

## **Peace and Security Interventions in Africa: A new Approach to Order-maintenance?**

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### **Abstract**

*The last couple of decades have seen an upsurge of military interventions in Africa addressing issues threatening the global security agenda. Under the broad banner of the liberal peace, resilience and counter-human trafficking, these operations have aimed at strengthening states' government and security apparatus. Though the continent has historically experienced different forms of military intervention, at least quantitatively, there is an increase both in the number of interventions and of actual deployments. Several questions stem from here: if problems of security and conflict in Africa tend to be linked to issues of development and state reform, why are these issues addressed by military means? Why is Africa the most militarily targeted continent? How do these interventions relate to practices of world ordering? Following recent literature on militarism (E.g. Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, Shaw 2005), the paper argues that there is a new kind of militarism that signals, firstly, that practices of power and order-maintenance continue to rely on violence both for deterrence and for the constitution of institutions of authority; and secondly, that North-South relations rely on the distribution of force both between and within states. The paper explores this argument by following Mahmood Mamdani, focusing on the notions of patterns, practices and decentralised despotism.*

**Keywords:** militarisation of peacebuilding, militarism, decentralised despotism, coloniality, heterarchy, Mamdani, Mbembe.

### **1. Introduction**

The rise in militarised peace interventions in the African continent highlights not only a recent trend in peacebuilding, but a much larger pattern of power relations in world politics. Practices of militarised peacebuilding can be seen in increased military operations under Chapter VII, increased military deployment, and a more explicit emphasis on building the security/military apparatus of the state. United Nations (UN) deployments in Africa have grown since 2003: they average over 11,000 troops, in contrast with the 8,220 total deployment average.<sup>1</sup> 12 out of the 20 Chapter VII operations since 2003 have been in Africa.

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<sup>1</sup> All calculations done from data on DPKO, List of Past Peacekeeping Operations' and DPKO, 'Where we operate'.

This continues UN's overall historical trend, which has seen most Chapter VII operations in Africa (22 out of the total 28). The mandate of the interventions is also increasingly geared towards peace-enforcement operations, of which Mali, Central Africa Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been principal targets.<sup>2</sup> Other multilateral organisations have also significantly targeted Africa more than other regions. The European Union (EU), for instance, has deployed 8 out of 10 military operations in Africa.<sup>3</sup>

These issues reflect a heightened security agenda after September 11, from an urgency to make peacebuilding more effective, from the rise of mass social movements and uprisings challenging the established order and, contradictorily, from specific constituencies' demands to become less engaged in conflicts overseas. However, the commitment to address these issues has overall been lukewarm. A puzzle has thus become apparent. On the one hand there is an increasing reliance on military solutions to end conflict;<sup>4</sup> increased strength of the military deployment for peacebuilding missions;<sup>5</sup> and the prioritisation of the security/military apparatus of the state as the basis for strengthening the central authority and managing threats.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, there is reticence to grant sufficient budget to most of these missions.<sup>7</sup> The ultimate aim seems to be to disengage from particular conflicts and security issues, rather than to engage in them.<sup>8</sup> In general, there is a 'security first' and 'resilience' approach but without it being the result of an engaged and well thought-out strategy.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, the fact that the biggest concentration of militarised peacebuilding is in Africa reflects, in the words of Anibal Quijano, the persistence of the racialised hierarchical order inherited from colonialism and constitutes the global structure of power. Yet such military increase suggests that such structure is increasingly resting on different forms of the use of force and less so on agreed norms and values.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Karlsrud, 'The UN at War'

<sup>3</sup> EEAS, 'Military and Civilian Operations'

<sup>4</sup> James Sloan, *The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Increasingly from the 2000s. DPKO, "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet," August 31, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/archive/2017/bnote1012.pdf> Accessed 26/09/2017.

<sup>6</sup> Alejandro Bendaña, "From Peacebuilding to Statebuilding: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?," *Development* 48, no. 3 (2005): 5–15; Marta Iñiguez de Heredia, *Everyday Resistance, Peacebuilding and State-Making: Insights from Africa's World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

<sup>7</sup> S. Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>8</sup> David Chandler, "The Security–development Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign Policy,'" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10, no. 4 (2007): 362–86, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800135>.

<sup>9</sup> P. Bourbeau and C. Ryan, "Resilience, Resistance, Infrapolitics and Enmeshment," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2017; A. Juncos, "Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatist Turn?," *European Security* 26, no. 1 (2017): 1–18; S. Guzzini, "The Argument: Geopolitics for Fixing the Coordinates of Foreign Policy Identity," in *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1–7.

<sup>10</sup> Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80.

With this puzzle in mind, the question the paper poses is: if problems of security and conflict in Africa tend to be linked to issues of development and state reform, why are these issues addressed by military means? Why is Africa the most militarily targeted continent? How do these interventions relate to practices of world ordering? Following recent literature on militarism (E.g. Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, Shaw 2005), the paper argues that there is a new kind of militarism that signals, firstly, that practices of power and order-maintenance continue to rely on violence both for deterrence and for the constitution of institutions of authority; and secondly, that North-South relations rely on the distribution of force both between and within states.

The literatures on militarism and peacebuilding have looked at some of these issues but have missed the importance of linking global militarisation to peacebuilding interventions in Africa from the perspective of continuities and changes in order-maintenance practices. This is important because these practices are the fulcrum of North-South relations and the way multiple interventions take place in the African continent. Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby already note how the concepts of failed states, new wars and human security in Sub-Saharan Africa have obscured how military power has been extended to new areas.<sup>11</sup> In Stavrianakis and Selby's volume, Nicola Short explores the relationship between conflict, identity and the global political economy.<sup>12</sup> She argues that contemporary conflict resolution approaches have, on the one hand, prioritised elite actors while simultaneously racialising groups along a traditional/modern divide that has reified coercive and exploitative practices. On the other, they have securitised social relations through the use of public and private coercion, facilitating the expansion of new corporate actors in this arena. Therefore, for Short, identity is a key factor for understanding contemporary conflict and militarism, but it does not override the patterns of power relations, nor the underlying logic of capitalist accumulation.

