The CWE-190 vulnerability mentioned refers to an Integer Overflow or Wraparound. Let's analyze the code to understand how this vulnerability can manifest, particularly focusing on the calculation of `payload_size` at line 108.

### Step-by-Step Analysis:

1. **Submessage Length Extraction**:
   - At line 108, `payload_size` is calculated by subtracting a constant value and the value of `octetsToInlineQos` from `smh->submessageLength`.
   - `smh->submessageLength` is a value extracted from a submessage header, which is likely controlled by an external input (the incoming message).

2. **Calculation of `payload_size`**:
   - `payload_size` is computed as:
     ```cpp
     payload_size = smh->submessageLength - (RTPSMESSAGE_DATA_EXTRA_INLINEQOS_SIZE + octetsToInlineQos + inlineQosSize);
     ```
   - This calculation is intended to determine the size of the payload by accounting for other elements (like inline QoS) that are part of the submessage but not part of the payload itself.

3. **Potential for Integer Underflow**:
   - If `smh->submessageLength` is smaller than the sum of `RTPSMESSAGE_DATA_EXTRA_INLINEQOS_SIZE`, `octetsToInlineQos`, and `inlineQosSize`, then `payload_size` will underflow.
   - This underflow is a type of integer overflow where the result wraps around to a very large positive number due to the subtraction resulting in a negative value in an unsigned integer.

4. **Consequences of Underflow**:
   - The large, incorrect `payload_size` resulting from the underflow could lead to several issues:
     - **Memory Access Violations**: When this incorrect `payload_size` is used to determine buffer boundaries for operations like reading from or writing to buffers.
     - **Incorrect Logic Execution**: Functions that rely on `payload_size` for loop boundaries or conditional checks might behave unpredictably.

5. **Security Implications**:
   - An attacker could craft a message with a specific `submessageLength` to trigger this underflow, potentially leading to buffer overflow conditions, memory corruption, or other exploitable conditions.

### Conclusion:
The vulnerability arises because there is no check to ensure that `smh->submessageLength` is greater than or equal to the sum of `RTPSMESSAGE_DATA_EXTRA_INLINEQOS_SIZE`, `octetsToInlineQos`, and `inlineQosSize` before performing the subtraction. This lack of validation leads to a risk of integer underflow, which can have serious implications for the stability and security of the software.

**Recommendation**:
- Implement checks to validate that `smh->submessageLength` is sufficiently large to avoid underflow.
- Consider using safe arithmetic operations that check for overflow/underflow conditions.