

THE LATE MISS E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

MISS JONES rendered services of very high value and importance to education as Lecturer in Logic at Gerton, and subsequently as mistress of that College. She was also endeared to a large circle of friends and pupils by her rare and admirable personal character. It would require much space to do justice to her memory from these points of view. What I am here especially concerned with is her published work in Philosophy.

Miss Jones was keenly interested in all vital philosophical questions and she has written well on Ethics and Metaphysics. Logic, however, was her special subject, and it is only here that she would herself have made any claim to originality. The logical topics with which she was chiefly concerned were the import and interpretation of propositions. She did good service in insisting on the distinction between interpretation from the point of view of the speaker and that of the hearer. But her main contribution, in her own view and also in mine, is to be found in her general view of import.¹ On the threshold of Logic we are confronted by the question, What is a proposition? and this, as Miss Jones maintained, is identical with the question, "What is a significant assertion?" There is significance so far and only so far as thought is carried forward beyond its point of departure to something in some way different from this. Thus the verbal formula A is A is totally insignificant. On the other hand, mere difference is not enough to give significance. In asserting a proposition we always assert identity: to say that A is B is to say that what we distinguish as being A , is identical with something that is B . This cannot, of course, mean that differences as such are identical. Are we then to say, with many logicians, that what is asserted is "identity in difference"? But how can this be, if the differences themselves are not identical? Miss Jones holds that we ought to speak of differences within an identity rather than of identity in difference. In ordinary categorical propositions we are dealing with a complex unity, comprehending and connecting with each other, on the one hand, a character specifying this complex as the subject concerning which an assertion is made, on the other hand, a character asserted as predicate. The copula is the complex unity itself. Miss Jones further identifies the inclusive whole with "denotation" and the diverse characters which it includes with "intension". Every categorical affirmation asserts diversity of intension as included within a denotational unity. In S is P , the denotation of S and P is the same though S -ness and P -ness are diverse. As a general formula for categoricals this seems fairly satisfactory, though not entirely free from difficulty. But Miss Jones would also extend it to hypothetical and disjunctive propositions. Though she defends this position with much acuteness and ingenuity, it can hardly be said that her treatment of the question is adequate. Granting that in non-categoricals as in categoricals what is asserted is always the connexion of differences within a unity; it is not clear that this can be adequately described as a denotational unity, when the meaning of the word denotation is determined merely by the current use of it in logical text-book. Further analysis and reconstruction seem to be required. However this may be, Miss Jones was, I think, right in insisting that some explicit formula defining the most general conditions of significant assertion ought to be made fundamental in works on Logic.

¹ Most definitely formulated in her little book *A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings*, which was very appreciatively reviewed by Dr. Schiller, *MIND*, N S., vol. xxi., p. 246. Cf., *Symposium in Aristot. Soc. Proceedings*, 1914-1915, p. 353.

I have dwelt on this topic, because Miss Jones herself would have wished me to do so. Her work on other subjects than Logic, though highly competent, was expository and critical rather than constructive. In Ethics she has given a very accurate and careful account of Sidgwick's utilitarianism and an able defence of it against its critics.¹ She showed her interest in Metaphysics by her admirably accurate and lucid translation of Lotze's *Microcosmus*. I may also refer to an article on "Dr. Ward's Refutation of Dualism" as a good sample of her power of exposition and sympathetic appreciation.²

No mere reference to her published work will do justice to the service rendered by Miss Jones to philosophy within her own circle of friends and colleagues. In conversation and discussion she was in a high degree helpful and stimulating, owing to her keen and unflinching interest in philosophical questions, her candour and straight-forward simplicity, and her remarkable flashes of insight.

G. F. STOUT.

SOCIETAS SPINOZANA.

AN international society with this title and having its headquarters at The Hague was founded in 1920 in order to further the study of Spinoza's philosophy. With this object it proposes, among other things, to publish annually a journal, to be called *Chronicon Spinozanum*, containing articles, in various languages, bearing on Spinoza's teaching and life; and the first number of this journal is now ready. The editors are H. Höffding, W. Meyer, Sir F. Pollock, L. Brunschvieg and O. Gebhardt. The journal will not be on sale to the general public, but members of the society will receive it free of charge; and applications for membership are invited. Members must be approved by the Governing Body of the society and must pay an annual subscription of 10s. Application may be made to Mr. L. Roth, Exeter College, Oxford.

¹ *Proceedings of Aristot. Society*, 1903-1905.

² *MIND*, N.S., vol. ix.