

## STEPHEN POYNTZ

1724-1727

THE man chosen to replace William Finch at Stockholm was a trusted henchman of Lord Townshend, Stephen Poyntz, of whom there is due notice in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. He reached his post in October 1724. During the first year his task was to re-establish British as against Russian influence in Sweden and to deal with the new situation created by the death of Peter the Great in February 1725. Afterwards his efforts concentrated on obtaining the accession of Sweden—the first, with that of Holland, sought—to the treaty of Hanover, concluded between Great Britain France and Prussia on 23 August/3 September 1725. For eighteen months he and his young French colleague, the count de Brancas-Céreste, strove with the partisans of Russia and Holstein, obliged to humour the tendernesses of the constitutionalists, hampered instead of helped by their Prussian coadjutors, and unable to bring Count Horn to declare himself until in the end the riksdag of 1726 made him the master and the longer purse prevailed. The accession was signed at last on 14/25 March 1726/7. In reward for his success Poyntz was promoted ambassador and named to represent Great Britain at the congress proposed for assembly at Aix-la-Chapelle.

British squadrons sailed for the Baltic again in 1726 and 1727. In the former year Sir Charles Wager made directly for Stockholm waters, as ordered, to meet on his arrival not with the welcome expected, but with storms of angry protest, for the objects of his coming were suspect. This put the British government in the difficulty noticed in the dispatches. It must either be disclosed in Sweden that the "friends" there had solicited the coming of the fleet, to their damage, or left to be supposed in England that no

invitation had been given, with awkward results in parliament. After lying for three weeks at Elsnabben Wager sailed for the Gulf of Finland, remaining on guard off Reval till the end of September. There were no hostilities; on the contrary, convivial intercourse with the Russian officers. The main Russian fleet stayed in security at Cronslot.

The expedition of 1727, as said in the introduction, had for its primary purpose the defence of Denmark.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR STEPHEN POYNTZ, ESQ., ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO FREDERICK I OF SWEDEN, 7 SEPTEMBER 1724.

(*Record Office, Sweden 35, F.O. King's Letters 65, copies.*)

1. Having received these Our instructions etc.
2. Upon your coming to his Swedish Majesty's court etc.
3. You will likewise have a letter from Us to Our good sister the queen of Sweden, which you are to deliver to her the first convenient time after you have had your audience of the king, adding to what We say in Our said letter such further compliments touching Our brotherly and friendly inclinations towards her Majesty as are usual and fitting on the like occasions.
4. You shall apply yourself with particular care and attention to discover the tempers and inclinations of the several senators and the party they are chiefly disposed to advance, whether that of the king or that of the duke of Holstein, and especially you shall endeavour to cultivate a strict friendship and intimacy with Count Horn, who appears to have great weight in the management of the affairs of Sweden and to have in view the general good and interest of that kingdom, which We desire likewise to promote.
5. In paying your court to the king you shall be carefull to be very well with the Sieur Diemer, who is minister there from the langrave of Hesse Cassel and who has a very great share in the favour and confidence of his Suedish Majesty.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Ernst Hartman Diemar. His fidelity to the king had brought about his expulsion from Sweden before Poyntz came there, but that his debts incurred on Frederick's account detained him. Poyntz found him the money to get away, and he rendered good service to George I at Cassel and in London. It was evidence supplied by him, at the instigation of the British government, that brought Poyntz his first clear success, the arrest and impeachment of his chief adversary, old Count Vellingk, in November 1726.

6. You will watch and observe with your utmost diligence all the motions intrigues and negociations of the minister residing there from the Czar of Muscovy and give constant and exact accounts of what you shall discover relating to the views and designs of the Muscovite court, it being of the greatest importance to Our service to be well informed of all the Czar is carrying on in Sweden, that We may be the better enabled to prevent any new disturbances breaking out in the north.

7. You shall on all occasions protect and countenance Our subjects trading etc.

8. Whereas a representation from the Commissioners of Trade, dated the 1st of April 1715, has been laid before Us, proposing a method to be set on foot for giving regular accounts of the state of the commerce of Our subjects in foreign parts and of the increase and decrease of the same, We, having approved of the said proposal, have ordered it to be put into your hands; and Our will and pleasure is that pursuant thereunto you do use your best care and diligence that accounts of trade be transmitted from time to time from such factorys of British merchants as are settled in any part of the king of Sweden's dominions.

9. You shall carefully maintain a good correspondence etc.

10. Whereas Our royal predecessor King Charles the 2nd etc.

11. You shall constantly correspond with our several ministers, etc.

12. At your return We shall expect a full and exact account etc.

13. You shall observe from time to time such further instructions and directions etc.

G. R.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

*(Record Office, Sweden 35, copy.)*

It having been hinted to Us from several quarters for some months past that the king of Sweden, tired with the confusion and disorder in which that country has for some time been involved and with the low and miserable state to which they have reduced his authority, has entertained thoughts of abdicating the crown and retiring, which would be acting so mean a part with respect to himself, and so injurious to the honour and peace of his family,

that We cannot think he can ever have such an intention ; but it being positively affirmed, and that by persons who by their stations are in a capacity of knowing the state of that kingdom, that his enemies are grown so powerfull, and he has so far lost all authority there, that it will be impossible for him to support himself against the duke of Holstein, even if at present the Czar should venture to assist that duke towards getting immediate possession of the crown ; We, having duly weighed the fatal consequences which such a change would bring with it to Us and Our dominions at this juncture, and being sensible of how great importance it is to Our service and the welfare of Our subjects that We should be truly informed of the state of that kingdom and give timely assistance towards preventing so pernicious an event ; and also considering with what caution and secrecy We ought to set about this inquiry, not to create jealousies abroad or give unnecessary alarms at home, nor to let the king of Sweden see how much We are concern'd for his preservation, lest he should from thence take an occasion to extort unreasonable conditions and sums of money from Us ; have made choice of you, whose fidelity capacity zeal and diligence in Our service We have with great satisfaction experienc'd upon divers occasions, to be by Us employed in the transaction of this weighty and difficult affair.

1. We do in the first place recommend it to you not to speak to any person whatsoever of the business hereby committed to your trust and care except Our principal secretary of state, from whom you will receive your dispatches, and such other person or persons with whom you are to confer upon it in pursuance of these Our instructions, which having received, together with your other dispatches, you are with all convenient speed to set forward on your way to Stockholm.

2. Being arrived there you shall take the first opportunity you can find of seeing Count Horn alone, to whom you shall in Our name give the strongest assurances of Our particular regard and kindness for him, and you shall tell him that, looking upon him to be the man of the greatest capacity and integrity at that court, the best disposed towards Us and Our nation, and who by keeping free from engagements with any of the several cabals there has preserved his credit and interest in his country, and in whom We can repose an entire trust, We have thought fit to address you to him preferable to all others, with particular directions to you to open your self

most freely to him and to communicate to him Our thoughts with relation to Sweden with the utmost confidence.

3. You shall acquaint him that although We have not been treated by their government with that regard We had reason to expect in their concluding an allyance with the Czar of Muscovy without Our being admitted into it, yet Our kindness and affection for the Swedish nation, of which, at a considerable expense to Us and Our people, We have heretofore given such signal proofs, is not thereby lessen'd, but that we have imputed this their conduct to the unsteadiness of their councils, occasioned by the ill state and disorder of their affairs and the prevalence of the faction that adheres to the Czar, from whose attempts We are desirous to see their country defended and preserved from the imminent danger, in which it seems to be at present, of falling a sacrifice to his ambition and of becoming in effect a province to Muscovy. You may represent to him that this is most plainly the Czar's only view, that his ambition is boundless, that he aims at no less than being master of all the Baltick, that he sees it is impossible for him to be considerable at sea without it, that fortune has, most happily for the Czar, thrown the duke of Holstein into his hands, with whom he plays as he sees best for his own interest, that the duke's pretensions are great and may give the Czar an opportunity of pushing his own designs in different quarters, and that it is apparent even from the manner in which he treats the said duke, whose credit with him ebbs and flows, according as the circumstances of affairs make him appear of more or less use to the immediate views of the Czar, that the Czar plainly intends no more than to keep him as an instrument towards giving him an easy inlet into countrys, where he could have no pretence without him.

4. If you find he enters freely into your way of reasoning upon this subject you may then venture to insinuate to him that the present king of Sweden, instead of being formidable to them upon account of endangering their liberties or their present form of government, does with difficulty support himself, and therefore they have nothing to apprehend from him ; but We cannot without the greatest concern reflect upon the danger Sweden and all the neighbouring parts of Europe must be in, should the duke of Holstein, after having married the Czar's daughter and during the life of the Czar, either upon any misfortune happening to the king of Sweden, or upon his death, get possession of that crown ; for besides the

influence the Czar must in such a case in reason be supposed to have over the duke, he will of himself be naturally inclined to desire his assistance towards getting rid of the present form of government. So that it is next to impossible to suppose that the Czar can fail, by the help of his daughter and his son in law, of reducing Sweden to the same state of subjection, to which he has brought Courland and would have reduced Mecklenburg, had not the neighbouring powers interposed; that We should be very glad to know his thoughts upon these important points; that he may open himself to Us with the greatest security; that as We have nothing but the publick interest at heart he may be assured We shall make no other use of what he shall say to you but only for Our own direction and in order to enable Us to be more usefull in concurring in whatever the count shall think to be most for the service of Sweden.

5. You may also inform him that We have not enter'd into any new alliance with any power but Prussia, and that is purely a renewal of the old defensive alliances between the crown of Great Britain and the house of Brandenburg; that the king of Denmark has indeed solicited Us to enter into stricter engagements with him but We have hitherto declined doing it, not out of any view of not assisting his Danish Majesty in case he should be attacked by the Czar (We being fully resolved to support him in that event) but because We are determin'd not to give any umbrage to Sweden, where those, who are devoted to the Czar, would not have failed to have made the strongest insinuations as if such an alliance had been intended against that kingdom, which by that means would have been brought into a still greater dependance upon the Czar, the preventing of which We have most at heart; that this is the single reason which has hitherto hindered Our entering into any new alliance with Denmark; that as to the reports of a Quadruple Alliance, they are without the least foundation, and it cannot be believed that We, who act in perfect concert with the court of France, would sollicite them to enter into an engagement with Denmark into which We have not thought fit to enter Ourselves for the reasons above mentioned.

6. You shall likewise let him, Count Horn, know that We have commanded you to govern your self entirely by his advice and direction and to keep private what shall pass between you, even from the king of Sweden himself as well as from Mons<sup>r</sup> Diemer, who is the chief in his favour and confidence, except such matters

as he, Count Horn, shall direct you to communicate to them or any other person, the manner of doing which you are to concert with him ; and you will let him know that We are sensible from the management of his Swedish Majesty, the persons above named, and the other ministers he employs, that they are not capable of conducting an affair of consequence. That we therefore hope he will freely impart to you his sentiments upon the present juncture of affairs and what he thinks may be the most probable means of providing for the safety of Sweden, assuring him that We have no other intentions than what are for the welfare and prosperity of that nation and for securing and maintaining their liberties and constitution upon such a foot as he, Count Horn, and every other true Swede would desire ; and that in this We have no particular view for Our self and Our dominions, and are acted by no other motive than Our tender regard for a nation to whom We, as well as Our predecessors, have ever been closely united, both for the sake of our most holy religion and of our civil interest ; that We are already by the late defensive alliance under the strictest engagements to Sweden, all which We will most punctually perform in their defense, whenever there shall be occasion ; that We have it always in Our power to give them the succours stipulated upon the shortest warning, those at sea being by a new regulation put upon such a foot that we can in a fortnight or three weeks time have twenty large ships at sea, besides those constantly employed in protecting the trade.

7. You shall open yourself more or less upon all the particulars above mentioned, according as you find his behaviour to you, and if he enters cordially and as a friend into Our views and way of reasoning you will be the more explicit to him and moreover tell him that you shall give the king and Mons<sup>r</sup> Diemer general assurances of Our friendship and assistance according to Our engagements, but shall not go any further with them, avoiding to enter into particulars and being content to hear only what they will say or propose, of all which you will give him a faithfull report and follow in all things his advice and direction, and this not only with regard to the king and his ministers but likewise to the senators and all other persons, who are any ways concerned in transacting publick business.

8. But in case, in discoursing with Count Horne, you shall find him cold and reserved and not affected with the compliments and

assurances you shall at the first entrance give him on Our part, you must then act with him with caution and be upon your guard and content your self with keeping within general assurances of friendship and support, in case Sweden should be attacked, and endeavour from other hands, and the best helps you can find out, to get into a perfect knowledge of the present situation and disposition of that country, pursuant to an order sent to M<sup>r</sup> Finch by a letter of July 6th, of which you have herewith a copy.

9. After you have executed what is enjoined you in your general instructions in relation to the compliments and assurances you are to give the king and Monsieur Diemer (which you shall do in the warmest and most affectionate manner) you will content your self with hearing what they shall propose, of which you will give Us a particular account, taking care however not to give them reason to suspect their not being in your confidence.

10. Whereas the main end of our sending you to Stockholm is to prevent the success of any attempt the Czar may make this summer for placing the duke of Holstein on the throne of Sweden, if therefore you should, upon your arrival there, find the advices we have received with regard to the designs of the Czar founded, and the king and the country under great alarms and apprehensions, and if upon talking with Count Horne, or such others of the knowing and honest men of the country as you shall think proper to converse with, you find that a summ of fifty or one hundred thousand pounds would enable them to put the kingdom into such a posture of defense as would defeat the Czar's attempt, you may then let them know you have orders and even a credit from Us to advance that summ to the king of Sweden, in case the Czar should actually make any attempt upon them, but upon this condition, that you your self may see the uses to which the said money is employ'd, that it may be sure to go towards the defense of the kingdom, which is the only purpose for which We design it; and you may concert with them the manner in which you shall communicate these Our kind and generous intentions to his Swedish Majesty, taking however care not to enter into any engagement for advancing the least part of the above mention'd summ, unless the Czar makes an actual attack upon Sweden.

11. And whereas We are credibly informed that the Czar has by gratifications in money drawn over several of the senators and people of credit and quality to his interest, which may be of fatal

consequence not only to Sweden but even to Us and Our dominions, considering the present form of government in that country, We therefore expect that you would use your utmost endeavours to get access to such as you shall find reason to suspect are engaged with the Czar and with the utmost caution and dexterity try to insinuate yourself into their confidence, so far as to get an opportunity to lay before them the fatal consequences that such their dependance may bring upon their country, and you may (if you find it necessary), in order to prevail with them to abandon an attachment so contrary to the interest of their country, promise them gratifications from Us, provided the engagements you enter into upon account of the said gratifications do not amount to more than the summ of £15,000, or at most £20,000.

12. And whereas you are commanded in the former part of these instructions not to engage to advance any part of the summs mention'd for the assistance of Sweden unless the Czar should actually make an attempt upon them, so you will be cautious not to dispose of any of the money intended for gratifications to private persons, except you find that the Czar has gained such a strong footing in the senate and among the people of credit and quality that such gratifications will be absolutely necessary to draw them from their dependance upon him; and you will do well not to dispose of the whole summ at once but at different and distant payments, in order to keep them in a greater dependance upon Us and prevent them from falling again under the influence of the Czar. And We have the greater reason to hope that you may find means, without such gratifications, to engage the principal persons at Stockholm to enter into Our way of reasoning, because they must be sensible, from what you will say to them, that We have no view but what tends immediately to the interest and preservation of Sweden, nor any design of proposing anything that may occasion a rupture between them and the Czar.

13. As Count Horn is strongly inclined to favour the duke of Holstein with regard to the succession of the crown of Sweden, and as we have no reason to be against the said duke, but what arises from his relation to and dependance upon the Czar, you may, in confidence, let not only the said count but all such other persons of credit as are favourably inclined to the said duke, and to whom you think you may open yourself with safety, know that We have no objection to him or to his succeeding their present Majesties

but the reasons above mention'd ; that if either the Czar were dead and his Highness consequently at liberty to act as a Swede, or if he could be any ways got from under the influence of the Czar, We should be glad to do him all friendly offices upon that occasion ; and this must convince the count and such others as you shall think fit to talk to upon that subject that We have no designs but what are for the good and advantage of Sweden.

14. You must drop or hint whatever you say upon this subject with the greatest caution, lest his Swedish Majesty should come to know these Our sentiments ; you will do well likewise to try if you can discover, in talking with the said count, his real sentiments as to the duke of Holstein and the succession, and what methods he proposes to take to prevent the mischiefs that must attend the said duke's succeeding during the life of the Czar and after having married his daughter.

15. You will likewise take care to insinuate yourself as much as possible into the confidence of the party who are called the patriots, from their being zealously attached to the present form of government, by giving them the strongest assurances of Our good intentions to see the present form of government supported and continued to them.

16. You must likewise endeavour to make yourself as agreeable as you can to General Diemer, who has the chief share in the king's confidence ; but you must take great care not to let him discover, either by your behaviour or by any thing that may drop from you, any of the contents of your private instructions, and if Count Horn enters cordially into what you shall say to him in Our name and treats you with confidence you will, in that case, advise with him as to your behaviour and as to your manner of talking with the said General Diemer.

17. You will likewise take care to live well with Our minister, M<sup>r</sup> Bassewitz, and get all the lights you can, both as to persons and things, out of him, without however imparting to him any of the particulars of these your private instructions.