Rita Abrahamsen has also showed how the specific politics of security around 'the securitization of underdevelopment and poverty' underpin contemporary militarism in Africa.<sup>13</sup> Studying the characteristics of contemporary militarism in Africa, she notes a wider range of actors involved, discourses and practices and a shift from order-making towards war-making. Philippe Frowd and Adam Sandor have also argued the need to understand contemporary militarism in the context of securitization, but have argued that both militarism and militarization are limited concepts in contrast with the wider range of practices and forms of violence that the concept of security accounts for.<sup>14</sup> The literature on the militarization of peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping has explored the shift to war-making but with few theoretical or empirical implications to broader aspects of militarism and power relations.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Stavrianakis and Selby, *Militarism and International Relations*.

<sup>12</sup> Short, 'Militarism, 'new wars' and the political economy of development'.

<sup>13</sup> Abrahamsen, 'The Return of the Generals'.

<sup>14</sup> Frowd and Sandor, 'Militarism and its Limits'.

<sup>15</sup> Tull, 'The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement Operations'; Sloan, 'The Militarization of Peacekeeping'.

On the flip side have been scholars that have analysed the continuation of colonial patterns in peacebuilding operations but have not addressed of militarism.

Meera Sabaratnam has been at the forefront of a decolonial critique to interventions, arguing that interventions are underpinned by ‘hierarchical historic structures of coloniality’.<sup>16</sup> She unearths how structural relations of colonial difference set the basis to study, frame and operationalise interventions. However, the role of force is implied rather than explained. This is symptomatic of the literature on the coloniality of power. Decolonial authors highlight the deep-seated legacies of colonialism to understand order, power and the persistent racialised structure of world politics.<sup>17</sup>

Simultaneously, an emerging literature has explored this issue at the global level, accounting for a general increase in militaristic and hard security approaches when addressing peace and security threats.<sup>18</sup> One of the most interesting contributions is the theorisation of militarism from a historical sociological perspective. As Martin Shaw argues, ‘[t]he core meaning of ‘militarism’ should be specified not in terms of how military practices are regarded, but how they influence social relations in general. Militarism develops not just when ideas of war are strong, but when military relations widely affect social relations and practices.’<sup>19</sup> Following this, militarism is conceived in this paper as a set of practices around the capacity to launch and absorb war. It also follows that examining the militarisation of peacebuilding entails exploring the nature of power relations between and within countries that sustain such process. It is for this reason that this paper is guided more by what the process of militarisation of peacebuilding does and how, than by why it happens.

Two approaches in particular help us making sense of this. Firstly, as just seen, from a practice theory perspective, the increasingly militarised approaches suggest both continuities and changes in how North and South countries relate to each other. Secondly, following Mahmood Mamdani, these practices can be seen as a form of decentralised despotism.<sup>20</sup> For Mamdani this describes the violent, racialised and largely indirect nature of colonial authority, that constituted North-South relations and relations within postcolonial states. More specifically, the use of force to grant states military hegemony, the focus on war-waging, and the increased military deployment, are based on racist frameworks that divide ‘proper’ and ‘deviant’ politics and perpetuate patterns of economic distribution that solidify social hierarchies. Continuities between contemporary and colonial interventions in the African continent does not suggest that nothing has changed since colonisation or that these

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<sup>16</sup> Sabaratnam, 'Decolonising Intervention', 6.

<sup>17</sup> Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power’.

<sup>18</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, *Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and Theory*, electronic book (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>19</sup> Martin Shaw, “Twenty-First Century Militarism: A Historical-Sociological Framework,” in *Militarism and International Relations*, ed. Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, electronic ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), para. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1996), ch. 1. .

interventions can be seen as purely Western impositions. Rather, they highlight patterns in the use of force and the contemporary constitution of African states.

Several clarifications are mandatory before proceeding. Firstly, militarism and the use of force are related but they are not the same thing. In this paper, militarism is understood as a set of practices that foster societies' capacity to launch and absorb war through the use of the military and the military-security apparatus of the state. Force is therefore a prominent aspect of militarism but not the only one. Secondly, the article historicises interventions and highlights elements that represent patterns of power relations that contemporary peacebuilding interventions represent. In so doing this paper does not portray a picture of 'the West' vs. 'Africa' or of 'Africa as a country' with no diversity and variance. In fact, militarised practices are just as acclaimed in the Global South and in the North.

The paper proceeds as follows, it first offers some relevant data; secondly it outlines the theoretical framework following practice theory and Mamdani; thirdly, it briefly examines the case of the DRC, which exposes how militarised peacebuilding has propped up the state, enforced a political agenda and counteracted resistance to state authority. The paper finally concludes that actual military violence plays a significant role in producing contemporary power dynamics and modes of social ordering in the postcolony.

## **2. Overview of a puzzle**

As already noted, there is contradictory data in terms of a consolidated trend that increasingly relies on the military for the purpose of ending conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, and the extent to which donor states are committed financially to such goals. In this section I provide some of the data so far gathered to make sense of that puzzle.

### *Militarising peace*

The militarisation of peacebuilding is seen from several indicators including the means used, and the goals of the peacebuilding missions. Examining some tables and graphs from UN operations sheds light into the extent this process is happening.<sup>21</sup> Most of what is shown below compares the 1991-2002 period to the 2003-2017. The cut off date comes precisely from noting a peak from 2003 onwards. This is despite the fact that during the 1991-2002 period more missions were authorised in less years than during 2003-2017 (39 in 11 years vs 22 in 14 years).

Looking at the number of operations authorised under Chapter VII, Tables 1 and 2 below show an increase from 2003 onwards. Between 1991 and 2002, 14 out of 39 missions were authorised under a Chapter VII mandate (that is a 35.8%). From 2003 until 2017, there have been 14 out of 22 operations with a Chapter VII mandate (that is 63.6%). This is in line with the process of the militarisation of peacekeeping that James Sloan talks about. Studying the

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<sup>21</sup> The data here is just from 1991 onwards to simplify the data and to avoid Cold War dynamics. Please note all data here is self-gathered and self-calculated.

qualitative aspects of the mandate and the actual engagement of the missions, he notes that missions have been given authorisation to use force beyond self-defence more often, betraying the three original principles (impartiality, force only in self-defence and consent of country).<sup>22</sup>

The increasing reliance on Chapter VII operations and the use of force beyond self-defence is tantamount to the increase in peace-enforcement operations. As it is well known, the renewed commitment to collective security mechanisms after the Cold War did not diminish the use of military force. In fact, there was an initial hype in military humanitarian interventions in the early 1990s to then retreat after the defeats in Somalia and Bosnia. Peace-enforcement follows that trend and it is not until the early 2000s that the return to ‘robust’ peacekeeping takes place. Yet, as discussed in more detail below, this ‘redeployment’ starts to happen more often through regional organisations. Already in the late 1990s there are three missions that seem to turn the trend, including the authorisation of a 50,000-strong NATO-led operation in Kosovo; in Sierra Leone, UN peacekeeping troops fight alongside government troops to defeat a new offensive from the RUF in 2000 under a new ‘robust’ mandate; similarly, peacekeeping troops were authorised to use force against the threat of militias in East Timor.

