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***Problems of Conduct. An Introductory Survey of Ethics.* Durant Drake. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 455. \ \$1.75.**

Hugo Münsterberg

Harvard Theological Review / Volume 9 / Issue 01 / January 1916, pp 126 - 129  
DOI: 10.1017/S0017816000004326, Published online: 03 November 2011

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## How to cite this article:

Hugo Münsterberg (1916). Harvard Theological Review, 9, pp 126-129  
doi:10.1017/S0017816000004326

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PROBLEMS OF CONDUCT. AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ETHICS. DURANT DRAKE. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 455. \$1.75.

Problems of conduct are not only those which the private life offers and which every individual has to solve for himself, but also those with which the community as a whole is concerned and which must be solved by public action. For both groups alike the standard must be the amount of happiness secured. Morality is the organization of interests, and as students of ethics we have to disentangle the passing and the lasting desires of ourselves and of our neighbors and of those who come after us, and have to determine in every case the safest way to reach the goal of greatest happiness. Professor Drake undertakes this analysis in a broad-minded spirit. His discussion is cautious and controlled by an evident desire to be fair. At certain points both in questions of personal hygiene and of public policies individual prejudices slightly interfere with this endeavor and make him shade the arguments of his opponent too darkly. Sometimes, especially in the question of economic policies, perhaps the discussion takes too much the character of editorials written for the day. But on the whole we remain on the height of truly psychological study, and we certainly never lose the feeling of being in contact with a well-informed, conscientious, and sympathetic guide. He leads us from the problems of physical health and efficiency, of athletics and cigarettes and alcohol, through questions of chastity in marriage, of loyalty and luxury, of truthfulness and aesthetic culture and self-control, to those of patriotism and political purity, of social alleviation and industrial reconstruction, and finally of liberty and legal control, of equality and privilege, of single tax and woman-movement; and everywhere order is brought into the chaos of conflicting arguments by a steadfast holding to the principle of greatest happiness.

The author, however, devotes only the second half of his book to that which the title indicates, the actual problems of conduct. The first half prepares this detailed criticism of present-day tendencies by a general study of the principles. The selection of the standard of greatest possible happiness must first be justified. The first half, accordingly, as the sub-title of the book suggests, is an introductory survey of ethics. Its trend is evident from its outcome. It is the ethics of utilitarianism which finds here a consistent and enthusiastic expression. The argument does not claim originality, but it might claim the merits of clearness and completeness in a short form, of felicitous expression and breadth of view. Is it convincing? I am afraid only to those who are convinced. There is many a fine word

against Carlyle and Kant, against Newman and the ascetics, against the intuitionists and the idealists, against religious and against metaphysical ethics; but we wait in vain here, as so often in utilitarian systems, for a fundamental argument why we should follow the voice of our conscience. On principle, we receive the story of man's actual behavior with reference to the resulting happiness and pain; but why a man in a concrete life-conflict ought to sacrifice himself in the interest of his moral duty can never be brought nearer to us through a mere psychogenetic analysis. Professor Drake stops, as so many others have done, with the psychological fact that pleasure is always desired, and this silently transforms itself into the demand that the creation of individual pleasures be the goal of every possible action. There is a jump from the "is" to the "ought," which, after all, takes the real strength out of his whole argument. It is Hamlet with Hamlet left out. Yet as a presentation of eudemonism and as a psychological study of the motives for man's actions, Drake's survey has unusual attractions and is warmly to be recommended to every student.

As is most suitable for such ethics, which is guided not by the appreciation of values but by the recognition of facts, Drake first looks back to the anthropological origin of social morality. He shows how savage life is essentially brute life, in which the individual is nothing and the tribe everything, and he can then point to the various means by which morality was evolved. Then the emphasis naturally lies on the idea of customs. Morals are simply customs that matter or are supposed to matter, standards to which each member of a group is expected by the other members to conform and for the neglect of which he is punished. Toward these standards the individual therefore feels a vague pressure, the reflection in him of the feelings of his fellows. Historically there has been a gradual though not continuous advance toward those codes of conduct which make for the preservation of life and for happiness. The moral guidance in this historical development passes through five stages—guidance by instinct, by custom, by law, by conscience, and by insight. The definite conception of "conscience" is very late, scarcely appearing until very modern times, and the fact that conscience itself is much later in growth than the natural animal instincts which it developed to control and guide, is shown by its late development in the child, normally not until the beginning of the third year. We reserve the name "conscience" for the vaguer and more elusive restraints and leadings, the accumulated residuum of inner experiences and outer influences. "The very lack of com-