18. You will not fail upon your first arrival at Stockholm to be most eagerly pressed by the king himself, as well as by General Diemer, for an immediate supply of money, without which they will tell you that it is impossible to support his Swedish Majesty's affairs there any longer. In answer to these instances you will shew them how impracticable it is to obtain any summ from the

parliament for their assistance, unless some of the cases mentioned in the defensive allyance were existing, and how little it is to be expected that the King should furnish any moneys for these purposes out of the Civil List. You will, however, before you give them these answers, endeavour to find out what summ they would have and to what uses they would apply it. And afterwards you will take care, in shewing them the difficultys the King lyes under as to furnishing such summs, to word what you say in so soft and gentle a manner as not to drive them into an absolute despair as to this particular.

19. If you can by your conduct gain any share of the king's or of Mon<sup>r</sup> Diemer's confidence you will then take all opportunities of exhorting them to avoid any projects or schemes, which may tend to make the king's government unpopular to the nation, and above all to avoid giving the least umbrage or jealousy, as if the king had a design to change the present settlement there, but on the contrary to pursue all such measures as will contribute to the softening the minds of the people and reconciling them to his administration, this being the only method by which he can gain any solid influence in that country, by attaching and fixing to his interest the party, who are called patriots, and by that means overbalancing those who are of the Holstein faction and those who are the creatures of the Czar. By talking in this manner to the king and to Mon<sup>r</sup> Diemer, by professing everywhere that We have no other views but the true interest and preservation of Sweden and the support of the government, as it is at present established, and by endeavouring to dissuade those of the duke of Holstein's party, with whom you have an intimacy, from entertaining any thoughts or attempting any thing that may occasion convulsions in Sweden and endanger the present constitution, out of an eagerness for securing the succession to the said duke; by this frank and honest way of proceeding it is to be hoped that you will gain a confidence among the best people of all partys and establish to your self the reputation of a man of sound principles and good intentions for the advantage of that kingdome, and you will particularly secure so much credit with the party, called the patriots, that you may be of use to the king in perswading them not to make any further attempt against the prerogative of the crown, by shewing them that it is already so much weakened that the king has scarce power to carry on the business of the government and that the reducing

his authority any lower can end in nothing but bringing the whole kingdome into a state of confusion and anarchy. By carrying your self in this manner you may in time gain so much confidence with all the parties, except that of the Czar, as to be in some measure a mediator amongst them.

20. We have ordered herewith to be put into your hands an extract of a letter of the 2d of August, N.S., wherein Our ambassadeur at the court of France gives an account of a conversation he had had with the Sieur Gedda, the Swedish minister there, by which you will find several lights relating to the affairs of Sweden, according to the knowledge that minister has of them ; and particularly a list of the senators with an account of the party they are chiefly inclined to, either for the king, or the duke of Holstein, or for a neutrality and the good of their country in general, from whence you may observe that those for the king of Sweden, joyn'd with the neuters, will make a considerable majority in the senate.

21. As to Count Welling, who is in the list, We look upon him as a person who on all occasions has shewn so great an animosity against Us and Our interests that it would be in vain to pay any court to him or to strive to gain his good will or to keep any sort of measures with him. But as to the other senators of that faction you will endeavour to sift into their prevailing passions and tempers and acquaint Us with your observations thereupon, that We may think of applying such means as are most proper towards gaining them to concur in Our views.

22. As to the Sieur Höpken, who is secretary of state there, he is a man of a very good understanding and capable of doing service ; but he is addicted to no party so strongly as to his own interest and is therefore likely to be biassed or brought over by arguments of that nature. This is such a character, that you will see that you ought not to trust him ; however, if you can gain his confidence he will be of great use to you, and if a summ to the value of one thousand pounds will work upon him for that purpose you should not spare to give it.

23. We would have you take all opportunitys, without giving any umbrage to the king, of making your court to the queen by assuring her frequently of Our particular esteem for her person and of Our high sense of her royal virtues and princely qualifications ; and We are the more desirous that you should cultivate the favour and good will of her Swedish Majesty because We have observed

and have been informed that in all the late intrigues of faction and disorder in Sweden she has shewn the most steddly courage and resolution for the true interest of that kingdome, and appears in all things more likely by her firmness to maintain her dignity and authority as queen than the king her husband.

24. Whereas the Sieur Bestuchef,<sup>1</sup> minister from the czar of Muscovy to the crown of Sweden, upon his coming to Stockholm did omit to notify his arrival, as usual, to the Sieur Bassewitz, who is the minister there from Us as elector, altho' he had done it to Our British minister at that court; and We having approved the conduct of our envoy extraordinary William Finch, Esq., in not paying a visit to the said Bestuchef, since We could not in honour pass by such a distinction or allow Our electoral ministers to be slighted, as if they had no relation to Us as king of Great Britain; Our will and pleasure therefore is that when you arrive at the court of Sweden you should forbear notifying your coming to the said Sieur Bestuchef, but the first opportunity you have of seeing him you should freely let him know the reason of it; that We are indeed very desirous of living in friendship and good understanding with the Czar, his master, and shall on all occasions be ready to show our inclinations that way by the behaviour of Our ministers, but as he had neglected to notify his arrival to Our electoral minister We could not allow any of Our servants to pay the usual compliments of ceremony to him, until he had set that point right with respect to Us, as elector. That it therefore now depended upon him to make amends for such his omission and that whensoever he shall have paid those respects that are due to Our said minister, the Sieur Bassewitz, you will be ready to do the same towards him and to live in the like good correspondence as you do with the other foreign ministers there.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO POYNTZ.

*(Record Office, S.P. Foreign, Sweden 35 to 39, 42, copies.)*

Whitehall, October 9, 1724.

. . . . . You will make the King's compliment, contained in my letter to Baron Sparre, to the king of Sweden and his ministers, taking care to keep strictly to the words of my said letter. You

<sup>1</sup> The Mikhail Bestuzher noticed previously.

will likewise observe the same conduct towards the Muscovite minister as is mentioned in my letter to M<sup>r</sup> Finch, and as the scene of affairs is intirely changed with relation to the Czar since you left this place, the King having all the reason in the world to think his reconciliation with that prince as good as concluded, you will not enter into any of the particular private instructions given you till you hear further from me, but will content yourself with carrying your self as easily and civilly as you can to every body without giving any person or party any occasion of offence, in doing which I am persuaded you will succeed as effectually as you have already done with Admiral Sparre. . . . .

5 February 1724/5.

. . . . . His Majesty takes notice that you frequently point out the dangerous situation Sweden is in; the weakness of the king and his low and distressed condition, with the great likelihood that a revolution may soon happen in that countrey and the Czar and the duke of Holstein become masters of it. You will have already seen the King's sentiments upon that state of affairs by my letters of the 12th of January, which Spear brought you; to which I have nothing more to add, but to desire that if you know any means, or have thought of any method, by which that kingdom may be extricated from its present difficultys, you would suggest your notions to the King and send a messenger with the explanation of those thoughts, which your conversation with the people and your daily observations upon the spot may have furnished you with, for we here are at a loss what remedys to apply to the evils you describe, being fully convinced that neither the king nor Diemar are to be trusted with any money, having neither credit firmness resolution nor any other abilitys requisite to conduct or carry on any concert for their own or the kingdom's safety. . . . .

23 February 1724/5.

. . . . . The great event we have lately learnt here of the death of the Czar and the mighty changes it will in all likelihood produce, with respect to all affairs in the north particularly, will no doubt have a strong influence on the partys which are now in Sweden and may be improved to put that kingdome in a state of less subjection to and dependance on the dictates of Muscovy. We know only yet that the Czarina has been acknowledged at Petersburg

as Empress, and till the King can see further what turn things will take in that country, and what effect this great change at Petersburg will have at Stockholm, his Majesty cannot, as you will easily agree, send you his sentiments upon several very important points mentioned in your great dispatch, or give you particular instructions how you should at this juncture conduct your self, nor what scheme you should promote in Sweden. You will, I am perswaded, take care not to appear elated at this great event and continue to behave your self in the same manner in all respects as you have hitherto done both to the Russian and Holstein ministers and factions, and be sure not to discourage any advances that either of them may now make to you, continuing however privately and with caution to pursue in general the principal view of keeping that kingdom upon the foot of government it is and encouraging them to maintain their libertys as independant of the Russ as possible, since that awe and those apprehensions they were under before from the Czar must abate extremely, in whose hands soever that empire subsists, or even cease entirely, if divisions and distractions should arise there and destroy the vast projects of the late Czar.

As to the summ of 12000<sup>lb</sup> which the king of Sweden desires may be given him between England and France, his Majesty will have the court of France sounded on that head, and when we have an answer from thence about their disposition to gratify the king of Sweden in this matter I will take care to let you know his Majesty's further sentiments. . . . .

de Whitehall le 6 Avril, 1725.

Quoique je vous aye déjà marqué de tems en tems, en réponse aux divers points contenus dans vos dépêches, les sentimens du Roy sur la situation présente des affaires dans le nord, cependant sa Majesté trouve à propos, par rapport à ce grand évènement de la mort du Czar, de rassembler ses veues sous un coup d'œil, et de former vos instructions de manière qu'en voyant les ordres de sa Majesté ensemble vous pouvés être mieux en état de les poursuivre uniformément dans cette conjoncture délicate.

Vous vous imaginerés aisément que le premier et principal but que le Roy se propose est de conserver la tranquillité qui est maintenant établie dans le nord, et de prévenir aucun trouble ou brouillerie de quel côté que ce soit qu'ils puissent y arriver. L'état incertain et chancelant des affaires dans le sud oblige le Roy

nécessairement à souhaitter avec ardeur que la paix présente dans les pais où vous êtes ne soit point troublée ou enfreinte ; puisque quelque differend que pourroit survenir dans ces quartiers là brouilleroit tellement les affaires même de ce côté icy que le Roy ne sçauroit donner l'attention qu'il faudra absolument faire à ce qui se passe à Cambray ; et l'Empereur en tireroit de si grands avantages, ou dans le commencement ou par les suites qui en resulteroient, que ce seroit une folie extrême de ne pas y prévenir autant qu'il sera possible toute dispute, et d'ôter par là les moyens à la cour de Vienne d'en profiter à leur grande joye et utilité.

Vous vous applicerés donc avec un soin particulier à détourner le roy de Suède et ceux de son partie d'aucun dessein qu'ils pourroient avoir de rompre avec la Muscovie, ou aucun de leurs voisins. Sa Majesté Suédoise sans doute et ses amis reprennent du courage, et s'enhardissent sur la mort du Czar. Et on ne doit pas s'étonner s'ils se laissent repaître des espérances des grands avantages qui doivent leur en revenir, et s'ils regardent cette occasion comme très favorable pour recouvrer au moins les provinces qu'ils avoient perdues et cédées aux Muscovites pendant la dernière guerre. Et sur ce principe ils se flatteront des désordres qui doivent s'élever en Russie, et ne croiront qu'avec peine que la Czarine sera jamais en état de se soutenir ; on ne sçauroit être seur à la vérité pour combien de temps elle le fera, mais il faut avouer que les commencemens sont heureux pour elle et fort favorables à son règne. Elle s'est gagné beaucoup d'estime et d'affection dans ces pais et a fait paroître qu'elle a de grand talens, et un génie supérieur. Et quoiqu'il puisse naître des divisions en Muscovie, et que le parti pour le fils du Czarowitz devienne puissant, elle a pourtant le bonheur à présent que les deux puissances voisines, c'est à dire la Prusse et la Pologne, qui sont à portée de luy faire le plus de mal, au lieu de profiter de cette occasion pour la contrecarrer luy font la cour, et paroissent disposées à l'aider et à l'affermir sur le throne.

Je ne sçauois mieux vous représenter ce qu'on pense là dessus à Berlin qu'en vous faisant tenir l'extrait cy joint de la lettre du 13/24 Mars que j'ay reçu du Colonel Dubourgay,<sup>1</sup> et je vous assure que la ministère prussienne icy me parle toujours aussi fortement en faveur de la Czarine que cette lettre. Pour la cour de Pologne, ils y ont borné tous leurs desseins à faire réussir la succession du prince électoral à ce royaume, et pourvu que la Czarine veuille les

<sup>1</sup> Envoy extraordinary at Berlin.

assister à y emporter ce point, il n'y a rien que cette princesse pourra demander au roy de Pologne qu'il ne fasse volontiers pour faciliter son projet favori.

Comme celle cy est la situation présente de ces deux puissances, si le roy de Suède y veut faire l'attention qu'il faut, il verra bien que cette conjoncture est très mal propre pour commencer quelque querelle contre la Muscovie et faire brèche à la paix établie par le traité de Nystadt, à quoy, comme vous avés souvent très bien remarqué à sa Majesté Suédoise, ni le Roy ni la France ne peuvent jamais donner les mains ; car, outre l'injustice d'un tel procédé, il est plus que vraisemblable qu'un tel pas attireroit les suites fâcheuses de la perte de la partie de la Poméranie qui reste à la Suède, dont le roy de Prusse ne manqueroit pas de se saisir à la première occasion favorable, et de l'élévation du prince électoral de Saxe sur la throne de la Pologne.

Toutes les fois donc que le roy de Suède et ses amis vous parleront de cette conjoncture, comme leur étant très favorable pour tâcher de reconquérir sur la Muscovie leurs provinces perdues, vous leur représenterés de la manière la plus vive le peu de fondement qu'il y a de se flatter de telles espérances, et vous vous servirez des raisons qui je viens de vous suggérer ; vous les ferés voir les risques qu'ils courront, et qu'un pas si précipité à l'heure qu'il est mettra tout le royaume dans le plus grand danger d'être abîmé pour jamais ; et qu'il faudra agir avec d'autant plus de précaution que leurs affaires sont dans un état fort bas ; il est évident qu'ils ne sçauroient rien entreprendre sans s'exposer à des périls extrêmes, à moins que d'avoir fait un concert avec la Prusse et la Pologne et avoir eu la concurrence des deux couronnes de la Grande Bretagne et de France ; vous leur mettrés donc devant les yeux les difficultés qu'il y aura à former un tel concert, vous leur ferés souvenir des embarras où les deux couronnes se trouveront, et vous vous évertuerés enfin avec toute l'adresse possible à empêcher qu'on ne se trompe pas à Stockholm en formant des projets dangereux et en s'encourageant mal à propos à venir à une rupture avec la Russe.

Vous tâcherés de convaincre le roy de Suède que cet avis que les deux couronnes luy donnent est cordial et sincère, et n'a point d'autre but que l'avancement de ses véritables intérêts, et qu'elles sont persuadées que s'il prend d'autres mesures il se ruinera de fond en comble et perdra entièrement le peu de pouvoir et d'autorité qui luy reste dans ce royaume.

Vous continuerez de poursuivre les instructions que vous ont déjà été données avec la précaution convenable et tâcherés de maintenir le gouvernement dans la Suède sur le pied où il est, et vous vous servirez de toutes les occasions propres à leur inspirer les sentimens nécessaires pour conserver leur liberté et pour se rendre le moins dépendant qu'il se pourra du pouvoir et de l'influence des Russes, et sa Majesté se persuade qu' vous aurés moins de difficulté à y réussir, puisque ces craintes et ces terreurs qui les ont tellement abatus pendant la vie du feu Czar sont diminuées sans doute par sa mort.

Vous aurés soin de vous conduire de la même manière que vous avés fait jusques icy envers les ministres de la Russie et de Holstein. Et vous ne les rebuterés point en aucune manière s'ils vous font des avances dans cette conjuncture, mais vous vous contenterés de leur répondre en termes généraux et fort honêtement, et vous donnerés compte à sa Majesté de ce qu'ils proposent, et tout ce qui se passera avec eux.

Ce que je viens de vous marquer peut bien servir de règle générale pour votre conduite envers ces messieurs les ministres de la Russie et de Holstein, cependant vous ne manquerés pas de prendre les occasions convenables de leur faire voir combien l'amitié des deux couronnes sera nécessaire au dit duc, et combien il importe à ses intérêts de ne rien faire qui puisse leur déplaire. Qu'en premier lieu la conduite de ceux qui ont manié alors les affaires du dit duc, et ensuite la nécessité des conjonctures, ont obligé le Roy et la France d'entrer dans des engagements touchant le Sleswick, qui sont contraires à ses intérêts. Qu'à la vérité les mêmes raisons de conserver la tranquillité du nord subsistent encore à présent ; et les deux couronnes ne peuvent jamais permettre qu'on donne la moindre atteinte aux engagements qu'elles ont pris à cet égard. Mais que cette situation par rapport au Schleswic ne doit pas porter le duc à s'attirer par les oppositions la mauvaise volonté de ces deux puissances, dont le soutien pourra dans la suite luy être beaucoup plus avantageux que la possession même de ce duché, puisque leur amitié et leur protection luy pourront être infiniment utiles dans tout ce qu'il aura à espérer à l'avenir. Qu'on a lieu de croire que toutes les delays et les accroches dans l'accommodement et l'alliance projetée avec feu sa Majesté Czarienne sont provenus des intrigues de ce duc et de ses ministres. Qu'on laisse à penser à ces messieurs si de telles démarches contre les deux couronnes

ne seront pas fort nuisibles au duc même et à ses intérêts et si, lorsque ces deux puissances seront persuadées que le duc s'est résolu de contrecarrer toutes leurs veues dans le nord, à moins qu'elles n'abandonnent pour luy plaire les engagements qu'elles ont pris avec d'autres princes, elles ne se trouvent obligées de regarder ce duc comme leur ennemi déclaré. Mais au contraire, si le duc se conduit d'une manière à donner des preuves de la confiance qu'il met dans les deux couronnes, il s'attirera leur amitié et leur concours à luy favoriser dans des occasions infiniment plus importantes qui pourront survenir pour avancer ses intérêts. Car dans le fond ses intérêts s'accordent bien avec leurs veues, et elles auront raison de les soutenir dans toute autre rencontre qu'à renverser leurs engagements solennels. Vous pourrés en même tems leur insinuer sur le pied d'une confiance particulière que s'ils continuent à s'y opposer aux veues des deux couronnes et à pousser des projets, qui pourront troubler le repos du nord, ils les mettront dans la nécessité de penser dès à cette heure aux moyens de les empêcher de se joindre à ceux qui ne leur veulent point du bien, et de les mettre hors d'état de poursuivre des manœuvres si dangereuses.

