning on its way. Most of us, indeed, suffer from national egotism, which perverts our sense of history. You have only to read debates in Parliament in the eighteenth century to see how Englishmen overvalued English institutions. Trial by jury, Habeas Corpus, and representative assemblies were to Burke and Fox, and to many lesser men, panaceas for a world diseased. It was with some indignation, some scorn and more disbelief that they heard, in 1774, that these peculiarly English creations were not desired by French Canadians, but were, on the contrary, feared. Institutions developed to suit English conditions and needs the Whigs thought applicable to the whole world, and this is a habit of mind of which we have not yet rid ourselves, and that has not made the English too much loved in Ireland, in India, or throughout the world. I must

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avoid the danger of preaching on the text of Canada's success in dealing with her constitutional and racial problems, but at the same time I must try to couple the local solution with the imperial, and to see where, if anywhere, Canada has led the way and of what value her experience has been.

The importance of Canadian history is threefold, both as regards the British Empire and the possibility of a permanent League of Nations. First, the problem of self-government within the Empire was worked out in Canada earlier than elsewhere. Responsible government, which means simply that the people of a Dominion have the same control over their domestic affairs as the people of Great Britain have over theirs, was a Canadian device, advocated by Canadian reformers, first tried in what is now Canada, and afterwards applied to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Without the evolution of responsible government the Empire would probably have broken into pieces, for under the system that prevailed till 1840 or even later, any development of a Colony's resources, any increase in its population and wealth helped to strengthen centrifugal forces, and to create a movement for separation. A reconciliation of the general with the particular interest, of the Empire with the Colony, was worked out in Canada. If this had not been done there, it would probably have been done elsewhere, just as if Columbus had not sailed westwards in 1492, some other enterprising adventurer would have pushed out into the Atlantic and sooner or later would have reached the New World. But Canada, like Columbus, was the pioneer. By evolving a system of responsible government she helped to reconcile national self-government with the existence of an international state, such as the British Empire is to-day. The solution found in Canada and now practised throughout the Empire may help in any international organisation yet to come.

Secondly, the domestic affairs of Canada, its internal

conflicts, are of some importance to the Empire. Federalism was not invented by Canadians, but Canada, first of the Dominions, tried the experiment of a federal system and in this again did pioneer work. It is worth noting that the experiment was made when federalism was in bad odour; the American Civil War had shown the danger of divided powers, and the weakness of any uncertainty as to where sovereignty, inalienable, indivisible and final, must lie. We are all federalists to-day; we are inclined to think federalism a thing good in itself whether or not it is necessary, but when Canada made its great experiment men regarded a federal solution not as an ideal, but as a makeshift, only to be tried when other systems had failed. Even Sir John A. Macdonald, speaking in the Canadian Parliament before confederation, admitted his preference for a legislative union over a federal system, for he was a monarchist and in 1867 federalism had a republican tinge which many thought incompatible with monarchy; yet federalism was tried and on the whole succeeded. How far Canada's experience proved of value to Australia and South Africa it is hard to say; these countries would almost certainly have evolved some form of union without it, for New Zealand had started constitutional life as a cluster of provinces, so that the experiment was not quite a novelty. But Canada showed them some things better avoided, and at the worst filled the rôle, so important at a revivalist meeting, of the horrible example. Australia in forming the Commonwealth, South Africa in making the Union, at least used Canada to this extent—they did not create a second house along the lines of the Canadian Senate.

The third aspect of Canadian history which is of special importance to the Empire and indeed to the world, is not so much constitutional as racial and linguistic. Canada is not a homogeneous country. Its politics are always complicated by the existence within its borders of a racial minority one-third of the whole,

