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The Populist Far Right In the EU: A convergence in immigration, climate change, and gender-related policies?

Executive Summary

This study explores the so-called populist far right parties and movements in the EU (PFRPs) and their attitudes towards selected policy domains. In the past, the PFRPs were often seen as singleissue parties with a focus on immigration. But given the PFRPs' electoral successes and the expansion of their political agendas, the question emerges of whether a broader convergence is not taking place around a larger set of issues on which these parties (and their voters) agree. This report sheds light on the relationship of the PFRPs to three such important, politically sensitive issues – immigration, climate change, and gender equality.

Our research confirms the relevance of some of these issues for the PFRPs, but the overall picture is more complex. First of all, immigration continues to serve as the key theme: the PFRPs remain 'issue owners' here, expounding very restrictive policies (9-10 on a 0-10 scale). There is little development of the PFRPs' position in time and the changes that do occur tend to be towards even greater levels of restrictiveness. Interestingly, as radical as the PFRPs often are, the positioning of some influential PFRPs overlaps with segments of other party families (Conservative, Christian Democratic and even Liberal).

Second, the PFRPs are substantially less united in terms of environmental issues and gender equality (variation in the range of 4-10 on a 0-10 scale). Even though in relation to climate change policies, the PFRPs are clustered around the 'pro-growth' end of the spectrum, they still continue to be quite dispersed. Again, no significant convergence of their positions could be detected for the studied period. In relation to gender and LGBTQ+ rights, the PFRPs also take a wide range of positions, from centrist to strongly anti-liberal. While on the whole, the PFRPs tend to exhibit rather anti-liberal political attitudes here, some Conservative and Christian Democratic parties' views are not substantially different. Again, no significant change in time was visible for the PFRPs' position regarding gender equality.

Third, beyond these three policy domains, the PFRPs' positioning and their ideological distinctiveness become gradually more prominent. This pertains in particular to Euroscepticism and the placement on the left-right scale. In terms of Euroscepticism, PFRPs are now clearly distinctive from other party families/groupings, being the only category of parties which systematically opposes further EU integration in all countries where they are present.

In terms of the placement on the left-right spectrum, the PFRPs have been gradually moving further to the right. If the data from previous years show a greater variation, by 2019 almost all PFRPs had converged towards the extreme-right end of the scale. Some differences persist if specific issues are explored (positions on public spending, taxation, social benefits, etc.). But even here, the PFRPs are moving towards the right end of the spectrum.

Fourth, our analysis of the parties and movements (the supply side) are confirmed by our analysis of the attitudes of the PFRPs' supporters (the demand side). The voters' attitudes to immigration serve as the strongest predictor of the support for the PFRPs, followed by a weaker effect of the environmental factors, with the gender attitudinal index being much less relevant.





Fifth, the three issues which we explored do not constitute a single coherent dimension. In other words, it is not self-evident that a consistent single socio-political cleavage is in the making, at least not based on the convergence around these three issue at this point in time. Instead, as with the supply side, Euroscepticism and the self-placement on the left-right spectrum corelate significantly with the support for the PFRPs. The analysis of the most recent dataset also shows that the supporters of the PFRPs are becoming more interested in politics than previously.





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1 Introduction

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Populist far right parties and movements are a rising force across the European Union (EU), as confirmed in the recent elections to the European Parliament. While media often talk about emerging transnational alliances of the PFRPs which are built around common positions of these parties around certain political issues, we lack data-based evidence about whether such a development is likely and whether a convergence of the PFRPs around specific political issues is indeed taking place. We also do not possess conclusive evidence about the motivations of those voting for the PFRPs. In particular, the question about whether their motivation is more related to socio-economic issues or whether it is rather culturally driven is yet to be answered.

This report aims at contributing to these debates by exploring the PFRPs' positioning regarding three sensitive, politically significant issues – immigration, climate change, and gender equality. These three issues were selected not only because their political relevance has been growing across the EU, but also because they can shed light on a related question of whether a potential new political cleavage might be emerging; a cleavage built around the convergence of the PFRPs toward similar positions regarding these three issues.

The PFRPs are typically defined as parties and movements exhibiting three key features: First, they are populist, which means that they argue that the society is 'ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', with the populists obviously standing on the side of the people (Mudde 2004, 543). Second and third, they are defined by a combination of nativism (the stress on and prioritization of the native segments of the society) and authoritarianism (the stress on order and strong leadership) (Mudde 2007). While the three elements – populism, nativism, and authoritarianism – do not always necessarily go hand in hand (obviously, populist far left parties also exist), the authoritarian stress on a strong leader who is directly linked to the people fits the populist argument about the corrupt elites that need to be removed from power. Additionally, in the European context, PFRPs often exhibit a fourth characteristic as well – a critical attitude toward European integration. Their Euroscepticism may range from a principled opposition to the country's EU membership to a qualified critique of some EU institutions, policies, and/or decision-making processes (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013).

But PFRPs can be particularly vocal about some other political issues. These issues may vary across national contexts, but they are always linked to the three above/mentioned characteristics. The most visible of these issues is immigration. Immigration is not a surprising topic for the PFRPs, given their stress on 'protecting' the native population from the alleged external threats. However, the relevance of immigration for the PFRPs has significantly increased in the last twenty-five years and especially in the course and the aftermath of the so-called 2015 European migration crisis. While there is substantial cross-country variation, the PFRPs typically portray immigrants as a threat, in terms of national security and in socio-economic, but also cultural terms. As a consequence, the PFRPs not only oppose pro-migration policies, but they also tend to express vocal opposition to policies promoting equality and diversity. In many national contexts, the PFRPs have served as the driving force of politicization of immigration (Braun et al. 2020), forcing other parties' adaptation and engagement with the issue as well (Hutter and Kriesi 2022, cf. Braun and Carteny 2024). The dominance of immigration as a key topic for many PFRPs is so strong that it leads to the





discussion about their classification as *issue-oriented niche parties* (van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Arzheimer 2009; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011; Vaughan 2021; Arzheimer 2018).¹

However, it is also possible to see the PFRPs not just as single-issue parties but as representatives of a deeper socio-cultural cleavage. This argument is typically derived from the 'cultural backlash' thesis, which claims that, starting in the 1980s, the growing support for post-materialist (or non-economic) values,² such as environmental protection, human rights, and gender equality, has led to the emergence of a countermovement represented by the PFRPs (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2019, Baccini and Weymouth 2021, Manunta et. al. 2024). The strength of this countermovement is explained either by the growing perceptions of economic insecurity and cultural discontent (or by a combination of both). This then leads to a sense of social marginalization, anger and deep resentment against political elites that defend the post-materialist values (Norris and Inglehart 2019, Bonikowski 2017, Georgiadou et al. 2018, Rhodes Purdy et. al 2021).

For some scholars, the transition of the PFRPs from the fringe to considerable electoral strength is thus seen as a consequence of the prioritization of socio-cultural issues (immigration being one of them) compared to the socio-economic dimensions of electoral competition (Kriesi, 2010). Within the cultural backlash thesis, the voters of the PFRPs see the elites as detached from their 'natural' (i.e. national) roots and from the real problems of the people. The liberal elites are perceived as seeking to bring about a 'cultural revolution' that replaces the traditional social and moral order with new, alien values (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The PFRPs, on the other hand, see themselves as defending the people as a national community, who fight for the traditional order and for social justice (Taggart 2004).³ In addition to the above-mentioned goals, this study will also engage with the cultural backlash thesis, especially when looking into the views of the PFRP supporters.

The research design of the report is based on the analysis of two dimensions of the PFRPs – the supply side (parties and movements) and the demand side (PFRPs' supporters). In terms of the parties' own attitudes towards the issues under study (supply side), we focus on the expert perspective on party politics in the period 2010-2019, utilizing the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (surveys from 2010, 2014 and 2019). We limit our sample to the ten member states included in the ActEU project: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain. As we are focussed on the PFRPs only (i.e. parties classified as far-right and populist by The PopuList), we study nineteen political parties in the countries listed. In terms of the empirical attitudes of PFRPs' supporters (demand side), we assess their degree of convergence on the issues under study across the different PFRPs in these countries. Through factor and regression analysis, we compare the results of two opinion polls: the European Values Survey published in 2017 and

¹ This is, however, contested. Some cross-national survey research has also shown that the success of PFRPs cannot solely be attributed to the gap that exists between the public preferences and actual immigration policies (Morales 2015).

² Regarding how a variety of attitudes on climate change (favouring eco-labelled products and services, and favouring renewable energy resources) relate to postmaterialism, see Salonen and Ahlberg (2013). On the relationship between postmaterialism and a pro-immigrant position (associated with a cosmopolitan attitude), see Davis and Davenport (1999). Finally, regarding how postmaterialist values generally relate to feminist positions, see Hayes et al (2000).

³ As discussed by Inglehart (1981, 890), post-materialists 'have a greater amount of psychic energy' to invest in more remote and long-term concerns than materialists who prioritize policies related to engaging with wars or economic crises. However, we know that the distinction might be becoming more tenuous today as some of these issues may be directly linked to pressing 'materialist' concerns (the increasing local visibility of the climate change impact, growing safety concerns among LGBTQ+ people due to rising extremism, economic worries related to migration, etc.).





the ActEU dataset from 2024 (for the former, we had to exclude Greece and Spain for methodological reasons). Our research design, including unit selection, time period and research limitations, is detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.

The report's structure is simple. First comes a literature review in which we present an overview of the current research on the PFRPs' positions regarding immigration, climate change, and gender equality. This section is divided into a separate analysis of the supply side (parties and movements) and of the demand side (supporters). Second, we present the results of our analysis of the supply side, i.e. the positions of the PFRPs on the selected policy domains. Third, we carry out a similar exercise for the demand side, looking particularly at the possible convergences of the PFRPs' voters around the three issues. This section is organized chronologically, to stress the novel developments as uncovered in the analysis of the most recent dataset (ActEU 2024). This is followed, fourth, by a short concluding summary which also indicates what policy recommendations can be drawn from our analysis.





2 State of the Art: PFRPs' positions regarding immigration, climate change, and gender equality

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This section presents a brief overview of the state of the art regarding the PFRPs and their positions regarding the three selected issues. It is divided in the supply side (with a sub-division according to the three issues) and the demand side (again, with the same sub-division).

2.1 Supply Side

While one could expect that PFRPs are important bearers of the traditionalist critique of gender equality policies, that they share nativist views of immigration, and that they deny urgent climate action, the existing literature gives diverse answers regarding the relationship of the parties toward these three issues. To show how nuanced and complex this debate is, we will present the attitudes of the PFRPs to these issues one by one.

2.1.1 Immigration

The anti-immigration stance is typically seen as the dominant feature of the PFRPs. The PFRPs often adhere to a combination of nationalist or even xenophobic positions, arguing that the state should primarily address the concerns of its native population. Non-native elements—including people, objects, and ideas—are seen as threats to the ideal homogeneous nation-state (Mudde 2007). Since the 1990s, Muslim immigration became the dominant target of the PFRPs' criticism, and the negative attitude to Islam/ism gradually replaced their traditional anti-Semitic position. In parallel, a partial shift took place in Western Europe: the new nativism is less preoccupied with race and nationality and more with civilizational, cultural, and religious identities (Kahmann 2017, 400). The shift to civilizational identities happened more slowly and to a lesser extent in Central and Eastern Europe. The PFRPs in this region thus initially showed a different pattern than their Western European counterparts, often focusing on the alleged threats emanating from ethnic minorities—such as the Roma (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Hence the link between immigration and the PFRPs used to be weaker in the post-communist part of Europe (Allen 2017).

However, a convergence between the PFRPs from the two regions of the European Union (EU) accelerated between 2015 and 2017, when the EU was confronted with the so-called 'European migration crisis'. At that time, attention to immigration increased dramatically for almost all parties throughout Europe, and Central and Eastern European PFRPs 'renewed' themselves by shifting their agendas toward anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant stances as well (Wondreys 2021). Trying to capitalize on fears stemming from large waves of refugees, as well as (uncontrolled and sustained) immigration, the PFRPs across the EU started to employ a combination of anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and anti-EU positions (Akkermann et al. 2016). Ever since then, there has been a consistent and solid relationship between more critical attitudes toward immigrants and increased Euroscepticism (Stockemer et al. 2020).