Que les moyens les plus efficaces ne manquent pas à ces deux grandes puissances, et qu'elles seroient responsables devant Dieu et à leurs peuples si elles ne s'en servoient pas pour se mettre à l'abri d'un dérangement si considérable qu'une guerre suscitée dans le nord leur causeroit. Vous leur laisserés entrevoir de tems en tems que vous leur faites ces représentations en ami et en bon serviteur du duc leur maître, et qu'au reste vous leur recommandés d'y penser meurement.

[The remainder of this long dispatch is concerned with prospective relations with the new government in Russia and with the conduct which Poyntz should pursue towards Osterman or any other minister whom Catherine I might send to Sweden.]

Same date, private.

. . . . . You will see by my long dispatch of this date containing your farther instructions that his Majesty can scarce believe that the Czarina will send Osterman at this juncture to Sweden, but in case this news, contrary to our expectation, should prove true, you are ordered to use your utmost endeavours to find out what he is sent upon, and you are authorised to give money in case that

will procure you an exact information of what passes between him and the Swedish ministers.

For it is of the last consequence that Sweden should not enter into any measures with the Muscovites, unknown to the King, nor till we see the fate of our treaty at Petersbourg. You will therefore spare neither pains nor money, in case Osterman or any other person come from the Czarina, first to discover what they have to propose and then to prevent the Swedes from coming into any measures with them. The King knows your abilities and is very well convinced of your integrity, and therefore gives you this unlimited commission, knowing you will not make use of it unless there be a necessity for it and his service absolutely requires it.

I am amazed how Count Horn could talk to you of the great influence the Swedes have had upon the late Czar's councils. He must think us very blind and very ignorant as to what passes in the world to imagine you could be so grossly imposed upon, but what amazes me most is that he of all men living can talk so, who two years ago of his own head drew our master into a negotiation with the Czar for a reconciliation, which six months after the count shamefully dropt, not being able to make good any one article of what he at first proposed.

However, from the character I have heard of the count I heartily wish he and the king of Sweden were reconciled, for he has certainly better abilities and more credit in his country than any of those employed by the king, and as M<sup>r</sup> Finch has told me, if he had his master's entire confidence he would then serve him with zeal and fidelity ; but I am persuaded you know his character much better by this time and therefore shall send you no orders or instructions on this head. . . . .

Whitehall, 27 April 1725.

. . . . . The King extremely applauds the method you propose of damping the duke of Holstein's expectations and bringing him to reason by endeavouring to raise secretly such a spirit against him in Sweden as may draw off from his party all but the most corrupt and abandon'd, and in this you will go as far as you can safely, without exasperating the Czarina or giving the Holsteiners any just cause of complaint. You have already begun this good work with so much dexterity and success by the communication

you made to Count Horn of the advices sent by M<sup>r</sup> Walpole,<sup>1</sup> that his Majesty has no reason to doubt but that the same prudence and ability, which led you to take this wise step, will suggest to you the properest methods for compleating what you have so happily begun. . . . .

I come now to that part of your dispatch which gives the King very great satisfaction, I mean that which relates to the conversion of some of the senators, who have hitherto been look'd upon as entirely devoted to Muscovy, and where you mention the secret instructions left by the dyett for managing the Czar in such a manner as not to give offence to their ancient friends and allies, and particularly to Great Britain. The King would have you do all in your power towards improving and encouraging these notions in the senators, and is mightily pleased with the conference you have had with Count Cederhielm<sup>2</sup> and with the manner in which you talked to him. The character you give of him is agreeable to what I have had from other hands, and therefore, tho' his sincerity and integrity are not much to be relyed on, yet, being pitched upon to be the person to be sent to the Czarina, all possible methods ought to be taken to gain him, the only way of doing which effectually is by making it his interest to attach himself to the King. I have already empowered you to draw by the King's order what money you shall find necessary for gaining such senators as you may think of consequence to the King's service. I am now, for the enabling you to perfect the necessary work, to acquaint you that his Majesty authorises you to draw for any sum not exceeding ten thousand pounds for the uses above mentioned, as well as towards disentangling Diemar from the incumbrances he lyes under for want of money, which, as you represent, have hitherto hindred him from setting out for Cassell. I must, however, as to this last particular give you this express caution, that you take care that whatever sum you pay towards the discharging M<sup>r</sup> Diemar's debts may not fall into the king of Sweden's hands nor be diverted to any other uses than the enabling Diemar to leave that country, and that you be well assured that he will go, before you

<sup>1</sup> Horatio Walpole, ambassador at Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Count Josias Cederhielm, about to go as ambassador to Russia. Poyntz was completely deceived in his expectations from him; on his return he helped to lead the opposition and in 1727 shared the fate of the irreconcilable Count Vellingk.

advance any money. As to what you may think proper to give the senators, it had better be done by annual private pensions than by any great sum given at first ; so that though the King gives you authority to draw for 10,000<sup>lb</sup>, yet his Majesty confides in your management and frugality and is perswaded that you will draw for no more at present than what you see is absolutely necessary for the carrying on his service. The King thinks it unnecessary to give you any caution with relation to the secret, which ought to be observed in the disposal of this money, that his Majesty's enemys may not get the least notice of it ; who will not fail to revive their old clamours, as if his Majesty were furnishing the king of Sweden with money in order to make him absolute in that country. . . . .

Hanover, 18/29 June 1725.

. . . . . Tho' I am not able now to write full answers to all your dispatches, yet I would not omit sending you the King's sentiments on that part of your letter of the 2d of June, where you desire to know whether, in case Sweden should come to be attacked by the Czarina or the duke of Holstein, you were not still at liberty to follow that part of your instructions, which enables you to draw for money to assist the king of Sweden in case of an invasion upon that kingdome. The King is perswaded from the experience he has had of your prudence and conduct that you will not make use of that power unless you find that there is an absolute necessity for it, in order to preserve the king of Sweden and to do that kingdom service in a pressing exigency, and that you can bring it within the terms of our treaty with that crown ; as, for instance, if the duke of Holstein should come on the coast of Sweden and land forces the case of the treaty would exist, and if the king and Count Horn should then demand of you the assistance stipulated by the treaty, you may assure them not only of the King's resolution to assist them effectually but you may likewise draw for 50,000<sup>lb</sup> or even for 100,000<sup>lb</sup>, taking care to do it in such a manner as to make it the most easy to have your bills answered in England ; and you may farther assure them that the King will punctually make good all his engagements to the utmost of his power. In case, likewise, that the duke of Holstein should only appear with the Muscovite fleet on the coast and demand the convoking of an extraordinary dyet, in order to settle the succession upon him, threatening to land forces if this demand

be refused him, if the king and senate shall however refuse th said demand and think their honour and dignity and even their sovereignty so much concerned as to look upon themselves to be attacked and to demand assistance, you may even in that case draw for such a summ of money as you shall judge their necessities may absolutely require towards drawing their army together and putting themselves in a posture of defence, accompanying the same with the strongest assurances of further assistance from the King.

I don't believe myself, neither do I find that anyone here thinks, that the Czarina will make such use, as has been feared, of her fleet this summer, however his Majesty thought it proper that I should write this only to set your mind at ease and that you might be prepared in all events, tho' there seems no likelihood of any occasion of that nature happening. . . . .

[Dispatches of July 1725, which follow, are concerned with the reports, alternately alarming and reassuring, of impending attempt by Catherine I to place her son-in-law on the throne of Sweden, or to recover Sleswick for him, by force of arms. A particular apprehension was that she might obtain the use of Swedish harbours to facilitate a descent on Denmark. Poyntz was ordered to exert himself to the utmost against such permission, whether by argument or by the promise of large sums of money.]

Hanover, 22 July/2 August 1725.

I am to acknowledge your letter of the 10th July O.S., which I received the 20/31 by Captain Deane and laid before the King, who was extremely pleased with the contents of it and highly commended your conduct in every particular; by your frugal and useful management of the money entrusted to you his Majesty finds he may leave it to your prudence to make such a further distribution as you shall judge necessary for his service.

The King was very glad to see that Count Horn was so zealous against the imperial scheme,<sup>1</sup> and his Majesty recommends it to you to do all you can to confirm him in those sentiments, for it would be of the utmost ill consequence if at this juncture the Emperor should be admitted to accede to the article concerning the duke of Holstein's pretensions to Sleswick, and therefore you may let the count know how much confidence the King puts in

<sup>1</sup> The emperor's accession to the Russo-Swedish treaty of February 1724.

him that he will baffle the projects of the court of Vienna at Stockholm, which tend to nothing but throwing the north, and Sweden in particular, into the greatest confusion ; besides, it would in truth be the greatest folly in Sweden to prefer the Emperor's friendship to that of his Majesty, for the first has neither money nor ships, which Sweden by it's situation and circumstances stands most in need of with regard either to it's present or even future views. Sweden, therefore, ought to fall entirely into the King's measures, who both as king and as elector must be ever their true friend. They should therefore throw their whole weight towards preventing the Czarina's being seduced by the Emperor, which by their influence with the duke of Holstein they may the more easily do, by shewing him how much it is his interest to be reconciled to the King, who is the only power that can effectually, upon a proper occasion, help him.

I cannot think it will be an easy matter to fix any friendship between the Emperor and the Czarina ; his Imperial Majesty must always have so strong a bias towards promoting the interests of the young son of the late Czarowitz, and the Czarina is so firmly bent to advance those of the duke of Holstein, her son in law. Sweden will have it always in their hands, I believe, to prevent such an union, if they should find a tendency towards it, and it is their interest to keep those two powers from joyning for several good reasons, but especially because by such a junction they must certainly lose all confidence with us.

As to Count Horn's strong inclinations for procuring a satisfaction for Sleswick his Majesty, as I have often said, has no enmity to the duke of Holstein, on the contrary, he wishes him well and would do all for him that is consistent with his engagements, the quiet of the north and the welfare of Sweden, as Count Horn will have seen by what his Majesty offers in the project of the separate articles of our intended alliance with Muscovy. But in the manner the court of Petersburg pushes that point, by all that appears to his Majesty he must either oblige himself to act contrary to his engagements, and a new war must be begun in the north by using force to wrest that dutchy from Denmark, or, if the powers concerned should take upon themselves to adjust and give a satisfaction in money, Count Horn will easily see which way that will be employed and what danger will threaten the present government of Sweden, when the duke shall be enabled by such large sums, as that

bargain must produce, to spread his bribes more effectually in that kingdom. These are the insuperable difficulties we fear, and therefore the King hopes the count will think that the duke ought to acquiesce in what has been offered by him and France for the present, and leave the rest to be worked out hereafter by more favourable conjunctures. But if, after our alliance with Russia is signed, where you see there is room enough for expedients, the count has anything to suggest not liable to the objection above mentioned his Majesty will be glad to hear it, being willing to embrace the count's sentiments for the publick good; and if Sweden would order their minister at Petersburg to press earnestly the Czarina's complying with the terms offered by the two crowns I am perswaded this great affair would meet with little difficulty or delay, and this treaty, once finished, would put it infinitely more in the King's power and set him more at liberty to be useful to Sweden.

You will certainly encourage what you mention as the count's plan for the next dyet, nothing could do the duke of Holstein himself a more real service than to get Monsieur Bassewitz<sup>1</sup> removed. Such a wild-headed man, with a set of frantick schemes, insulting everybody and alienating them from his master, ought to be mortified and made incapable of doing more mischief, and I hope matter enough will be found to ruin his credit both with his master and in Sweden.

It will be curious to have M<sup>r</sup> Cederhielm's account of the state of affairs in Russia. My friend, whom you know at Paris, told me in his last that he had advice from Petersburg that not only the chief persons in Muscovy were in confusion and discontented, but that even the new married couple had fallen out with one another.

His Majesty likes very well what Count Horn says about the king of Sweden's being to be kept still a little in awe and in the dark, and was glad that you readily fell into his way of thinking upon that head. You will find it of use, no doubt, to adopt his sentiments and seem to be governed by him, whilst he pursues the King's general view.

Hanover, 24 August/4 September 1725.

I send you enclosed by the King's order a copy of the alliance signed between his Majesty, the most Christian King and the king

<sup>1</sup> Count Henning Friedrich Bassewitz, first minister to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp

of Prussia<sup>1</sup>; and I am perswaded you will agree with me in thinking that nothing can be better calculated at this juncture towards preserving the present and future peace and tranquility of the north as well as the south.

The King flatters himself, not without reason, that it will give an immediate check to the views of Spain and the Emperor, that it will be no small mortification to the Czarina to find the king of Prussia so closely united to the two crowns, and that the 5th article of the treaty and the 1st separate article will be a very good foundation for getting the civil and religious grievances in the Empire and Poland redressed. The said articles are worded, if I judged right of your last dispatch, pretty much according to the sentiments and notions in which Count Horn talked to you upon those subjects. Our having signed a defensive alliance with France and Prussia will be publickly known before this comes to your hand, though the particulars of the treaty are, and I hope will be for some time kept secret. We may however most undoubtedly assure our selves that as soon as the news of this alliance being signed reaches Stockholm the Holstein and Russian faction, taking advantage from the thorough aversion the Swedes have to the Prussians, will not fail to be inventing malicious insinuations as if Sweden had reason to apprehend great prejudice from this alliance. To obviate therefore any attempts of this kind his Majesty would have you, in conjunction with M<sup>r</sup> Brancas<sup>2</sup> (in case he be arrived when this comes to your hands), privately and in the greatest confidence communicate this treaty and the separate articles to Count Horn. You will let him know how great a mark this is of the King our master's and his most Christian Majesty's confidence in him, and make him sensible of their regard and attention for him upon this occasion, he being the first person to whom they (relying entirely upon his discretion and secrecy) have ordered this communication to be made, and that you have orders not to shew the treaty to the king of Sweden himself, unless Count Horn thinks it absolutely necessary; and in case Count Horn should advise the communicating of the treaty to

<sup>1</sup> The treaty of Hanover.

<sup>2</sup> Bophile-Hyacynte-Toussaint de Brancas, Comte de Céreste (in the dispatches usually "Count Brancas"), now on his way to Sweden as envoy from Louis XV. Having made his acquaintance at Hanover Townshend (in another dispatch) extolled his fitness and desired Poyntz to cultivate most friendly relations with him. He was a nephew of Marshal Villars.

the king of Sweden you must take all possible precautions that his Swedish Majesty may keep it secret.

It will be no difficult matter for you to shew Count Horn that there is nothing in this treaty that can possibly hurt Sweden, but on the contrary it will be of very great advantage to them, as it may be a means of detaching the king of Prussia from the Czarina, which is one of the main points that the Swedes ought to have in view. You will, however, take care as yet to say nothing to him that may look as if you were desirous of bringing Sweden to accede to this treaty, contenting yourself with endeavouring to find out his sentiments in relation to every particular of it.

You will communicate this letter to Monsieur de Brancas, if he is with you, whom (if I may judge by the small acquaintance I had with him here) you will find a very honest good natured man and willing to act in concert with you upon every occasion.

Private.

Hanover, September 21/October 2, 1725.

. . . . . You may observe that France has a great notion of the duke of Holstein's influence in Sweden and therefore shews an inclination towards proposing some equivalent for him. This so dangerous a topick at this juncture will turn the whole power and influence in the north so absolutely into the hands of the Czarina and Bassewitz, and will inevitably run us into so many difficulties with respect to Denmark and all our affairs in the north, that the King hopes and is persuaded that Count Horn himself will see the hazard of bringing such an intricacy upon the anvil now; it will putt a stop to, if not overturn, all we are doing and consequently throw the north into a new flame. Wherefore Count Brancas should by no means be encouraged to make the least mention of any equivalent now, as the most dangerous point which can be started and the most likely to ruin all our work in the nice situation we are in at present. Wherefore you will do what you can to keep off such a proposal and get Count Horn to joyn with you; not that the King is against having a due consideration of the duke of Holstein's case, but his Majesty fears, as I have said, that the mixing it with our other negotiations at this juncture will infallibly undo all. . . . .