prehension serves in less rational minds to enhance their prestige with an atmosphere of awe and mystery." The whole development can be summarized so. Instinct and desire alone are not sufficiently adjusted to the needs for happiness. Society tries to control them by law and custom; but these are external and would easily awake a rebellious spirit, producing perpetual conflict between the internal impulse and external restraint. To overcome this the development led to that secondary and overlying set of inhibitions and promptings which we call the moral sense or the sense of duty, by which that external restraint is reflected within the individual mind. As men grow more and more adjusted by instinct, training, and reasoning to their real needs, they have less and less use for conscience. "After all, there is something wrong with a life that needs conscience; it is a transition-help for the long period of man's maladjustment."

From the evolution of morality Drake turns to the theory of morality. Its core is that "to be virtuous is to be a virtuoso in life." The greatest total happiness is the only desirable aim. To purchase one's own happiness at the expense of others, and to purchase present satisfaction by an act which will bring less good in the end—these are the cardinal sins. Mere conscientiousness cannot help us and has no value. "Conscientious cranks and blunderers are perhaps even more of a nuisance than out-and-out villains. There is hardly a folly or a crime that has not been committed prayerfully and with a clear conscience. The saint and the criminal are sometimes psychologically indistinguishable." "Asceticism, like self-indulgence, is selfish. It asks, what shall I do to be saved, rather than, what shall I do to serve."

To be sure, Drake sees too that the question why the individual ought to be altruistic must be answered somehow. But we hear only that the life of service is in normal cases a happier life in itself than the life that is preoccupied with one's own pleasures, and that the altruistic life earns the gratitude of others. "In the long run it pays to be good to others." The theoretical failure of every eudemonistic theory is at no point more obvious. It is only consistent that Drake treats the cases of moral self-sacrifice simply as "abnormal cases." Where the moral obligation is taken as obedience to the will of God we must consider that we cannot know what the will of God is except by analyzing what makes for human welfare. Moreover, if God were to command us to sin, it would surely not be right to obey Him. Morality is older than religion. The organization of our interests with the aim to secure the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number must remain our ultimate

test. Even those who feel dissatisfied with such a psychologizing ethics of enjoyment will appreciate on every page the tart formulation of the argument. In its merits as well as in its limitations it strongly reminds the reader of Perry's *Moral Economy*. Every chapter is supplemented by a well-chosen list of detailed references to the ethical literature in the English language.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

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ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION AND MEDICAL PROGRESS. Professor W. WILLIAMS KEEN, M.D., LL.D. With an introduction by President C. W. ELIOT, LL.D. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON VIVISECTION. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1912.

Under the above title Dr. Keen has republished a collection of essays written by him over a series of years from 1885 to 1914, dealing with certain aspects of what is generally, but not very accurately, described as "the vivisection question." The author apologizes for the rather wearisome repetition involved in such republication of collected papers, each of which was deemed to be "complete in itself," but he justifies such reiteration as antidotal to "the constantly repeated misstatements by the opponents of experimental research in spite of public exposure of these misstatements."

The volume has a commendatory foreword by President Eliot, which speaks of "the very interesting manner" in which Dr. Keen describes "the new surgery of the last forty years and its extraordinarily beneficent results." "The new surgery has been made possible," we are told, "by the combination of anæsthesia and asepticism," and "these immense benefits" are "due to animal experimentation." On the ethical side of the question President Eliot assures us that the "sacrifices of animal life or happiness" are "always made as painless as possible," and he asks, "How many rabbits or guinea-pigs is it justifiable to incommode or kill in order to save the life of a child attacked by diphtheria? How many monkeys would a competent experimenter be justified in sacrificing, in order to find a sure treatment for infantile paralysis?" The reasonable answer to all such questions is to be found, according to President Eliot, in Dr. Keen's pages.

About one-third of the book is devoted to criticism and exposition of the methods of certain anti-vivisectionist writers. Dr. Keen