The successful exploitation of the issue by the PFRPs shifted the overall political attention to immigration, making it one of the most important issues for electoral campaigns and public debates (Abou-Chadi 2016). As a result, mainstream parties adapted to the pressure, and also started to





express more concerns about immigration (Gessler and Hunger 2022). The refugee crisis thus in a sense confirmed the proposition that the PFRPs often serve as 'issue entrepreneurs', especially as far as immigration is concerned (de Vries et al. 2012). However, while the PFRPs share a similar framing of immigrants (combining nativism with populism), they often adapt their message to the national context within which they function (Caiani and della Porta 2011).

In summary, for PFRPs, immigration is a central policy issue, and these parties exhibit a significant capacity for mobilization by portraying immigrants as a threat to cultural identity and national security. The electoral success of PFRPs is thus not solely a result of public attitudes toward immigration, but also the PFRPs' ability to actively shape public discourses on the topic.

2.1.2 Gender Equality

The existing research shows that the issue of gender equality is a highly politicized element of the agenda of the PFRPs, as they often employ strongly gendered messages and defend anti-gender ideologies (Akkerman 2015). According to Mudde (2007), however, a distinction needs to be made between parties with neo-traditional and modern-traditional approaches to the issue of gender. Neo-traditionalists aim to create a supportive environment for women to embrace motherhood and homemaking, often discouraging their participation in the workforce and supporting larger families. In contrast, modern-traditional views blend traditional values with modern ones, allowing women to pursue careers while also raising children.

In their examination of the party manifestos of PFRPs in the Netherlands and Flanders, de Lange and Mügge (2015) discover a third pattern present within some PFRPs, labelled as 'modernist.' This faction advocates for policies such as equal pay for equal work, increased labour market participation, and the promotion of economic independence through the provision of high-quality childcare facilities. De Lange and Mügge (2015) also underline that some modern and traditionalmodern agendas overlap with anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim positions. In other words, while resorting to a liberal position on women's rights, some PFRPs (especially those that emerged in the post-9/11 context) pay significantly more attention to whether the so-called Islamic values are at odds with the emancipation of LGBTQ+ and women, highlighting the harmful cultural practices such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation to advocate anti-immigration policies.

Several scholars, focusing on the West European cases of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the National Rally in France, and the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, documented that some PFRPs do embrace gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights as part of their agenda (Duina and Carson 2020). The rationale is explained in their nativist rhetoric aimed at supposedly backward societies and the migrants from them—especially Muslim ones. Through embracing gender equality and promoting LGBTQ+ rights, these parties emphasize European superiority vis-a-vis other cultures. The Austrian Freedom Party also exhibits this pattern, using 'gender equality' in an instrumental way for boundary-making and establishing 'Europeanised' nationalist narratives of the 'self' and the 'other' (Hadj-Abdou 2018). Akkerman (2015) seconds this view and argues that gender issues gained importance for this party family mainly in the domain of immigration and integration policies. Some studies also argue that the liberal defense of gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights by the PFRPs indicates their 'civilizationalist' rather than 'nationalist' character against the threat of Islam (Brubaker 2017).

When addressing specific issues within gender equality, such as 'abortion rights' or 'positive discrimination', the perspectives and stances among the PFRPs vary even more significantly (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015). The gendered opportunity structures (i.e., opportunity structures that capture the ways in which institutions and discourses engage with gender equality) also differ





nationally, leading to a variety of positions. For instance, in Sweden, where these issues are less contested, the PFRP (i.e., the SD) endorses gender and sexual equality and exploits these issues to advance a monocultural agenda. In Germany, where these issues are more contested, the PFRP (i.e., the AfD) takes a more negative stance toward the political and civic participation of women and LGBTQ+ persons (Reinhardt et al. 2023). In Central Europe, neo-traditionalist approaches are more common among the PFRPs. For instance, in Poland and Hungary that were ruled by PRFPs (PiS and Fidesz) for years, women's issues have been gradually replaced by family issues, while institutions responsible for gender equality were replaced by ones dealing with family and demographic growth (Pető and Juhász 2024, Gwiazda 2021). In these countries, attacks on LGBTQ+ rights or, among other things, gender studies programmes have also been more common.

Compared to the issue of equality between men and women, the issue of the LGBTQ+ rights are perhaps even more politicised by this party family. With the increasing public visibility of women in leadership roles within the PFRPs, such as 'Marine Le Pen (France), Pia Kjærsgaard (Denmark), Frauke Petry and Alice Weidel (Germany), Beata Szydło (Poland), Giorgia Meloni (Italy) and Siv Jensen (Norway),' as Blee (2020: 419) puts it, these parties underline the necessity 'to protect white, heterosexual women from the dominant culture, whose childbearing is essential to the future of the majority race, nation or religion.' Meanwhile, they bring forth a new framing around opposition to feminism or what they call as 'gender ideology' which represents the demands of supposedly elite feminist and LGBTQ+ groups. The PRFPs have thus (re)discovered 'gender' as a tool for conservative mobilization, which from a vote-seeking perspective, turns against a 'progressive' rights-based agenda (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021).

2.1.3 Climate Change

Recent research suggests that the PFRPs expanded the range of topics they engage with, including the climate change. The dominant branch of literature on the PFRPs' attitude towards the climate change issue suggests that in Europe, this party family is often associated with climate change denial or at least climate change scepticism (Jylhä and Hellmer 2020; Jylhä, Strimling and Rydgren 2020). Similar to their opposition to an elite-imposed 'feminist' agenda, a significant part of the anti-climate rhetoric is embedded in a broad meta-political discourse that again reflects the 'corrupt elites' vs. the 'pure people' distinction (Lockwood 2018). Climate protection is seen by the PFRPs as imposed by international elites, which are disconnected from the local context and from the problems of the local citizens. As liberal political and intellectual elites are also seen as agents of an insidious cultural change, designed to threaten the traditional social order and the economic interests of the local people, the PFRPs often combine the two elements. In addition, climate scientists and supporters are also often seen as representatives of the left-wing elites who want to limit the freedom of ordinary people (Mikecz and Boskie 2023).

In this sense, some researchers use the concept of 'environmental nativism' to refer to the PFRP ideology (Riedel 2021). It means the protection of so-called native people's interests such as their right to exploit the natural resources against foreign interventions and supranational climate change policies (ibid. 209). This situates the PFRPs as defenders of the native people and their way of life from outsider influences that aim at the elimination of their interests and replace them with a new foreign lifestyle. The agenda of these parties, therefore, includes scepticism toward climate-change policies since they reject international commitments and external interference (Forchter 2019). In addition to its ideological layer, the critical discourse of the PFRPs has an economic dimension to it as well. These parties believe that regulations aimed at reducing the human impact on the climate threaten the well-being and economic security of citizens and strengthen





international business. In this perspective, the threat affects not only individual citizens but also the economy of the state as a whole (Kuchler and Bridge 2018).

Another group of studies complicates this picture by pointing out that not all PFRPs take a negative stance towards climate protection (Oswald and Broda 2021). Based on a dataset on party positions on climate change, including 485 party manifestos (76 of which are from the PFRPs) from the 1990s to 2022 in 10 Western European countries, a recent study has found that while the PFRPs are generally less likely to speak out for climate protection than other parties, the picture is more complex (Schwörer and Fernández-García 2023). For instance, the PFRPs in Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom reject climate protection, but consider climate change as an important issue; while the PFRPs in Italy, France and Sweden address the issue and accept the necessity of acting against global warming, maintaining a low salience on the issue (ibid., 20). The specific positions of these parties thus probably vary depending on the broad political context, the consensus on climate policies, the position of the other political parties on the topic. If favourable contextual circumstances occur or there is general agreement on a solution to a given climate problem, these parties do not oppose reforms. For instance, reforms can be justified on health grounds or to maintain national 'food sovereignty' that is threatened by climate change (Huber et al. 2021).

2.2 Demand Side

Existing research offers a more nuanced understanding of the attitudes of the PFRP voters towards immigration compared to the issues of climate change and gender equality. This discrepancy is unsurprising given that PFRPs are primarily known for their anti-immigrant stance, prompting greater interest in the alignment between party policies and voter demands on this issue. However, with the increasing politicization of gender equality and climate change, new studies have begun to investigate the demand side of these issues among the PFRP voters as well.

2.2.1 Immigration

Over the past 20 years, immigration has gradually shifted from a low politics issue to a highly sensitive one. Meanwhile, the European populations, such as those in France and Germany, have become more critical of immigration over the past decade (Schain 2008, Grande, Schwarzbözl and Fatke 2018, Hutter and Kriesi 2021). The PFRPs have exploited this shift: there is evidence that PFRP voters mostly agree with these parties' nativist outlook and with their anti-immigrant sentiments. In fact, their attitudes towards immigration constitute the main motivation to vote for the PFRPs (Ivarsflaten 2008). On one side, some scholars argue that voters mostly align with the PFRPs for instrumental reasons, i.e. to protest the indifference of the mainstream parties toward the issue of immigration (Eatwell 2000). On the other, the support for the PFRPs is affected not just by the immigration policies but by the way policies interact with societal values. For instance, in Austria, those who vote for the FPÖ, tend to do so as a result of having not only nativist, but also authoritarian tendencies (Dunn 2015). Baur et al. (2016), having studied the cantons of Switzerland, also find that the interaction between immigrant integration policies and conservative values has been a significant predictor of the support for the PFRPs (the SVP in the Swiss case).

Other studies show that a recent increase in immigration predicts the vote for PFRP more strongly, and this relationship is strengthened under conditions of higher economic strain and inequality (Ramos et al. 2021). Findings from cross-sectional, cross-time and cross-level analyses further confirm that high unemployment rates predispose citizens to accept the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the PFRPs, and a low unemployment rate predisposes citizens to reject this rhetoric (Cochraine and Nevitte 2014). The bottom-line of these studies is that the anti-immigrant attitudes turn into a





support stance towards the PFRPs only when they interact with certain economic conditions. These findings are paralleled by studies that argue that individual perceptions of economic hardship and feelings of discontent with societal life are causally linked to the rise of the PFRPs. With the numbers of individuals who subjectively feel left behind increasing, the political agendas focusing on integration and immigration establish 'social envy' for those who receive the benefits from social welfare programs (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018).

2.2.2 Gender Equality

Despite a recent wave of grassroots mobilizations against gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and sex education, which vilify the term 'gender' in public debates in Europe (Korolczuk and Graff 2018), the demand side research on how gender attitudes shape support for the PFRPs is less developed. The existing scholarship mainly focuses on the differences between men and women in their support for the PFRPs, showing that the PFRPs draw more voters from men than from women. In this sense, the PFRPs are often labelled as Männerparteien, i.e. parties typically led and supported by men (Immerzeel et. al. 2015). However, there is no clear-cut answer to the question of why there is such a gender gap in supporting these parties, the dominant explanations being the differences in socio-economic positions and programmatic attitudes, most notably anti-immigration and law and order attitudes (Harteveld 2015 et al., Immerzeel et al. 2015, Spierings and Zaslove 2015).

Yet, Spierings' and Zaslove's more recent study (2017) warns that the gender gap in voting for the PFRPs should not be overestimated as it is not too large. Their study confirms the existing hypotheses that women and men differ in their attitudes towards the anti-immigration and socioeconomic positions, which partly explains the gender gap. On the other hand, when they control for these two factors, they find that women are (still) less likely to vote for the PFRPs compared to men. They explain the remaining difference through the populist attitudes that men tend to exhibit more strongly than women.⁴ According to Christley's (2022) analysis of the EVS 2017 data, individuals who endorse traditional gender roles—characterized by less support for women in education or employment—are more inclined to express support for PFRPs compared to those with egalitarian values. She further finds that holding more gender-traditional attitudes raises the probability of supporting the radical right among both nativists and non-nativists.

A recent qualitative study (Off 2023) which analyzes the gender attitudes of the voters of the AfD through interviews reveals that the PFRP voters not only vary with regard to their opposition against certain sub-issues regarding gender equality (LGBTQ+ rights, abortion rights, sex education, gender quotas) but also with regard to their reasoning of why they oppose these values. For instance, while some are against the rights of LGBTQ+ people due to religious or nationalist reasons (such as the reproduction of society), others are against it since they believe these issues are imposed by the state/elites. Another study (Off 2024), also focusing on the AfD in Germany, compares the PRFP voters' approach to immigrants (especially, people of colour), women and LGBTQ+ people. It finds similar patterns across the three, which the author calls 'intersectional cultural grievances.' According to the PRFP voters, as the study reveals, people of colour, women and LGBTQ+ people are perceived as the *most advantaged* in symbolic, material and legal ways, while (white) German cis-hetero men are perceived to be the *most disadvantaged*.

