First, we found that several FBI employees who played critical roles in the  investigation sent political messages—some of which related directly to the Midyear  investigation—that created the appearance of bias and thereby raised questions  about the objectivity and thoroughness of the Midyear investigation. Even more  seriously, text messages between Strzok and Page pertaining to the Russia  investigation, particularly a text message from Strzok on August 8 stating “No. No  he’s not. We’ll stop it.” in response to a Page text “[Trump’s] not ever going to  become president, right? Right?!,” are not only indicative of a biased state of mind  but imply a willingness to take official action to impact a presidential candidate’s  electoral prospects. This is antithetical to the core values of the FBI and the  Department of Justice. While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence  that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific  investigative actions we reviewed in Chapter Five, the conduct by these employees  cast a cloud over the entire FBI investigation and sowed doubt about the FBI’s work  on, and its handling of, the Midyear investigation. It also called into question  Strzok’s failure in October 2016 to follow up on the Midyear-related investigative  lead discovered on the Weiner laptop. The damage caused by these employees’  actions extends far beyond the scope of the Midyear investigation and goes to the  heart of the FBI’s reputation for neutral factfinding and political independence. Second, in key moments, then Director Comey chose to deviate from the  FBI’s and the Department’s established procedures and norms and instead engaged  in his own subjective, ad hoc decisionmaking. In so doing, we found that Comey  largely based his decisions on what he believed was in the FBI’s institutional  interests and would enable him to continue to effectively lead the FBI as its  Director. While we did not find that these decisions were the result of political bias  on Comey’s part, we nevertheless concluded that by departing so clearly and  dramatically from FBI and Department norms, the decisions negatively impacted  the perception of the FBI and the Department as fair administrators of justice.  Moreover, these decisions usurped the authority of the Attorney General and upset  the well-established separation between investigative and prosecutorial functions  and the accountability principles that guide law enforcement decisions in the United  States. As we further outline in this report, there was a troubling lack of any direct,  substantive communication between Comey and then Attorney General Lynch in  advance of both Comey’s July 5 press conference and his October 28 letter to  Congress. With regard to the July 5 events, Comey affirmatively concealed his  intentions from Lynch. When he did finally call her on the morning of July 5—after  the FBI first notified the press—he told her that he was going to be speaking about  the Midyear investigation but that he would not answer any of her questions, and  would not tell her what he planned to say. During that call, Lynch did not instruct  Comey to tell her what he intended to say at the press conference. With respect to  the October 28 letter, Comey chose not to contact Lynch or then Deputy Attorney  General Yates directly; rather, he had FBI Chief of Staff Rybicki advise Yates’s  senior advisor (then PADAG Axelrod) that Comey intended to send a letter to  Congress and that Comey believed he had an obligation to do so. Given these  circumstances, Lynch and Yates concluded it would be counterproductive to speak  directly with Comey and that the most effective way to communicate their strong  opposition to Comey about his decision was to relay their views to him through  Axelrod and Rybicki. We found it extraordinary that, in advance of two such  consequential decisions, the FBI Director decided that the best course of conduct  was to not speak directly and substantively with the Attorney General about how  best to navigate these decisions and mitigate the resulting harms, and that  Comey’s decision resulted in the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General  concluding that it would be counterproductive to speak directly with the FBI  Director. This is not the first time the Department and the FBI have conducted a  politically-charged investigation, and it will not be the last. To protect the  institutions from allegations of abuse, political interference, and biased enforcement  of the law, the Department and the FBI have developed policies and practices to  guide their decisions. In the vast majority of cases, they are followed as a matter  of routine. But they are most important to follow when the stakes are the highest,  and when the pressures to divert from them—often based on well-founded concerns  and highly fraught scenarios—are the greatest. No rule, policy, or practice is  perfect, but at the same time, neither is any individual’s ability to make judgments  under pressure or in what may seem like unique circumstances. It is in these  moments—when the rationale for keeping to the ordinary course fades from view  and the temptation to make an exception is greatest—that the bedrock principles  and time-tested practices of the Department and the FBI can serve their highest  purpose. This notion was most effectively summarized for us by DAAG George  Toscas, who was the most senior career Department official involved in the daily  supervision of the Midyear investigation: One of the things that I tell people all the time, after having been in  the Department for almost 24 years now, is I stress to people and  people who work at all levels, the institution has principles and there’s   always an urge when something important or different pops up to say,  we should do it differently or those principles or those protocols you  know we should—we might want to deviate because this is so  different. But the comfort that we get as people, as lawyers, as  representatives, as employees and as an institution, the comfort we  get from those institutional policies, protocols, has, is an unbelievable  thing through whatever storm, you know whatever storm hits us,  when you are within the norm of the way the institution behaves, you  can weather any of it because you stand on the principle.  And once you deviate, even in a minor way, and you’re always going  to want to deviate. It’s always going to be something important and  some big deal that makes you think, oh let’s do this a little differently.  But once you do that, you have removed yourself from the comfort of  saying this institution has a way of doing things and then every  decision is another ad hoc decision that may be informed by our policy  and our protocol and principles, but it’s never going to be squarely  within them. There are many lessons to be learned from the Department’s and FBI’s  handling of the Midyear investigation, but among the most important is the need  for Department and FBI leadership to follow its established procedures and policies  even in its highest-profile and most challenging investigations. By adhering to  these principles and norms, the public will have greater confidence in the outcome  of the Department’s and the FBI’s decisions, and Department and FBI leaders will  better protect the interests of federal law enforcement and the dedicated  professionals who serve these institutions.