the French Canadians, original possessors of at least part of the land and made citizens of the Empire not of their own will but by conquest. In Canada there is and there will have to be dualism of language and of race, and what suits the English will not always suit the French. Matters are not so complicated as in Austria, for Canada has only two races, two languages, of any importance, instead of half a dozen, nor is there across the frontier a French nation preaching Irredentism, and complicating internal affairs by the pressure of foreign relations and the dangers of an alien propaganda. But the situation in Canada is complex enough; French and English speak different languages, follow for the most part different religions, have different ideas regarding the future of the country; they read different histories, different newspapers, they move in different societies. Yet the country economically and strategically must remain one, working out its problems day by day and finding solutions for its troubles one at a time. Canada has discovered no panacea for racial feeling; there is no cut-and-dried system which will make all men friends. The 'happy families' which you see in some menageries—cats, dogs, birds, and mice—are only the result of long training, and even then the birds and mice have to be renewed occasionally. But on the whole Canadian history has shown, and is showing even to-day, when racial bitterness seems greater than it has been for seventy years, that dualism is not incompatible with real national feeling, that French and English may quarrel but that most of them seek the interests of Canada first, that the bulk of neither party, despite irreconcilables and firebrands on either side, wishes to push things to an extremity. Canadian experience should be of some value to Ireland, to India, possibly even to South Africa, even though we find in Canadian history no magic solution.

Can we summarise the value of Canadian experience as regards the Empire? I think we can. On the whole

the Empire has looked to Canada for experiments on some of its *political* problems—responsible government (which means the existence of nationality within an international state), federalism, racialism—or at least the existence side by side in one state of two nationalities. In the same way the Empire has looked to Australia and New Zealand for experiments in solving *social* problems, and it is looking and will look to South Africa for suggestions on what is perhaps the greatest difficulty of them all, the colour question. We shall understand Canada's constitutional and political development better if we keep in mind the two themes upon which its history is a series of variations, first, the need of combining a world-empire, or as we ought to call it, or at least part of it, a Commonwealth of Nations, with complete local freedom, and secondly, the necessity of maintaining peace and goodwill in a State where two races, languages and religions meet. All the variations on these two themes have not been worked out; the constitutional experiment of responsible government is still in process of development (the Imperial Conference, the Imperial Committee of Defence, and the War Cabinet's admission of Dominion ministers, are amongst its later results), and the relation of French Canadian to English Canadian is not yet final. Moreover, we seldom get these two themes unalloyed, for the American Civil War, European crises, economic relations with the United States, and boundary disputes with the same country have complicated them. But none the less the key to Canadian history lies in these abstractions.

The history of Canada as a British possession begins in 1763, when the population comprised a few hundred persons who spoke English, mostly merchants and officers, and about 65,000 French. For eleven years control was in the hands of governors who preferred the *habitant* to the English settler—not without good reason. Canada was governed not by Act of Parliament but by

instructions and commissions. The system was meant only as a stop-gap, for representative institutions were to be set up as soon as possible in the hope that they would win over the French; meanwhile a benevolent autocracy would suffice. When there came the troubles leading to the American Revolution, it was determined to maintain the French in their own law, customs, language and religion, and the Quebec Act bade farewell to any attempt at turning the *habitant* into an Englishman. He was left his language and religion, he was not given a Parliament nor did he want one. It is the custom nowadays to criticise this measure adversely; one of the latest writers on Canadian history says of it: 'For the development of French-Canadian Nationalism as an uncompromising political creed, with its instinctive tendency towards separation and isolation, the responsibility rests with the Quebec Act of 1774'.<sup>1</sup> His argument is that before 1774 conscious nationalism was not yet alive and might never have existed if it had not been for this artificial revival. Lord Durham, a great Liberal but not a believer in nationalism, criticised British policy for another reason, for its vacillation, and argued that Canada should either have been made all English or kept entirely for the French. But both these criticisms go astray in that neither considers the difficulty of the situation. When one reads the correspondence of the time one feels that any course other than that followed was most difficult and dangerous, if not impossible. The Quebec Act contemplated the retention of the American Colonies within the Empire, in which case there would have been little British emigration to the northern half of the continent. As the English would not go and occupy the land it was only natural to let its previous occupants keep their old way of life. Moreover, to claim that French-Canadian Nationalism sprang from the Quebec Act is plausible but unsound. Nationalism

<sup>1</sup> *Canada and its Provinces*, vol. iii. p. 49.

springs more readily from repression than from indulgence, and as far as one can tell any attempt to Anglicise the French would have roused them at once to a consciousness of their identity.