2.2.3 Climate Change

Whether or not the voters' attitudes toward climate change (especially if expressed as climate protection or climate denialism) affect their support for the PFRPs is not much explored in the literature. The research has, nevertheless, shown that the majority of individuals in rural and

⁴ In this study, populist attitudes are measured through a factor analysis of six items in which the lack of political trust and the idea that politics and people constitute opposites all load on one and the same factor.





suburban areas fear income losses and reduced purchasing power due to mainstream parties' climate change policies (Arndt et al. 2023). Therefore, one could expect such individuals to be attracted to the anti-establishment rhetoric of the PFRPs. Yet, based on the European Social Survey data, a recent study compared the voters of all party families across Europe and found that the PFRP voters are less worried about climate change than other issues in Western Europe, whereas in CEE countries, the same study did not find a consistent pattern (Fisher et al. 2022).

However, using the same data (European Social Survey) from 2016, another study came to the conclusion that the people's attitudes toward climate change are highly influenced by nationalist ideologies (such as those advocated by the PFRPs). In other words, individuals holding attitudes consistent with nationalism are more likely to be sceptical about the realities of climate change, and substantially more likely to oppose increasing taxes on fossil fuels. These inconsistent results show that it is necessary to conduct more cross-national research to understand the linkage (or the lack thereof) between the attitudes toward the climate change and the support for the PFRPs (Kulin et al. 2021).





3 The 'Supply Side' of the Representation of PFRPs in Europe: An Examination of their Positions on Climate Change, Gender Equality/LGBTQ+ Rights and Immigration

Laura Morales (CSIC) & Luis Ramiro (UNED)

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we focus on the empirical analysis of the 'supply side' of the PFRPs on key issues or policy domains, with a particular focus on their positions on (1) climate change, (2) gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights and (3) immigration.

Analysing the 'supply side' requires establishing the positions of PFRPs on these three issue/policy domains. Unlike for citizens (the 'demand side'), there is no unequivocal way to assess or measure party positions. Parties are collective actors that do not always have uniform positions regarding any given issue. Internal dissent is common and it is the very nature of party factionalism. Moreover, the positions taken by political parties can be highly complex and context-dependent.

As we discuss at greater length in the next section, given the various choices at hand, we have decided to employ data from the 1999-2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file (Jolly et al. 2022) for the period since 2010. For this study, we have opted for expert surveys as existing party manifesto data containing information on all policy domains of interest primarily focus on salience rather than position, and because strategic silence on issues that are not a competitive advantage is common among these (and other) parties. We limit our analysis to the most recent period since 2010, partly because the analysis undertaken in the following chapter on the demand side focuses only on 2017 and partly because CHES only started including positions on the environment since 2010.

The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss important aspects regarding data choice and the methods used. We then move to describe the overall positions of PFRPs on a core set of issue and policy dimensions: EU integration, the generic left-right divide, as well as two traditional components of the economic left-right competition dimension – public spending vs. reducing taxes, and redistribution. The fourth section zooms in on the positions of PFRPs on the three issues of primary focus for this report and for the ActEU project as a whole: climate change, gender equality, and LGBTQ+ rights and immigration.

3.2 Data and methods

All data sources available in political science to estimate the policy or issue positions of political parties on any given domain are just that, estimates. The 'true' positions of parties on any given issue are unknown and any method used serves to estimate, with more or less measurement error (and sometimes bias), the underlying 'true' positions (see e.g. Marks et al. 2007, McDonald and Budge 2014, Laver 2014 for summaries). Some approaches favour the use of policy statements or votes (e.g., Schwarz et al. 2017), others the use of party manifestos or electoral programmes as summarising documents explicitly designed to communicate the positions that parties hold on a range of issues (e.g., Budge et al. 2001), while other scholars rely on the views of experts (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984, Hooghe et al. 2010).

In this chapter, we have opted to infer party positions through expert surveys – specifically, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) – as this dataset offers the most complete and suitable source for our purposes, given that experts position parties on a bipolar scale for all of the issue domains of





interest. When considering possible sources of data, we examined the possibility of drawing from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset, which relies on (mostly manual) coding of quasisentences of electoral party manifestos and does so for the electoral pledges in national, European Parliament and (for some countries and years) regional elections. However, we discarded this option for several reasons. First, although the CMP allows in some instances to capture the directionality of party statements, the coding of party manifestos is heavily relying on salience (see Lehmann et al. 2024). Secondly, for some key issue domains, the coding was insufficient: environmental positions are only coded through quasi-sentences mentioning positions in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate change and supporting 'green' policies without a symmetric code that would capture quasi-sentences that are denoting scepticism of climate change or policies contrary to fighting it. Third, for other key issue domains, the coding did not allow to separate the issue or only did so for the most recent years: there is no separate coding for women or LGBTQ+ rights, and positions on immigration have only been coded since the mid- or late-2010s.

The CHES data that we analyse is collected through a survey – nowadays conducted through an online survey – of hundreds of experts on party politics across Europe. These experts are asked to 'score' the position of a selected number of parties of the countries of their expertise on summarising scales of specific policy issues or, more often, policy domains. These scales typically range between 1 and 7 or between 0 and 10. The parties' positions are, thus, estimated as the average value attributed by the experts who rated the given party. For the period that we cover in this report (2010-2019), CHES conducted three waves of the survey with similar questionnaires in 2010, 2014 and 2019 with between 337 and 421 experts.

While the CHES dataset includes, for most waves, all EU Member States, for our analyses we will restrict the selection to the 10 countries included in the ActEU project: Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain. Table A describes the number of parties included in the analyses per country, as well as the number of experts that scored the respective parties in each country. We undertake our analyses over a total of 237 party/year units.

Country	CHES 2010	CHES 2014	CHES 2019
Austria (AT)	6	7	5
	(14)	(10)	(10)
Czechia (CZ)	7	9	9
	(20)	(15)	(27)
Germany (DE)	6	9	9
	(18)	(13)	(21)
Denmark (DK)	8	8	10
	(11)	(11)	(14)
Greece (EL)	7	9	8
	(11)	(9)	(9)
Spain (ES)	4	7	7
	(11)	(10)	(15)
Finland (FI)	7	7	7
	(10)	(10)	(14)
France (FR)	8	12	9
	(9)	(14)	(8)
Italy (IT)	12	10	7
	(9)	(7)	(19)
Poland (PL)	6	8	9
	(15)	(17)	(21)
Total	71	86	80
	(128)	(116)	(158)

Table A. Number of parties (and number of experts that evaluated those parties in parentheses) included in each survey wave

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





Our analyses focus on PFRPs, which are those classified as both far-right (often also referred to as 'radical right') and populist. We follow the classification of populist parties by The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2023a, 2023b) and, hence, include the parties listed in Table B in our analyses.

Country	Party	PopuList	Radical right in CHES	
AT	BZÖ	Yes (until 2008?)	Yes (up to 2014, included)	
AT	FPÖ	Yes	Yes	
CZ	ÚSVIT	Yes	Yes	
CZ	SPD	Yes	Yes	
DE	AfD	Yes (from 2015)	No family in 2014; Yes in 2019	
DK	DF	Yes	Yes	
DK	NB	Yes	Yes (2019 only)	
EL	LAOS	Yes	Yes (2010, 2014)	
EL	ANEL	Yes	Yes (2014)	
EL	XA Golden Dawn	Yes	Yes (2014, 2019)	
EL	EL	Yes	Yes (2019)	
ES	VOX	Yes	Yes (2019)	
FI	PS	Yes	Yes	
FR	FN / RN	Yes	Yes	
FR	DLF	Yes	Yes	
IT	FdI	Yes	Yes	
IT	LEGA (LN)	Yes	No (regionalist, 2010-2014)	
			Yes (2019)	
PL	PiS	Yes	Yes	
PL	KONFEDER	Far-right, but not populist	Yes (2019)	

Table P. List of DEPDs included in the analy	was and their algoritization in CHES and The Denul ist
Table B. List of PERPS included in the anal	yses and their classification in CHES and The PopuList

Note: Classification by CHES is based on the value in the variable 'family' being 'radical right' and by The PopuList based on the values for the variables 'far right' and 'populist'.

Our analyses rely heavily on classifying political parties in the 10 countries across party families (or party groupings). For the most part, we retained the CHES party family classifications for most parties. Beyond the few changes already described in the slightly different classification between the 'radical right' grouping proposed by CHES and our classification of PFRPs, we kept mostly untouched the classification into Conservative, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Socialist/Social democratic, Green/Ecologist, and Radical left.

However, we departed from CHES classifications in some instances. For example, we classified the Italian Alleanza Nazionale in 2010 as Conservative, as by that time the convergence into PdL was completed. We also depart from CHES by classifying Lega Nord/La Lega in Italy as a PFRP as most Italian scholars agree on this classification for this party by 2010, as is the case in The PopuList. Similarly, we departed from the PopuList classification for the case of Konfederacja in Poland, as our ActEU country experts considered the party fits well with the PFRP type we are analysing in this report (see Table 1 in the Appendix for the full classification).

Additionally, to improve the clarity of the analyses, we have excluded or reclassified several political parties. We exclude regionalist parties as these were only present in the CHES dataset for Finland, Italy and Spain. The few parties that were classified as agrarian or confessional by CHES in the party family variable were either dropped due to their limited electoral relevance by 2010 (in Italy CD, Centro Democratico-Diritti e Libertà; in Poland S, Samoobrona RP, and LPR, Liga





Polskich Rodzin) or reclassified into another party family (KESK in Finland as Liberal, KD in Finland as Christian Democrats, PSL in Poland as Christian Democrats). We also created a new category of 'Other populists' where we included several parties/lists classified by CHES as 'no family': the List Hans-Peter Martin and Team Stronach in Austria, ANO and the Pirate Party in Czechia, the Pirate Party in Germany and M5S in Italy. The Spanish party UPyD, which CHES classifies as Liberal in 2014 but as 'no family' in 2010, is classified as Liberal for both years. We also dropped FolkB (Folkebevægelsen mod EU) in Denmark from our analyses, as it is not properly speaking a political party but a left-leaning list of Eurosceptics only running for European Parliament elections and they were not classified in The PopuList, as well as the German NPD and the French MPF because they were only included in the 2014 wave of CHES (when the former obtained one MEP).

In the analyses in this chapter, we examine how distinct PFRPs are from the remaining party families/groupings on their positions regarding a range of policy issues or policy fields. We examine: their position towards European integration, their overall left-right position as well as their position specifically on improving public services vs. reducing taxes and their position in favour or opposing redistribution, their overall GAL/TAN position, as well as the specific position on environmental sustainability, gender equality and LGBTIQ+ rights (labelled 'social lifestyle' in CHES), immigration policy and the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers.

Table C shows the value range, CHES variable name and key descriptive statistics of the variables employed in this chapter. We can observe that for most variables the mean position of all parties included in our analyses oscillates around the central point (5) of the theoretical range between 0 and 10 of the distribution, with the only exception of the position on EU integration where the range is between 1 and 7 (making 4 the central point) and for which the mean is clearly on the prointegration side of the distribution. Nevertheless, we see that mean values regarding the choice between improving public services and reducing taxes, as well as on redistribution, are clearly on the 'progressive' side (4.48 and 4.20 respectively) for the pooled dataset of all party/year units considered across the ten countries when compared to the mean value of the left-right scale (5.10). Equally, we see that average party positions in these 10 countries on gender equality and LGBTQ+ are a lot more liberal than the overall mean GAL/TAN scale position that summarises the socio-cultural divide, while positions on environmental sustainability, immigration policy and integration models are on the 'traditional' side of the distribution.

In the next section, we proceed to compare the distribution of the positions held by PFRPs on EU integration and the left-right divide to that of the remaining parties of the largest party families.





