

best not to disturb these groups so far as the men now in the service are concerned, except to permit those among them who may wish, to transfer to the new system. It included all future appointees in these departments. Regular retirement was fixed at the age of 60. Ordinary disability to be recognized after ten years of service and accidental disability any time.

The members were to contribute 4 per cent of their salary and were to receive an annuity in accordance with the tables of mortality which were to be prepared for the various occupational groups. The city was to provide a pension of an equivalent amount and make up the contributions on its own account as well as on behalf of the employe for all years of prior service. For cases of ordinary disability the pension part was to be increased to 90 per cent of the amount which would have been provided had the employe continued at the same salary in the service until the age of 60. Liberal accidental disability and accidental death benefits were provided, and the contribution of the employe together with interest at 4 per cent were to be refunded in cases of resignation, dismissal or ordinary death. In accordance with the best precedents various options on retirement were offered.

The system was to operate on a full reserve basis with the accrued liabilities to be discharged in the course of 30 years—a feature which distinguishes the system from that of the Massachusetts teachers and state employes in which no reserve is provided for the payment of the pension part of the benefit and the accrued liabilities, and in which the burdens are disproportionately small in the beginning and will be disproportionately large in the future.

The bill (House 1665) was introduced in the legislature and was passed overwhelmingly in the both branches, but according to Mr. Dowling, counsel of the commission, "the police commissioner objected to the inclusion of the police department in the provision of the contributory system and the governor refused to sign the bill with the police so included. The House of Representatives refused to exclude the policemen and the legislature was prorogued before the settlement of the question. The bill, therefore, goes over to the next year's legislature."

The chairman of the commission, Judge Michael Sullivan, is planning to get early under way with the work and is very hopeful that next year will crown the efforts of the commission with success.

CIVIL SERVICE IN THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN

BY HENRY M. WAITE

President, National Municipal League

A GREAT many city managers feel that, as they are not political appointees, they should not be restricted by civil service regulations.

These city managers argue that if they are to run the city's business as an industry, they should not be ham-

pered by regulations that do not occur in industry.

On the other hand, industry is developing more and more along civil service principles. Through shop committees and employment officers, everything is being done to reduce turnover.

Industry is more careful at the present time than in the past in the selection of its employees. If a man does not succeed in one position, he is tried out in others to ascertain where he best fits. An employe of a modern operated shop is not discharged until the employment office is satisfied he will not fit in any place in the organization.

In a well-governed city, where you have co-operation between the civil service commission and the administrative head of the government, the same results are being accomplished. Civil service, properly regulated, fairly enforced, can accomplish many of the things in public work that industry is now attempting.

The public in this country to-day is educated to the use of civil service commissions in public business. They expect fair treatment to be given the city employes and a continuation of office. The public looks to civil service to protect their public affairs from political control and the spoils system.

The civil service rules recommended by the National Municipal League in its model charter, properly handled, furnish the protection the public expects. They also give the city manager all the freedom that he requires for an efficient administration.

The civil service commission should be appointed by, and be responsible to, the city commission or council. This point is arguable. The trend of improvement in city government, however, is all toward providing machinery that will exclude politics in the administration of city affairs.

The theory of the city-manager form of government is that the commission is the elective or political body. The administration of city affairs is to be under the manager and divorced from politics. The prime object is to keep both the commission and the manager from building up a political organization.

If the civil service commission, for example, were under the city manager, there would be too much power in his hands. If the civil service were under the commission and the employment of all employes were also under the commission, there would be too much power in the hands of the commission. By putting the civil service commission under the commission or council, and certifying lists to the city manager, an effective compromise is reached.

The National Municipal League charter allows the city manager to discharge employes, but he must employ them from civil service lists. This is good theory, and it so works out in practice, as it protects the city—as far as it is possible to-day—from either the commission or the manager building up political machines.

The city-manager form of government in operation is carrying out the theories that prompted the manager charters. The city manager is anxious to build up an efficient organization. The manager's success locally depends upon it. Managers around the country are working for a reputation so that they may be called to other cities. The wise manager leans strongly on the civil service commission. He sees that they get the efficiency records. He knows that these records are being used for the advancement of his men. He builds up the confidence of his organization in civil service. He reaps his reward, as does the city.

To make civil service in government a success, there must be a pension system in connection with it.

The theory of civil service is to keep men long in office. If employes are to be kept in office, there must be some fair and just means to take care of them when they are too old to carry on their functions. Again, the analogy between public affairs and industry

holds. Industry, however, is leading government in providing pensions and sick funds.

With the daily increase of city managers throughout the country, there may develop later some procedure that will replace present civil service methods. This, however, will only

occur after a long demonstration of the fact that the city manager remains free from political control and can demonstrate that there is some other method that will insure the employment of capable men in public office and keep such men in continuous service.

HOW TO SAVE OUR GOVERNORS FROM RUIN

BY ARCH MANDEL

Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research

A proposal to make the lieutenant governor deputy to the governor and thus bring relief to that harassed individual for whom Former Governor Smith plead in the May issue. :: :: :: :: :: ::

EX-GOVERNOR SMITH of New York deplores the fact, and rightfully so, that governors are ruined by being obliged to attend personally to innumerable and unimportant details of administration.¹ This complaint doubtless strikes a sympathetic chord in the minds of every contemporary and ex-governor in the Union.

The statement that "unfortunately there is no deputy governor" made by Governor Smith in his article on "How We Ruin Our Governors" brings sharply to our attention an absurd tradition in the organization of our states and nation. New York State, and all other states have deputy governors, or lieutenant governors, as they are called, but for all practical purposes they might as well be nonexistent.

PUT THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR TO WORK

In face of the burdens imposed upon governors in the administration of a

commonwealth, lieutenant governors are pigeon-holed by being assigned the duties of presiding over senates and gracing public functions with their presence and speeches. Here are officers who could, if profitably employed, be of service to their states by releasing governors for their larger executive duties, and at the same time get things done for the state that governors, under present conditions, can only half do.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that all lieutenant governors are potentially governors; that when the occasion arises, and many such occasions have arisen, they must assume the office and duties of governor. Yet there is nothing in the duties performed by lieutenant governors that fits them to be chief executives of commonwealths. In fact, they are less fitted by training for this office than are chairmen of important legislative committees.

It must also be recognized that so long as the office of lieutenant governor carries with it nothing but an empty title, and is a blind alley politically,

¹ See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW for May, 1921.