The American Revolution upset the calculations of the British Cabinet. It left only the north, and far the poorer, part of North America in British possession but it helped to people these tracts, for the Tories of the American Colonies, the United Empire Loyalists, streamed into what are now New Brunswick and Ontario. As a result of this emigration British policy towards Canada had to change once more. The loyalists were used to Assemblies and must have one, but it would be very difficult if not impossible to divide Canada, giving one part of it representative institutions, and at the same time withholding these from the other. So in 1791 the Constitutional Act set up representative government in both Lower and Upper Canada; the country had taken the first step in constitutional development, it had acquired a legalised voice. For the next step it had to wait over fifty years.

Charles Buller, one of Lord Durham's associates, and a most able thinker, said of representative as opposed to responsible government, that to confer it was to light a fire and then stop up the chimney. The people of Canada—both Upper and Lower—elected members to the Lower House, the Assembly, on a low property qualification. But the Assembly, like the English Parliament in the reign of James I, did not govern. It had a limited power over the purse, and no new law could be passed without its consent. But government does not consist in making laws so much as in administering them, as we have all found out by now—though it took us about 200 years to make the discovery. Above the Assembly was the Legislative Council, an Upper House filled by nomination, not by election. Still higher was the Executive Council, a sort of Cabinet but without



either individual or collective responsibility; the Governor did not have to change his Ministers even when the Assembly was unanimous against them. Of course there was friction; such a system is certain to make friction in any country that is growing, and that looks consciously or unconsciously to self-government. In Lower Canada the friction inevitable when the shadow but not the reality of power was given to the electorate was complicated by racial feeling. The British Government, uncertain how to deal with Canada, was sure enough of one thing—that sovereignty could not exist in a colony without breaking the Empire in pieces, and that the chain of responsibility must run from the Colonial Governor to the Ministers in Whitehall, not from the Governor's advisers to the people of the Colony. An inevitable but none the less fatal *impasse* resulted, only to be solved when some Canadian politicians—such as Howe and Baldwin—discovered that there might be a double chain of responsibility, one connecting the Governor with the British Ministry and eventually with the British people, the other tying the Governor, through his Ministers, to the Colonial electorate. Lord Durham adopted this solution, though the British Government fought shy of it; gradually between 1840 and 1850 it prevailed, and from Canada it was transferred almost immediately to the Australian Colonies, which in 1855 began their political career as self-governing partners in the Empire.

Thus one of the constitutional difficulties was worked out. We can admit at once that the settlement was not quite satisfactory in a logical way. The Imperial Parliament remained sovereign, as it does to-day, but it had already handed over to the Canadian legislatures set up in 1791 the machinery of control and certain necessary departments. Responsible government needed no further Act of Parliament; all that was necessary was a definite understanding that the Ministry should

consist of men having the confidence of the Lower House ; a Cabinet and the party system followed as inevitably as the night the day. But Joseph Howe and Lord Durham, together with other advocates of responsible government, were not separatists ; they wanted Canada to remain within the Empire as a self-governing nation. To avoid danger of division they ear-marked certain subjects for the Imperial Government, foreign relations, defence, the regulation of commerce, and Lord Durham added the apportioning and settlement of the millions of vacant acres within the Colonies. The Imperial Government was to regulate these, the Canadian legislatures all other matters, that is to say all domestic affairs. But one cannot separate domestic affairs from Imperial in this simple way. Canada wished to control her own house, and this house might be fundamentally altered—as for instance the whole Empire was affected in 1914—by a British declaration of war. Canada wished to control the conditions of life within her boundaries, and what is of greater importance in the humdrum details of life, than the question whether the country is free trade or protectionist ? In 1859 the first compromise was broken down by a Canadian advance ; a tariff was imposed on imports whether British or foreign ; the Colonial Office expostulated, and Galt replied for the Canadian Government that Great Britain had no financial responsibility for Canadian affairs, and that therefore Canada must raise revenue in any way that seemed good to her. Before that time the vacant lands had been made over to the Colony for her to settle and use as she wished. Later on came a demand that, as Canada controlled the conditions of life within her borders, she must also control the elements of that life—that is must admit or exclude immigrants at will. In all these things the Colonial case won, as it won in Australia and South Africa. Responsible government proved to be the starting-point of constitutional development and not the terminus.

