Based on the provided code and the specified vulnerability (CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write) on line 3, here are five possible patches:

Patch 1:
```c
3     if (len > INT_MAX) {
4         pr_warn_once("skb push length %u exceeds INT_MAX\n", len);
5         return NULL;
6     }
```

Patch 2:
```c
3     if (unlikely(len > INT_MAX)) {
4         WARN_ONCE(1, "skb push length %u exceeds INT_MAX\n", len);
5         return skb->data;
6     }
```

Patch 3:
```c
3     len = min_t(unsigned int, len, INT_MAX);
4     DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(len == INT_MAX);
```

Patch 4:
```c
3     if (len > INT_MAX) {
4         len = INT_MAX;
5         pr_warn_once("skb push length truncated to INT_MAX\n");
6     }
```

Patch 5:
```c
1 static inline void *__skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
2 {
3     if (unlikely(len > INT_MAX))
4         return NULL;
5     
6     skb->data -= len;
7     skb->len  += len;
8     return skb->data;
9 }
```

These patches aim to address the potential integer overflow issue when `len` exceeds `INT_MAX`. They either return an error, truncate the length, or provide a warning while allowing the operation to proceed.