Table C. Description of key variables of interest

Variable	CHES name	Theoretical range	Empirical range	Mean	Std. dev	N of parties
Position on EU integration	eu_position	1 (strongly opposed) – 7 (strongly in favour)	1 - 7	4.79	1.83	237
Left-right scale	lrgen	0 (extreme left) – 10 (extreme right)	0.2 - 10	5.10	2.54	237
Improving public services vs. reducing taxes	spendvtax	0 (improving public services) – 10 (reducing taxes)	0.4 - 9.5	4.48	2.47	236*
Position on redistribution	redistribution	0 (strongly favours redistribution) – 10 (strongly opposes redistribution)	0.1 - 9.6	4.20	2.34	236*
GAL/TAN socio- cultural scale	galtan	0 (Libertarian) – 10 (Authoritarian)	0.3 - 10	4.85	2.74	237
Position on environmental sustainability	environment	0 (strongly supports environmental protection) – 10 (strongly supports economic growth)	0.3 - 9.4	5.18	2.20	237
Position on gender equality and LGBTQ+	sociallifestyle	0 (strongly supports liberal policies) – 10 (strongly opposes liberal policies)	0.3 - 10	4.30	2.88	237
Position on immigration policy	immigrate_policy	0 (strongly supports liberal policies) – 10 (strongly favours restrictive policies)	0 - 10	5.22	2.71	237
Position on integration models	multiculturalism	0 (strongly favours multiculturalism) – 10 (strongly favours assimilation)	0.6 - 10	5.40	2.65	237

* There is no value attributed in the original CHES dataset for the animal rights German party 'Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz' (Die Tier) for 2019, presumably because German experts on political parties were unable to position this party on those specific issue scales.





3.3 What issues do the PFRPs represent?

Assessing where PFRPs stand on a range of issues might be more complicated than it seems at first sight. Indeed, as Rovny (2013) demonstrated, PFRPs (the larger set of radical right parties, in his terminology) often strategically blur their positions on policy issues or domains that may not favour them in political competition terms. Before we describe, in the next section, the position of PFRPs on climate change, gender and immigration, in this section we focus on their positions on EU integration, the general left-right economic divide as well as their specific positions on the choices between public spending and reducing taxes and between more or less redistribution. We do this through the analysis of the three selected waves of 2010, 2014, and 2019 of CHES for the 10 countries studied and the selection of parties mentioned previously.

Figure A shows the distribution along the 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour) scale of positions on EU integration, with PFRPs highlighted as the black circles (for ease of identification). As can be seen, all PFRPs are unequivocally on the Eurosceptic side of the distribution, with no exceptions. From this point of view, PFRPs are distinctive from the other party families/groupings, as they are the only category of parties systematically opposing (further) EU integration in all countries where they are present. Although radical left parties are also predominantly in the Eurosceptic camp, we find numerous examples of radical left parties in some countries with pro-EU positions. Moreover, while at the beginning of the studied period, PFRPs shared Eurosceptic stances with a wide range of parties that included a few Conservative, Liberal and other Populist parties beyond the Eurosceptic radical left, by 2019 they had become near-monopolists of the political space in opposition to EU integration and were only kept company by the Greek and French radical left parties.


Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that not all PFRPs take on similarly extreme positions opposing EU integration. Whereas parties like the French FN/RN have systematically taken quite extreme positions against (further) EU integration with values around 1.2 - 1.4 on the 1-7 scale, other parties like PiS or Vox have tended to take softer Eurosceptic positions, with values between 3 and 4. It is also important to note that for all three survey waves considered, it is not a PFRP that takes the most extreme anti-EU position but the Greek Communists (KKE) and the Polish far-right (but not Populist) KNP. In any case, it is undeniable that PFRPs have gradually become both more distinctively anti-EU and more unambiguously the 'owners' of the Eurosceptic political competition space in the 10 countries studied.

The convergence of PFRPs towards greater ideological distinctiveness is also visible in Figure B, depicting their position compared to other parties on the general left-right scale. Whereas in 2010 and 2014 some (very few) PFRPs held relatively moderate or centrist positions on the left-right divide – notably the Finnish PS – or less extreme right-wing positions (e.g., the Danish DF) that were close to those of many Conservative, Christian Democrats and some Liberal parties, by 2019 almost all PFRPs converged towards the extreme-right end of the scale. In fact, we can observe a pattern of greater distinctiveness and structuring of parties' ideological positions by party family. In a sense, polarization is bringing greater clarity and homogeneity in the ideological positioning of parties by party family/grouping.





Figure A. Positions of PFRPs on EU integration compared to those of the remaining parties, 2010-2019




Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





Figure B. Positions of PFRPs on the left-right general divide compared to those of the remaining parties, 2010-2019



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






This convergence towards greater ideological distinctiveness and homogeneity is a lot less clear-cut when we break down the meaning of the left-right divide into specific issue positions around the core economic polar choices that have historically defined left-wing and right-wing party supply: the choice between increasing public spending to improve public services or reducing taxes, and the choice between more or less wealth redistribution through taxation and various social benefits. Figures C and D show where PFRPs stand concerning those two issue divides.

As we can see, at the beginning of the period studied (2010), PFRPs did not take the most extreme positions in favour of reducing taxes or opposing redistribution, as traditional Conservative and Liberal parties took such positions. However, by 2019, an increasing number of PFRPs moved towards the right-most end of the distribution on both issues and leap-frogged Conservative parties, which in turn moved towards more moderate positions. Hence, while PFRPs have not become 'issue owners' regarding tax reduction and opposing redistribution and benefits, they seem to be gradually moving in that direction (at least some of them) and are becoming more distinctive in their positions.






Figure C. Positions of PFRPs on public spending vs. reducing taxes compared to those of the remaining parties, 2010-2019





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Figure D. Positions of PFRPs on redistribution compared to those of the remaining parties, 2010-2019



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





3.4 What is the common position (if any) of PFRPs on climate change, gender, and immigration?

3.4.1 Climate Change


From the supply side perspective, PFRPs have often voiced one or several of a variety of sceptic views towards climate change and have spearheaded the opposition to many or all mitigation policies (Gemenis et al. 2012; Reed 2016; Fortchner et al. 2018; Forchtner 2019). Some of them are staunch deniers of the fact that there is a climate change trend or – when they acknowledge the existence of a trend – of its human origin (see, e.g., Cantoni et al. 2017). Most PFRPs typically oppose the sort of transnational arrangements and multi-national agreements required to fight climate change effectively (Lockwood 2018; Hess and Renner 2019; Fortchtner 2019a). Some PFRPs, while accepting the existence of climate change, oppose mitigation policies or promote only national mitigation policies that do not entail transnational arrangements (Jeffries 2017; Ruser and Machin 2019; Schaller and Carius 2019). In many cases, PFRPs just simply avoid discussing climate change in their electoral platforms, campaigning and party manifestos (see, e.g., Farstad 2018).

We assess this variation by plotting the positions of PFRPs on environmental sustainability (horizontal axis, on a scale measuring positions on pro-environmental protection vs. progrowth stances) compared to their overall left-right position (vertical axis) in Figure E. We choose the left-right divide as the second dimension to plot as it allows for greater clarity of assessment of the positioning on the political competition space for each policy domain.



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Figure E. The position of PFRPs on the environment compared to that of other parties



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






As Figure E demonstrates, although PFRPs are concentrated on the 'strongly pro-growth' end of the spectrum, they share the positioning space with a large number of Conservative, Liberal and Other populist parties. Indeed, Conservative parties in Italy, Greece or Poland take on positions on climate change that are – by and large – quite similar to those of the PFRPs in their respective countries (or, at least, that are perceived as such by the party experts responding to the CHES). Although the dispersion of positions on the environment of PFRPs is considerable, it is less dispersed than the distribution of positions that we see for other party families, such as the Liberals, Social Democrats and Radical Left parties. Unsurprisingly, only Green/Ecologist parties have relatively similar positions on the strongly pro-environmental protection side of the spectrum, with very few exceptions (ICV and SF) that are to be explained in the origins of these two parties in the radical-left party family.

Focusing on position change over time, Figure F shows that most PFRPs do not drastically change their positions on environmental sustainability during the studied period. In Austria, both FPÖ and BZÖ shifted slightly towards more pro-environmental positions in 2014 only for the FPÖ to move back to even more pro-growth positions in 2019; a movement that seems nearly identical to the one found for Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. The French FN/RN has only very gradually shifted towards slightly less pro-growth positions with Marine Le Pen's strategy of moderation. In Greece, we detect a movement towards more centrist positions on the environment for Golden Dawn (XA). True Finns and PiS have moved towards more clearly pro-growth positions.





Figure F. The position of PFRPs on the environment over time by country



Graphs by country

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






Figure F2 allows us to nuance our conclusions around the positions of PFRPs on the environment when placed comparatively, on a country-by-country basis and over time, with those of other parties. We can observe that – even if PFRPs tend to have pro-growth positions overall – in Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Italy and (for some years) Poland, they are often overtaken by Conservative parties in the extreme end of the pro-growth side of the political spectrum. In other words, until 2019 they did not 'own' that political space and were not the sole parties representing the more sceptical positions regarding the need to shift towards a more sustainable economy to combat climate change and to protect the environment.



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Figure F2. The position of all parties on the environment over time by country



Graphs by country

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





3.4.2 Gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights


Turning now to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights, PFRPs usually do not tend to directly oppose the principle of equality between women and men as such but often indirectly do so by denying the existence of gender discrimination, arguing that Western societies already have achieved gender equality at the same time that they defend traditional cultural values and familyist models (Spierings et al. 2015; Grzebaslka and Petó 2018; Dietze and Roth 2020). Similarly, their positions on LGBTQ+ rights have been shown to be quite heterogeneous in case-study research, with some parties espousing liberal positions (Akkerman 2015) and others espousing traditional ones (Backlund and Jungar 2019).

Unfortunately, CHES data do not allow disentangling positions on gender equality and on LGBTQ+ rights, as they both form part of a single variable on 'social lifestyle' – which seems somewhat of a misnomer as these positions concern civil rights. Nevertheless, we are able to ascertain the relative position of PFRPs on these rights compared to the remaining parties (Figure G).





Figure G. The positions of PFRPs on gender and LGBTQ+ rights compared to those of other parties



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






Figure G shows that – as in the case of positions on environmental protection, PFRPs hold a wide range of positions on gender and LGBTQ+ rights that oscillate from centrist positions (by the Danish Dansk Folkeparti – DF) to strongly anti-liberal policies espoused by parties such as Konfederacja or Golden Dawn. Compared to environmental positions, PFRPs tend to occupy on their own the most anti-liberal political space on this policy domain, but some Conservative and Christian Democratic are closely aligned to the positions of several of the largest PFRPs, such as the French Front National/Rassemblement National or the Italian Lega Nord. Although not the focus of our analysis, it is also worth noting the even larger dispersion in the positions of parties in the radical left: most of them concentrate around the most pro-liberal positions but the Greek KKE and DIKKI as well as the Czech KS**Č**M have systematically held anti-liberal positions, particularly on LGBTQ+ rights. In fact, the only party family that displays homogeneous positions on gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights is the Green/Ecologist party family.

Shifts in the position on gender and LGBTQ+ rights are also not dramatic. We see a gradual shift towards slightly more liberal positions for the Danish and French PFRPs, and a movement in the opposite direction for the German AfD. Other than these variations, most PFRPs take on similar positions in 2019 to those they took in 2010. Interestingly, we do not see uniform shifts towards either more liberal or more anti-liberal positions.





Figure H. The position of PFRPs on gender and LGBTQ+ rights over time by country



Graphs by country

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






Unlike for positions on the environment, Figure H2 shows that PFRPs are in almost all countries studied the ones taking the most extreme anti-liberal positions on gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. The only exceptions are Czechia (in the earlier years), Finland (where the Christian Democrats hold very similar, if not more anti-liberal positions than True Finns), and Poland for 2014 (when several conservative parties emerged with relatively anti-liberal positions).



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Figure H2. The position of all parties on gender and LGBTQ+ rights over time by country



0=strongly pro-liberal policies; 10=strongly anti-liberal policies

Graphs by country

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





If we compare the positions that PFRPs take on the environment and on gender and LGBTQ+ rights (Figure I), we can see that the majority of parties are concentrated around the most pro-growth and anti-liberal ends but that several hold positions that are markedly more liberal on gender and LGBTQ+ rights (e.g., the Danish DF and the Austrian BZÖ), whereas several of them hold more pro-environmental positions while holding highly anti-liberal positions on gender and LGBTQ+ rights (e.g., Lega Nord and the FPÖ in 2014 only). However, by and large, their positions tend to be consistently placed within the space reserved to the more traditional positions.




Figure I. The positions of PFRPs on the environment and on gender and LGBTQ+ compared

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).