It is obvious nowadays that the British Commonwealth exists on sufferance. To the Imperial Government is still reserved the right of veto on Dominion Acts, and the Canadian student of history is sometimes startled and alarmed to find that the first bill passed by the Canadian Parliament after Confederation (to reduce the salary of the Governor-General) was disallowed by Downing Street and that the Empire still survives. If the Canadian Parliament were to pass an Act which seemed to the Imperial Government fatal to the existence of the whole Commonwealth, and if it felt strongly enough about the measure to persist in it after its disallowance, a break might be made, either the Imperial Government modifying its views or the Commonwealth disrupting. But this presupposes a bankruptcy in negotiation and in the internal diplomacy of the Empire which has never existed since responsible government began. Perhaps it is one of the best things about a system of responsible government that it depends for its efficacy upon individual and official tolerance; both the Imperial Government and the Governments of the Dominions have continually to give way, and to modify their wishes in accordance with the general interest.

For an example of this we must look at the control of immigration. This subject did not in 1865 or 1867 seem of sufficient importance to justify special mention in the British North America Act. But since then there has been a great influx to Canada from all countries in Europe, and a still greater influx from Asia has seemed probable. The people of British Columbia took alarm, fearing that the 400,000 persons in a province about the size of Germany would be swamped by crowds of Indians, Chinese and Japanese. They tried to prevent Asiatic immigration by Provincial enactment; this was beyond their powers, but the Dominion Government was prevailed on to pass legislation to this end. Now this seems simple enough, a domestic matter concerning

only Canada, but what are the results? India is part of the British Empire, its inhabitants are British subjects, and they claimed—unsuccessfully—the right to live in any part of the Empire they chose. The denial of this claim by the Parliaments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa has not made British government in India an easier task. Secondly, Japan is an ally of the British Empire, and would not see her subjects excluded from parts of that Empire without protest. The difficulty has not yet been permanently solved, but the important thing to note is that in this matter, intimately connected with the government of India and with foreign relations, the Dominion Parliament has persisted and the British Government has given way. In some other things—such as the attempted reduction of the Governor-General's salary and the New Zealand Shipping Act—feeling in the Dominions was not so strong, and the local Governments yielded with or without a good grace.

Self-government in Canada and the other Dominions has gone so far that, along the lines it has followed, it can go little further. Durham's reservations—trade, defence, foreign affairs, lands—have in three cases been washed away, for Canada now equips and controls her own forces, both by land and (what there are of them) by sea, although these forces, it is true, take orders in time of war from the War Office and from the Admiralty. The only thing remaining is foreign affairs, and if Canada is to control her own relations with other states, while at the same time remaining part of the Commonwealth, some new constitutional form will probably have to be found; perhaps a truly Imperial Parliament, perhaps (as Mr. Herbert Samuel has suggested) the setting up of a House of Lords reformed into becoming an Imperial Senate, perhaps a permanent Imperial Committee on foreign affairs, probably with co-opted members to represent different parts of the Commonwealth. But I

have no business with prophecy; my task lies with the past.

So much for the solution of how a nation can remain part of a world-state which shall stand for liberty and local self-government rather than for excessive centralisation and for a monotonous similarity between all countries of the earth. How has Canada worked out the other two problems, closely related to one another, of federalism and of two racial cultures within one country?

Canada has seen much in the way of constitutional experiment. In 1774 government by one Governor and one Council was set up for the whole of the inhabited interior; in 1791 came representative government, coupled with almost complete division. Lower Canada and Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick had relations with each other like those of foreign states, save that they lacked a diplomatic service. They were divided, each corresponded directly with the Colonial Office, and the title of Governor-General was a nullity. The system broke down not only through the demand for responsible government, but also through the improvement in communications; Durham prophesied that a Halifax-Quebec railway would make union inevitable. However in 1841, before such a railway was built a limited union was set up, consisting of Upper and Lower Canada. The reasons for this were simple, to give Upper Canada trade access to the sea without her depending on the goodwill of Lower Canada, and (though this was not avowed so openly) to swamp the French element. Few people then realised that nationality had already solidified; most politicians, both in England and Canada, thought that it could be moulded at will into new forms. But it is not possible nowadays to abolish racial difficulties by denying their existence or by taking long and inaccurate views. Nationalities and languages do not expire to-day unless they are destroyed by force, and the union of 1841 did not fulfil the expectations of

its authors, Durham, Russell, and Sydenham. French nationalism slowly adapted itself to the new conditions and thrived under them. Government of the Union went on because it is a way governments have, but it soon ceased to be real party government and became a continual balance of coalitions. The system at last seemed impossible to the men working it, and therefore in 1864 they jumped at the chance offered by a conference of the Maritime Provinces held to discuss a maritime union; the British North America Act was drafted, rushed through the different Parliaments concerned, and the first big federation within the British Empire came into existence.