Since the early 2000s, authorisation for peace-enforcement operations, generally through regional organisations or third states, becomes a norm. This is the case of French Operation Licorne and ECOFOR in the Ivory Coast in 2003. In Haiti, since 2004, not only MINUSTAH took an active role against so-called gangs, as Lemay-Hébert notes, the autocratic and militarized political system, legated by colonialism has been maintained after independence and reproduced in the dynamics of the different UN interventions, effectively ‘us[ing] a military solution to what is fundamentally a social problem, anchored in profound social, economic and cultural inequalities.’<sup>23</sup> In 2013 in the DRC, the authorisation of the Intervention Brigade signalled a consolidated trend in terms of the renewed commitment to enforce peace.

This commitment has also been reflected in an increase in the military deployment. Table 3 shows the ebbs and flow of the peacekeeping history in post-Cold War years but reflects an upward trend in number of troops deployed. Taking out the missions of Somalia (28,000 troops) and Bosnia (38,599 troops), deployments have grown significantly since the early 2000s. Since 2003, operations have averaged 8,220 troops per mission in contrast with the previous 38 missions between 1991-2002, whose average is 4,161. Taking out the deployments of Bosnia and Somalia, the average goes down to 2,602 troops. Whereas in the 1991-2002 period there is a tendency, with exceptions, to have an initial deployment that ranges from just a few hundreds to about 3,000-5,000 troops, in the 2003-2017 period, initial deployment has tended to be above 15,000 troops and only 4 operations out of the 14 under Chapter VII have had a deployment of less than 5,000 troops.

The goals of peacebuilding also signal a militarisation. The focus on ‘stabilisation’ in the last decade shows that peacebuilding concerns the reinforcement of the state apparatus, and

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<sup>22</sup> Sloan, *The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century*.

<sup>23</sup> Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, “Resistance in the Time of Cholera: The Limits of Stabilization through Securitization in Haiti,” *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 2 (2014): 204.

particularly its security and military capacity.<sup>24</sup> The turn to counter-insurgency operations also highlights a turn from a civilian to a military ethos in peacebuilding missions. Peacebuilding is now concerned with the capacity of societies to discipline and absorb war, and relies on violence both for deterrence and for the constitution of political authority. The launching of military operations on the part or on behalf of the UN aims by and large to grant the monopoly of the means of violence to the state and to support state armies to be able to secure themselves. This is the more urgent priority, over negotiation and mediation with armed groups, which are generally depoliticised, seen as greedy, irrational or evil, and cannot guarantee the foundation of a secured state.

### *A committed undertaking?*

However, despite the fact that all the above signals a renewed commitment both politically and financially to ‘robust’ and forceful peacebuilding, militarisation rather signals an attempt to disengage from conflicts and areas of conflict, and to making the states concerned and their militaries more self-reliable. Looked at from the perspective of the financial commitment and the operationalization, military operations seem rather improvised and not well thought-out. If anything, there is a clear preference to delegate peace and security enforcement to regional organisations and third states.

If taking again the UN missions, it is undeniable that increasing strength and increasing use of military solutions to seek peace entails more budget commitments. However, as it has been widely studied, authorisation and operationalization of a peace operation is a highly politicised process, generally under resourced and with multiple transversal and contradictory political agendas.<sup>25</sup> For instance, despite a common agreement among the UNSC on the need to act robustly in the Central African Republic after it suffered six mutinies 1996, the trust fund created to support the Inter-African mission that was already deployed received no contributions. More recently, despite the fact that the Sahel region has become a number one priority area for counter-terrorist operations and migration policies to which France has contributed 4,000 troops, it has become notable for its budget shortfalls.<sup>26</sup> To the estimated €423 million needed, only 57 so far have become available. The new European Union’s Capacity Building in support of Security and Development, which is a policy to allow the EU to grant non-lethal military support to third countries only counts with €100m.

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<sup>24</sup> For E.g. Missions in the DRC, the Central African Republic, Mali and Haiti adopted throughout the 2010s a ‘stabilisation’ focus, being renamed as Mission of Stabilisation in Congo (MONUSCO), Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH).

<sup>25</sup> Some of these have been addressed by the UN enabling the *integrated missions*, meaning ‘to have a clear chain of command and central decision-making authority from which all UN country-activities can be coordinated’. Heiner Hanggi and Vincenza Scherrer, eds., *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo* (Berlin: Lit, 2008), 8.

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-sahel/french-and-west-african-presidents-launch-sahel-force-idUSKBN19N0CS>

Additionally, there is the question of delegation. The reliance on regional organisations does not only respond to the regional organisations themselves to take up ownership of their own affairs, which is an important element, but also to the fact that security and stability are now thought-out as better served by building the military capacities of the countries affected. Thus, taking the example of the Central African Republic previously mentioned, whereas the trust fund to support an African force was left empty, this did not stop the UNSC to set up MINURCA, to which government forces were included in the fight against mutineers.

