

Wellington in 1826. The Duke returned from St. Petersburg defeated in the duel. The Tsar foresaw the Turkish war, but it would not have been what he desired, a struggle in which Russia stood alone, if Canning had lived. Canning too was convinced that war could not be evaded, but when Russia declared it, he would undoubtedly have done what Finlay said England ought to have done—recognised the independence of Greece and adopted corresponding measures (for instance, the occupation of Morea). Schiemann quotes a letter of Canning, written in 1824 and opened in France:

If we cannot hinder the war—as to the issue of which no illusions are possible—our creed is this: assuming that Russia does not get a foothold on the Mediterranean, that the French receive no compensations, and that Austria gains considerably in territory and subjects, then we can allow the destruction of the Ottoman empire. In that case we are in the position to take what we choose.

Canning's well-thought-out policy, of which phil-Hellenism was only a decoration, disappeared with his death.

The relations between Nicolas and Constantine, the antagonism of their views on Poland, are another point of interest in this volume. Constantine desired to unite Lithuania with Poland; his brother's aim was the ultimate absorption of Poland itself in Russia. Constantine represented the policy of Alexander, to which Nicolas largely imputed the responsibility for the conspiracy of December. The elder brother's attitude is illustrated by his judgment of the partition expressed in a letter to the Tsar. Poland, he wrote, 'a été spolié et non conquis par l'impératrice Catherine,' and he branded the means of spoliation as 'les plus honteux et dont chaque âme honnête aurait répugné.' He resented any interference on the part of the Tsar in Polish affairs. But his own administration pleased the Poles no more than the Russians, and in 1829–30 he can hardly have failed to feel that his work had been futile, while his position was undermined.

The volume ends with the news of the July revolution, in the European sequel of which Nicolas divined an opportunity of playing more or less the part of Alexander. 'So verlangten es seine Prinzipien,' the author observes with an ironical mark of admiration.

J. B. BURY.

*The Life of Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle, 1811–1864.*

By JOHN MARTINEAU. (London: John Murray. 1908.)

MR. MARTINEAU tells his readers that this book was originally intended to deal only with the duke of Newcastle's administration of the war office during the Crimean war, and its interest is chiefly confined to the part of it which relates to that subject. He has not been fortunate in his efforts to obtain biographical information, nor has he perhaps always used such as was available to the best advantage. While he has done well in abstaining from giving details respecting the duke's divorce (when he was Lord Lincoln), his notice of it comes into his narrative with strange abruptness, merely as explanatory of a reference in a letter. Something should certainly have been said about Gladstone's unavailing mission in 1849, recorded in Viscount Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, though without the name of the friend on whose behalf it was undertaken. The duke's death is also awkwardly narrated. There was no mystery about it, though the author's words might lead a reader to imagine that there was;

nor is it strictly accurate to say that it occurred 'somewhat suddenly.' It was not unexpected, for the duke had for some time been seriously ill; but it occurred with momentary suddenness in the evening of a day when he had rallied so far as to visit his stables, and while he was talking with his friend and solicitor about a village festival. Of his father, the fourth duke, we hear a good deal. He is memorable for his application of the words 'May I not do what I will with my own?' to his parliamentary patronage, and is historically important as having made toryism hateful. As the incident which caused the duke of Wellington to say of him, 'There never was such a fool as he is,' is related here, the great duke's characteristic and appropriate words might as well have been added.

The fifth duke entered the house of commons as Lord Lincoln at the general election of 1832, and held office in both Sir Robert Peel's ministries, being chief secretary for Ireland for about four months before Peel's defeat in 1846. He declined to accept office under Lord John Russell, and, in common with Sidney Herbert, was active in endeavours to keep the Peelites together as a distinct party. Mr. Martineau seems to consider that after Peel's death the duke, as he became in 1851, was leader of the party, and prints a letter from him to Gladstone on the question of leadership. The duke, while protesting his own unfitness for the post, observes that Sir James Graham, whom he accuses, certainly with injustice, of self-seeking — 'playing a game of his own' — was impossible, and declaring that for his part he would serve under no one but Lord Aberdeen, points out with much frankness how unfit Aberdeen was to be leader. Here again we should have had a reference to the *Life of Gladstone*, for it affords an amusing comment on this letter. Viscount Morley finds reason to believe that the duke coveted the post, and quotes a memorandum in which Gladstone notes that he told the duke distinctly that 'Aberdeen was the person entitled to hold it' — a communication probably made in answer to Newcastle's letter, the real meaning of which seems fairly evident. A misconception occurs with reference to Palmerston's position in the Aberdeen ministry. The remark that he was relegated 'to obscurity at the home office' is repeated on the next page, and again elsewhere in the strange phrase that he was 'comparatively ostracised.' On the contrary, his position as home secretary was by no means obscure; it was the office he desired, and his work there was remarkably useful, as is shown by his extension of the factory acts to children, the prohibition of intra-mural interments, the abatement of the smoke nuisance, his efforts to enforce sanitary reforms, and in connexion with them his memorable letter to the moderator of the Edinburgh presbytery on the suggestion that a public fast should be appointed as a means of checking the spread of cholera; indeed the work of the home office has seldom been more in evidence than when he was head of it.