All federations differ from one another, not only in the apportionment of powers, but also in the spirit in which they are formed and worked. Canadian confederation came about owing to many causes—the need of railways, a growing feeling of national unity, fear of attack from the United States, and the impossibility of continuing the previous system—but the chief reason for its having been a confederation, and not a legislative union, was the existence in what became the Province of Quebec of a French-Canadian majority. As Siegfried says, the Quebec Act of 1774 was more a treaty than a law, and the treaty could not be broken in 1867; the French had to be guaranteed their language, their religion, and their other ancient and prized institutions. They were to be a minority in the new Dominion of Canada, but geographically they were indispensable, for they held the passage between the two English sections grouped by the Atlantic Ocean and round the Great Lakes.

It would be interesting to trace the development of Canadian confederation from 1867 to the present day, and to compare its growth with that of the United States, of Australia, and of South Africa. But the subject is one for a constitutional lawyer, not for an amateur historian.

However this can be said, federations do not stand still, there is a continuous change and growth in any Constitution, written or unwritten, rigid or elastic. In the United States this growth was controlled by the Supreme Court which sat at Washington, which was in close touch with the Administration and knew its difficulties. Therefore the development was continually towards a closer union than the framers of the Constitution had planned. Somewhat the same course has been followed in Australia, where the Federal High Court has considerably augmented the powers of the Federal Government. Canada has not had a Federal High Court until recently, and her constitutional difficulties have generally come, sooner or later, to the Court that is perhaps the most wonderful in the world—the only one, I believe, worshipped as a god by an Indian village—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This Court sits removed by 3000 miles from the workings of the Canadian machine, and naturally has tried to follow rather than to alter the law. As a result the Canadian Dominion, which started as a far more centralised Government than did either the United States or the Australian Commonwealth, has not kept its respective distances from these; Australia has to-day in some respects as strongly centralised a Government as Canada. The real governors of a country often turn out to be men we never think of as rulers—perhaps the clerks who draft Bills for Parliament, perhaps the judges who interpret the resulting Acts, at all events Parliament does not rule alone.

Has Canadian federation failed to solve the racial question? That is a query in the minds of many to-day. One cannot give a definite answer to it any more than one can, in a history examination paper, answer some such question as, 'Was Napoleon the heir of the French Revolution?' by the single word 'yes'. There is one thing we should note about confederation and about the union of 1841, from which confederation sprang. Both

these measures contemplated the British as the dominant race; the British North America Act guaranteed the French Canadians their rights in the Province of Quebec but did not make the rest of the country bi-lingual; it does not seem to have entered into the minds of those framing the Bill, that the French would some time or other overflow Quebec and seek for new outlets in the Dominion. I think we may say that in Quebec French-Canadian national feeling has been fairly satisfied; the recent troubles have come not because of an attack by Ontario upon the French position in Quebec but because Ontario and Manitoba resolved to remain English-speaking provinces. Feeling has run high, there has been much violent language on both sides. But we make a serious mistake if we think that most Canadians, whether English or French speaking, do not put Canada first, and are not alive to the necessity of living together without feeling compelled to stab each other from behind. There is no single permanent solution for any problem of nationalism, for every nationality grows or dies, and both growth and death start the problem again in a new form. Canada's recent troubles are in a way her growing pains. They are due primarily to the resolve of the English-speaking provinces that the bulk of Canada shall choose an English rather than a French way of life, and to the natural unwillingness of French Canada to submit to this. The Ontario bi-lingual schools question, which has unfortunately stirred up so much trouble, arose out of Ontario's resolve to make English its language; the Ontario Government showed little tact and roused opposition that might have been avoided, but constitutionally it won its case in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and unless something unforeseen should happen this decision will prevail eventually, and French Canada will admit that it must remain a minority, though a strong one, in a country mainly British. To say that is not to say that French will die out nor that it ought to die out.