In this respect the EU was a forerunner, setting up the African Peace Facility (APF). It was created in 2003 in the spirit of multilateralism as an EU-AU agreement for the purpose of boosting the military capacity of the AU in terms of conflict prevention and has become the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU Peace and Security Cooperation. While this clearly represents EU's ambition to have a secure neighbourhood in the hands of 'reliable' African troops, the whole of the APF budget is €1.9b and 80% goes to Somalia.<sup>27</sup> The EU has displayed diminishing goals in terms of its peace and security agenda. The recent EU Global Strategy displays a much less ambitious agenda to for instance the claims under which EU CSDP strategy was born, proclaiming that 'the first line of defence will often be abroad', that the EU 'should be able to act before countries around [it] deteriorate' and that 'no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.'<sup>28</sup> It now states that the EU must contribute to: 'Responding to external conflicts/crises; Building the capacity of partners; Protecting EU citizens.'<sup>29</sup> Peacebuilding as a response to crises and prevention work as building the capacity of partners highlights the shift from the aim to promote good governed states to military-capable ones. From the UN, most of the peace-enforcement operations that have taken place since 2003 have been carried out in whole or in part by regional organisations. The latest mission authorised under Chapter VII, UNOWAS, aims to '[p]rovid[e] advice to and assist regional institutions and States to enhance their respective capacity to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular election-related instability and challenges relating to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism.'<sup>30</sup> Despite repeated statements about the importance of this region for security, funding is a matter of dispute.<sup>31</sup>

A question that this puzzle raises is why it happens. As noted in the introduction this is however something that has partly been already answered by the literature. Three main answers can be highlighted. One refers to the rise of the War on Terror, the rise of state failure and a heightened global security agenda.<sup>32</sup> For Balzacq et al, it illustrates the blurring demarcation of the police/military divide, which is simultaneously illustrative of the blurring

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<sup>27</sup> EU officer, interview, Brussels, 3/3/2017.

<sup>28</sup> EU Global Strategy. 2016b. 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' EU Commission.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> UNOWA, 'mandate' in <https://unowa.unmissions.org/mandate> 27/10/2017

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/new-400m-army-to-fight-human-traffickers-and-terrorists-faces-un-moment-of-truth>

<sup>32</sup> Dillon and Reid, *The Liberal Way of War*; Stavrianakis and Selby, *Militarism and International Relations*.



inside/outside divide.<sup>33</sup> A third answer is given by Cynthia Enloe in saying that militarism is the result of elites feeling threatened while a turn a particular kind of masculinity in everyday situations and relations.<sup>34</sup>

Not only the why question has already received attention. Additionally, as already noted, there are many voices arguing that this process does not respond to a strategic framework. The new credo of ‘resilience’ is a testament to the fact that the goals and operationalization of security and peacebuilding policy has changed, with implications to the relations between donor and receiving countries. But again, it is interesting, that what the literature on resilience is pointing out is that neither this is the product of a strategic framework but rather of much incoherent, ad-hoc and electorally-rewarding policies.<sup>35</sup> For Philipp Cunliffe the reliance on the military for the purpose of peacekeeping, mediation and other peace-related activities has jeopardised these activities with an imperial footprint, and also just made cheaper powers’ out-branching their military, security and foreign policy goals on third world countries’ peacekeeping troops.<sup>36</sup> Yet putting the two trends together does not add up to a coherent policy.

This is why this paper is more concerned with questions of what and how of militarisation and in particular, with the militarisation of peacebuilding and order maintenance practices in world politics are related in light of the half-hearted, disengaged and delegated approaches the process displays. The next section proposes a theoretical framework to address that question.

### **3. Decentralised despotism and the structure of coloniality**

The militarisation of peacebuilding may not be surprising for those who think that war and liberalism are related.<sup>37</sup> It is undeniable that at least in its origins and framework, peacebuilding has a liberal ethos. However, peacebuilding’s militarisation has more to do with the structure of coloniality than with the nature of liberalism, revealing that order-maintenance practices conflate violence, authority and race. As was noted above, following Mamdani this could be described as decentralised despotism. This may not be a novelty, precisely because it relates to patterns in world order, yet, as also noted above, it implies that there is a transition from protection-based to force-based ordering practices. This section outlines the theoretical framework of this paper. It first conceptualises militarism and militarised peacebuilding; secondly, it analyses what militarising peace does to global relations; and finally, it gives an account of how militarisation takes place identifying improvisation, delegation and racialization as characterising the process.

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<sup>33</sup> Thierry Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” in *International Studies Encyclopedia Online*, ed. Robert Denemark (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell and International Studies Association, 2010), 14.

<sup>34</sup> Enloe, *Globalization and Militarism*.

<sup>35</sup> Bourbeau and Ryan, “Resilience, Resistance, Infrapolitics and Enmeshment”; Juncos, “Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm”; Guzzini, “Introduction.”

<sup>36</sup> Cunliffe, ‘The militarization of Peacekeeping’

<sup>37</sup> Dillon and Reid, *The Liberal Way of War*; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Howard cited in Dillon paper, p. 2).

### Militarism as a practice of decentralised despotism

A sociological understanding of militarism poses that ‘militarism should be specified in terms of how military practices influence social relations.’<sup>38</sup> I would go further and argue that militarism is a set of practices that transform social relations around society’s capacity to launch and absorb war. Practices mean seeing them as forms of social interaction that are simultaneously collective, historic, discursive and material.<sup>39</sup> They are a ‘routinised type of behaviour’ including ‘forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge.’<sup>40</sup> Far from being the result of a rational design, they are rather the result of intersubjective understandings and inherited approaches.<sup>41</sup> This understanding of practices pushes us to investigate more ‘their manifestations’ than the ‘intention’ behind the use of power.<sup>42</sup>

The concept of practice has generated confusion. This paper agrees with Bueger and Gadinger that practice in IR research is not just ‘what scholars of IR always have studied’ but rather a unit of analysis that implies particular ontological, methodological and epistemological commitments.<sup>43</sup> Studying the militarisation of peacebuilding therefore involves exploring the collective practices and shared (practical) knowledges that have constituted such process and how they have simultaneously contributed to changing and maintaining social order.

The militarisation of peacebuilding has ensued from the discursive practices and knowledge around ‘state failure.’ The ‘paradigm’ of ‘state failure’ has been made possible by other interrelated practices that, as discussed below, entail a racialisation of war, peace and protection practices. The actual ‘doings’ of militarised peacebuilding can go from military intervention and military support to combat, to training in multiple skills such as public order policing, mortar firing, infantry, force organisation, sniper skills, logistics, tactical air control, and intelligence gathering.<sup>44</sup> They also include the rationales and know-hows through which these practices and skills are actually carried out.

Thus seen, these practices constitute North-South relations as a hierarchical relationship based on force and race. They are not just a *modus operandi*, but ways of exercising power in an unaccountable manner. This realisation is not surprising to those who have already explored

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<sup>38</sup> Shaw, “Twenty-First Century Militarism,” para. 2.

<sup>39</sup> Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” 2.

<sup>40</sup> Andreas Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 2 (2002): 249.

<sup>41</sup> Balzacq et al., “Security Practices,” 3.