3.4.3 Immigration

We now turn to the consideration of PFRPs on the issue that is the most salient for them and on which they have become 'issue owners'. On the supply side of the political marketplace, PFRPs have historically made frequent and continuous use of the immigration issue, increasing its saliency and relevance, to the point of owning the immigration (or the anti-immigration) issue (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Van Spanje 2010; Ruedin and Morales 2019). These parties base their platforms on restrictive conceptions of who belongs to the national community (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013) and over time they have developed a reputation around their position on this broad policy field becoming issue owners (Immerzeel et al. 2016; Kitschelt 2018). The expectation, therefore, is that PFRPs will display relatively homogeneous and extreme positions on immigration with all or most parties adopting stances that are on the most restrictive end of the spectrum.

Indeed, as Figure J shows, the vast majority of PFRPs take positions between points 9 and 10 of the scale, signalling the most restrictive positions on immigration. Equally, Figure J also demonstrates that they occupy almost exclusively this political space, such that no party of






the other major party families/groupings shares the most extreme space of restrictive positions on immigration.

Nevertheless, Figure J also adds important nuances to this analysis of the supply side of PFRPs on immigration. First, we can identify a few political parties that are somewhat less extreme – namely, the BZÖ in Austria and Fratelli d'Italia in Italy, but especially the PiS in Poland – that are in positions around 8 and 9 (or 6-7) where they share similar stances to those of many Conservative, Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. Second, as shown in Table D, they are the party family or grouping with the most homogeneous positions on immigration – though very closely followed by the Green parties. Third, other populist parties – such as Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy or ANO in Czechia – hold similarly restrictive positions on immigration but are somewhat more moderate.





Figure J. The positions of PFRPs on immigration compared to those of all other parties



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).






The positions of PFRPs are also, by and large, relatively stable with very small shifts in position (Figure K). When any changes in position are noticeable – such as for the AfD in Germany, True Finns in Finland or PiS in Poland – they have been in the direction of further restricting immigration.





Figure K. The position of PFRPs on immigration policy over time by country



Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).







Similar to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights, Figure K2 shows that – with the only exception of Poland in 2014 – PFRPs invariably occupy the most extreme restrictive positions on immigration policy. In fact, one of the aspects that stands out from this figure is the considerable distance between most PFRPs and their closest competitor (typically Conservative, Christian Democrat or Liberal parties) in the political competition space around immigration. Unlike for the environmental policy field and the gender equality and LGBTQ+ policy field, where PFRPs compete closely with other (conservative) parties around their pro-growth and anti-liberal positions, on immigration, they truly are the owners of the space they occupy.



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Graphs by country

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





3.4 Summary of results and discussion

Our analysis confirms the conclusions of the vast scholarship in this field as we find a high concentration of PFRPs on the most restrictive positions on immigration (most around the 9-10 values) with some (small) variation, but a much wider variability along the environmental and gender equality & LGBTQ+ rights scale, with positions ranging from values 4 to 10. When we focus on the evolution of positions over time, we observe that positions around immigration have clearly converged towards more homogeneously restrictive ones across all PFRPs, whereas we do not yet observe an equivalent concentration of positions on the environment or on gender equality & LGBTQ+ rights, which remain as varied (if not more) than in the first period observed (2010).

Finally, the positions of PFRPs on immigration are the most homogeneous across all party families, but they are not such for the environment (where Christian Democrats and Conservatives hold much more homogeneous positions within their party family) or for gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights (where Green parties and Social Democratic parties hold more similar positions within their respective groupings), as shown in Table D. Further evidence of this are the results of a principal components analysis displayed in Table D2, where we can see additional evidence supporting the conclusion of a different dimensionality of positions on the environment, gender equality/LGBTQ+ and immigration for PFRPs when compared to the overall set of parties. Indeed, we can see that a single GAL/TAN dimension is the best description for the dimensionality of parties' positions as a whole, yet that this single dimension more poorly describes the positions of PFRPs as a subset of parties, where positions on immigration really stand apart as distinct.





Table D. The positions on the environment, gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights, and immigration policy by party family (mean with standard deviation within parentheses)

	Party label group								
	Populist Far-Right	Conservat ives	Liberals	Christian Democrats	Social Democrati c	Radical Left	Green/ Ecologist s	Other Populists	Total
N (percentage of	i di Tugitt	1765	40	Democrats	C	Leit	5	i opunito	237
total)	36 (15.2%)	27 (11.4%)	(16.9%)	23 (9.7%)	39 (16.5%)	40 (16.9%)	22 (9.3%)	10 (4.2%)	(100.0%)
position:	7.618	7.105	5.704		4.388	3.598	1.585	4.658	5.184
environment	(0.887)	(0.869)	(1.523)	5.992 (0.552)	(1.192)	(1.768)	(1.134)	(2.159)	(2.199)
position: social	8.486	6.505	3.388		2.417	2.358	1.003	3.601	4.300
lifestyle	(1.145)	(1.468)	(1.570)	6.777 (1.443)	(1.044)	(1.844)	(0.481)	(2.617)	(2.877)
position:									
immigration	9.345	7.184	5.078		3.962	2.874	1.772	5.323	5.223
policy	(0.854)	(1.155)	(1.619)	6.202 (1.231)	(1.408)	(1.730)	(0.864)	(2.376)	(2.713)

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).

Table D2. Comparing the dimensionality of the GAL/TAN and individual scales on the environment, gender equality and LGBTQ+ and immigration for all parties and for PFRPs (Principal Components Analysis)

	Populist Far-Right	All parties
N	36	237
Eigenvalue of component 1	2.11	3.6
Proportion of variance accounted for		
by component 1	0.53	0.90
Eigenvalue of component 2	0.96	0.23
Proportion of variance accounted for		
by component 2	0.24	0.06
Loadings on component 1		
GAL/TAN	0.60	0.51
Social lifestyle	0.54	0.50
Immigration policy	0.29	0.50
Environment	0.51	0.48
Loadings on component 2		
GAL/TAN	-0.00	-0.35
Social lifestyle	-0.41	-0.48
Immigration policy	0.91	0.08
Environment	-0.07	0.79

Source: CHES 1999-2019 Trend File, Jolly et al. (2022).





4 The 'Demand Side' of the Representation of the PFRPs in Europe: Attitudes of the Populist Far Right Voters - Is There a Transnational Divide?

Jan Kovář, Pelin Musil, Petr Kratochvíl, Zdeněk Sychra, Katarzyna Kochlöffel (IIR)

4.1 Introduction

This part of the report is based on the empirical analysis of the attitudes of the voters, i.e., the demand side of the PFRPs. Similarly as in the previous section, it explores the key issues or policy domains, with a particular focus on the three issues of immigration, climate change, and gender. The chapter is structured somewhat differently than the previous part, as it is organized chronologically, presenting first our analysis of an older dataset and then our analysis of the most recent one. The former dataset comes from European Values Survey (EVS) of 2017 and the latter is the new dataset which we collected within the ActEU project and which reflects the most recent situation (data from 2023-2024). There are two major reasons for structuring the chapter in this way: First, it makes more sense to present the results from the two datasets separately as there are some differences in the samples and the methods of collection between them. Second, by presenting the results of our analysis of the most recent dataset in the second part of the chapter, we will show more clearly the changes and shifts in the attitudes of the citizens between 2017 and 2023-2024.

4.2 Data and Methods

In order to explore to what extent the attitudes of the voters of the PFRPs converge on the issues of immigration, gender equality, and climate change and whether they constitute a single, internally connected societal dimension of a socio-cultural cleavage derived from the 'cultural backlash' hypothesis, we have analysed and compared the results of two public opinion surveys: European Values Survey (EVS) dataset released in 2017 and the ActEU dataset compiled in 2024.

The selection of EVS 2017 meets the purpose of our research in two ways. First, for practical reasons, this is the only available and most recent survey released before the ActEU 2024 dataset, including questions covering gender equality, immigration, and environmental concerns (even though it is not particularly focused on climate change) and containing questions on the preferred political party including a PFRP option in all ActEU countries except for Greece (Spain, Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland). The second reason relates to the comparative perspective it can provide over time, which we would not be able to have, had we focused only on the ActEU 2024 survey. While the issue of immigration has a long history of politicization and is seen as the main driver of the public support for the PFRPs in Europe, we know that in the last decade, the issues on gender equality and environmental issues have also become politically more salient. In the past few years, for instance, we 'have witnessed more and more apparently populist rhetoric, politicized claims, and confrontational decisions that shape climate action' (Marquardt and Lederer 2022, 735). Similarly, emerging studies not only document the recent growth of antigender agendas with transphobic components, but also the way some political actors and civil society movements have become more vocal in defence of gender equality and social justice to counter these trends (see for instance, Lombardo et al. 2021). Hence, despite the differences in samples and data analysis methods between the two surveys, a comparative glance at the EVS 2017 and ActEU 2024 can demonstrate whether the attitudes of PFRP





voters on these two issues have varied over time and become part of a transnational dimension, converging with anti-immigrant positions.

4.3 The EVS 2017 survey analysis

Before we provide the analysis of the EVS 2017 survey—whether and to what extent gender, immigration and environment-related attitudes converge and explain the support for the PFRPs in the year 2017, we must underline two limitations of this survey. The first one is its omission of Greece from the integrated survey. The survey on this country is presented as an individual dataset and its question list does not include the same variables as the other countries included in the integrated dataset. Therefore, it was not possible to include Greece in our analysis of the attitudes of the PFRP voters on the issues of immigration, gender equality, and environment. The second limitation relates to Spain. This country had no influential PFRP at the time of the EVS 2017 data collection. Even though *Vox*—recognized as the most well-known PFRP of Spain – was established in 2013, it was not a visible political party until the 2018 Andalusian regional election (Vampa 2020, 305). In 2016 national elections, for instance—one year before the date of the EVS data collection, *Vox* received only 0.2 per cent of the popular vote and so was not included in the EVS 2017 list of Spanish political parties.

We measured the dependent variable, the support for the PFRPs, based on Q49 of the survey, 'which political party appeals to you most' taking it as a dichotomous measure (1 = PFRP appeals the most). The PFRPs for each country were derived from the country reports of the PopuList Project and coded manually (see Table F below). Approximately 14 per cent of the total sample were supporters of PFRPs. In total there were 1,912 supporters (more details can be found in Table S in the Appendix). Nevertheless, due to missing data the particular sample of PFRP supporters is slightly different in each analytical step. The sample sizes of PFRP supporters are always reported at the relevant place.





Table F. The list of the selected PFRPs for analysis

Austria	FPO (Freedom Party of Austria)
Czechia	SPD, Úsvit
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF; Danish Peoples Party), Nye Borgerlige (The New Right)
Finland	PS (Perussuomalaiset, True Finns Party)
France	FN (Front National), Debout La France (DLF, France Arise)
Germany	AfD
Italy	Lega (League), Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), Italia agli Italiani (Italy to the Italians), CasaPound Italy
Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), Wolność (Liberty; Korwin)

In order to see whether the voters of the PFRPs converge on the three issues of immigration, gender equality, and climate change, we first ran a factor analysis among the variables related to their attitudes on three issues derived from EVS 2017. Second, we estimated several regression models to explore the relationship between the (sets of) attitudes on the three issues and the support for populist far-right parties (PFRPs). Table Q in the Appendix shows the list and description of these variables. Since there was no specific question on 'climate change' in the survey, we focused on the questions assessing the attitudes on 'environment' or 'environmental threats' in general. The list also includes questions pertaining to our control variables. We control for the traditional socio-demographic characteristics: age, sex, education. As suggested by the literature, we also included attitudinal variables such as the self-declared position on the left-right scale, the attitudes on the economic left-right spectrum, trust in political institutions (Zhirkov 2013), social trust (Schübel 2015; Berning and Ziller 2017), interest in politics (Leone et al. 2014) and whether the respondent is born in the respective country or not. Since the support for the PFRPs is known to be strongly associated with Euroscepticism (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013, Pirro et. al 2018), we have also controlled for the attitudes towards the EU through the question on the confidence in the EU.

4.3.1 Factor analysis

We start by discussing the results from the factor analysis. We use Cattell's scree test to establish how many factors to retain (Preacher and MacCallum 2003). The results of the rotated factor analysis with a Kaiser normalisation specification are contained in Table G. In the pooled dataset, the four issues do not load on the same factor. The migration items all, except for one (the 'cultural' question on migrant's customs), load solely on one factor (*factor* \mathcal{I}). The environmental items all load on one factor too (*factor* \mathcal{A}). Gender-related items load onto two factors, which are both independent of the 'environmental' and 'migration' factors. One is created by items capturing the role of women at home (*factor* \mathcal{A}) and the other relates to broad societal, economic, and political aspects of gender roles (*factor* \mathcal{A}). The question whether men have more right to a job than women also loads on both factors, but its loading is significantly higher in the factor capturing broad societal, economic, and political aspects of gender roles (*factor* \mathcal{A}).