Our new alliance is very well relished in Holland, and I am persuaded the States will accede to it. This ought to encourage our friends the Swedes to follow their example. You will likewise

see that our reconciliation with the Czarina is at a greater distance than ever, and the extract I send you of my letter from Berlin will shew you that the king of Prussia begins to think he must act in concert with the King our master in the north as well as in other parts. Count Brancas is put absolutely into Count Horn's hands, and if he will direct him right all will go well. The money that is to be left by the project in your and Count Brancas's hands shall be entirely under Count Horn's direction. . . . .

You see by what I say of our expenses in Sweden that I assert you have laid out twelve thousand pounds. You must always aver before Count Brancas that the same sum has been disburs'd, though it is not at all necessary that you should let him into the particulars. You will have observed that my word is concern'd in that point, and I hope you will have had no occasion to say the contrary to Count Brancas before my first hint about it came to you by my order from M<sup>r</sup> Tilson.<sup>1</sup>

Göhrde 14th/25th October 1725.

I received this minute your letters of the 5th October O.S. by Camara the messenger, which, you will give me leave to tell you, put me under the greatest concern to find that you had in my opinion not understood perfectly the orders which have been sent you with relation to the communicating the treaty to the court where you are; which, I perceive, has brought you under the greatest difficultys in not knowing how to comply with Count Horn's desire so farr as to empower him to own that he had seen the treaty.

In my first dispatch to you upon this subject, which was of the 24 August/4 September, you was ordered to communicate the treaty to him, and to the king of Sweden if the count approved of it, and the whole tenour of what I have wrote since running upon the great advantage and even necessity of securing the accession of Sweden I cant well conceive why you should make any difficulty to give Count Horn a copy of the treaty, if he desired it, much less could there be any reason not to allow him to say he had seen it, when he thought it of use to own his having had a sight of it.

You will, therefore, upon the receipt of this immediately give Count Horn a copy of the treaty and of the three separate articles, making the strongest compliments to him upon this occasion on the part of the King; letting him know that you have his Majesty's

<sup>1</sup> George Tilson, under-secretary of state.

orders to follow his advice and directions not only in this affair but in all things you have to transact at the court of Sweden, acquainting him at the same time that this is not a compliment made to himself only from the King on this occasion but that it proceeds from the regard and confidence his Majesty has in him, and that I had by the King's order said the same thing to Prince William of Hesse and Major General Diemar while at Hanover, in the plainest terms I could express it.

You must endeavour to get Count Brancas to joyn with you in making this communication ; he may depend upon the court of France's being in the same sentiments as to this affair with his Majesty, thò perhaps he may not have received his orders ; and the necessity of this step will justify his doing it. But were the reasons not so strong, even the intimacy that is at present between the two crowns would justify his complying at this juncture with a measure the King has so much at heart. But if you can't with all your reasonings bring Count Brancas to joyn with you you must, however, do it alone.

You may assure Count Horn that the story about an engagement to any of the king of Sweden's brothers is as false as that other your lately mentioned of his Majesty's promising to guaranty the succession to the duke of Holstein ; neither of the brothers, nor any one of them, having mentioned any such thing to the King or his ministers ; and you will find some way to make the king of Sweden feel that if he withdraws his confidence from Count Horn the King's towards him will abate in proportion. This is the language I have constantly held to the landgrave, Diemar, and the whole family, as Sparre is my witness.

As to the future steps to be taken towards bringing Sweden to accede you and Count Brancas will take Count Horn's opinion in all you do and move in it as he advises, without expecting any further orders from the King.

I shall conclude with telling you that the bringing about the accession of Sweden to this treaty is the most acceptable and most important service you can do the King at this juncture, and therefore I most heartily wish you success.

I must not omit letting you know that neither Sparre nor Diemar have been told anything of the contents of my letter of the 22th September, and you may be sure it shall be an absolute secret to them.

Göhrde, 25 October/5 November 1725.

. . . . . The cordiality with which the Czarina has come into the schemes of the Holstein faction has produced the desired effect at Vienna, for that court is going in all haste to strike up a great intimacy with that of Petersbourg. Count Rabutin<sup>1</sup> is recalled from Berlin with the design of being sent immediately to Muscovy, so that there is no doubt to be made but that we shall soon see the strictest union between the Emperor and the Czarina, and you at Stockholm will not be long before you feel the weight of their joint endeavours. They are sensible that in the nature of things Sweden must in a few months be brought to declare either for the King our master or for them. They cannot stand long alone in Sweden; they must either accede to our treaty or join with the Muscovites and Imperialists; and consequently they must declare either for or against us. If they chuse the latter, you will see that the Jacobites scheme<sup>2</sup> is not so ill laid, and you will find that that kingdom will soon be made too hot for you, in spite of all the countenance the king or Count Horn can show you; nay, the Holsteiners, when once they have got so farr, will not stop there, their resentment will still go on against the king himself the count and all the true patriots, and will end in nothing less than the total subversion of the present establishment in that country. Bassewitz's and Cederhielm's letters, which I formerly sent you, plainly hinted at that matter, and if they were obscure, and wanted explanation, what I had last from you make it evident that this is their way of thinking at Petersbourg.

You must therefore state this whole affair clearly and openly to Count Horn and let him see how much their safety is concerned in bringing the king and senate to accede to our treaty; and you must spare neither pains nor money, if it be wanted, towards

<sup>1</sup> General Count Amadeus von Rabutin, a distinguished soldier, son of one yet more distinguished. He was at Berlin as envoy from the emperor from April to October 1725, and went to Petersburg in April 1726.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to intercepted letters from Jacobites at Petersburg to merchants or bankers at Paris, Bordeaux and Madrid which, taken in conjunction with a voyage of three Russian ships to Spain, which were believed to have landed arms on their way in Scotland and Ireland, had lately raised the most profound alarm. Poyntz, and Cyril Wich at Hamburg also, had orders to investigate Swedish complicity in the supposed plot, but neither could find proof of any. Cf. on the subject the letters printed by Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, II. 480. f.

compassing this point, it being of so much importance to the future peace and tranquillity of Great Britain. You must likewise continue your utmost attention to discover the designs of the Jacobites at Stockholm and the preparations they are making there and at other places in Sweden. Count Brancas will, I doubt not, by this time have received full instructions from his court to enable him to act in conjunction with you, and I hope he will execute them with that vigour and firmness he ought to do. Count Horn will have now in his hands a fine opportunity of doing the greatest and most signal service to his country and of being at the head of an affair supported by princes who, he may depend upon it, will constantly and effectually support him; the pride, the treachery and the insolence of the Muscovites will, I believe, put the King under the necessity of sending a strong squadron next spring into the Baltick, as soon as the season is proper. . . . .

Helvoet Sluys, 1/12 January 1725/6.

Since I left Hanover I have received your letters of the 1st, 8th and 15th December, which have been all laid before the King with the minutes that came enclosed of your conferences with the Swedish commissarys. His Majesty approved very well of all you did, and particularly that you communicated to Count Horn beforehand what you intended to say, and what steps you took in the great affair under your management.

The King is very glad to see that things in general in Sweden have so favorable a prospect and that our friends are in no pain about the opposition which the Holsteiners design to make.

We had heard from Berlin before that the Czarina intended to offer subsidys to Sweden, but his Majesty was very well pleased to find by your last that the Swedes had taken that matter so right and were against accepting subsidys from her, which undoubtedly were proposed with no other view than to hinder their accession to our treaty and without any intention of making good what should have been promised; for it is very sure that the Czarina is in no condition at all of furnishing subsidys, or indeed of giving any real assistance to Sweden.

As to what you mention in your's of the 15th about our friends desiring a secret article from the three crowns for assisting Sweden at a proper juncture to recover Livonia etc<sup>a</sup>, you will easily imagine that the King is not sorry to see a spirit of that kind rising where

you are, thò it will be, as his Majesty conceives, very hard to reconcile any article of that nature to our treaty, which you know is purely defensive. The king of Prussia's fears in general, and the particular dread he is under with relation to the Muscovites, will never permit him to come into such a measure, and I believe France will likewise have her difficultys. It is to his Majesty alone that the Swedes owe the steps that that crown has lately taken in their favour; the French have for some years past seen with pleasure the rising power and influence of the Muscovites in the Baltick, proposing to themselves greater advantages from a close union with them than they ever had from their former engagements with Sweden. And they never departed from this view till his Majesty drove them to the necessity of declaring whether they would place their confidence in him or in the Czar, and since in the Czarina. In the present state of affairs they wisely thought that point could bear no debate and consequently came into his Majesty's measures and resolved to cultivate the friendship of Sweden. But whether they will go so farr as to stipulate any thing that may be looked upon by the Muscovites as an offensive engagement against them is more than I can tell. I am inclined to think they will not be prevailed upon to do it at present. Neither can I comprehend how the article you mention can be drawn so as not to offend the old Russes.

You will therefore in confidence state these difficultys to Count Horn and such of our friends as you shall think proper, that they may be apprized of the danger they run of defeating the accession of Sweden to our treaty by insisting upon the secret article above mentioned.

If we may judge of the present prospect of affairs in Europe there is no great occasion for any such article. For from the measures and way of acting of both the Imperial and Spanish courts they certainly intend a warr. Our last advices from Vienna assure us that the project of the treaty between the Emperor and Czarina is returned to Vienna, and the Czarina's minister residing at that court authorized to sign it, so that the work may be look'd upon as done. And his Imperial Majesty cant have any other motive for entring into engagements with the court of Petersbourg but the view of strengthening himself against us. And by all our advices from Spain that court, which at present acts in perfect subordination to that of Vienna, intends to begin the dance and is

resolved to push things to extremity, and if the Emperor and Spain refuse us justice upon the points of trade, of which we complain, things may soon come to the extremity. The Czarina must therefore in consequence be involved in the quarrel, and we have an opportunity, in case Sweden has acceded to our treaty, of exerting our utmost, and in that case without doubt, in conjunction with France and Prussia towards recovering to Sweden the provinces the Russes have taken from them. I can with great truth say that the Swedes cannot be more eagerly bent upon regaining Livonia than his Majesty is to assist them in the doing it. They must be convinced by our behaviour of late that the King is sensible that he has no measures to keep with the Muscovites, so that the Swedes must see that as to the regaining Livonia, tho' we may differ as to the manner of bringing it about, we do not differ in the proposition itself. His Majesty apprehends that inserting a secret article on that head and making it a condition of their accession may defeat the whole, for the reasons I have already suggested. Whereas in the present situation of affairs in Europe, if the Swedes can be prevailed upon to accede to our treaty without any conditions, they will naturally in all human probability have the whole strength of the powers concerned in this alliance engaged in measures for the recovery of Livonia much stronger than any they themselves dare venture to prescribe at this juncture in any secret article even of their own wording.

You will acquaint Count Horn, as likewise such others as you shall think proper, with these his Majesty's sentiments, making them feel that his Majesty has no difficulty as to his own part in engaging any lengths against the Czarina and that his objections to any secret article of the nature of that you mention arise from its not being a proper means for attaining the end proposed. . . . .

Very private.

Whitehall, 1 March 1725/6.

I have received your letter of the 9th of February, and you will easily imagine with what satisfaction I laid it before the King. His Majesty was extremely pleased with the agreeable advices it brought, and your application and endeavours in bringing matters in Sweden to so successful an issue were highly approved and extolled. His Majesty, as a mark of his being very well satisfied with your whole conduct and with the services you have rendered

him in your post at Stockholm, has resolved when the parliament rises to free you from your companion in your office here and to give you the enjoyment of the entire place. I congratulate you both on your success and in this new instance of his Majesty's approbation.

I shall be glad to have your next by a messenger, or by the post, to know the particulars of what passed upon the senate's taking this right resolution in favour of acceding to our treaty, which shews that they have some true courage still left, and which will be the best means of freeing that kingdome from the dependance they have so long layn under.

We now perswade ourselves from these your last advices that it will not be very long before the accession be perfected. And the repeated vigorous addresses of our parliament, with what passes in Holland, will, we doubt not, have much contributed to strengthen and invigorate the good dispositions in Sweden.

The squadron for the Baltick being arming with all expedition, the King thinks it high time to be considering of the particular uses and services this fleet may be of to Sweden during the summer. And in order to enable his Majesty to frame his instructions to his admiral he would have you talk to Count Horn, and to him alone, on this subject; that the orders the King gives to him, that will command this fleet, may be agreeable to the count's views and notions.

His Majesty sees that in general the first advantage that Sweden will receive from this squadron will be protection from any insults from the Muscovites and the duke of Holstein during this year, and consequently not only so much time will be gained but likewise an opportunity will be put into their hands (provided they go on and finish their accession to our treaty) of laying down a plan for freeing themselves for ever from the bondage they have been under to the Russ and Holsteiners.

The hint you gave in your letter of the 2d of February, as if Count Horn designed to make this use of the succours his Majesty intends them, pleases the King extremely. Sweden by their accession to our treaty will and must have the lead in the affairs of the north; the interest as well as the inclination of this country will make us always give them the preference in point of friendship. And the Czarina and her government have so farr lost all credit in France, that if they see that Sweden begins to take courage and is

resolved to act independently from Muscovy that court will return to their old maxims and replace their confidence in Sweden.

The present state of affairs in Muscovy will not admit of their undertaking any considerable design against their neighbours. The Turks, their intestine divisions, and the Czarina's having lost her character with the nation, will make them absolutely incapable of carrying any great views abroad. And the Czarina, seeing it impossible for her to dispose of the succession to Muscovy in favour of any of her children, will not care what becomes of Russia and will apply herself entirely to favour the duke of Holstein and to direct all her measures with that single view.

The duke of Holstein's fate is entirely in the hands of Sweden, and if they have the honesty and courage to talk to him as they ought he must submit and be subservient to them and follow their advice, otherwise he will see that he must lose all his expectations to that crown. So that it will be now in the power of Sweden, with the help of their allies, to influence the Czarina in all her measures, provided they have spirit and conduct.

The first care of Sweden ought to be to shew the duke of Holstein that nothing can be thought of in his favour till he thinks fit to submit himself entirely to Sweden and to govern himself and direct his measures in perfect conformity to the interests of that kingdom. The helping him to Sleswick or to any satisfaction for it, till he is perfectly reduced to this way of thinking and acting, will be putting arms into his hands for the destruction of Sweden and it's liberties. It would be setting the north in a flame, weakening the hands of the allies to Sweden, and making the Muscovites once more masters in those parts.

If the Holstein faction is so strong and numerous, that these measures cannot be carryed so far as they ought to be in reason and good sense, the next thing to be done is to try if Sweden and Denmark cannot be brought to terms of agreement for their mutual defence; without meddling with the affair of Sleswick but leaving that upon the foot of the late treaty of peace between those crowns. Such a treaty or agreement would give great strength to Sweden in the Baltick and lay a foundation, as time and opportunity should offer, to act against the Muscovites, and might lead to the recovering the provinces the Swedes have been obliged to yield to Russia, which ought ever to be their first point in view.

These are the King's present thoughts upon these heads, which

I send as hints to you to talk to Count Horn in confidence, that his Majesty may learn his views and sentiments, in order to form the instructions to be given to his admiral, who is to go to the Baltick. You will know how to manage the communication of what I write in such manner as to make it a particular compliment to the count and a fresh mark of the King's great opinion and esteem of his superior sense and judgment. And you will send me as soon as you can the result of what you shall learn from the count upon your opening to him with so much freedom his Majesty's notions with respect to the advantage Sweden may draw from the present situation of affairs.

Whitehall, 22th March 1725/6.

. . . . . The method proposed by Count Horn for gaining time towards ripening matters would have rendered this a most tedious and almost endless negotiation. The count must see the hazards to which we have been already exposed by the caprice of the king of Prussia, and as the count owns himself to be eager for the accession the King cannot but think that he must at the same time see the necessity of finishing it as soon as possible, to obviate the daily dangers to which we may be otherwise exposed. The King has taken care on his part to put it in the power of Sweden to conclude this necessary work by providing a sufficient security for them against all the designs or attempts of the Muscovites. A squadron of twenty stout men of warr, compleatly manned and provided in all respects, will be ready to sail to the Baltick in a fortnight, or three weeks at farthest ; so that they will be in the Sound before it is possible that the ice should permit any thing to stirr out of Petersburg. After making so great an expence for the protection of Sweden surely the King might in return expect to have the accession finished all at one stroke, for since the Swedes themselves don't dare to own publickly their fears and apprehensions of the Muscovites, and consequently cannot pretend to demand our assistance by virtue of the defensive alliance, I do not well see how we can in strictness justify our being at the charge of sending such a squadron, unasked for by the crown to which it is sent, were it not in the view of their accession to our treaty. However, as the King knows and is perswaded of Count Horn's good intentions, and as you have mentioned the right use he designs to make of this squadron's being sent for the benefit and security of Sweden,

his Majesty, notwithstanding the many difficultys that lye in his way, and which hereafter may arise upon account of having put the nation to so great an expence before the accession was concluded, would not omit doing all he could to put it into the count's power to serve his country in that manner, and with that effect, he hopes to do by the coming of the King's fleet into those seas. . . . .

What the King has at present most at heart is to have the point of the accession speedily finished, that he may be the better authorized in all he shall do against the Muscovites. His Majesty has no defensive alliance with Denmark, his only engagement with that crown being the guaranty given by him and France for Sleswick, for which he cannot properly be called upon till that country is actually attacked. However, the fleet will be in the Baltick, as I have already told you, time enough to prevent the Muscovites putting to sea or to beat them if they shall think fit to appear. What his Majesty expects from Sweden at present is their accession to our treaty, in order to justify what he does in their defence, at a time when they themselves dare not openly ask it of him.