<sup>42</sup> Balzacq et al., 3.

<sup>43</sup> Ringmar cited in Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, “The Play of International Practice,” *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (2015): 450. Bueger and Gadinger go on to argue that this implies ‘a rejection of methodological individualism, a thoroughly performative understanding of the world, the adoption of an interpretive methodology, and an understanding of science as one cultural domain among others.’ (Ibid.)

<sup>44</sup> Cf. European Union, *CSDP annual report*, 2016, EEAS: Brussels. p. 4-5.

race and racism in International Relations and in peacebuilding more specifically.<sup>45</sup> The point here is to contribute to this literature with an analysis of the role of actual physical violence or the threat of. This is particularly well captured by Mahmood Mamdani's concept of decentralised despotism.

For Mamdani, the colonial state was defined by a bifurcated formula that merged 'two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority.'<sup>46</sup> It implied the creation of Native authorities, which were instrumental for land dispossession and land administration, for the administration of discipline and justice and for any productive and order-maintenance colonial requirements.<sup>47</sup> Ruling was done over a 'racially defined citizenry' with 'extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice' and against subjects that resisted both customary authorities and the racism in civil society.<sup>48</sup> Mamdani does not discount elements of direct rule, but takes as a fact that '[e]verywhere, the local apparatus of the colonial state was organized either on an ethnic or on a religious basis.'<sup>49</sup> Governing through customary and religious institutions, whether precolonial or not, transformed the nature of those intermediaries, especially customary authority. 'Native Authority' created a regime of 'decentralized despotism' that not only was unaccountable and authoritarian, it also made force, authority, production and race an indivisible system of rule. As he states:

So long as the use of force could be passed off as customary it was considered legitimate, and — to complete the tautology — force decreed by a customary authority was naturally regarded as customary. No wonder that when force was needed to implement development measures on reluctant peasants, its use was restricted to Native Authorities as much as possible. In the language of power, custom came to be the name of force. It was the halo around the regime of decentralized despotism.<sup>50</sup>

Paraphrasing the statement in the context of peacebuilding, when force is used in the name of security, order and peace aims to be regarded as legitimate, and when force is needed to implement any security or order measures, its use is placed in the hands of 'native authorities' as much as possible. In this sense, militarised peacebuilding is a form of discipline, and hence a mode of ruling, that distributes force along a racial line. The racial cleavage is crucial since it is precisely claims to inferiority about the supposed optimal level of military capacity and capacity to deal with threats and order that is triggering militarised forms of peacebuilding.

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<sup>45</sup> Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, "Confronting the Global Colour Line: An Introduction," in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line*, ed. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (London: Routledge, 2014); John M. Hobson, "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-Racist Critical IR," *Review of International Studies* 33, no. Supplement S1 (2007): 91–116; Heidi Hudson, "Decolonising Gender and Peacebuilding: Feminist Frontiers and Border Thinking in Africa," *Peacebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2016): 194–209; Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention*.

<sup>46</sup> Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 18.

<sup>47</sup> Mamdani, 23.

<sup>48</sup> Mamdani, 19.

<sup>49</sup> Mamdani, 24.

<sup>50</sup> Mamdani, 286–87.

However, class and gender, alongside race play an important role, since, to a large extent, the revolts, wars and uprisings that are the target of militarised peacebuilding have to do with unequal allocations of resources, rights and privileges across these social hierarchies.<sup>51</sup>

Grosfogel has most starkly highlighted the intersectionality of coloniality. Decentralised despotism and the coloniality of power conceptualise the nature of colonial power within and beyond colonialism. They do from different perspectives that focus either on practices or the structure of such power respectively. Quijano argues that through colonisation ‘social relations of domination were configured, where identities now based on race and the corresponding roles given in the new structure of control of labour, resources and products imposed a ‘model of colonial domination.’<sup>52</sup> Following this, Ramón Grosfoguel has argued that coloniality is heterarchy, meaning ‘an entangled articulation of multiple hierarchies, in which subjectivity and the social imaginary is not derivative but constitutive of the structures of the world-system.’<sup>53</sup> Militarised peacebuilding practices are reinforcing the coloniality of power where modes of accumulation, production, hierarchisation and order-maintenance are being disciplined through force or the threat to use it.

### Improvisation, delegation and racialization

The half-hearted approach to some aspects of this process reveal improvisation, delegation and racialization as prominent features of the militarisation of peacebuilding. These are not peculiar to this process. In fact, the improvised and delegated manner in which world politics operate as well as how social hierarchies are reproduced at the global level has been the focus of alternative accounts of order and practices in world politics from critical theory and historical sociology for a long time. Similarly, delegation is a well-entrenched practice in international relations, added to practices of mediation and shared authority.<sup>54</sup> The role of race and racial hierarchisation is something that has been studied more recently, but that has been a feature of world politics since the conquest of the American continent.<sup>55</sup>

However, examined ‘from the South’, improvisation, delegation and racialization show a bigger picture. As Jean and John Comaroff posit, ‘it is the so-called ‘Global South’ that

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<sup>51</sup> This statement does not assume that all contemporary conflicts can be solely explained by the grievances of one or more groups. To fully understand contemporary conflict requires understanding, at least, the politics of particular contexts and the ideology of the groups involved.

<sup>52</sup> Quijano, “Coloniality of Power,” 534.

<sup>53</sup> Ramón Grosfoguel, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,” *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1, no. 1 (2011): 13.

<sup>54</sup> Mark Hoffman, “Agency, Identity and Intervention,” in *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), 194–211; John MacMillan, Richard Little, and George Lawson, “The ‘Will to Order’: Intervention in the Modern World,” *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 5 (2014); Ayşe Zarakol, ed., *Hierarchies in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) (Introduction).

<sup>55</sup> Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Robbie Shilliam, eds., *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014); Quijano, “Coloniality of Power.”

affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large'.<sup>56</sup> As just seen above, delegation is part and parcel of decentralised despotism. For Mamdani, the exercise of indirect rule is the most distinctive feature of colonisation. Power is defined by force and right, giving the state a particular formula of bifurcation by which it applies direct and indirect rule under which it distributes wealth, power and rights arbitrarily. For him '[b]ehind the rigorous logic of indirect rule lay a multitude of unofficial practices, as both chiefs and district commissioners had recourse to informal means of political control, some of which were improvised, others were simply continuations of old practices in a new guise.'<sup>57</sup> In a similar manner, not all military-led peacebuilding takes place through delegated practices. France for instance has deployed 3000 troops in the Sahel. UN peacekeepers should be seen a form of direct deployment, even if decentralised, and even if to a large extent there is also a racial line between peacekeeping funders and troops. However, these practices are unaccountable to those who are targeted, they become absolute rule in that they represent a military solution to restore the status quo, and they do largely operate through delegation.

