Bergson and Plotinus on Freedom

This article deals with the concept of freedom in Bergson and in Plotinus. This concept is a central one in Bergson’s work, as he himself remarks many times: it is on this concept that he builds his thought and starting from it he interrogates the thought that precedes his. In investigating the presence of this concept in Plotinus, Bergson sees it as linked to the concept of the individuality of the soul, and to this te concept of freedom would be confined in Plotinus’ thought. What follows will question Bergson’s reading, showing that the concept of freedom in Plotinus is much more pervasive and closer to that of Bergson than Bergson himself thought. The result of this comparison will be to suggest that both philosophers understand freedom as will. Instead of closing the problem, this conclusion opens up new questions both historical and philosophical: Can the concept of will be seen as a foundational one in the history of philosophy since its Greek inception? Is will the more radical concept under which to think freedom?