His Majesty hopes Count Horn will prevent the Emperor's accession to the treaty concluded between Sweden and Muscovy, for such an event at this juncture would turn all we are doing for Sweden into ridicule.

The fleet we shall send will cost the nation above £350,000. . . . .

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR VICE-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES WAGER, KNT.,

11 April 1726.

*(Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 65, copy.)*

Whereas We are assured by certain and repeated advices from Petersburg that the Czarina is making great warlike preparations, that besides a considerable fleet of ships of war that princess is likewise fitting out great numbers of galleys and other vessels proper for transporting troops, and that her Czarish Majesty has ordered a large body of her forces to be drawn together in and near Petersburg, that they may be ready to be put on board her said fleet and galleys, which, as it is said, are to be put to sea in May, and that Monsieur Osterman, under pretence of going ambassadour to Sweden, is by the assistance of this fleet to put in execution the design that was formed and intended to be executed last spring

against the king and the established government of Sweden and to exact from that crown the use of it's ports and the assistance of its troops against Denmark ; and as this extraordinary armament on the part of Muscovy must, without doubt, very much alarm all the powers in those parts and particularly Our good brother the king of Denmark, who has therefore made the most pressing and reiterated instances that We would send timely assistance into those seas to protect his dominions from the attempts of the Russian armament ; and as We have likewise great reason to think that the good disposition which appears in the king and senate of Sweden to accede to the defensive alliance made at Hanover in September last may incite the Muscovites to endeavour also to awe and terrify the Swedes by the fears of another invasion, and thereby discourage them from acceding to the said alliance, which it highly imports Us to forward and perfect to the utmost of Our power ; We, being always attentive to preserve the publick peace and tranquility in all parts of Europe, and being more particularly sollicitous in this time of danger to prevent the breaking out of a new war in the north, which might easily spread to other countries and set the rest of Christendome in a flame in the present critical situation of affairs ; and We being moreover very desirous to encourage and further the good dispositions of Sweden towards the accession aforesaid and to prevent the ill designs, which may in all likelihood be formed against them on that account ; and above all being sensible of how fatal consequence any increase of the present power and influence of the Muscovites in the Baltick may be to the commerce and even to the peace and security of this Our kingdom, having some time since received undoubted intelligence of the court of Petersburg having entered into measures in favour of the Pretender and his adherents ; have thought it highly necessary to fit out a sufficient squadron of Our men of war and to send them to the Baltick Sea, in order to protect and support Our friends and allies, preserve the quiet of those parts, and prevent any hostile enterprise that may be intended by the Muscovites. And as We, reposing great trust and confidence in your skill ability and zeal for Our service, have appointed you to command Our said squadron in chief, We have thought fit to give you the instructions following for your better conduct in the execution of Our commands.

1. You shall immediately upon the receipt of these Our instructions take under your care all Our ships of the line and others that

compose the said squadron, and you are to sail with them as soon as possible up to the height of Stockholm.

2. When you pass the Sound you shall send a messenger on shore with a letter to the Lord Glenorchy, Our envoy extraordinary at Copenhagen, advising him of your being come and of your being directed to proceed without loss of time up the Baltick to the height of Stockholm, and from thence to some station towards the Gulph of Finland, which shall be judged the most proper to hinder the Russ fleet and galleys, if possible, from stirring out of their harbours ; this being the best method to secure the coasts of all Our friends and allys. And you shall desire Our said envoy to inform the king of Denmark thereof, as he has Our orders already so to do, and to get such ships of war, as his Danish Majesty intends to send to join Our squadron under your command, to be ordered to follow you immediately and to do in conjunction with you what may be found necessary or proper for the purposes aforesaid.

3. As soon therefore as you have sent your letter you shall without loss of time proceed with Our fleet up the Baltick Sea to some proper station near the river of Stockholm, and in case you shall have intelligence that the Muscovite fleet is not come out, and that you may have time to go your self to Stockholm, you shall repair thither and apply to Our trusty and welbeloved Stephen Poyntz Esq', Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the court of Sweden, and communicate to him all your instructions and dispatches and concert with him and by his means the measures you are to take for the most effectual performance of the service you are sent upon.

4. You shall jointly with Our envoy ask an audience of Our good brother, the king of Sweden, and deliver to him Our letter herewith put into your hands, acquainting him that as We have received repeated advices of the great warlike preparations of the Muscovites, and being apprehensive that their designs may be directed against his dominions on several accounts and particularly with respect to the good disposition his Swedish Majesty and the senate of Sweden have shewn towards acceding to the treaty concluded at Hanover between Us the most Christian King and the king of Prussia, We, not to be wanting in so important a juncture to shew Our friendship to his Swedish Majesty and Our readiness to defend the kingdom of Sweden, have sent you with a strong fleet of Our ships of war for the security of their coasts and to protect and encourage them in their design of joining with Us in Our defensive alliance

aforesaid for the advantage of Our antient friends and allys, the Swedes, and for the general good of Europe. But that you may see more particularly what We write to his Swedish Majesty upon this occasion you have herewith a copy of Our said letter.

5. As soon as you have had your audience of the king of Sweden and shall with Our envoy have settled and adjusted with Count Horn all such matters as he and you shall think of use to Us or necessary for the service you are sent upon, you shall without loss of time proceed with Our fleet and take such a station as may be most convenient and proper to hinder the Muscovite fleet and gallies from coming out.

6. But if upon your coming up the Baltick to the height of Stockholm you shall be certainly informed that the Muscovites are come out and under sail to execute their designs, which We hope they will not, then you shall not leave Our fleet nor make any stay but proceed immediately with the whole squadron, upon the first sure notice you receive of the Muscovite fleet being at sea, and endeavour to come up with them and if possible to destroy them.

7. If the Muscovite fleet and gallies shall be still lying in harbour, when you arrive in the seas going up to Petersbourg, you shall send a proper person up thither with a letter to Admiral Apraxin, or to one of the Czarina's chief ministers, as you shall agree upon with Our envoy before you leave Stockholm, desiring him to acquaint her Imperial Majesty in Our name that she will easily beleive that We and Our allies have just reason to be alarmed at the extraordinary armament which she has made in time of peace, that on Our parts We have ever been desirous to preserve the publick tranquillity of Europe and to live in amity with Russia, and as an instance of Our sincere disposition to that end We did some time since signify Our good will to enter jointly with France into a defensive alliance with the late Czar of Muscovy on such terms as might be consistent with the peace of Europe and the interest dignity and honour of the three crowns reciprocally, by which means not only the differences between Us and his Czarish Majesty might have been intirely forgotten by a sincere reconciliation and a perfect friendship and harmony established between the two nations, to their mutual advantage, and also the tranquillity of the north might have been established upon a sure and lasting foundation; and that for these good ends and purposes a plan of a treaty had in concert with Us been framed at the court of France upon the

advices and informations sent by Mon<sup>r</sup> Campredon from Petersburg for that purpose and had been transmitted to his Czarish Majesty for his final approbation and consent, but the perfecting of so good a work was prevented by his sudden death. That We nevertheless, since his departure of this world still retaining the same good intentions for preserving the peace of the north and for renewing Our antient friendship with the crown of Muscovy, did jointly with his most Christian Majesty signify Our readiness to enter into the aforesaid treaty with the Czarina upon her first accession to the throne, not doubting but she would willingly have embraced a proposition of such advantage to Our subjects, as well as to the publick peace ; yet, contrary to all expectations, instead of making a suitable return to such friendly offers on Our part, after many unnecessary and tedious delays her ministers insisted upon such alterations in the said projected treaty as were entirely foreign to the interest of Muscovy and not only contrary to the solemn obligations which We and his most Christian Majesty were under to other powers, but also such as must have inevitably involved the northern crowns in new troubles and confusion ; and also during this negociation We received undoubted intelligence that without the least provocation on Our part measures had been entered into at the court of Petersburg in favour of the Pretender to Our crown, and great encouragement given to his adherents. After such treatment her Imperial Majesty will not wonder if We, being indispensably obliged to provide for the security of Our dominions, to make good Our engagements to Our allys, and to maintain the public tranquility in the north, which seem to be greatly threatned by such warlike preparations, have thought it necessary to send a strong fleet of Our ships of war into those seas under your command to preserve the publick peace there, with orders to declare that in case her said Imperial Majesty should persist in her resolution of sending her fleet to sea We shall be obliged to endeavour to hinder its coming out. You will at the same time let her Imperial Majesty know that We do most earnestly desire to live in peace and amity with Russia and therefore do most heartily wish that she, reflecting seriously upon the true interest of her people, would permit them to enjoy the blessings of that peace, which they have purchased at the expense of so much blood and treasure under the conduct of his late Imperial Majesty, and that rather than think of entering into measures, which must inevitably plunge the whole north into war

and confusion, she would give the world instances of her inclination to peace and of her good disposition to live in friendship with her neighbours.

8. You will receive herewith a draught of a letter in French to the purport abovementioned, to be wrote by you as is before directed. And you have also a letter from Us to the Czarina to the same effect, as you will see by the copy of it herewith put into your hands. You shall consult Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm upon these two letters, and according to his opinion and advice, or as it shall be agreed between you, you shall dispatch either Our letter to the Czarina herself or that which you are to write to one of her chief ministers, in the manner above specified, as shall be thought most expedient for the service or most suitable to the situation of affairs upon your arrival at Stockholm.

9. When you have sent up to Petersburg one of the letters above mentioned you shall lie with Our fleet in the station that shall be judged most proper to observing that of Muscovy, and if the Russian fleet shall be quiet in their harbours and not come out to execute the designs which have been in agitation, and the Muscovites shall at the same time neither interrupt the trade of Our subjects nor seize their persons or effects, then you shall continue in your station without doing the least damage or offering any trouble or molestation to the subjects of the Czarina. But in case the Muscovite fleet should attempt to put to sea, then you shall pursuant to these Our orders attack them and use your utmost endeavours to destroy them, and if the Muscovites shall molest Our subjects in their commerce or seize their persons or effects, then you shall do what hurt you can to the Czarina and her subjects and stop all ships whatsoever going up to Petersburg or sailing to any other of the Russ ports, and seize those belonging to Muscovy and detain both their persons and effects.

10. As Our negotiations with the court of Petersburg have hitherto passed through the hands of the most Christian King, and as We are determined to keep them in the same channel and to do nothing but in concert with the crown of France and through their means, in case therefore that it should happen that whilst you lie in the seas near the Russian coast the Czarina should send to you and offer to enter into a negotiation you must then let her know that as We have hitherto transacted all Our affairs with her court

in conjunction with France and by the means of that crown you have no orders nor any power to treat with her Imperial Majesty or with any of her ministers.

11. You have herewith Our full power to you to act in conjunction with Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the court of Sweden and to do and perform with the ministers of his Swedish Majesty such matters and things as may occur to be transacted relating to your commission, as Our admiral in the Baltick Sea. But as Our said envoy is particularly charged with a negociation for the accession of the king and kingdom of Sweden to Our defensive alliance concluded last year at Hanover, Our will and intention is that you should not interfere in that negociation ; which being already begun and carryed on pretty farr jointly with the ministers of the most Christian King and of the king of Prussia would be rather impeded than forwarded by the formality of admitting a new plenipotentiary.

12. During your stay in those seas you shall protect and assist all the merchant ships of Our subjects and of Our friends and allies, who shall want the same, as farr as the service you are principally sent upon will permit.

13. You are to give Us constant and regular accounts of your proceedings from time to time by one of Our principal secretaries of state, and you shall particularly correspond with Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm and with others Our ministers abroad as Our service shall require.

14. You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as We shall think fit to give you by one of Our principal secretaries of state.

G. R.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

*(Ibid., copy.)*

Whereas by the 2d and 3d articles of Our instructions to you We have directed you in passing the Sound not to stay there but only to write to Our envoy extraordinary at Copenhagen to advise him of your arrival and to desire him to get the Danish ships of war, which are design'd to joyn you, to be ordered to follow you immediately, We have now thought fit to give you a letter likewise for Our good brother, the king of Denmark, and We would have you

go on shore and present it to his Danish Majesty at an audience you will ask of him, in which, after the usual compliments and having given him strong assurances of Our friendship and esteem for his person, whereof the sending Our fleet to his assistance is a most evident proof, you shall only desire that his Danish Majesty will hold that squadron of his ships of war, which he intends shou'd joyn Our fleet, in a readiness to sail, and that he will please to order them to come to you upon the first notice that shall be sent by you. You are not to make any stay at Copenhagen, and you will take care that the delivery of this letter be of as little hindrance as possible to your proceeding with Our fleet up to the height of Stockholm.

G. R.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME, SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*, copy.)

Whereas by Our other instructions to you you are directed to go up to Stockholm your self, if you possibly can without detriment to the service of Our fleet, and to communicate to Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary there all the commands you have received from Us, it is Our will and pleasure that you govern your self in every thing, whilst you are at Stockholm, by the advice of Our said envoy, that you even communicate to his Swedish Majesty the whole or such parts only of Our instructions to you, as he and you shall judge proper, and you may even add what he and you shall think may be for Our service, in what you shall say to the king or to his ministers. And whereas you are required by Our said other instructions to ask an audience of his Swedish Majesty and deliver to him a letter therein mentioned, now as that letter contains only general expressions of Our intentions in sending Our fleet into those seas We have thought fit to write another letter to Our said good brother, intimating more particularly the reasons and motives of Our sending him the assistance of Our ships of war, as you will find by the copy thereof herewith put into your hands.

2. You shall therefore consult with Our said envoy extraordinary, whom you shall inform of the orders you have received from Us, and take his sentiments and advice upon them, and you shall ask his opinion which of Our said letters it will be most proper for you to deliver to the king of Sweden at your audience, and you shall

accordingly present to his Majesty that which Our said envoy shall most approve.

3. We having sent Our orders to Our said envoy extraordinary in a letter written to him<sup>1</sup> by the Lord Viscount Townshend, one of Our principal secretaries of state, whereof you have herewith a copy, directing him to consult with Count Horn and know his thoughts how Our fleet may most usefully be employed this summer for the advantage of Sweden, you, together with Our said envoy, shall consider what shall be most fit to be done in pursuance of the said orders, and what shall be agreed upon between you you shall execute to the utmost of your power.

4. You shall, in case Our said envoy approves of your doing it, represent to his Swedish Majesty, or to such of his ministers as Our said envoy shall think most proper, that as one of the motives of the coming of Our fleet is the protecting Sweden in order to the bringing the accession to a speedy end, We do expect that that necessary work be concluded out of hand, which will enable Us to go greater lengths in the defence of Our new ally, and you will acquaint his Swedish Majesty, or such of his ministers as you and Our said envoy shall confer with upon this occasion, that unless the accession be perfected you shall find your self under a great incapacity to act with that vigour you might otherwise do ; but We can make no question but that, in return for Our readiness to assist Sweden, for the great and heavy expences We have been at in equipping so large a squadron for that purpose, and for Our particular attention to enable them to put the affairs of Sweden upon a better and more independent foot with respect to Russia, they will employ all their credit and application to finish the accession out of hand.

5. You will take the advice of Our said envoy how farr you shall admit the French minister, the count de Brancas, into your consultations or communicate your orders to him, it being Our intention always that the greatest union and confidence should appear between Our ministers and those of his Most Christian Majesty.

6. As We are not very certain what part the king of Prussia may act, and how far he may be inclined to favour or make his court to the Muscovites, you will behave yourself with such caution or openness to the Prussian minister as Our envoy shall inform you to be necessary.

7. Whereas stormy and tempestuous weather begins to set in

<sup>1</sup> Noted in margin as of 1 March.

towards the latter season of the year and the Baltick Sea is usually dangerous by reason of frequent high winds at that time Our will and pleasure is that with the first fair wind in the month of September you should return to England with Our fleet under your command. We hope that the service of the year will be performed before that season, that you may come home without any detriment to Our affairs there, and unless the highest necessity requires your stay, or that you have Our orders to the contrary, you shall return and not endanger Our fleet by lying out too long in those seas.

G. R.

TOWNSHEND TO POYNTZ.

*(Record Office, S.P. Foreign, Sweden 42 to 47, copies.)*

Whitehall, 26th April 1726.

Since my acknowledging yours of the 2d which came by Brighter I have received that of the 6th by the post and have laid it before the King, who will be very glad to hear, by the express you promise to send, those vigorous resolutions which it was expected would soon be taken in the senate; and his Majesty hopes that the good beginnings in Sweden towards their accession will be brought to effect without further loss of time; which step is become more necessary than ever, since the advices we have from Vienna of that court's having acceded to the treaty of Stockholm and to the secret article in favour of the duke of Holstein. This news at first surprised us a good deal both here and in France, and we were concerned that such a step should be taken as could never be to the advantage of that kingdom, or for the interest of the present government there; since it cannot be imagin'd that the Emperor's accession to that treaty is owing to any friendship or regard for Sweden, but to his desire of gratifying the Muscovites by his engaging to secure to them the conquests they made during the late war upon Sweden and of being more closely united to the Czarina, who, having obtained this mark of his Imperial Majesty's complaisance to her, will flatter herself that upon her entring in return into the treaties concluded between the courts of Vienna and Spain she shall have the Emperor's support in all her ambitious views in favour of the duke of Holstein, one of which will certainly be to crush the patriot party and to overturn the present form of government in Sweden; so that this accession, instead of bringing any

addition of strength to Sweden, will probably have such consequences as it highly concerns them to guard against.