For Achille Mbembe too, the nature of rule and so of order in the postcolony reflects the relationship between violence, racialization, improvisation and delegation. For him, the 'postcolony identifies specifically a given historical trajectory—that of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonization and the violence which the colonial relationship involves.'<sup>58</sup> Racialisation and violence were intrinsically linked during colonisation, setting the basis for the constitution of colonial authority. It enacted a system of taxes, privileges and immunities attached to categories of people based on race. These systems of rule and violence were subsequently justified for the purpose of civilising and protecting natives under a self-proclaimed duty to protect. But again, rather than this signalling a coherent strategy, as Mbembe also argues, the 'postcolony is characterized by a distinctive style of political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and lack of proportion, as well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed, and put into circulation.'<sup>59</sup> For him this is linked to the fact that people 'experiment' to survive (people move around crowds, maneuver, get round or step over things, fix deals with authorities or concerned people, purchase goods, have arguments, breach the law, etc).<sup>60</sup> However, it also relates to the fact that the postcolony, and Africa in particular, has been 'an object of experimentation.' This feature has to do with the self-granted authority inherited by colonisation whereby African countries, and many other colonies, had to be brought to modernity. The policies applied to and developed towards Africa have been by and large experiments deployed with the moral and political authority that Africa had to be transformed as well as in the largely ad-hoc unthoughtful approach. Thus improvisation does not only reflect domestic politics but also the modus operandi of those who relate to Africa, and the global south in general. The cases of Bosnia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, where statebuilding was first tested are testimony to the

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<sup>56</sup> Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving Toward Africa* (London: Routledge, 2012), 1.

<sup>57</sup> Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy Updated Edition: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, 2nd Revised & Updated ed. edition (New York: NYU Press, 2006), 211.

<sup>58</sup> Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 102.

<sup>59</sup> Mbembe, 102.

<sup>60</sup> Mbembe, 147–48.

extent of the enterprise. Delegation is also an important feature since, for Mbembe, ‘the postcolony is also made up of a series of corporate institutions and a political machinery that, once in place, constitute a distinctive regime of violence.’<sup>61</sup> This is a feature inherited from colonisation whereby authority took the form of both direct and delegated rule through companies and individuals, which distributed symbolic and material privileges as well as violence.

This half-hearted approach could be seen as clashing with what for instance Sabaratnam calls ‘protagonismo.’ Taken from the Portuguese, what protagonismo highlights is donor’s impetus to be present and reify their importance.<sup>62</sup> In fact, they illustrate similar dynamics even if done in different ways, given by the specific context and issues (military vs. development/civilian-led peacebuilding engagements). Improvisation, delegation and racialisation do not only tell us how militarised peacebuilding is carried out, but also how it relates to long established patterns in order-maintenance practices in world politics.

#### *A final thought*

The advantages of this framework are mainly two: it characterises the nature of militarised peacebuilding, and it accounts for what it does and how. From these two perspectives, the framework then allows us to explore on the one hand, that militarised peacebuilding reproduces the structure of coloniality in a decentralised despotic manner. This is seen in that the militarisation of peacebuilding highlights sharply the relationship between modes of ruling, violence and race. On the other hand, it allows us to explore that militarised peacebuilding transform relations between and within states around their capacity to launch and absorb war. Peacebuilding is not anymore about protecting citizens from a rapacious state, it is about according military capacity to the state, even if it is rapacious, for the purpose of taming societies. The transition from a system of protection-based to one of force-based practices signals a qualitative change in the administration of discipline and hence in order-maintenance practices. The fact that this process has featured lax commitment, improvisation and delegation does not make it less significant nor does it take away the importance of its impact.

#### **4. Militarising peace and state-building in the DRC**

What follows from the analysis so far is that militarised peacebuilding in Africa is not linked to the nature of African conflicts, but also to the patterned relationship between North and South. This section applies this argument to paper the policy followed by the UN in the DRC. Though the DRC is a complex case and the UN has started to draft a strategy of withdrawal, the DRC could be seen as what Gerring calls a ‘typical’, that is a case that ‘represents the central tendency’.<sup>63</sup> In the DRC, the turn to military solutions has come since the turn to ‘stabilisation’ and the implementation of MONUSCO in 2010. With this move, the mission effectively acknowledged its role as a peace-enforcer and not as a peacekeeper. This was

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<sup>61</sup> Mbembe, 103.

<sup>62</sup> Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention*, 60–80.

<sup>63</sup> Gerring, ‘Case Study Research’.

ratified with the authorisation of the FIB in 2013, which ‘remains for the time being the only UN peace enforcement mandate since the Somalia experience in the early 1990s’.<sup>64</sup> Military force adds a coercive layer to the implementation of reforms and the authoritativeness of the state model that comes with them. It is this particular aspect that takes us back to self-acclaimed ‘right to conquest’ that gave footing to an authority constituted through force and racialisation.

### Contextualising the DRC

The layers of conflict in the DRC have been rightly described as an onion or an octopus.<sup>65</sup> At one level is the region, which sparked the conflict with the coup against Mobutu by a coalition of renegade soldiers, Rwanda and Uganda, led by long-time revolutionary leader Laurent Kabila, and supported by the US and the UK. The conflict quickly mounted with other African states involved and their allies, and especially after his allies waged war on Kabila, becoming the so-called ‘Africa’s world war’. The national layer gravitated first around Mobutu who had driven the country to one of its greatest social, political and economic crises, aided by Cold War politics, US military support, and World Bank policies of state privatization; then around Joseph Kabila, who took over after his father’s assassination, has since won two rounds of elections and is now attempting to delay elections. At another level is the conflict over entitlements and privileges based on nationality. Belgian colonial administration brought into Congo about 150,000 Rwandan and Burundian workers, granting them access to customary authority. This has been aggravated by different nationality policies demarcating who is Congolese, creating conflicts around questions of land, identity and political power. This layer has been defined as ‘local’, though clearly goes beyond it. Politically, another layer is the struggle for democratisation, which has underpinned much of Congolese history and since the 1996 war has become militarised. Resource exploitation is another layer of conflict, creating not only the means to finance much of the war-waging effort of all parties but also underpinning historic dynamics of social, political and economic inequalities. These dynamics and layers have continued until today in different shapes, to which peacebuilding interventions have contributed. Since a primary goal of conflict has been the conquest or transformation of state authority, both armed groups and peacebuilders have reinforced the link between the constitution of authority and the use of military force. Let us see more concretely how this has happened.

