On the riddle of nature: Hobbes, Foucault and the problem of sovereignty

This is the first part of a collection that consists of three parts. It presents the problem and the approach that will be applied in part 2 and part 3. It’s posed in theoretical terms, meaning that it is about "nature" and "life" as philosophical terms, rather than about genetics or the associated technologies.

The main point of reference is the work of Michel Focuault, although there are substantial observations on Arendt and Latour. It is argued that these authors are misunderstood when seen in contrast to “the basics” of political theory, like sovereignty, the social contract, nature and so on. Instead they engaged with these concepts and they are important when applying the associated methodologies to contemporary questions of science, technology and society.

To be precise: the text begins by stating what the “riddle of nature” might be. This refers to the Frankfurt school, and it moves on to presents Foucault's work, discussing the relevance of Hobbes and Rousseau. The conclusion revolves around what Foucault called “the modern space of representation”, which is presented as a version of the "riddle of nature", or rather the conventional ideas about "the state of nature".

In other words, the problem should not be formulated in terms that aim to solve some type of issue with today's science, technology and society. Rather, it is about creating or revising the type of interpretive and comparative frame from where it becomes possible to consider engaging with today's issues. It is about creating the space from where to consider alternative ways of thinking (rather than closing them down a-priori, as is too often the norm). 

Finally, this was no different in the two chapters from 15 years ago, that this text reworks (see the introduction that precedes this chapter. The topic has not changed, nor has the approach, the method or the goal. Rather, the previous version contained many abbreviated discussions of later observations on the life sciences and related conception topics.

These have been removed, as they interfered with the text, the problem statement and were there as a compromise, reflecting institutional priorities that impose a form of tautological thinking on intellectual projects. This is the norm today, and often seen in terms of "clarity" - I disagree, it makes the underlying philosophical approach superfluous and narrowed to work that is of use to the values of a technological culture that is unwilling to consider its problems or alternative solutions. The end result is shorter, and more directly about establishin a perspective on Foucault that stands on its own (with or without its application). Nonetheless, the basic idea is the same as before, with the presentation benefiting from experience and publishing without the type of agendas attached to typical editorializing oversight.