The most certain means of avoiding the dangers which may accrue to them from this formidable union between the Emperor and the Czarina will be for the king and senate to make without loss of time the same declaration at Vienna which they have lately made at Petersburg, viz. that they do not look upon themselves as engaged by the secret article of the abovemention'd treaty to use force at any time for obtaining satisfaction to the duke of Holstein for Sleswig. This Count Brancas has orders from his court to press most strenuously, and you will not fail to join most earnestly with him. The next point is to hasten their accession to our treaty as much as possible. When that step is made they may depend upon the utmost support and assistance that can be given them by the two crowns, and they need not apprehend any backwardness on the part of France, since the Czarina and the duke of Holstein, by throwing themselves into the arms of the Emperor, must certainly have forfeited any favourable inclinations that France may have heretofore had towards them. . . . .

Whitehall, 3d May 1726.

[Further on the dangers threatened by the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, and on the necessity of the Swedes refusing to ratify unless with restrictions against employment of force on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and against demand for succours "in the case of the Ostend Company or on account of any troubles that should arise in Spain or Italy, or out of Europe." The dispatch continues:]

Your description of Count Horn is excellent, and the colours in which you paint his way of thinking and acting most lively. His Majesty was indeed glad to find upon the whole that he was so sincerely disposed to finish the accession to our treaty, but was at the same time concerned to see he was for driving it off to a dyet. We feel what inconveniencys his former dilatoriness has brought upon our business by giving the Emperor time to play the game he has done; and if he still continues cold and slow his enemies, who are neither so scrupulous nor so cautious, will strike some other bold stroke to break all his measures; and therefore we heartily wish that his passion of anger and resentment for what has lately passed may get the better of his caution and reservedness and make

him exert his utmost without loss of time to retrieve the false step with the court of Vienna in the best manner possible. . . . .

His Majesty, who has all the respect in the world for Count Horn and for his judgement, has come into what you mention towards the latter end of your despatch concerning an expedient in favour of the duke of Holstein. The behaviour of that prince towards the King and France has indeed been such as not to deserve any regard from the 2 crowns, not to mention his disrespectfull conduct towards the king and senate of Sweden, with those ungrateful returns to the Swedish nation and the many ill consequences of giving the least encouragement to that duke's dangerous and ambitious views. However, his Majesty is willing to pay that deference to the opinion of our friends at Stockholm and to facilitate the accession in their own way, and therefore you may, in conjunction with Count Brancas, promise that when the accession is finished the King will consent to the forming of a separate article in favour of the duke of Holstein upon the foot of that offered in his behalf by the treaty projected to be made with the Czarina; but this article must be founded on this express condition, that the duke do previously change his conduct both towards the two crowns and towards Sweden and act entirely conformable to their interests. In such case and not otherwise, and with this provision in the article, his Majesty will agree to concur in doing anything in favour of the duke of Holstein and his pretensions that shall not be contrary to the engagements he is already under to Denmark.

His Majesty foresees, as well as you do, the difficulties and unreasonableness of this condescension on his part, and would not therefore have you mention any thing on this head unless you see an absolute necessity for the doing it and that you are sure that a proposal of that kind would have such an effect upon the Swedish senate as to make them vote for perfecting the accession immediately.

Whitehall, 20 May 1726.

. . . . . You must not expect at present a particular answer to the points contained in your last letters and papers, but I must lose no time in telling you that his Majesty thinks you are so well apprised of his sentiments with respect to the principal heads mentioned in your conferences with the Swedish commissarys that he hopes you will hasten on with all the diligence you can the business of the accession and not suspend your proceedings one

minute in expectation of instructions by way of ultimatum jointly concerted between the three powers. The speedy finishing this work is of so great importance, and the King sees you act with so much judgement and prudence, that his Majesty is of opinion that you and Count Brancas may from the instructions you have already received fix and settle the accession, which will be much better than to stay to consult the king of Prussia's thoughts upon the several particulars; for it will be much easier to get that prince's consent to the whole when settled in the manner above mentioned, provided nothing be inserted at which he can take just exception, than to propose things in detail and ask his opinion upon every article; for there is no question to be made but that his Prussian Majesty would entangle us in a thousand difficultys, if we should apply to him in that method.

If the Swedes are excused from being concerned with what may happen in the East or West Indies the King does not see what they can justly object against any other engagement of the treaty of Hanover, which would not lye as strong against their present defensive alliance with us, and those they have with France; and you and Count Brancas have made such full and solid replys to all that was said by the Swedish commissarys that his Majesty is persuaded that, if the Swedish ministers are in earnest, the points in dispute are brought into so narrow a compass that they will be easily adjusted. I dare say you will have no difficulty with Sir Charles Wager. His orders are positive to act in everything as you and Count Horn shall advise, and he has as good sense and as good intentions as any man living can have. . . . .

Whitehall, 17th June 1726.

I received on Saturday morning your dispatch of the 27 of May by the messenger Du Commun, and on Monday I had by the post your letter of the 1st inst<sup>l</sup>. They have both been laid before the King, who was extremely well satisfied with your accounts of the situation of affairs in your parts and was particularly glad to see that the decision of that grand one of the accession drew so near, and that you had such good hopes that the question would be determined in our favour.

His Majesty was indeed sorry to find that you were of opinion at the same time that they would still insist on most of their exceptions. As to what they desire of not extending the guaranty of the king and

kingdome of Sweden further than rights and possessions in Europe, you have seen sufficiently by my letter of the 3d of May that his Majesty makes no scruple of consenting to that limitation. And as to the separate article, which they supposed the king of Prussia had to excuse him from taking any part in the troubles which might arise in Spain or Italy during the time of the allyance, you was very fully informed by my abovementioned letter that they were under a mistake as to such an article, but that they might have a declaration of the same import with that given to the king of Prussia, if they desired it. And as to the extent of the guaranty in the 2d article, which they complain of as taking in all rights immunitys and advantages, and in particular those relating to commerce, which the allys do enjoy or ought to enjoy respectively, these they look upon to be expressions of a great extent and lyable to several interpretations, and therefore they would have those words explained and limited, that the crown of Sweden should not be obliged to support any treatys they have not been concerned in, nor any rights or pretensions which may be formed upon them or which have been already formed either within the Empire or without it, his Swedish Majesty likewise reserving to himself not to meddle with the affair of the company of Ostend otherwise than by good offices, as farr as they may be either usefull or agreable to the partys concerned. This last point you say in yours of the 1st inst<sup>t</sup> you apprehend they will not let drop, as having exacted the same restriction from the court of Vienna.

I have already in mine of the 3d of May explained to you the King's sentiments upon this head, which you will have found confirmed in mine of the 20th of the same month. And I hope what I wrote to you will have had its due weight at Stockholm. For really the King cannot conceive upon what ground the Swedes can pretend to be exempted by this treaty from any engagement, to which they were bound by our former defensive allyance. By that treaty they must acknowledge that if any prince in Italy Spain Flanders or any other part of Europe should attack England they would be obliged to furnish the succours stipulated. And in like manner undoubtedly their defensive allyance with France must engage them to assist that crown, if attacked by any power in Europe. But if we should be the aggressors they would be under no obligation at all. This is evidently the state of the case with respect to the treaty of 1720, and this is all we ask now ; we desire no more as to

our rights and possessions, nor even in point of our trade and our navigation, than what that last defensive treaty most plainly expresses. So that if the stipulation in the 2d article of the treaty of Hanover be confined to the limits of Europe, that is all they can in justice expect or we with prudence and safety grant. And his Majesty thinks that in this respect there is a great difference between him and the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty has no antecedent defensive treaty with Sweden, and what they ask of him concerning the business of Ostend and the other restrictions to be insisted on at Vienna has hapned since their invitation of him to the treaty of Stockholm and long before his accession, so that they have right eno' to demand such explanations of the Emperor and to restrain their guaranty with him, as they think necessary. But this nation was long ago in possession of the engagement, which the Swedes would now lessen. We had it by the treaty of 1700, and it was confirmed to us in the renewal of that treaty in 1720 by my Lord Carteret. And the Swedes themselves are so intent upon keeping strictly to the above mentioned treatys in those particulars, which are in their favour, that they even now insist on the arrears of subsidys due by virtue of the first of them and confirmed by the last of them. How then can we on our part derogate by this new allyance from what we are so justly entitled to by the old one? Wherefore his Majesty hopes that when you have set these arguments in their proper light the Swedes will be contented with the old limitation of not exceeding the bounds of Europe, and that as to the rest they will not be so unreasonable as to insist on making our condition by this new treaty worse than it was before, by excepting even things within Europe; which, you will easily imagine, no minister can ever stand the admitting of in this country.

The King makes no difficulty of letting their quota by this treaty be the same with that the king of Prussia is to furnish, tho' by former treatys the quotas between the crowns of Great Britain and Sweden were equal.

As to the business of the arrears of subsidys from the year 1713 to the year 1718, and the liquidation of captures, which you expect will be demanded according to Lord Carteret's treaty, the King sees no reason to refuse making an article upon those heads, provided it be founded on the abovementioned treaty and conformable to what is promised by it.

As to our not producing in parliament, when it meets again, the

motives for sending our fleet into the Baltick, I hope the effects of its going will prove so visibly good before the end of the summer that no one will think of calling for all our reasons for being at that great charge. But if our success should not answer expectation it will be impossible to withhold papers from the clamorous and inquisitives. You will tell Count Horn and our friends, therefore, that the best way to prevent such an enquiry is for them to accede as soon and as handsomely as possible to our treaty, which will undoubtedly put the nation in such good humour, that we shall have no further questions asked; or if any such motion should be made we could in that case very easily stop any enquiry of that nature.

I send you under a flying seal what I write to Sir Charles Wager; you will acquaint Count Horn with the orders he has, in case the Muscovites should march towards Sleswick. You will be pleased to seal it and forward it to the admiral by a messenger, since I make no question but you will find opportunitys to send him by sea to the place where the admiral is.

We have nothing remarkable from France since I wrote to you the 7th, all things continueing to go extremely well at that court.

Whitehall, 24th June 1726.

I have received yours of the 8th with the inclosed memorials, and having laid them before the King I am commanded to acquaint you that his Majesty approves of what you did, and thinks your memorial very proper to induce the Swedes to determine a question which has been depending so many months; and his Majesty hopes that your next letters will bring an account that the senate have come to a conclusion according to our wishes, and the true interest of Sweden.

The King was sorry to see that you expected no more than a bare majority and that you were not without apprehensions that their accession might be attended with demands of subsidys and other difficultys. If they resolve to accede, though it be only with the majority you mention and that their resolution be clogged with some demands, yet his Majesty would not have accession rejected, nor any mark of indignation shewn on this occasion. It is better to continue to sollicit and to endeavour with temper and calmness to shew the unreasonableness of the conditions they would impose than to fling up the game now and to throw ourselves in anger upon the future disposition of a dyett.

You will have seen by my dispatch, which Camara the messenger carries you, what his Majesty's sentiments are upon the chief of those objections mentioned by the commissioners in your conferences ; and if there should arise any thing new I shall send you further instructions. But the negociation must be kept on foot, and we must try to get off any hard terms, that may be offered, as well as we can ; and you must let our friends know that if we do not succeed in the accession, after we have sent our fleet and have been at such extraordinary charges, we shall be obliged to produce to the parliament the true reason of our sending it and own the sollicitations we received from thence, which necessity we wish heartily they would help us to avoid. . . . .

Whitehall, 8th July 1726.

. . . . . I was surprised to find by your letter that Baron Sparre had informed his court that the King acquiesces in the restrictions proposed to be added to the Swedish act of accession. I have constantly talked to him in the same style I have always wrote to you, and in a conference I had with him yesterday morning I repeated to him what I had formerly said upon that subject. However I am glad to find you think that nothing of moment will be insisted on except the affair of Ostend, and as to that I hope I have stated his Majesty's sentiments to you in so clear a light that the Swedes cannot refuse to come into what his Majesty proposes on that head, since it is in truth no more than what they are already obliged to by the defensive allyance now subsisting between the two crowns. And I have already sent you his Majesty's thoughts so fully upon that matter, as well as upon the restrictions in general, that you will be very well able to judge whether those proposed are such as can be complied with. If there should be none offered that you shall think unreasonable his Majesty would have you, in conjunction with Count Brancas, endeavour to persuade the Swedish commissioners to sign immediately and leave a place open for the king of Prussia's minister to sign, when he shall receive his master's directions for that purpose. This will be absolutely necessary, his Prussian Majesty being in a disposition if not to defeat, at least to delay and clog our measures as much as possible, and he will hardly grow more tractable till he sees that the success of our negociations, and the perfecting those matters that are now in agitation, do not entirely depend upon his concurrence. His Majesty is so thoroughly

persuaded of the king of Prussia's inclination to give us all the trouble and uneasiness he can, that he has sent orders to M<sup>r</sup> Finch to do the same in Holland that you are directed to do in Sweden ; and I hope soon to receive the Dutch act of accession signed by the deputys, M<sup>r</sup> Finch, and Mons<sup>r</sup> Fenelon,<sup>1</sup> although his Prussian Majesty should not think proper to give directions to Mons<sup>r</sup> Meynertzhagen<sup>2</sup> to joyn with them.

I am very glad the question for a dyett was determined so much to your satisfaction. I have had some discourse with Baron Sparre upon that head, who I find has received letters from Count Horn and M<sup>r</sup> Törne<sup>3</sup> desiring him to write to Sweden for leave to be present at the dyett. He seemed to make some difficulty of going unless he could be assured of some assistance in money for the king of Sweden, in order to facilitate the success of his affairs at the dyett. After some persuasions he promised me to write to Sweden as Törne had directed, but at the same time I let him know that the nature of our government was such that it would be impossible for the King to give them any help in money from hence unless the accession be previously concluded, that I therefore hoped the king of Sweden would not think of any assistance from his Majesty, till that affair was entirely finished. In case Count Horn should mention anything of that kind to you you will be sure to make him the same answer that I made to Baron Sparre ; you must, however, let Count Horn know he may depend upon being supported in the dyett, in case the accession to our treaty is previously finished, and that we do not doubt but France will joyn with us ; that it was with pleasure the King heard he was to be marshall, his Majesty placing his greatest confidence in his skill knowledge and integrity ; and that provided the king and senate will put it in his Majesty's power by concluding the accession, he need not doubt of his being vigorously supported in the dyett with every thing necessary for the carrying on and perfecting the great views he has for the service and interests of his country.

Whitehall, 12 July 1726.

. . . . . The resolution for the meeting of the dyet gave the King much satisfaction, and particularly that the business of the accession

<sup>1</sup> The marquis de Fénelon, French ambassador at the Hague.

<sup>2</sup> The Prussian envoy there.

<sup>3</sup> Private Secretary to Frederick I of Sweden.

would be going on in the mean time and that you would use your utmost endeavours to get it finished before that assembly meets. That his Majesty takes to be the wisest and the safest measure, since, if that matter should remain unconcluded and the whole should be left to be tossed about in the debates of that numerous meeting, we should be thrown as it were into a wide sea and have new and great struggles, perhaps, to get through every article in dispute. Whereas if the accession is completed according to the resolution of the senate, then the contest in the dyet will lie in the compass of the single question, whether to approve or not, which will be much more easily managed and quicker decided, besides that if the accession is brought to a conclusion previously to the meeting of the dyet it will be a subject ready prepared for their deliberation, and worthy of their most serious thoughts not to refuse after the senate had gone so far in it. And indeed, as you rightly observe, the confirmation of the dyet will be very useful and necessary to give the finishing stroke to that work. Since considering the weakness and uncertainty of that majority, by which we shall have carried it in the senate, we shall run great risk of mis-carrying in any thing that were to be done in pursuance of the accession unless it has received the sanction of the dyet. So that the King's thoughts are that no stone should be left unturned to get the accession entirely finished before the meeting of the dyet, that it may come before them in it's perfect shape ; and that then all application possible should be used to get it approved immediately by that assembly ; that being agreed to by the voice of the nation our friends may have more spirit and authority, as occasion shall offer, in concerting proper measures for supporting and improving an alliance which, wisely conducted, may be of such infinite good and service to Sweden.

I have told you already that the King is concerting measures with Denmarke in conjunction with France, and I am hopeful that they will be soon adjusted and turned in such a manner as not only to secure the quiet of Germany from any invasion of the Muscovites or any other power whatsoever, but also that they may be extended afterwards in concert with Sweden and provide against any disturbance that shall affect the tranquillity of the north.<sup>1</sup>

I hinted to you in my last that the King designed to concert with France the having a good summ of money ready in your's and Count

<sup>1</sup> See on this subject pp. xxxvi, 230-1.

Branca's hands to be disposed of for our joynt service in the dyet. I believe we shall find France ready to concur with us in that most necessary point to make sure of all our negociations there. But his Majesty is sensible how needful that is and would not have your hands empty, and therefore gives you authority to draw to the value of ten thousand pounds as you shall find occasion, and care will be taken to answer your bills. . . . .