### Achieving state’s military dominance

Contemporary militarised peacebuilding in the DRC started most significantly with the peace-enforcement operation brought in by the EU to the situation in Ituri in 2003 and reached a tipping point with the deployment of the FIB with a peace-enforcement mandate. The UN has been crucial to maintain the DRC in one piece, to hold elections, to build infrastructure and

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<sup>64</sup> Tull, ‘The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement Operations’, 2.

<sup>65</sup> Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*; Ndaywel è Nziem, *Historia Del Congo*.

enact development programmes throughout the country, but its militarised approach is part and parcel of the continuation of violence and the entrenchment of Kabila's regime.

This militarised approach to peace has come from the main aims of granting the state the monopoly of the means of violence, restoring state authority and the persistence of conflict. From the start, MONUC and MONUSCO were tasked with protecting civilians, providing support to secure the territory and reconstituting state authority.<sup>66</sup> In overall terms, this follows from the consistent perception that state failure was at the root of conflict.<sup>67</sup> It is here where we find that peacebuilding has maintained the aim to constitute state authority in ways deemed 'modern', 'righteous' and 'appropriate' backed with military force. When in 2007 MONUC is given a more specific mandate for statebuilding, the mission is tasked with providing 'a secure environment' for the development of other civilian-conceived tasks, which in essence grants powers to enforce the political agenda of the mission. This political agenda may expose in paper historical demands by many in the DRC around democracy and development, but in practice, it has sustained the increased authoritarianism of Joseph Kabila and the continuation of economic dynamics of accumulation and dispossession. The way the UN has operated in the DRC corresponds to Rita Abrahamsen's war-making edge in intervention characterising post-cold war militarism. Order-maintenance has entailed the reification of the status-quo for the sake of building a state to fit international order, while also the transformation and by-passing of the state for the sake of implementing a liberal agenda.

Specifically, for MONUC, the restoration of state authority was the result of its task to oversee and assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement. Additionally, the very first deployment of MONUC was undertaken by Organisation of African Unity troops. This gives evidence that the failed state discourse was not only waged by interveners or Western states, but was a co-constituted discourse through which intervention was legitimised and undertaken, and through which warring parties had the opportunity to gain stakes in the government and in the army. As mentioned earlier, since 2007, Resolution 1756 gave a full statebuilding mandate with a break-down of tasks, including, democratisation, political dialogue, human rights protection, and good governance promotion. But as Tull notes, these broader goals worked more on paper than in practice. The later 'MONUSCO was uneasy with its own comprehensive approach to stabilization and de facto focused on military and technical tools to support the restoration of state authority'.<sup>68</sup> Even today, though current UN policy, as represented by a revised International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), has acknowledged that a 'technical and military approach' is insufficient, the reliance on military operations as an important aspect of the goals of the mission persist.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> E.g. the foundational resolution S/RES/1279 (1999) and subsequents -E.g. Resolution 1291 (2000) as well as MONUSCOs foundational 1925 and subsequent, e.g. 2053 and current 2409 (2018))

<sup>67</sup> Anonymised reference, ch.1.

<sup>68</sup> Tull, 'The limits of Enforcement', 13

<sup>69</sup> ISSSS, *Annual Report*, 7. ISSSS is a strategy to operationalise the goals of security and stabilisation coordinating all implicated actors, including the UN, donors, and international NGOs in the DRC.



The goals of granting military hegemony to the state has overridden the aims of democratisation, by sustaining an increasing authoritarian government that is now clinging on power even at the risk of taking the country back to a new war. The UN has not been uncritical of this, but has nevertheless continued providing ‘support to and collaboration with the FARDC within its approach to stabilization and statebuilding’.<sup>70</sup> This has been despite that, as noted by a wide number of researchers and UN reports, peace-enforcement in the DRC has been both ineffective and counterproductive.<sup>71</sup> As Tull argues, peace-enforcement has framed the conflict around a simplistic and inaccurate binary whereby ‘all armed groups’ were the principal problem and supporting the state was the solution. Such enforcement has made a blanket approach to all armed groups, not acknowledging relevant grievances and demands; it has des-incentivised the government for political negotiation and inclusiveness, it also des-incentivised an already reluctant government to take up programmes relating to SSR, rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, land conflicts, ‘accounting for surging levels of insecurity since 2014’.<sup>72</sup> That is, peace-enforcement in the DRC has ‘damaged the prospects for stabilization and long-term peace-building in eastern Congo.’<sup>73</sup> The weakening of political and economic institutions through interventions has precisely been seen as a sign of the coloniality of peace interventions.<sup>74</sup>

A pernicious consequence of these operations is the toll they have taken on civilians. The initial round of operations created by a renewed commitment to end war in 2008, which even brought cooperation between DRC-Rwanda Umoja Wetu, Kimia II and Amani Leo provoked a public outcry both inside and outside of the DRC. These operations committed human rights abuses, gender violence and provoked massive displacement. In the context of operations, Out of the 3,723 incidents reported in the first half of 2010 by UNHCR in North Kivu, 1,302 (35 per cent) were caused by FARDC, compared with 698 (19 per cent) by FDLR. para. 26. S/2010/596 Group of experts 2010 Nov). The current Sukola II operation has already created ‘massive displacement.’<sup>75</sup>

The problem is that even when military force seems to be the only possible solution to the activities of armed groups, as with the situation in the area of Beni, this is not straightforward. Due to the complex situation in the area, a report conducted by the Congo Research Group concluded that ‘MONUSCO should suspend military cooperation with the FARDC around Beni pending their own internal investigations into the massacres, FARDC complicity, and MONUSCO’s own conduct. p.4. CRG report. In fact, out of the three waves of violence, two

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<sup>70</sup> Verweijen, ‘Strange Battlefield fellows’.