We also include a battery of questions capturing economic left-right attitudes. These items do not load onto any of the four previous factors capturing migration, gender, and environmental attitudes. Instead, they load together on a separate factor (*factor 5*), which underlines the claim that socio-economic issues constitute a separate dimension of conflict. The results of our exploratory factor analysis, therefore, suggest that on the demand side in the eight countries analysed, migration, gender, and environmental attitudes did not form a single coherent dimension in the year 2017. In other words, we do not see a bundling of the attitudes on these three issues in a common dimension according to the EVS 2017 data.

We cross-validate these results using confirmatory factor analysis, which can help uncover whether a single latent underlying dimension is consistent with the data. Confirmatory factor analysis shows that if the three issues are bundled as belonging to one underlying factor, the model fit is poor with a Standardised Root Mean Squared Residual of 0.107 and hence above the acceptable level of 0.08 for model fit. Using the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-squared statistic to estimate the underlying structural equation model, which unfortunately does not allow to use population and/or country weights and thus may bias the results towards larger countries, the values of the Comparative Fit Index (0.555) and Tucker–Lewis Index (0.506) suggest poor model fit as well (Pituch and Stevens 2016). In other words, confirmatory factor analysis does not suggest a single underlying latent dimension that fits the data well. This supports our findings from the exploratory factor analysis.

Variance						
Factor	Variance	Dif	ference	Proportio	n Cı	ımulative
Factor1	2.60581	0.3	3474	0.3098	0.5	3098
Factor2	2.27107	0.0	9518	0.2700	0.	5799
Factor3	2.17588	0.1	4158	0.2587	0.	8386
Factor4	2.03430	1.5	0085	0.2419	1.0	0804
Factor5	0.53345			0.0634	1.1	1439
Loadings						
Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
Priority to nationals over immigrants	0.5468					0.5535
Impact of these immigrants on the development of a country	0.6541					0.5492
Immigrants take jobs away	0.6305					0.5135
Immigrants and crime problems worse	0.7365					0.4196

Table G. Rotated factor analysis of the pooled dataset for the PFRP supporters



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Immigrants as a strain on a country's welfare system	0.7441				0.4141
Immigrants and their distinct customs	r				0.9343
Give part of my income to protect environment				0.3272	0.8375
Too difficult to do much about the environment				0.4724	0.7348
More important things than protect the environment				0.6201	0.5833
No point in doing what I can unless others do the same				0.6119	0.5815
Claims about environmental threats are exaggerated				0.6259	0.5493
Protecting environment vs. economic growth				0.4908	0.7300
Mother works for pay, the children suffer			0.7284		0.4067
Most women really want is a home and children			0.6103		0.4905
Family life suffers when the woman ha a full-time job	S		0.7533		0.3759
A man's job is to earr money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family		0.4427	0.5657		0.4314
Men make better political leaders than women do		0.7193			0.4000
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl		0.6722			0.4617



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Men make better business executives than women do	0.7530			0.3740
Men have more right to a job than women	0.4761	0.3050		0.6040
State responsibility			0.4378	0.8002
Right to refuse a job			0.3407	0.7987
Incentives for individual effort				0.9752
Government ownership of business and industry			0.3685	0.8604

Note: Factor loadings below 0.3 are represented by blank cells for better readability of the underlying dimensionality. N = 1,338.

4.3.2 Regression Analysis: Predicting PFRP Support

In addition to the factor analysis, we carry out a regression analysis to detect whether the PFRP voters' attitudes on immigration, gender equality, and the environment associate with their support for these parties. To do this, we construct an additive index for each of these three issues based on the corresponding EVS questions. The index is then normalized to range between 0 and 10. Low values on the indexes represent sceptical views (towards gender equality, migration, and environment), while high values present positive attitudes. Table H and Figure L below show the results of a series of regression models in which preference for the PFRPs is regressed on the individual migration, gender, and environment attitudes as well as indexes summing up the attitudes towards the three issues. Below, we also graphically examine these associations through predicted probability plots. We employ country-fixed effects to avoid a potential inconsistency due to unobserved country heterogeneity as well as country-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Models 1, 2, and 3 show the association of each index (migration, environment, and gender respectively) with the support for the PFRPs in the absence of the other two indexes. Model 4 shows the association between each index and the support for the PFRPs when we also control for the other two attitudinal indexes. Model 4 is eventually our baseline model, which we use to substantively interpret results. Figure M also presents predicted probability plots for the three attitudinal indexes (migration, gender, environment) and the socioeconomic left-right index.

	Logit (Model 1)	Logit (Model 2)	Logit (Model 3)	Logit (Model 4)
Migration index	0.703***			0.719***
	(0.074)			(0.064)
Environment index		0.898***		0.949**
		(0.029)		(0.016)

Table H. Covariates of PFRP support: attitudinal indexes





0.944

0.865+

Gender Index			0.865	0.944
			(0.074)	(0.063)
EU confidence	0.626***	0.562***	0.544***	0.645***
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Left-right self-placement	1.504***	1.594***	1.591***	1.474***
	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.075)
Economic left-right index	0.985	0.998	0.995	1.008
	(0.047)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.063)
Medium income	1.199***	1.155+	1.118	1.118
	(0.061)	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.089)
High income	1.269	1.238	1.207	1.303
	(0.281)	(0.250)	(0.245)	(0.269)
Sex (=women)	0.927	0.966	0.971	1.017
	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.081)	(0.075)
Native-born	1.602*	1.945***	2.309***	1.822**
	(0.305)	(0.375)	(0.327)	(0.360)
Medium education	1.026	0.972	0.996	0.959
	(0.225)	(0.182)	(0.195)	(0.257)
High education	0.578+	0.521**	0.554*	0.552*
	(0.166)	(0.124)	(0.144)	(0.165)
Age	1.067*	1.073***	1.077***	1.074**
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Age ²	0.999**	0.999***	0.999***	0.999***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Social trust	0.614***	0.554***	0.506***	0.671***
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.069)
Trust in parliament	1.043	1.026	1.056	1.007
	(0.184)	(0.197)	(0.179)	(0.141)
Trust in parties	0.921	0.968	0.981	0.997
	(0.090)	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.081)
Trust in government	1.108	1.071	0.994	1.066
	(0.273)	(0.307)	(0.262)	(0.283)
Political interest	0.987	0.915	0.944	1.006

Gender index




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	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.109)
_cons	0.038*	0.018**	0.024**	0.051+
	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.091)
Ν	9309	8566	9003	7930
r2_p	0.342	0.319	0.317	0.335

Note: PFRP supporters are represented by about 14 per cent in the dependent variable in Model 4 (1,117 supporters in total).

Figure L. Coefficient plot of radical right party support (based on Model 4)




Note: Horizontal lines represent 95 and 90 percent confidence intervals, respectively.





Figure M. Predicted probabilities of radical right party support (based on Model 4)



If we analyse the association of each attitudinal index with the dependent variable based on Models 1, 2, and 3, we see that each has a statistically significant relationship with the support for the PFRPs. In other words, when the immigration and gender indexes are absent, the index on environmental attitudes shows a significant relationship with the outcome. We can make the same interpretation for the gender index in the absence of immigration and environmental indexes, even though its significance is lower for the outcome than the other two. Finally, if the environment and gender indexes are absent, immigration index also has a significant relationship with the outcome.

However, the results based on Model 4 as well as Figures L and M show that when all three attitudinal indexes are present, the immigrant attitudinal index has the most evident relationship with the support for the PFRPs as argued by Vaughan (2021) and Arzheimer (2018). The results also show a negative relationship between the index of environmental attitudes and the dependent variable, but the effect of this index is not as strong as the index of immigration attitudes. The effect of the gender attitudinal index on the support for the PFRPs, on the other hand, is not statistically significant in Model 4, although it is in the expected direction. This shows that, when all three indexes are taken together, the environmental and gender attitudes lose their significance in predicting the support for the PFRPs and immigration index remains as the most significant one.

On the other hand, Table L (Appendix) shows the results of the disaggregated attitudinal indexes on the outcome, showcasing which particular dimension of each attitudinal index matters most. For instance, anti-immigrant attitudes related to job security under harsh economic conditions seem to have an impact on the support for the PFRPs. Especially under



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conditions of job scarcity, the respondents feel that the natives should have priority over the immigrants in securing jobs (mig_att_1). This is in line with recent publications on this topic (Burgoon and Rooduijn 2020; Heizmann et. al. 2021). However, the results also show that the PFRP voters do not simply perceive immigrants as a threat to the country's welfare system (mig_att_5) or as people who simply steal jobs from the natives under normal economic conditions (mig_att_3). The cultural component of anti-immigrant attitudes (mig_att_6), on the other hand, is more clearly related to the support for the PFRPs.

With regard to environmental attitudes shown in Table L (Appendix), we see that none of the dimensions, except one (env_att_5), is statistically significant according to EVS 2017. The only dimension that seems to matter is the attitude that 'environmental problems are exaggerated' for the PFRP supporters. Considering the slight effect of the whole index of environmental attitudes on the support for the PFRPs, one can conclude that PFRPs drew, to a certain degree, support from those who tended to believe in the exaggeration of environmental issues.

Among a variety of eight attitudes on gender stereotyping shown in Table L (Appendix), none of the dimensions except one (gend_att_7) is statistically significant. This dimension is related to whether or not women make as successful business executives as men do. Considering that the overall index on gender attitudes provides no clear relationship with the dependent variable according to EVS 2017, the relationship between attitudes on gender stereotyping and the PFRP support should not be exaggerated when it comes to the first two decades of the millennium. On the supply side, we know that this issue recently started being politicized on the agenda of the PFRPs (Akkerman 2015) and that the PFRPs draw more votes from men than from women (Spierings and Zaslove 2017). Yet, the available data until 2017 show that the societal attitudes on gender stereotyping have not had a direct relationship with the support for the PFRPs. We should also not forget that the questions on gender equality within the EVS 2017 survey do not cover LGBTQ+ people's rights. The observed increase in the number of women occupying senior positions in party structures suggests a change in the PFRPs position on gender equality and the need to expand the operationalization of gender attitudes beyond what is covered in the ActEU 2024 survey.

Finally, Figure N in the Appendix presents predicted probability plots for all the control variables. Among the control variables, we find particularly Euroscepticism (confidence in the EU) and left-right self-placement to show significant effect on the support for the PFRPs. Social trust, whether the person is native-born, and the highest level of education also have some effects. The economic left-right dimension or the income level do not show any statistically significant results (even though the voters' own self-left-right placement does). These results indicate that economic hardship (in the form of low income) is not directly linked with the support for the PFRPs which is in accordance with previous research. It has been underlined that the absolute deprivation theory is related with nonvoting rather than with voting for the PRRPs (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2018). The relative deprivation theory based on more subjective feelings such as the feeling that 'one does not get what he/she deserves in favourable socioeconomic conditions' is much more related to the support for the PFRPs (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018).

Our results from EVS 2017 support this logic of interpretation as we see that the lack of social trust also matters for the outcome. The supporters of the PFRPs do easily trust other people. A recent study has also found that 'a higher level of social trust decreases the probability to prefer' the PFRPs and explained that 'this effect is fully mediated by anti-immigrant





sentiments' (Berning and Ziller 2017, 208). Interestingly, we also find neither political trust (trust in parties, parliament, government) nor interest in politics matter for the support for the PFRPs. Compared to the high levels of Euroscepticism found in the PFRP voters, this explains that the main frustration that these voters express towards the establishment is not related to the institutions of their country but rather to the EU itself (Pirro et al 2018).

Finally, it is possible to talk about the effect of age on the PFRP support even though it is substantively small. The relationship between age and the PFRP support remains inconclusive in the existing literature. But, according to the curvilinear relations observed in Figure O, our results show that the PFRP supporters are most likely to be middle-aged between 40 and 60, with a peak at 48 years. Perhaps it is better to consider the age factor as one that interacts with other important predictors of the PFRP support such as a person's left-right self-placement or possession of traditional values (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

To sum up, the results of our EVS 2017 analysis show no strong indication about the effect of gender-stereotyping and only a minor effect of environmental attitudes on the support for the PFRPs. Yet, attitudes towards immigration do matter. These results confirm the existing findings of the literature pointing to the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and support for the PFRPs. But to date, the effect of the attitudes on environment and gender has not been explored that extensively. Moreover, there is no study showing whether these attitudes converge or not from the perspective of the PFRP voters. All in all, our results from EVS2017 indicate that up until 2017, there has been no such convergence. Anti-immigrant attitudes, combined with high levels of Euroscepticism have been clearly the main drivers of the PFRP support.