Private.

Whitehall, 13th July 1726.

Since I wrote you mine of yesterday I have received by the post yours of the 29th June and have laid it before the King. His Majesty was indeed much surprized to find that the demand of subsidys was inserted in the advice of the chancery, and would be insisted on as absolutely necessary to procure the accession and to support Sweden after it. What you mention of Count Branca's having privately given encouragement to Count Horn to expect money on the part of France his Majesty likewise finds to be true, for Count Broglie<sup>1</sup> has received orders from his court to propose to the King the paying to Sweden, jointly with France, a summ proper to putt them on a foot to preserve themselves. This resolution in Sweden to demand, and this proposal from France to give, putts his Majesty under almost insuperable difficultys. It has never been known in England for the parliament to give subsidys to any one in time of peace, and his Majesty knows not how well to turn this matter, in order to make everything as easy as possible in this most critical conjuncture. The King sees by what you write, and by what France as well as the Swedish ministers say, that the accession will be lost, or will be of no manner of significancy, unless the Swedes have money furnished them both to putt themselves in a posture of defence and to ballance the offer of a subsidy the Czarina has made, when this matter comes to be considered in the dyett. It is very certain, in the present state of affairs, Sweden will not dare to accede unless they can defend themselves afterwards. And weak and helpless as their present condition is, without money they will not be able to make any resistance against the force of Muscovy and the interest of the duke of Holstein. Besides, the King sees how dangerous it is, not only for Sweden but even for his own kingdoms, that they should be

<sup>1</sup> French ambassador in London, otherwise Broglie.

left in so wretched and defenceless a state as easily to be overrun by the Muscovites. This appears to be their case, if they should venture to accede without being assisted with money by England and France. And if they should refuse the accession, and not care to risque those dangers that hang over them, it is most undeniable that the power of Muscovy and of the Holstein faction will soon be predominant; that as the Emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm will then take place in full force Sweden will be lost to us and our allies and will no doubt be soon so much under the influence of Muscovy, that all the dangerous schemes formed at Petersburg will then be putt in execution, to the utter ruin of Sweden and to the endangering the trade together with the peace and tranquility of these kingdoms. You know very well yourself that the true aim of the Russian armaments has been all along not so much the recovering Sleswick from Denmark as the chasing the present king of Sweden from his throne and the placing the duke of Holstein on it in a forcible and arbitrary manner. And we are very well aware what pernicious projects the court of Petersburg and the Holstein ministers have entred into from time to time in favor of the Pretender, and consequently what imminent dangers these his Majesty's dominions would be exposed to on that side, if ever the duke of Holstein by the power of Russia should make himself master of the kingdom of Sweden.

These weighty considerations have determined his Majesty to authorize you in conjunction with Count Brancas to promise the Swedes subsidies upon their finishing their accession forthwith and without delay. But whereas Count Broglie proposes that a summ should be paid the Swedes all at once, his Majesty does not like that way; for tho' France may have a view by that not to engage to be paying annual subsidies for a time unlimited, or even for the term of the treaty, yet his Majesty is more afraid that this money, given all at one time, may be misapplied, and that then we may be drawn into further expences to support them, when our first charges are misspent and lost. Therefore, when you consent to give subsidies, the King's thoughts are that you should tell them plainly that if his Majesty goes out of his way so much for the love of Sweden, as to give the subsidies in time of peace, he expects the money should be applied so that in the first place it shall not be expected that he should send a fleet into the Baltick next year, unless the Czarina, in resentment of Sweden's joining

with the two crowns, should actually declare warr against that crown, and, in the next that they do enter into a concert with Denmark for their mutual defence. Such a concert heartily made, and the money they shall receive from England and France being rightly laid out, will putt them in an independent state and enable them to defend themselves. I shall not say anything more to you about Denmark, having formerly spoke upon that head when I sent you the King's thoughts upon the use Sweden ought to make of the coming of the King's fleet. His Majesty likewise thinks it proper to mention another inducement for his giving these subsidies in so extraordinary a manner, that is, that Sweden should engage, as the landgrave of Hesse Cassell has done, to furnish the King and France with a body of 12/m men, as often as any case of the treaty of Hanover shall require it, during the time the subsidies are paid ; on condition these 12/m men, when they shall be demanded, be paid by England and France on the foot of Dutch pay. This stipulation can be no ways burthensome or uneasy to Sweden, since they have an army of between 40/m and 50/m men always ready and will not be obliged to raise the most part, as the landgrave is fain to do ; and as the kingdom will be putt to no charge the officers and soldiers will certainly be glad to find their account in serving upon Dutch pay, should there be occasion for them.

If Count Horn and the commissioners give you and Count Brancas reasonable satisfaction on these particulars, his Majesty gives you leave to promise that he will on his part pay the summ of fifty thousand pounds per annum to Sweden for three years successively ; that the first fifty thousand pounds shall be paid in the month of January next, after the accession is intirely finished ; and that the rest shall be paid yearly during the term of three years ; and you may accordingly enter, jointly with Count Brancas, into an article for that purpose.

The King thinks it proper likewise that you should take care that you and Count Brancas may be informed how the money will be laid out and see that it is employed, as intended, to the putting the kingdom in a posture of defence ; and in three years time at least his Majesty hopes, with this assistance, Sweden will gather so much strength, and be so well prepared by their own force and the measures they may take with Denmark, as to stand in need of no further support. France, we hope, will do something more than his Majesty can do, as it is reasonable they should, we having

already been at such vast charges to send a fleet this year to cover Sweden and give them time to provide for themselves and save their government from intire destruction and ruin.

His Majesty observes by Count Broglio's orders that France would have a secret article added to the accession to our treaty, that the ratification of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm should in no wise prejudice or derogate from their engagements with us. This the French court think ought to be annexed as a condition to the giving the subsidies. But the King is of opinion that such an article is neither very necessary nor very usefull; however, if it can be obtained without difficulty there can be no harm in it.

Wee find likewise by Count Broglio that France is very indifferent whether Sweden accedes to the 2d and 3d separate articles, as desiring rather to treat with them as an independent kingdom than as being in any wise subject to the Emperor and Empire. And if Count Brancas is instructed in that manner the King has no manner of difficulty in dropping those two articles, which were made at the earnest instance of France without any desire on the part of his Majesty or any notion of the use and significancy of them.

Upon the whole I must acquaint you that as the Swedes have departed from the point of Spain and Italy, as being inconsistent with their former alliances, so the King expects they should likewise drop any exception of the Ostend business, as being on the same foot, when their guaranty is confined to Europe only; and when the accession is agreed to be made in this manner, and you come to form the article concerning subsidies jointly with Count Brancas, it is not his Majesty's intention that the not sending our fleet, or the putting themselves in a posture of defence, or their entring into measures with Denmark, should be made part of the article. You should only press those things upon them as reasonable and as necessary for their own safety and advantage. But the King would have you use your utmost endeavors that the promise of holding ready the 12/m men upon the conditions above mentioned should be inserted, which will have a very good effect here and elsewhere to make the article to be much the better relished by the parliament and can bring no inconvenience upon Sweden; as being likely either never to be wanted or to be well paid when they are. His Majesty makes no question but Count Brancas will be empowered

to give as great a subsidy at least, if not more ; and therefore you will take care not to sign such an article, unless France be at least upon an equal foot with us.

Whitehall, 12 August 1726.

As I had only by last post a short letter from you of the 27th July, acknowledging the receipt of my dispatches by Du Commun and referring to what Mottram should bring, who is not yet arrived, I am under a great uncertainty what to say to you upon the state of our affairs in Sweden. The letters which General Diemar received from Monsieur Törne of the 27 July and communicated to me gave me a good deal of uneasiness, they being in a most lamenting strain upon the demand of the 12/m men as a condition for granting the subsidys, which would be attended with such difficulties as could not but disappoint the finishing their accession before the dyet, which was their design ; besides that you said nothing of your having money for secret service, which put them under great agonys as to the management of the dyet when it met, their adversaries pretending to be well supported and seeming flushed with hopes of doing great matters with that assembly. As I knew nothing of what you had done or said upon your receiving my letter of the 13th of last month I could not be without some pain upon seeing the desponding style in which Mo<sup>r</sup> Törne wrote ; however I did not let either General Diemar or Baron Sparre perceive it, but told them they were very unreasonable to expect subsidys without giving us the name of having such a small body of forces at our command ; however, they might be sure that if in other respects they agreed to the accession in a right and a reasonable manner the King would not insist upon what was proposed about the troops. And I persuade myself that you will not have insisted upon the article of the 12/m men, if you found it likely to meet with those difficultys Mo<sup>r</sup> Törne expresses, since my first letter upon that head *only directs you to use your best endeavors for that purpose*, without making it a condition not to be departed from, and in my letter of the 5th of August I have told you that the King would rather have it let fall than hinder the accession by it.

As to the money to be employed in secret service you had formerly a power to draw for £10,000, and since that his Majesty, being sensible that you never put him to any unnecessary expence, has

authorised you to draw for as much more, and even for whatever you shall judge to be necessary for that service ; so that you are effectually enabled to do all that can be desired on that head, and with the £20,000 Count Brancas is supplied with from France you will be in a condition to go beyond the utmost you ever mentioned, which was thirty thousand pounds.

As you are clearly instructed upon these essential points the King hopes all difficulties will be got over and that the accession will be signed before the dyet, which Mo<sup>r</sup> Törne assures was always their earnest desire, as looking upon it to be much easier to get the dyet to approve the convention when signed than to bring them to settle and determine the several particulars, if they should be left open and unfinished at their meeting. However, should it happen that the accession cannot possibly be wholly got through before the dyet is assembled, his Majesty is always of opinion that we should go on and do our utmost, and not give over our pursuit of the accession on account of the delays and discouragements we have met with.

Count Broglie has communicated to me a letter he received from Mo<sup>r</sup> de Morville, of which I send, enclosed to Lord Glenorchy, you a copy. It contains the thoughts of France, how Count Brancas should endeavor to prevent jealousies in Sweden on account of the ambassador they are sending to Copenhagen and of the measures it will be supposed we are concerting with Denmarke. The King thinks it very proper that you should joyn with Count Brancas in curing the Swedes of any suspicions they may conceive upon that subject, and in giving them right notions of the good intentions of the two crowns.

I have formerly given you some hints of our having under consideration a concert with Denmarke, and now I send you a copy of the convention and of the separate and secret articles, as they are settled between us and France and as they will be offered jointly by the ministers of the two crowns to Denmarke, who we hope will not refuse them ; these I entrust to you in the greatest confidence, not that they should be communicated to any one but that being master of the whole you may with more positiveness and assurance let Count Horn, and such as it shall be necessary to inform, know that you are sure that the whole tenour of our negotiation with Denmark will be for the good and security of Sweden itself. And you may in the strictest secrecy, if you think

proper, acquaint Count Horn with the substance of the article in favour of the duke of Holstein, which is worded so as to please and give entire satisfaction to every honest Swede.<sup>1</sup> . . . . .

Private.

Whitehall, 19 August 1726.

I have received yours of the 3d inst<sup>t</sup> and have laid it before the King, who has no new orders to send you with respect to the accession ; we have exhausted ourselves here both as to instructions for your conduct and as to the offers of subsidies and other money matters to enable you to carry your point ; and if all those means will not prove effectual we must bear our miscarriage as well as we can and labour to redress matters as conjunctures may give us opportunity. I told you by last post that Baron Sparre had out of his own caprice, without any the least foundation here for such hopes, writ to Sweden to give them encouragement to expect larger subsidys from us and from France, if they would insist upon them. But you must disabuse Count Horn as soon as you can as to that groundless insinuation, for we have both stretched farther than I ever imagined we should be able to do, and I do assure you it will be impossible on any consideration whatsoever to advance our offers.

As to what Count Horn surmises about Denmark, and his earnest desire that nothing should be done with that crown before the dyet, I have already sent you a copy of the convention as concerted between us and France, and you will be able from thence to convince the count that our measures intended to be taken with the Danish Court are not only very innocent but such as every true and honest Swede should desire, and you see how much more necessary those measures become daily even by the conduct of Sweden itself ; for the more precarious and uncertain they render their accession to our treaty, the more diligent ought we to be to secure our friends, whom we may safely depend on and by whose conjunction with us we may either bring a greater strength to Sweden, if they are inclined to concurr in our measures, or fear them and want them the less if they should, after all we have done, forsake us and fall into contrary schemes ; for I must tell you that Denmark

<sup>1</sup> This article, of which Townshend boasted (elsewhere) that it meant nothing, was inserted in the Danish convention on the insistence of France, but in the end expunged.

is a power that has forces both by sea and land, which may be put in such a posture, with much less expence than Sweden will cost, as not only to counterbalance their loss but even to make them feel their error if they should desert such good and useful friends, as we might be.

You will have found by the orders to Sir Charles Wager of the 26th of July, which Bill carried, that our admiral has sufficient authority to stay with the King's fleet in those seas as long as Count Horn seems to desire, to countenance and encourage our friends in the dyet and to hinder the Russ from bringing a terror and a constraint upon them. Thus, you see, his Majesty readily does everything in his power to make Count Horn and his friends easy and to strengthen their hands in finishing the accession. Whereas we meet with nothing but delays and discouragements and have even had publick rebukes for sending our fleet, which was so earnestly desired and pressed for. For I can put no other construction upon their telling us that they were in so strict an amity with Muscovy that they had nothing to fear from them and consequently had no need of the assistance of his Majesty's squadron. But you may be sure that the nation, who have been at such great charges to equip such a number of ships for the Baltick, will require some good reason at our hands for bringing that expence upon them; and if the accession is not done before the parliament meets, and if the dyet does not act as we expect in that business, we must be forced, as I have told you before, to discover the true motives and shew the earnest and repeated solicitations we had from Sweden to succour them in their distress and to hinder the Muscovites from coming on their coasts to compel that kingdom to follow their dictates and act as the court of Petersburg should prescribe.

To shew you what encouragement our adversarys take from the delays in the accession, what storys they spread, and what schemes they are forming to secure their own game, I send you by the King's command several letters that have come to my hands by the means you know of; they are from Count Freytag<sup>1</sup> to Mo<sup>r</sup> Palm<sup>2</sup> and to the imperial chancery and to Count Rabutin, and from Mo<sup>r</sup> Palm to Count Königsegg<sup>3</sup> at Madrid, and from the Marquis de

<sup>1</sup> Imperial envoy to Denmark and Sweden.

<sup>2</sup> Imperial minister in London.

<sup>3</sup> Imperial ambassador to Spain.

Pozobueno<sup>1</sup> to his court. These you will easily understand are communicated to you in great secrecy, but you will know how to make use of the contents and to shew Count Horn how freely Count Freytag treats his character and conduct, and what sort of methods he and his brethren employ to carry on their intrigues; for it is our misfortune to have to do with a set of opponents, who seem to have laid aside all shame and do not stick at spreading the grossest untruths, and the most notorious inventions, in order to attain their ends.

Very private.

Same date.

Since writing my other letter I have received an express from Mons<sup>r</sup> de S<sup>t</sup> Saphorin,<sup>2</sup> which brings news that the Czarina has acceded purely and simply to the treaty of Vienna. The freshest of those dispatches is dated the 15th August N.S. and says that the Emperor has engaged by that treaty to furnish the Czarina on his part, in case she should be attacked, with 30/m men, 10/m horse and 20/m footmen, and the Czarina promises on her part to assist the Emperor with 20/m foot and 15 ships of war and to use her utmost endeavors to make Sweden accede to the treaty of Vienna. The appearances of a war grow now stronger than ever, and the Emperor is endeavouring, not without hopes of success, to list all the Roman Catholick princes of the Empire in his party; and Mo<sup>r</sup> de St. Saphorin thinks that an attempt may be made, even before winter, to bring a body of Russian troops into the Empire. His Majesty would therefore have you spare no pains nor money towards compassing the Swedish accession to our alliance. The proposal for that kingdom's furnishing us a number of men in case of necessity is so advantagious, that tho' his Majesty does not intend you should insist upon it, yet I cannot but think that if it were known to the officers of the Swedish army it must be very agreeable to them. You will represent to Count Horn how highly necessary it is that all the protestant powers should unite against the views of those engaged in the treaty of Vienna, which we have too much reason to think aim at the utter extirpation of our religion. For my own part I cannot but think that every honest and sensible

<sup>1</sup> Spanish ambassador in England.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut.-General Louis-François de Pesme de Saint-Saphorin, a Swiss, British minister at Vienna.

Swede must now be for the accession, since the Czarina and the Emperor have entred into the engagements above mentioned ; for in case of a war the two crowns will, for their own immediate interest and security, be obliged to support them vigorously in the recovery of all they have lost to Muscovy. On the other hand, as the duke of Holstein is now armed with the assistance of the Czarina and the Emperor, if the Swedes should neglect the support offered them by the two crowns they must expect to be reduced to the most shameful and abject slavery to Russia ; and in case the present face of affairs should alter, and the appearances of a war vanish, contrary to all expectation, their accession to our treaty will have involved them in no burthensome or dangerous engagement but will only have rescued them from the Muscovite influence and put them upon a foot of being more masters at home, and more considered and respected in Europe, than they have been of late years ; so that in all events their accession must turn greatly to their advantage and cannot possibly lead them into any difficulties whatsoever. Upon the whole you must resolve to get, whatever it costs, the majority in the dyet, for in our present circumstances we must not lose Sweden, and you must make them accede.

