

thought is rather of creating by ideals a "subjective environment" toward which the objective environment is to be shaped. This is not to make intellect instrumental to a (non-intellectual) life-process. It is rather to bend the life-process toward standards and ideals which could have no existence without intellect. Intellect, does not merely "function" by "mediating" social adaptations; it is itself a creative agent, a constituent factor in determining what the adaptation shall be. I do not mention this ambiguity because it is peculiar to Professor Ellwood's discussion. It is not infrequent, but the two interpretations mark fundamentally different views as to consciousness.

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RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology of the Religious Life. GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON.
New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. ix + 376.

The appearance of this volume in the well-known "Library of Philosophy," edited by J. H. Muirhead, is an indication of the increasing importance of the study of the psychology of religion. It is similarly significant that it is written by one so long and fruitfully devoted to experimental psychology. The book is marked by the same clearness and charm of style as the author's earlier work on *Experimental Psychology and Its Bearing upon Culture*.

More than any other treatise in its field, it has employed materials from the oriental religions. The use of Persian, Indian, Egyptian, and Chinese religious literatures is a notable extension of the general subject. The prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecy are regarded as the best sources, and these are found in the great canonical collections. Only secondary importance is attached to the introspective reports of individuals. The works of Tylor and Frazer are employed for the accounts of less civilized peoples, but the names of several recent investigators like Spencer and Gillen, Howitt, Rivers, and Dudley Kidd do not appear among the numerous references cited.

The book is analytical and descriptive. Approaching the subject in this way, religion is found to be marked by conflict, and this word conflict is the key to the book. There are four parts. The first treats in seven chapters of the conflicts in regard to feeling and emotion. Part two is concerned with the conflicts in regard to action and has five chapters. Conflicts in regard to religious thought

occupy ten chapters in the third part. The fourth part presents the "Central Forces of Religion" in chapters treating of The Idealizing Act, Change and Permanence in the Ideal, and Standards of Religion.

It is my impression that in spite of the author's caution in the introduction against allowing himself any human interest in such a study, his work would have gained in scientific clearness as well as in its grip upon the reader if he had placed the last part first and ordered all the others by it. As it stands one is indeed impressed by the variety and depth of the conflicts in religion but there seems to be no adequate statement of their source or end.

The author shows an intimate appreciation of the various moods and tempers of mankind. The reader is everywhere impressed by the range of insight and sympathy for the most divergent types, and by the remarkable skill in portraying them. Now it is indeed important to build out in this impressive way the complexity and variation of the religious consciousness, in its appreciation and contempt of self, its breadth and narrowness of sympathy, its opposition of gloom and cheer, its activity and passivity, its opposition of picture and thought, its contrasts of many gods and one, of divinity at hand and afar off. It is valuable to have an elaborate and artistic catalogue of these differences and conflicts, but the demand constantly asserts itself for simplification, and for explanation of all this variety by a view of the deep working causes.

This demand presses for expression in the author's own mind and there are many asides, as it were, in which this demand rises to the surface of his thought. These are doubtless the "lapses due to the infirmity of the flesh" for which the reader's charity is asked on page 2. Many readers will wish that the final fruitful and illuminating "lapse" which begins on page 325 had taken place in the introduction, so that everything might have been ordered by it from the first. On this last mentioned page an account of the idealizing act is begun which reveals the sources of all the conflicts of feeling, action, and thought in religious experience. A few sentences from this part will show how the author would explain the preceding conflicts. "It is a mark of human nature—though the same trait appears in life still lower—to transform its neighborhood." "The impulse to mould the facts until they more nearly conform to some inner rule and standard—to supplement them, if need be, by direct addition—appears in many different forms between idealization's infancy and its maturer years." "The completion of the observed world by adding to it that great unobserved world so real to the

religious, is therefore no anomaly." "The instinct to remodel the given fact to our satisfaction—at first to meet physical needs, but soon to meet the no less urgent need of beauty and justice and intelligibility—by this wide instinct all are moved." "The ideal is the picture of what will satisfy in fullest measure our desires."

Here, then, is the key. Man, like all sentient forms, is characterized by various desires and cravings. In the lower stages these are relatively few and primal. In the higher stages they branch and ramify under the pressure of environment and habit. Greater emphasis upon this principle would have brought the diversity of religions, and the contrasts within any single faith more completely under the solving notions of genetic and social psychology. It is surely a proper function of scientific psychology to show how the conflicts of individual and group experience stand related to the epochs of growth, to the run of attention, to the ground patterns determined by the struggle for existence, and by the pace set by the leaders and geniuses of races. A hint of this larger explanation appears on page 33 where the "intellectual vertigo and revulsion" of Buddhism with its endless transmigrations and repetitions is casually referred to the correlated "machine-like round of life." There are doubtless "types of character that are permanently magnetized in opposite ways," but it is the older static psychology which stops at that point, without inquiring into the environmental influences and other forces which have played the part of the magnets.

Religion is conceived as the supreme expression of the idealizing activity. It is well defined (page 343) as "man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest—where 'best' is used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and 'greatest' is confined to no particular religion." Therefore, "no clear line marks the transition from religion to other human activities." The Best is predominantly social (pages 337 f.) and would seemingly be regarded as primarily social but for "motives connected with high curiosity" apart from any practical interest. The author's mild dissent from recent attempts to state religion in terms of the social consciousness is seen in the following: "The reverence which men have shown the Highest has usually been, not alone because it fulfilled their social needs, but also because of its satisfaction to sensuous and æsthetic and causal and logical needs, which grow, it is true, by the mutual friction and support of men, but seem not to originate in this way nor to be part and parcel of the social feeling itself."

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