As secretary for war and the colonies in the Aberdeen ministry Newcastle did well while peace lasted. He belonged to the war party in the cabinet, and when, three months after the declaration of war with Russia, his office was divided in June 1854, unluckily, at least for his own reputation, he chose the war department. He devoted himself to his official duties with unsparing industry, and it is possible that no minister

could have avoided some degree of failure under the complicated system of military administration then existing, when the commissariat belonged to the treasury, the medical department for some months longer to the office of the secretary at war, and the ordnance was under a distinct authority. Newcastle's failure, however, did not arise solely from the system under which he had to work; it was in some measure due to himself. While apparently a man of strong character and of independent judgment, he was in reality constantly led by others and, as Mr. Martineau justly observes, 'seems to have persuaded himself that he was guiding public opinion when all unconsciously he was being borne on its current and carried off his feet.' He adopted opinions, and, believing them to be his own, was apt to state and act upon them in a way that outstripped rather than moderated or directed public sentiment. His letters to Lord Raglan, which were used by Kinglake, are printed here, together with some part of Raglan's replies. The publication of this correspondence is a gain: the duke's letters bear out Kinglake's view of his conduct, and those of Raglan are, as Mr. Martineau claims, of exceptional interest. Dignified and vigorous as they are, they show how deeply the withdrawal of the minister's confidence wounded the general, and how grievously the complaints and accusations they contained added to his burdens. Absolutely ignorant of what he was ordering, the duke directed Raglan to undertake the siege of Sebastopol in terms which the general considered imperative; he refused to listen to Raglan's representations, and declared that he expected an early success. Then, when disappointment came, when Russell revealed the terrible sufferings of our troops, and the *Times* enforced its correspondent's letters and violently attacked the commander-in-chief, ministers, not perhaps consciously, sought to shield themselves by following the lead of the press and throwing the blame on Raglan and the officers of the staff.

Newcastle became the mouthpiece of the public discontent. Adopting the opinions of the *Times*, and influenced by the complaints of anxious wives and mothers, and by stories brought to him by irresponsible persons, on which he based an untrue and undignified charge against the quartermaster-general, Sir Richard (afterwards Lord) Airey, the duke treated the commander-in-chief with an extraordinary lack of consideration. No one who reads this correspondence will feel that it is altogether a matter for regret that he in his turn received an undue amount of blame for the miscarriages of the war. Much suffering would probably have been spared to our troops if he had insisted that the treasury should provide an ample supply of hay. That would indeed have been subversive of the routine of official life, and would have required some independence of character. Newcastle, however, did not always shrink from a breach of official etiquette. We have printed here for the first time the letter to Raglan containing his amazing message to Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, to which both Kinglake and Mr. Parker in his *Life of Sir James Graham* refer, though neither had seen it. Lyons, it was popularly believed, would have done great things if he had not been kept back by his chief, Sir James Dundas. The secretary for war adopted this opinion, which indeed, though exaggerated, seems in a measure to have been well founded, and held it so strongly that he took upon himself

to tell Raglan that he might assure Lyons that, if in certain circumstances Lyons disobeyed his commander-in-chief, he should have all the support that he could give him.

WILLIAM HUNT.

*The Cambridge Modern History.* Edited by A. W. WARD, LITT.D., G. W. PROTHERO, LITT.D., and STANLEY LEATHES, M.A. Vol. XI. *The Growth of Nationalities.* (Cambridge: University Press. 1909.)

THE penultimate volume of this comprehensive work embraces the period from about 1840 to 1871—a period of European history more than usually eventful. Accordingly, in reading this portion of the book, the student realises more clearly than in the previous section the inevitable defects of this encyclopædic treatise. Able and learned as most of the twenty-nine contributors are, they cannot be expected to make their subjects really readable in the narrow space at their disposal, while occasionally their accounts overlap and conflict with each other. For example, who could possibly give a thorough and interesting account of the English literature of that generation in twenty pages, or of the Italian writers of the period in only six? One wonders, therefore, for whom this method of writing history is intended. The specialist will seek the books on his special subject, while upon the general reader this compressed narrative, with its masses of names and dates, will leave merely a confused impression. Probably, the most valuable part of the volume is the series of bibliographies.

At the present moment one turns with interest to the chapters dealing with the Balkan Peninsula, which have been entrusted to Mr. Blech. It is unfortunate that the author, in treating of the reign of Otho, has not thought fit to consult the numerous excellent histories of the period in modern Greek, not one of which appears in his scanty bibliography, while he is apparently unaware of the reaction in favour of Otho and his gifted Queen which has set in during recent years, and of which the success of a play like 'H Karoxi' is the outward sign. Otho failed for two reasons, because he did too much, and because he had no heir; but of his intense love of Greece, and of the real services rendered by Amalia to her adopted country, there is no trace in these acrid pages, derived from the personal prejudices of Finlay's seventh (not 'eighth') volume. Nor is the narrative always accurate. The neutrality of the Ionian Islands extends to Corfu and Paxo alone—a question discussed in 1897—while the only fortifications dismantled by the outgoing British were those on Vido and some of those on Corfu. Nor was it 'at Marathon' but at Pikermi that Lord Muncaster's party was attacked by brigands—an incident which did not redound to the credit for discrimination of the British Government. Turning to the other parts of the Near East, we find Damé's admirable history of modern Rumania omitted from the bibliography of that country, while there is no mention of the excellent Italian bibliography of Montenegro, of Denton's and Andrić's histories of the Black Mountain, of Madame Mijatović's history of Serbia, or of Cunibert's book on Miloš Obrenović. But the strangest mistakes in Servian history are to be found in Mr. Drage's summary on p. 694. The evacuation of Belgrade was not 'in 1866,' but in 1867; and in the following sentence every statement is wrong. Milan was not recognised