Whitehall, 20 September 1726.

I must begin with congratulations and tell you that I received yesterday yours of the 7th inst. with the greatest joy and carried it to the King with more satisfaction than I have done any despatch for a long time. His Majesty was extremely pleased to see by it that Count Horn was chosen marshal of the dyet by so considerable a majority, and you will take some method, tho' you are not to have access to him your self during the sitting of the dyet, to let him know the part the King takes in the choice the States of the kingdom have made of him to be their marshal. His Majesty, who has the highest opinion of his probity abilities and zeal for the true interest of Sweden, which has so near a connexion with that of these kingdoms, was so truly sensible of the good consequences of this election that I never observed him more pleased in my life, and at the same time I may without flattery let you know that your conduct in all this affair had the King's entire approbation. If you think my compliments to Count Horn may be either proper or agreeable I desire you would let him be acquainted that no true Swede could wish him more success than I do, being persuaded

that whatever shall be done for the real interest of his country cannot but square with the good of my own, especially when the direction is in the hands of one whose honour and judgment are of so superior a degree.

The King's thoughts are bent upon having the accession finished as soon as possible. Not that his Majesty would have Count Horn pressed beyond what he judges fitting to be done, but if it could be carried on with vigour and spirit it would be very acceptable, and of peculiar use here if it were concluded in time; for tho' I told you lately that our parliament would not meet till after Christmas, yet you know of what advantage it will be to the disposition of our affairs to be assured of the accession of Sweden as soon as possible.

You will have seen by my dispatch of the 23th of August, which I sent by Gordon the messenger, what the King's sentiments were as to the managing the accession by the way of the dyet. His Majesty hopes you will be able to get it pass upon the terms therein mentioned, so that you will need no further instructions to bring that whole matter to bear according to the King's intentions.

We see that the French are fonder of having a body of troops from Sweden than we thought at first they would be; you will therefore try if it be practicable to get the article of the 12/m men agreed to. We think that if the Swedes come to judge rightly they must be pleased with such a stipulation, which will be to their advantage in point of money as well as give them an opportunity to make a figure in the world, having 12/m men in our pay, which are to be employed for the preservation of the peace of the north and of the tranquillity of all Europe. But this and all other things relating to the accession the King leaves to your conduct, of the prudence whereof his Majesty has such convincing proofs as give him perfect satisfaction.

Whitehall, 30 September 1726.

I received yesterday your's of the 14th and laid them before the King, who was very well pleased to see that the dyet goes on with that spirit that becomes a free nation and hopes they will take such a turn as will deliver them from the dependance they seem to have been under to their powerful neighbours by adhering to their truest friends, England and France.

I told you in my last that the French court was grown very

desirous of having the article of the 12/m men insisted on; and since the King finds that they continue to be more earnest than ever, and are displeas'd that we have been so yielding in that point, his Majesty would have you make use of the most warm and pressing instances, which France makes here, as an argument for your renewing that demand, which we really take to be very advantageous to Sweden. You will shew how the King, as to his own particular, was inclin'd to make the accession as easy as possible by giving up this point, because he saw it created a great deal of uneasiness among our friends; but as France appears to be very resolute, and to lay a particular stress upon having these 12/m men, his Majesty thinks Sweden would do best not to disoblige that court in this article, in which he must not refuse to joyn with them; and especially since, upon sounding of late several of the members of parliament here, we find there will be extreme difficulty in obtaining the subsidies for Sweden, unless the stipulation for the 12/m men goes along with them. You know our situation here in such cases, and how necessary it is to be able to give very solid and substantial proofs of the usefulness of a treaty in order to obtain such a summ as is designed to be given to Sweden, and the having a body of Swedish troops in readiness for our service is the only palpable argument that can justify our asking for subsidys to be given them in time of peace. . . . .

Whitehall, 28 October 1726.

Bill, the messenger, brought me on the 26th your dispatch of the 8th inst., which I laid before the King without loss of time. His Majesty was extremely well pleas'd with your account of what passes at Stockholm and with the strong hopes you give that every thing will go in the dyet in the best manner we could wish.

The King, however, was much concern'd at your apprehensions of delays, which, if not prevented, will turn both to their and our confusion, and therefore nothing must be omitted or spared to quicken the resolutions of the dyet and to bring the accession to a conclusion as soon as possible. If the instruments cannot be dispatched and sign'd before our parliament meets, so as to be laid before them when the session opens, it will be impossible to get a vote pass'd for the payment of the subsidys and a whole year may be lost, so that our hands may be tied up from assisting

Sweden in these dangerous times. You will therefore press Count Horn and all our friends in the most earnest manner by setting before them the very ill consequences of delay ; we hope the most shameful part the king of Prussia has acted will animate them and let them see how dangerous a neighbour they may have of him, as being back'd by the Emperor and the Czarina, unless by a speedy conjunction with France and England they fortify themselves against all such enterprises. And the King, upon account of the same base conduct of that prince, is more concerned now than ever in point of credit both at home and abroad to secure the accession of Sweden as soon as possible, and therefore you will leave no stone unturn'd to obtain it speedily.

I can say nothing more than I have done about Ostend, and the troops, but as to a squadron which you find will be expected next summer, provided an article be not made expressly for it I believe they can't fail of having one in the Baltick in case of need ; but it will be impossible to do it by a formal stipulation, since we shall never be able to get a squadron and subsidys to pass together in our parliament. By our convention, which we are making with Denmarke, the King will be obliged to send a squadron into the Sound upon the requisition of that crown, and our former treaty with Sweden will empower us to succour them by sea, if there be any exigency or danger that shall make it necessary. So that you see Sweden will be secure of a squadron both ways, and you may give the strongest assurances that they will not fail of having one, if needful ; but you will make them feel at the same time that the likeliest way to defeat it will be to insist on an article in form now for it.

I hope to write fuller to you by a messenger I intend to dispatch next Tuesday ; but I thought it proper not to omit giving you thus much of his Majesty's sentiments without loss of time by the post.

Whitehall, 1 November 1726.

Upon looking over again your letters of the 5th, 8th, and 12th of last month I find I have already answered the most material parts amply enough for your instruction ; but I send you this messenger chiefly to convey Monsieur Diemar's packet. He is at my brother Walpole's in Norfolk, and I wrote to him strongly to stir up all his friends in the most pressing manner to cut off all delays as much as possible and to hasten the finishing the accession with the utmost

expedition, that a whole year might not be lost by it's coming too late to ask the subsidy of the parliament, for in that case delay would be as bad almost as a refusal. I hope the General will exert himself and lay it home to his friends, and that his exhortations, with your efforts, will convince them in Sweden that the only way to draw a real and immediate use from their accession is to dispatch it and enable us to lay it in time before the parliament and procure their consent to make good the terms of it. I have likewise talked to Monsieur Diemar in so strong a manner concerning the restrictions, with which we apprehend they will clog their accession, that I persuade myself he will represent what I have said in the best light he can.

Though your dispatch of the 8th gives us the state of the accession in it's best and it's worst view, yet I think the hopes of success outbalance the fears on the other side. You give us an account of the disposition of the secret committee and of other particulars in our favour as facts and certaintys, and what you oppose to them are conjectures about delays and hard conditions, which depend chiefly upon supposing Count Horn will continue to be over-cautious and to draw as many compliances as possible from us. I hope when the count is fortified with the resolution of the dyet he will lay aside his timorousness, and a few proper insinuations in a firm but civil manner may divert him from insisting on unreasonable stipulations. I hope what I said to you in my last concerning a squadron will be sufficient on that head, and the articles concerning Ostend and a body of troops I must leave to be managed according to former instructions. . . . .

Whitehall, 28th February 1726/7.

I received this morning by Du Commun the messenger your dispatch of the 11th inst., and having laid it immediately before the King I send you by another messenger without loss of time his Majesty's sentiments upon it, that you may want no orders that are proper for finishing the great work you have in hand.

I omit speaking upon the former part of your letter for the present, and only take notice of what relates to the accession. His Majesty was extremely well pleased with the account you gave of the resolution which the secret committee was come to of acceding to our treaty, and makes no question from the several particular circumstances you recount but that you will be able now to finish

the whole in a short time. We look upon the accession of Sweden to be at this time more necessary than ever for the good of our affairs, and therefore I am perswaded you will spare no pains nor applications to bring it to a happy and a speedy conclusion.

The King has read over the paper of articles communicated to you by Chancellor Duben,<sup>1</sup> and his Majesty approves intirely the remarks you made upon them.

The project of an article No. 1, in favour of the duke of Holstein his Majesty would have you decline accepting, as you propose, if you can do it safely and without hazard of the accession, but if you find the Swedish plenipotentiarys stiffer than you expected, and resolutely determined to have an article in behalf of the duke of Holstein, you may give way to the having one, turning it as you propose upon a change of conduct in the courts of Holstein and Muscovy and leaving the satisfaction to be procured in as loose and general terms as possible. I must acquaint you that as Denmark has all along made many difficultys with respect to the article proposed to that court in favour of the duke of Holstein, France has consented to let it drop, and I expect very soon to hear that our convention is concluded at Copenhagen without any such article.

His Majesty has no objection to an article of the tenour of that marked No. 2, provided it be made reciprocal, as you suggest, and as Chancellor Duben seems to agree that it ought to be.

The secret article concerning the subsidys makes indeed a very considerable addition to the summ at first proposed by the two crowns, but rather than lose the accession his Majesty is willing to agree to pay his share; and the duke of Newcastle writes to France by the King's command to persuade that court to send the like orders to Count Brancas. You have already sufficient instructions concerning the first payment of the subsidys, and France will be pressed to empower Count Brancas likewise to concurr with you in fixing the term of that payment on their part to as short a time as possible; half yearly payments, as you intend to settle them, if you can, will certainly be easier and more convenient than advancing the whole summ at once at the beginning of the year, and I hope

<sup>1</sup> Court-chancellor Baron Joakim von Düben, reckoned by Poyntz "a very modest sensible person," neutral and generally liked, whose sister was in the queen's especial confidence and whose office came "the nearest to that of Attorney General in England and gives him a share in the transaction of several weighty affairs."

you will have no difficulty in adjusting these particulars, as you propose, in which you are left to do the best you can.

The other secret article, as it is drawn up by the Swedes, is too loose and general, especially in those expressions which you had marked, but you may very well admit of one, if you see it needful, of the purport of what you mention in your remark in the margin ; we have one of the same nature with the States General, and our concern for the safety of Sweden would not suffer us to see them overrun, while we are only employing good offices.

I have so hearty a zeal for the publick good, and am so particularly concerned in any thing that relates to you personally, that I rejoice extremely to see that you have brought this important and necessary work so near its conclusion ; I wish you all imaginable success in what remains and hope you will not fail to compleat the whole in a very short time. . . . .

Whitehall, 28th March 1727.

On Saturday in the afternoon I received your dispatches of the 8th instant, which put me in some concern as to the article which you and Count Brancas had thought fit to reject. But at night Randall the messenger brought me your's of the 11th with a copy of the additional articles agreed to, by which I found with the utmost satisfaction that the whole was perfectly well settled and that you expected to sign the accession, together with the separate articles and the secret one, in a few days, as soon as the instruments could be engrossed.

You may be sure I lost no time in laying this welcome dispatch before the King, and I can assure you I never saw his Majesty in all my life better pleased with the service of any minister than he was with your finishing this accession. His Majesty read with satisfaction all the articles and the just and solid account you give of them in your letter, and in saying he did not find one word in them, that he desired to be altered, commanded me to signify to you in a particular manner that all you had done met with his intire approbation. Upon which I most heartily wish you all possible joy and congratulate this happy conclusion of your long and most important negotiation.

We shall now expect with impatience the arrival of M<sup>r</sup> Zolman <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Poyntz's secretary.

with the instruments signed, and no time shall be lost then in getting the King's ratification dispatched, in order to be exchanged with those of Sweden, which we understand that Baron Sparre will bring with him. We shall likewise prepare the money to be ready to be paid according to the secret article immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, and our friends in Sweden may depend upon it that the King will punctually make good the payments as promised, and exactly fulfil all the engagements of this treaty.

In making his Majesty's compliments to the king of Sweden on this occasion you will let him know that we have a good squadron of ships in a manner ready to sail to the Baltick, if his Majesty and the kingdom of Sweden find themselves in any want of such an assistance; the King our master is resolved as a good and faithful ally not only to perform religiously all that he has stipulated but even to prevent the desires of Sweden, where his Majesty thinks their safety is concerned. You will, therefore, mention this point as an instance of great friendship in the King, who is desirous to be informed of the necessities of Sweden and to do them all the service in his power, and let me know their sentiments. The squadron will be ready to sail in a fortnight or three weeks at farthest.

Now Sweden has acceded his Majesty would be glad to see them put themselves in a posture to be as secure themselves, and to be as useful to their friends, as possible. His Majesty thinks that a good body of their troops in Stralsund and Pomerania would be as serviceable to that end as any other measure whatsoever. The king of Prussia is far from acting a right part towards our allyance and daily grows more and more suspicious in his conduct, being capable of being hurried by the intrigues of Vienna and Petersbourg into very dangerous projects; but nothing would check his career sooner, nor make him more cautious in engaging too deeply with the Emperor and the Czarina, than the seeing a body of Swedish forces in Pomerania. This we believe they may be likewise very sensible of in Sweden, but as our treaty is young, and we should not terrify our new friends with dangers nor ruffle them with quick demands, you will insinuate this notion gently and in a dextrous manner, as from yourself alone and as your own way of thinking for the advantage of Sweden and for the security of that most necessary part of their territories, Pomerania, on which the king of Prussia has long and often cast a greedy eye. . . . .

Whitehall, 12 May 1727.

I received the 10th, by Parry, your letters of the 24th of April with the several curious papers inclosed and have laid them all before the King. His Majesty was extremely well pleased with the exact accounts you sent of all affairs relating to your province, and thinks you did very right in talking with Count Horn as you did on the subject of our fleet. You will have already had a copy of Sir John Norris's instructions, and before this comes to your hands will have heard that he has arrived at Copenhagen. Whether the secret committee shall have applied for the coming of a squadron, or no, you will judge best how to make the greatest merit you can of the King's most friendly attention to the welfare of Sweden to have a fleet early in the Baltick, in order to succour that kingdom upon any emergency; for though the admiral is appointed to go by Copenhagen, yet you will have seen by his instructions that he will be at your call if the Swedes think it necessary for their service. He was not sent directly to the coasts of Sweden, because we did not know how welcome he might be there, and the reception of our fleet last year might very well make us somewhat cautious at present; but we are glad to see the language is changed and that we may be owned publickly to be seasonable and useful allies.

The King would not be sorry to see the Swedes become solicitors with respect to bringing Prussia to reason, and, if that be their great bent, you will inquire privately what methods they will propose to do it and what troops they will think fit to transport to Pomerania, where they must chiefly bend their force, if they design to work upon that prince's fears. Sir John Norris, you know, will be ready to give his utmost assistance, whenever the king of Sweden shall find it proper to have a body of troops transported and conveyed to Stralsund. By what we hear of the King of Prussia he is still very strongly attached to the Emperor, tho' the business of procuring Bergue and Ravenstein for him from the Elector Palatin is rather further off being brought to bear than ever. So that the violent imperialism, that still continues, seems to be the effect of some secret promises of advantage; and we cannot conjecture where his views may more probably tend than towards Swedish Pomerania. So that it is in prudence highly incumbent on them to have a strict eye to their own safety, and to the particular preservation of that province. . . . .

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SIR JOHN NORRIS, KNT., 24 APRIL 1727.

(*Record Office, F.O. King's Letters 8, British Museum Add. MS. 28146, copies.*)

[The principal instructions, of even date (*British Museum, Add. MS. 28156, original, copies as above*) concern only Denmark.]

Whereas Our good brother the king of Sweden, together with that kingdom, has acceded to the treaty concluded at Hanover the 3d day of September 1725, whereby We are by new and particular engagements obliged to defend the territorys belonging to the said crown in case of any danger that shall threaten the same ; if therefore Our trusty and wel-beloved Stephen Poyntz Esq<sup>r</sup>, Our envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Stockholm, with whom you shall constantly and regularly correspond, should acquaint you that the court of Sweden have just grounds to apprehend that any neighbouring power has formed a design to invade and attack that kingdom, and that Our good friends the Swedes do desire that you should sail with Our fleet under your command to assist in preventing the dangerous attempts of their enemies, you shall immediately comply with the desire of Our good brother, the king of Sweden, signified to you by the said Stephen Poyntz, and give them all the aid you can and endeavour to protect their coasts and to repel the attempts of their invaders.

2. As we do not apprehend that the coasts of Denmark and Sweden can both be in danger together from any naval power in the Baltick, you shall conduct your self in such manner as may best provide for the security of the territorys both of Sweden and Denmark.

3. You shall for this purpose particularly correspond with Our abovesaid minister at Stockholm, and upon your arrival in the Baltick you shall acquaint him therewith, that he may let the king of Sweden know that Our fleet under your command is ready to be employed in the defence of his kingdom, in pursuance of our engagements for that purpose, in case there be any need or any danger that requires their coming upon those coasts.

G. R.