

The question is pertinent whether Dr. Stettheimer has correctly interpreted Professor James at all points. The writer's failure to do so may be due to the fact that Professor James's views change somewhat in the course of his writing — a fact not peculiar by any means to him but found in other writers, as Kant, for instance.

Those who read this book will probably fall into two classes in their estimation of it. The followers of Professor James will hardly believe that Dr. Stettheimer has done full justice to their author; and those who have little sympathy with Professor James's doctrine will find in Dr. Stettheimer's examination and criticism a welcome confirmation of their own views. It may be asked whether it is not possible to find a certain intermediate ground where it is not necessary to reject Professor James's doctrine of defense of faith and religious beliefs because this defense is purchased at the cost of pure knowledge and objective reality. That is, is it not possible to find a position which, while maintaining the integrity of pure knowledge and an objective and universal reality, can also admit the relevancy of faith and religious beliefs? The reviewer believes that this is not impossible.

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INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Das Problem einer Charakterologie. EMIL LUCKA. Arch. f. d. ges. Psych., 1907, XI., 210-240.

Lucka divides his paper into four parts. The first part, the special psychology, is chiefly a criticism of the existing systems of differential psychology. Lucka holds that a special psychology or characterology must take the individual consciousness as a functioning organism, and must search for a basal function. All mental phenomena must be considered as a branching out of this basal function and they can be separated only by abstraction. Both the German and the American-French school of differential psychology have failed to do this. They have searched for coördinated elements instead of a basal principle. These they have attempted to fix by arbitrarily chosen mental tests, which Lucka thinks can at best give only a psychometrics, but never a psychology. No attempt is made to show a necessary relation between the elements discovered by the tests. Finally, they are satisfied with a cross-section of the psychic, neglecting the genesis entirely.

In the second part the author gives what he thinks the two aims of a characterology. The first task is to examine all the ramifications of the concrete psychic life. The second task is the classification of

everything special in the individual into his total consciousness, and then of the special individual in his place in the universal human.

The third part gives the methods of a characterology. The first aim is to see the psychic life in its whole complexity. Life may be studied in biography, reports of ethnology, results of folk psychology, in the psychological analyses of our great poets, etc., above all however by direct observation, provided the observer has the faculty of sympathetic insight. Experiment might be valuable, but until now it has failed to bring useful results. Lucka recognizes the difficulty of this method, as it requires a peculiar faculty on the part of the observer, and because no degree of exactness can be reached through it.

In the last part the author gives a brief sketch for the founding of a systematic characterology.

Consciousness draws all its material from the objective world, but the individual mind determines what is taken, in what form it is taken, with what intensity the new is assimilated with the already existing, and finally what further becomes of the contents thus taken in the individual consciousness. These must always be functional movements as the content of consciousness grows out of functions.

The inner structure of the concrete consciousness reveals itself in every act (*a*) by its position to the environment, (*b*) by the inner psychic processes. The horizontal organization, showing what relation the individual consciousness can take to the environment and to its own content, gives two possibilities: (1) The relation may be direct, the reaction following the stimulus without being consciously affected by the other contents of consciousness; (2) the relation may be mediate. Here reflexion is placed between stimulus and reaction. The individual has contents and, besides that, he knows that he has them and how he has them.

The vertical organization shows what becomes of the material thus taken in the interweaving of the concrete consciousness. The degree of intensity of a subjective reality lies in the degree of independence from the data of the environment. The man who always acts on the spur of the moment is the lowest form of the reproductive type. He reproduces the content as well as the form of all impressions. On the other end of the scale is the man of the producing type. For him impressions are only raw material for new contents. The quantitative measure of the individual psychic value is the predominance of the power of reshaping over the power of merely preserving. The two basal functions of consciousness are memory and imagination, corresponding to the opposites, learning and experience.

In experience (Erlebnis) Lucka believes to have found the basal function domineering all other functions of the psychic life.

Character, from the functional side, is the disposition of the individual psychic organization to take impressions of the environments in a specific manner and to react upon them in a specific way, *i. e.*, the characteristic relation to the environment. Now there are two possible relations: (1) The contents of the individual consciousness may be residues of previously experienced stimulations; or (2) everything taken by the consciousness may only be the raw material for new contents. This peculiar power to create new contents is to experience, and a person possessing this power is a personality. Personality, the I or the soul, is the inner organization, one might say the *a priori* element, a function free of all material. Form is given to personality by contents coming from the external world.

In this basal function Lucka believes to have found the explanation and the basal principle for a differentiation and a classification of an individual consciousness. Through it, he believes, it is possible to reveal the innermost nature of man, his relation to the external world and his position to the general culture value.

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SUPERSTITION.

Superstition and Education: FLETCHER BASCOM DRESSLAR. University of California Publications, Vol. V., No. I., 1907, pp. 1-239.

This extensive investigation 'has to do with that mental tendency in humanity which finds satisfaction in retaining superstitions and in believing in them.' The material for the study was collected from normal-school students in California, the method employed precluding the possibility of suggestion. Students were asked to write all the superstitions they knew, and to indicate their attitude toward them by 'belief,' 'no belief,' or 'partial belief.' In all, 7,146 separate reports of superstitions were thus obtained from 875 persons, mostly young women. Of the 7,146, 44.9 per cent. were expressions of 'belief' or 'partial belief.' *Almost every person believed in at least one superstition.* Considering the source of the material, the extent of belief in superstitions is astonishing, and educationally discouraging.

The author employs *superstition* in the sense of an instinctive desire to believe in causal relations that cannot be proved to exist. Superstition exemplifies the tendency of the mind to an inertness which results in over-ready generalization, extreme respect for tradition, and