4.4 ActEU 2024 Survey Analysis

Our analysis of the ActEU 2024 aims to shed light on two interrelated questions and the results show similarities with those of the EVS 2017 analysis. First, guided by the 'cultural backlash hypothesis', we are interested in knowing whether there is a societal divide (along the postmaterialist-materialist axis) that can be revealed through the potential convergence of the attitudinal indexes of gender equality, environment, and immigration. We aimed to find this out through combining the methods of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. We should also note that, in contrast to EVS 2017, the ActEU survey includes both the cases of Greece and Spain, and that the questions about environment are more specifically targeted at climate change issues.

Second, we ran a regression analysis to assess the explanatory weight of each attitudinal index along with the other variables that we discussed in our EVS 2017 analysis (i.e., Euroscepticism, economic left-right divide, education level, income level, political interest, social trust, political trust, age). Yet the measures used for our dependent and independent variables differ slightly from those of the EVS 2017 due to the different structuring of the questions. Most importantly, we measure the dependent variable of our study, the support for the PFRPs, as the PFRP party with the highest probability of voting based on a scale of 0 to 10, using question no. 32 'How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties?' (see Table J) due to the fact that there are multiple PFRPs that respondents can select from the list of parties in the ActEU survey.





Austria	FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria)
Czechia	SPD (Strana p ř ímé demokracie)
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF; Danish Peoples Party)
Finland	PS (Perussuomalaiset, Finns Party)
France	RN (Rassemblement National)
Germany	AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
Greece	Greek Solution (Ελληνική Λύση)
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy)
Poland	PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
Spain	Vox

Note: For Denmark, Italy, and Poland, there were multiple PFRPs for which respondents could express their voting intention. To make the analysis feasible, we had to select only one per country. We decided to select for each country the party with the highest mean voting intention across all respondents. Similar to the EVS 2017 analysis, the selected parties correspond to the PopuList project.

4.4.1 Factor Analysis

We start by discussing the results from the factor analysis. Like in the EVS analysis, we use Cattell's scree test to establish how many factors to retain. Altogether, the test results indicate four factors. While gender (*factor 1*) and immigration (*factor 2*) constitute two of these factors, the environmental item is divided into the socio-political (*factor* \mathcal{B}) and economic dimensions (*factor 4*) of climate change. The results of the rotated factor analysis with a Kaiser normalisation specification are contained in Table K. In the pooled dataset, the four issues do not load on the same factor. The migration items all load solely on one factor (factor 2). The gender items also all load on one factor (factor 1). The environmental items load onto two factors, independent of the 'gender' and 'migration' factors. One factor (factor 4) is composed of two economic questions related to climate change, which concern (a) the willingness to decrease the personal level of consumption and (b) the implementation of climate protection measures regardless of cost. The other three items loading together (factor \mathfrak{I} are more concerned with the socio-political aspects of climate change. Like in the analysis of the EVS 2017, the results of the exploratory factor analysis based on the ActEU survey suggest that on the demand side in the ten countries analysed, migration, gender, and environmental attitudes do not form a single coherent dimension. In other words, we do not see their bundling.

We cross-validate these results using confirmatory factor analysis, which can help uncover whether a single latent underlying dimension is consistent with the data. Confirmatory factor analysis shows that if the three issues are bundled as belonging to one underlying factor, the model fit is poor, with a Standardised Root Mean Squared Residual of 0.138, which is above the acceptable level of 0.08 for model fit. Using the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-squared statistic to estimate the underlying structural equation model, which unfortunately does not allow the use of population and/or country weights and thus may bias the results towards larger countries, the values of the Comparative Fit Index (0.538) and Tucker-Lewis





Index (0.461) suggest poor model fit as well (cf. Pituch and Stevens 2016). In other words, confirmatory factor analysis does not suggest a single underlying latent dimension that fits the data well. This supports our findings from the exploratory factor analysis that there is no bundling of the three attitudinal indexes.

Variance					
Factor	Variance	Difference	Prop	portion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.02961	0.81206	0.43	319	0.4319
Factor2	2.21755	0.42570	0.31	.61	0.7480
Factor3	1.79185	0.84657	0.25	554	1.0034
Factor4	0.94529		0.13	47	1.1381
Loadings					
Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Uniqueness
Bad or good for economy that people come to live here from other countries?		0.8150			0.2892
Made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?		0.8156			0.2895
Extent of allowing people of a different race or ethnic group to come and live here?		0.6053			0.5877
Measures that ensure equal pay for men and women	0.7640				0.4013
Measures against sexual harassment in the workplace	0.7119				0.4778
Measures to ensure parity between men and women in politics	0.7390				0.4084

Table K. Rotated factor analysis of the pooled dataset



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Measures that target					
gender-based violence	0.6875				0.4971
Measures that target the distribution of household chores and childcare (e.g. paternal leave)	0.6450				0.5454
Measures that ensure access to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy	0.5221				0.6897
Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated.			0.7483		0.4236
Willing to decrease my personal level of consumption to actively fight climate change.				0.5685	0.4734
Climate protection measures need to be implemented, regardless of cost.				0.5994	0.4173
There are other, more pressing issues in [country] than environmental protection.			0.6315		0.5363
Climate change is just an excuse for politicians to further restrict our freedom.			0.7691		0.3666
European unification should go further.		0.4846		0.3129	0.6121

Note: Factor loadings below 0.3 are represented by blank cells for better readability of the underlying dimensionality. N = 9,811.

4.4.2 Regression Analysis: Predicting PFRP Voting Intention

In addition to the factor analysis, we conduct a regression analysis to detect whether the PFRP voters' attitudes on immigration, gender equality, and environment are associated with their intention to vote for a PFRP. To do this, we construct an additive index for each of these three issues based on the ActEU questions on each issue. The index is then



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normalised to range between 0 and 10. Low values on the indexes represent sceptical views (towards gender, migration, and environment), while high values present positive attitudes. Table M and Figure O below show the results of a series of regression models in which voting intention for the PFRPs is regressed on the indexes summing up attitudes towards the three issues. We also include models regressing the voting intention for PFRPs on individual migration, gender, and environmental attitudes (see Table I in the Appendix). Below, we graphically examine these associations through adjusted means plots. We employ countryfixed effects to avoid a potential inconsistency due to unobserved country heterogeneity and country-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All models are linear regressions estimated by the ordinary least squares technique. Models 1, 2, and 3 show the association of each index (migration, environment, and gender, respectively) with the voting intention for the PFRPs in the absence of the other two indexes. Model 4 shows the association between each index and the support for the PFRPs when we also control for the other two attitudinal indexes. Model 4 eventually becomes our baseline model, which we use to interpret results substantively. Figure M also presents adjusted means plots for the three attitudinal indexes.

When examining the association of each attitudinal index with the dependent variable individually, as shown in Models 1, 2, and 3, each index has a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. However, the gender index has the weakest substantive effect and is only significant at the 0.1 alpha threshold. Specifically, in the absence of the environment and migration indexes, the gender index still impacts the outcome, but the effect size is negligible. However, when all three indexes are included in the analysis, as evident in Model 4 and illustrated in Figure O, the gender index loses its statistical significance, and the magnitude of its effect decreases even more. Conversely, both the migration and environment indexes exhibit a statistically significant and equally substantively significant association with the voting intention for the PFRPs. The environment index's effect size is slightly larger than that of the migration index. This suggests that attitudes towards the exaggeration and costliness of climate protection measures, as well as the perception that politicians use climate change to restrict freedoms, have become as important as attitudes regarding economic and cultural concerns related to immigration.

As we discussed in our literature review section, the existing research on the support for the PFRPs has for long emphasized the importance of anti-immigrant attitudes while some recent studies (i.e., Kenny and Langsæther 2023) have started emphasizing the growing influence of climate scepticism among PFRP voters. According to the ActEU 2024 survey, which allows us to simultaneously compare these attitudes, environmental issues have also become a factor as important as immigration influencing voters' decisions to support the PFRPs. The disintegrated results in Table I in the Appendix further show that the economic dimension of anti-immigrant attitudes matters more than the socio-cultural dimension. Within the attitudes on environment, the attitude that 'climate change is used as an excuse by politicians to restrict freedoms' particularly affects the tendency to vote for the PFRPs.

This finding warrants careful attention in terms of how and why attitudes on environment have gained this level of significance among the supporters of the PFRPs in the last decade. It is beyond the scope of our study to explain the reasons for why these attitudes matter more than before; however, it is possible to make some assumptions based on other observations derived from the ActEU survey.





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Migration index -0.304*** -0.259*** (0.044) (0.043) Gender index 0.022 -0.052+ (0.026) (0.033) -0.295*** Environment index -0.332*** (0.052) (0.049) -0.125*** -0.182*** -0.149*** -0.091** EU support (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020) 0.568*** 0.617*** 0.540*** 0.532*** Left-right self-placement (0.080) (0.076) (0.083) (0.077)0.120** 0.171*** GAL-TAN placement 0.062 0.005 (0.030)(0.034) (0.038) (0.033) 0.098*** 0.044** 0.078*** Social trust 0.027+ (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) Trust in parliament 0.014 -0.009 0.011 0.030 (0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) Trust in government -0.001 -0.006 0.010 0.014 (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) 0.023 0.021 Trust in government parties 0.034 0.036 (0.085) (0.086) (0.078) (0.085) 0.017* Trust in opposition parties 0.014+ 0.014+ 0.016+ (0.007) (0.007)(0.007)(0.008) 0.290*** Political interest 0.263** 0.254*** 0.303*** (0.047) (0.058) (0.050) (0.063) Sex (=women) -0.089 -0.000 0.027 -0.023 (0.162) (0.159) (0.144) (0.149) Age -0.007 0.006 -0.000 -0.003 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) Age² -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Table M. Covariates of PFRP voting intention: attitudinal indexes





Medium education	-0.647**	-0.555**	-0.546**	-0.516**
	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.157)
High education	-0.860***	-0.876***	-0.820**	-0.757**
	(0.171)	(0.164)	(0.187)	(0.183)
Income level	-0.068*	-0.070*	-0.063*	-0.060*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Native-born	-0.228	-0.032	0.034	-0.099
	(0.205)	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.187)
_cons	3.034*	1.511	3.617*	4.405**
	(1.050)	(0.860)	(1.118)	(1.066)
N	9205	8991	9571	8514
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.332	0.313	0.335	0.355

First of all, we see that Euroscepticism continues to play a role in the support for the PFRPs, raising question marks about whether attitudes towards climate change can be triggered by the politicization of this issue by the PFRPs as a reactionary response to the EU policies on climate change (i.e., the EU Green Deal). Previous research has shown that the politicization of the issue of immigration by these parties against EU migration policies--most importantly its response to the 2015 refugee crisis--has been an important trigger for their electoral rise across Europe (Hutter and Kriesi 2021; Pirro, Taggart and van Kessel 2018). Hence, it is necessary to conduct similar deeper research into the relationship between EU environmental policies, their politicization by the PFRPs and the support for the PFRPs in the future.

On the other hand, we cannot make a similar interpretation about the potential effect of EU gender equality policies on the support for the PFRPs since gender index fails to explain the outcome. In other words, the probability is low that the politicization of gender equality issues by these parties—as we discussed in our literature—has effect on the support for the PFRPs. This could perhaps be related to the fact that as part of their civilizational discourse emphasizing European superiority versus other supposedly backward cultures, these parties are more recently inclined to frame gender equality positively (Brubaker 2017; Hadj-Abdou 2018; Akkerman 2015) as opposed to climate change and immigration.

In addition to the attitudes on environment and immigration, the results also underline the importance of other factors, among which the level of education and the voters' left-right self-placement play an essential role. The level of education (measured in a categorical way) stands out as the most important factor among others: The higher the level of education, the less likely the intention to vote for a PFRP. This finding is not surprising and corresponds to the existing accounts of how low-educated voters tend to support the PFRPs particularly in contexts with a large immigrant presence (Cordero et al. 2022). Regarding age, we do not find any evidence that middle-aged people tend to vote for the PFRPs; in fact, it is the younger people who show a slightly higher tendency to vote for these parties. Similar to what we





argue in our EVS 2017 analysis, we think the effect of age should not be exaggerated and is probably conditional on other factors.