From the existence of the two languages and literatures Canadian life should draw a variety and richness which it would not possess were all the provinces similar in speech and thought.

Constitutional progress is in the last instance dependent on two things: the struggle of differing principles within the state and the interplay of personal forces. I have tried to deal with the former aspect but have a word to say about the latter. Dominion politics are like British in one thing at least, that men are inclined to picture a bygone age as gilt if not golden, and to think that giants are not born into a world largely occupied in the study of microbes. There may be something in this, even though we exaggerate it. It is necessary only to read the debates on confederation in the Canadian House of Commons to see that Parliament then contained very able men, with possibly a higher average of eloquence than it has to-day. The men who built the house may have been better workmen than those who live in it and try to keep it in repair. But this fact, if fact it is, need not make us despond.

In the political history of any British Colony there are three stages, which we can call the periods of the official, of the immigrant, and of the native-born. At the beginning administration is in the hands of men sent from Great Britain for the specific purpose of government. They have generally been fairly able and well educated, and on the whole they have been honest, although Mr. R. C. Mills' book, 'The Colonisation of Australia,' expresses disbelief on this point. They have governed moderately well, but their government has had this defect, that their thoughts were concentrated not on the Colony but on Great Britain; they were temporary sojourners in a strange land, looking forward to retirement as the end of exile. Then came the second period, that of the immigrant. New settlers from Great Britain swarmed into the Colony intending to make it their home, clamorous for economic development, hard-

working, full of enterprise. In many cases they were well educated, often University men, wishing for a more varied career than seemed possible in England. By their energy, their devotion to an adopted land and the force of their ideas they became an important political factor; it was men of this type who brought about responsible government in both Canada and Australia, and who proved that the new system could work.

With the third period, that of the native-born, we reach the present day. Population grows so that immigrants are no longer the principal element, and Canada begins to develop her own politicians. They have not been trained in the Universities of Great Britain, frequently not in any University, and they are often men of little education. Where the immigrant thought in terms of Burke and Pitt, the new generation may not see beyond practical necessities. People in England often fail to realise how important to a country recently settled is the building of roads, canals, railways, in short all public works. Politics for a time seem to leave principles behind and to deal only with contracts. The truth is that the country is still at war with the wilderness, and in war as we all know communications are the main thing. But if politics are to be mainly concerned with public works, it is inevitable that they should be dull to men who care about issues of principle. The new generation, the native-born, not only lacks to some extent the education of the immigrant, but also where the immigrant sent his best into politics the native-born may send only the second best. Canadian politics, as a Canadian professor once said, are as dull as ditch water, and full of it. Well, politics are what we make them, but it is inevitable in a country needing material construction, clamouring first and foremost for public works, that politics should attract some of the least desirable elements in the country. Still the change from the immigrant to the native-born has its good side. The English-speaking leaders in confederation were many of them Canadian

by adoption rather than by birth ; they may have been less vulgar than we are to-day, but their culture was exotic. If we are vulgar in these days we are at least indigenous ; we are passing through an inevitable and rather crude stage on the way to a real national culture. Moreover, we have passed the worst of this stage and are improving. Corruption is often talked of in connection with Canadian politics, and undoubtedly there has been and probably still is corruption. But the fact that it is talked of openly as corruption and with indignation not condonement, is a good sign, and it is highly probable that there is less of it to-day than there is talk about it.

Coupled with the beginnings of a native culture goes a greater political alertness. In the last ten years Canadian opinion has become far more alive to big world questions than it was before. Not only is this true of the Atlantic sea-board and of Ontario, but what is more striking of the new inland provinces. The political and constitutional future of Canada to a great extent rests with its newest part, with the Western Provinces lying between Ontario and British Columbia. These provinces hold the balance of power between Ontario and Quebec. In them politics have a freshness and force probably greater than they have in the East ; these new provinces are far enough removed from racial feeling to think of other things. Economic progress is not my theme, but it is worth noting that economic progress has a reflex in political thought. Any increase in the means of life means an increase in the possibility of thinking, and Canada needs thought more than anything else. Like all democratic countries she should join in Meredith's prayer, ' More brain, good Lord, more brain '. But the brain that she must use and through which the constitution will grow must be her own brain, native to the country and the product of the country's conditions. One cannot transplant intellect wholesale any more than one can transplant constitutions.