<sup>71</sup> Tull, Verweijen, Vogel, Karlsrud.

<sup>72</sup> Tull, ‘The limits of Enforcement’, 15

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention*; Wai, *Epistemologies of African Conflict*, Gruffyd Jones, ‘Good governance’ and ‘state failure’.

<sup>75</sup> Stearns and Vogel. *The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo*; UNICEF ‘Humanitarian Report’

coincided with military operations, backed by MONUSCO.p. 9-10. Overall, this approach has further fuelled armed resistance.

As in other places in Africa, the state remains both the flagship of economic and social reforms that enable forms of monopolisation of power and wealth from the top. Kabila's latest grip on power, and his purposeful delay of elections in the midst of a political crisis tackled by repression, has primarily been contested on the streets. These protests, and not the record of authoritarianism and lack of commitment to a peaceful environment by Kabila is what has pushed DRC's major allies, including the EU, to enact sanctions and threaten with penalisation on aid. What this shows again is that whereas authority in a place like the DRC is shaped by the external intervening policies that strengthened the binomial state-military apparatus, such authority is subsequently shaped and tamed by the resistance such oppressive politics generate.

## **5. Conclusion: A heterarchy of militarism?**

In the course of this paper it was shown that the militarisation of peacebuilding is a fact. Since 2003, the number of chapter VII operations and the average number of troops deployed has doubled in comparison to the 1991-2002 period. Additionally, they generally tend to either enforce peace by military means or boost the military capacity of third states. While seemingly having a committed strategy to end conflict or to threaten to use force, it was also shown that since the early 2000s, missions had been carried out by third states, and that these missions did not always count with the necessary budget. On the whole, it has been argued that the practices that constitute the process of the militarisation of peacebuilding entail a transformation of social relations around the capacity for war while also signalling a continuation of practices of improvisation, delegation and racialisation that reinforce a global-colonial structure of power. These practices have come to reinforce racial, gender and class hierarchies that are noticeable both at the global and national level. This heterarchy is in itself not new but the constitutive practices of militarised peacebuilding reveal important transformations.

Martin Shaw argues that contemporary militarism manifests a transition from a mode of 'industrialised total warfare' to 'a new mode of global surveillance warfare.'<sup>76</sup> For Shaw this explains the continuous development of the potential of war in a time where there is both peace and actual fighting. While militarised peacebuilding could fit into this picture, this approach does not explain the qualitative changes in the surveillance mechanisms and targets of peacebuilding, and why the transition from total to surveillance warfare has not essentially altered the racialised hierarchy through which peacebuilding is implemented. This gap illustrates the need to bring together different conversations that have been taking place around different aspects of this process need. In general, as Sabaratnam argues, there is a need to think with rather than for the targets of intervention and to unearth the material and historical underpinnings of intervention.<sup>77</sup> Examining the role of militarism and force in this process is therefore crucial.

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<sup>76</sup> Shaw, "Twenty-First Century Militarism," para. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention*.

Peacebuilding's militarisation follows forms of racialization that set the bar for appropriate military capacity against the global south. This is despite the existence of various levels of commitments in actually carrying out military intervention and military support. This paper has seen the practices of improvisation, delegation and racialization and the analysis of the relationship between rule, authority and race as a form of decentralised despotism reinforcing a heterarchy of power. Inherited and long-term practices have been at the heart of the construction, maintenance and reinforcement of a particular structure that is now visible in the militarised practices of peacebuilding.

These continuations and reinforcements should not conceal important changes that the militarisation of peacebuilding has ensued. If the liberal peace was based on the need to tackle threats and this was conceived in large part as the authoritarian nature of third world governments, what the civilian-led agenda did was to try to restructure state-society relations around systems guided by democratic, rule of law and free-market norms (whether the basis to do this were not addressing the mistrust, inequality and structural issues these state-society relations were based on). The military-led agenda is addressing international security threats by seeking respect to authority, discipline and order from societies by force or the threat to use it. It also implies preparing societies to absorb the impact of preparing and launching war.

The paper explored the case of the DRC, arguing that it represents a wider trend in peacebuilding, and in Africa in particular. The current focus on military training to let states deal with threats and crisis themselves deepens the militarisation of state. This is a broader trend beyond peacebuilding and the UN. For instance, the EU training missions are on the rise, having gone from being just an 8% of the missions up until 2009 to being now over 69% of the missions.<sup>78</sup> The US has also been at the forefront of military training in Africa with the setting of the Africom base.<sup>79</sup> But as seen with the case in the DRC, one of the consequences of this militarised approach has been the instigation of further violence. While the FIB was able to strike a victory against the M-23, in general, UN military operations before and after the FIB, either on its own or in support of the FARDC have generated greater insecurity and protests by the civilian population. This climate of violence adds rather than reduces violence.

The impact of these transformations goes beyond peacebuilding and they should be seen in the context of the global process of militarisation. Cynthia Enloe sees that global militarisation is happening at various levels and most relevantly at the level of everyday life. It happens when 'a mother lets her son be recruited by the military, when people get excited when a jet bomber flies over a football stadium to open the football season.'<sup>80</sup> For her this has ensued at the global level based on a particular type of masculinity that has served as a model, from an increasing diffusion of military ideas particularly into popular culture, and from a proliferation of weaponry, due to states elites feeling insecure. The more state power and the global economic model is contested at the global level through the Arab and African uprisings

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<sup>78</sup> Author (anonimised).

<sup>79</sup>AFRICOM 'about' and 'Congolse Soldiers Graduate'.

<sup>80</sup> Enloe, *Globalization and Militarism*, 235–40.

and through different forms of terrorism, the more elites are turning to military responses to anything that looks like a threat. And yet, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, ‘the continuation of violence’ in places like Africa ‘is one indicator of the continuation of coloniality after the end of colonialism.’<sup>81</sup> The militarisation of peacebuilding is therefore likely to spur more violence than what is likely to curtail. We may have to agree with Hameiri that how the tension between the diffusion of state power across the globe on the one hand, and popular demands for political participation and accountability on the other, play out will be crucial to the future of peace, war and, I would argue, to the coloniality of power as a whole.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2013), 144.

<sup>82</sup> Shahar Hameiri, “The Crisis of Liberal Peacebuilding and the Future of Statebuilding,” *International Politics* 51 (2014): 318.

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