Similar to the findings from the analysis of the EVS 2017, ActEU 2024 survey results also do not show any relationship between the political trust variables (i.e., trust in government, trust in parliament) and the tendency to vote for the PFRPs. The only trust variable that seems to matter is the trust in opposition parties even though the effect size of this variable is considerably low. This can be attributed to the fact that the PFRPs continue to be in opposition in most contexts across the EU. In contrast to our findings from the EVS analysis, we see that there is a quite visible relationship between higher political interest and the tendency to vote for these parties. Perhaps, the long-term presence of the PFRPs in the public space over the last decade has made the supporters of these parties more interested in politics (Goodliffe 2012). In fact, some recent studies underline the mobilizational effect of the PFRPs during elections which supports these findings (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015).

Our analysis brings some additional results contrary to expectations. For instance, we find that social trust plays an opposite role than expected in the tendency to vote for the PFRPs in other words, the more people trust others, the more likely they are to vote for the PFRPs. Being native does not bring any tendency to vote for the PFRPs either (see Figure P in the appendix). These unexpected results are hard to interpret without further investigation of the psychological complexities of why people make such choices. However, it is once again important to underline that the PFRPs are no longer marginal actors as they used to be; they are publicly visible, and their framings are likely to appeal to a more diverse group of people than before.





Figure O. Coefficient plot of radical right party voting intention (based on Model 4)

Note: Regression coefficients. Horizontal lines represent 95 and 90 percent confidence intervals, respectively.





Figure Q. Adjusted means of radical right voting intention (based on Model 4)



4.5 Summary of results and discussion

Our analysis of the demand side shows, to a large extent, similar results as the analysis of the supply side. Overall, we have not discovered a bundling of the three issues. In the ten countries that we analysed, immigration, gender equality and climate change do not constitute one coherent dimension. In other words, we do not see a trend that could lead to the emergence of a new socio-political cleavage in the near future based on the convergence around these three issues.

Immigration remains the unequivocally strongest predictor of the support for the PFRPs, but the environmental factors also play a role, with the gender attitudinal index being much less relevant. Interestingly, as the analysis of the ActEU dataset reveals, the climate-related factors seem to be gaining on importance in terms of influencing the citizens' support for the PFRPs. The perception of the current climate policies, particularly the view that the dangers related to climate change are exaggerated or used as an excuse to restrict freedoms by politicians seems to be one of the important drivers of the PFRP support today. Considering the ongoing impact of Euroscepticism on the public support for these parties, one can hypothesize that the EU policies of climate change can potentially trigger further politicization of this issue by the PFRPs, which ultimately helps them gain support from the voters. Yet, further research is needed to better understand the causal mechanisms behind these developments.

Our analysis also confirms another finding from the previous chapter: if we move beyond the analysis of the three policy issues of immigration, climate change, and gender equality, the two factors that stand out as having the strongest effects on the support for the PFRPs are Euroscepticism and the self-placement on the left-right spectrum; both of them exhibit a significant correlation with the positive views of the PFRPs.





Finally, the analysis of the most recent dataset also reveals some interesting changes in the way the PFRP supporters relate to politics. Most importantly, they show an increased level of interest in politics. The argument about the disengagement from and disinterest in politics of the typical PFRP voter will have to be carefully re-examined by future studies.





5 Conclusion and Policy Relevance

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This research explored the question about the attitudes of the populist far right towards three highly relevant political issues (immigration, climate change action, and gender equality) which could also form a bedrock of an emerging socio-cultural cleavage. It asked about whether these PFRPs and their supporters take similar positions regarding three clusters and whether any convergence can be detected there. However, our analysis went beyond the three issues, exploring the PFRPs' other characteristics that might be relevant for our understanding of their political roles, such as Eurosceptic attitudes, their positioning on the left-right axis, etc.

We analysed the topic by cross-nationally examining both the supply side and the demand side of the populist far right, and our research has revealed similar results for both. As far as the supply side is concerned, our analysis has yielded a complex picture of the PFRPs' political positioning in which, however, one policy domain – immigration – is clearly dominant. It is so central to the PFRPs that they can be said to essentially own the immigration issue. Immigration is also the one issue out of the three where further convergence among various PRFPs is detectable. As far as climate change and gender-equality policies are concerned, a significantly higher variability can be observed, and a similar convergence is not happening. Interestingly, a substantial overlap exists between the PFRPs and other party families in regard to some of these issues. For instance, the PFRPs take quite similar positions as some Christian Democratic parties in terms of gender equality policies.

Our study confirms that the PFRPs are strongly Eurosceptical, more distinctly and more consistently so than any other party family (including the far left which is also often Eurosceptic, but where more variability exists). Next to immigration, Euroscepticism is thus the most visible hallmark of the PFRPs as a party family. The PFRPs' attitudes to European integration nevertheless also vary, with some taking a hard Eurosceptic position (advocating for the dissolution of the EU or their country's exit) and others defending a softer stance (notably, the Polish PiS or the Spanish Vox).

The PFRPs have been gradually converging towards the far right on the left-right political spectrum. If we compare 2010, 2014, and 2019, for instance, a clear clustering around the far-right end of the spectrum is visible. What is particularly interesting is that the PFRPs gradually shift towards more right-wing economic policies (regarding issues such as tax reductions or their opposition to redistribution). In many cases, they have become more vocal proponents of such policies than parties from the Conservative party family.

The results on the demand side are slightly different, but they still exhibit a similar pattern. Most importantly, there is no evidence of the bundling of the voters' attitudes on the three issues in one coherent dimension – the same finding results from both the exploratory and the confirmatory analysis, both from the EVS 2017 data and from our own ActEU survey data. On the other hand, our analysis of to what extent the three issues play a role in the support for the PFRPs have shown somewhat different results, based on the two survey data





sets. According to EVS 2017, if all three indexes are combined, the gender- and climaterelated factors lose their significance, and the immigration factor becomes substantially more relevant in predicting the voters' support for the PFRPs. According to ActEU 2024, we have found that when all three indexes are combined, attitudes regarding climate change (i.e. the concerns that this issue is exaggerated and manipulated by politicians to restrict people's freedoms) are almost as important as anti-immigration attitudes. The attitudes towards gender equality, on the other hand, do not affect their preferences.

Another difference pertains to the type of anti-immigration attitudes. While we find antiimmigrant attitudes to have been linked both to cultural hostility and economic threats (i.e. the fear of the migrants' 'stealing jobs' from the natives) within the EVS2017, according to ActEU 2024 survey, we observe that they primarily relate to economic concerns. Still, even in the ActEU 2024 survey, the general attitude of not welcoming people of other races or ethnicities within one's own country persists.

Finally, the most recent data on the demand side show a shift in terms of the attitudes of PFRP supporters towards politics. While they were previously seen as alienated citizens, they have now become more interested in politics, and they also exhibit a higher level of social trust. This raises important questions about their political behaviour and also about whether the PFRPs can still be seen as representatives of disengaged citizens.

5.1 Policy relevant conclusions

- The emergence of a strong consistent new socio-cultural political cleavage (based on the convergence of positions on gender equality, climate change, and immigration issues) is, based on our data, not (yet) fully taking place at the moment, either on the demand side or on the supply side.
- The PFRPs continue to serve as issue owners in the policy domain of immigration and immigration serves as the key policy field both on the supply side and the demand side, linking the parties with their supporters. Here, other parties are forced to take the PFRPs' views very seriously and engage directly with voters in this critical policy field.
- The PFRPs are gradually shifting further to the right, including in economic policies. Again, a strong overlap between the parties' positioning and voters' self-placement on the political spectrum can be observed here.
- The PFRPs adapt highly to local national contexts, which may be a successful electoral strategy, but it also leads to diverse attitudes to various policy issues. Hence, a diverse range of positions are exhibited in relation to gender equality and while the PFRPs are typically rather anti-liberal, significant convergence is not visibly taking place here.
- As a result, an intense, consistent cross-national (or transnational, in the case of the EP) cooperation among the PFRPs is more likely in relation to immigration and, increasingly, climate change, but less so in regard to gender equality.
- Beyond the three policy issues that we focussed on, the supporters of the PFRPs are distinctive in terms of their Euroscepticism. On the supply side, the PFRPs too are the most salient representatives of Eurosceptic attitudes of all party families and they are likely to continue being seen as the most vocal critics of the integration process. The



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growing presence of the PFRPs in the European Parliament will likely lead to an increased political contestation in the future and a stronger opposition to deeper integration.

- Finally, despite the gradual shift of the PFRPs further to the right, a significant overlap in some topics continues to be visible between the PFRPs and the Conservative or Christian Democratics families. In the former case, this pertains to economic policies; in the latter, to the attitudes to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights.
- Data quality is a major issue if researchers are to be able to provide insights on parties' and voters' positions on the three policy fields studied climate change, gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights, and immigration. It would be useful to ensure that key survey infrastructures (e.g., the European Social Survey, the European Values Study, the Eurobarometer, etc.) as well as the CHES systematically include good quality indicators on positions of citizens and parties on these policy fields. Particularly, good quality time series that separate positions regarding the equality between women and men and positions regarding LGBTQ+ rights is essential both for citizens and for parties.





APPENDIX

Table E. Parties included in the analyses by country, year and party family classification used

Country	Year	Populist Far- Right	Conservatives	Liberals	Christian Democrat s	Social Democratic	Radical Left	Green / Ecologists	Other Populists
AT	2010	BZÖ; FPÖ			ÖVP	SPÖ		GRÜNE	MARTIN
AT	2014	BZÖ; FPÖ		NEOS	ÖVP	SPÖ		GRÜNE	Team Stronach
AT	2019	FPÖ		NEOS	ÖVP	SPÖ		GRÜNE	
CZ	2010		TOP09; ODS	VV	KDU-CSL	CSSD	KSCM	SZ	
CZ	2014	USVIT	TOP09; ODS	SVOBOD NI	KDU-CSL	CSSD	KSCM	SZ	ANO2011
CZ	2019	SPD	TOP09; ODS	STAN	KDU-CSL	CSSD	KSCM		ANO2011; PIRATES
DE	2010			FDP	CDU; CSU	SPD	LINKE	GRÜNEN	
DE	2014	AfD		FDP	CDU; CSU	SPD	LINKE	GRÜNEN; Die Tier	PIRATEN
DE	2019	AfD		FDP	CDU; CSU	SPD	LINKE	GRÜNEN; Die Tier	PIRATEN
DK	2010	DF	KF	RV; LA; V		SD	EL; SF		
DK	2014	DF	KF	RV; LA; V		SD	EL; SF		
DK	2019	DF; NB	KF	RV; LA; V		SD	EL	SF; A	
EL	2010	LAOS	ND			PASOK	DIKKI; SYRIZA; KKE	OP	
EL	2014	LAOS; ANEL; XA	ND			PASOK; DIMAR; TO POTAMI	SYRIZA; KKE	OP	
EL	2019	XA; EL	ND			PASOK; KIDISO	SYRIZA; KKE; MR25		
ES	2010		PP	UPYD		PSOE	IU		
ES	2014		PP	UPYD; Cs		PSOE	IU; PODEMOS	ICV	
ES	2019	VOX	PP	Cs		PSOE	IU; PODEMOS	Más País	
FI	2010	PS		KESK; KOK	KD	SDP	VAS	VIHR	





FI	2014	PS		KESK; KOK	KD	SDP	VAS	VIHR	
FI	2019	PS		KESK; KOK	KD	SDP	VAS	VIHR	
FR	2010	FN	UMP	MODEM; NC		PS	PRG; PCF	VERTS	
FR	2014	FN	UMP	MODEM; NC; PRV; AC		PS	PRG; PCF; Ensemble; PG	EELV	
FR	2019	RN; DLF	LR	MODEM; LREM		PS	PCF; LFI	EELV	
IT	2010	LN	PDL; AN	IdV	UDC	SL; PD; PSI	RC; SD; PdCI	VERDI	
IT	2014	LN; FdI	FI; NCD	SC	UDC	PD; SEL	RC		M5S
IT	2019	LN; FdI	FI	RI		PD; SI			M5S
PL	2010	PiS		SD	PO; PSL	SDPL; SLD			
PL	2014	PiS	KNP; SP; PR	RP	PO; PSL	SLD			
PL	2019	PiS; KONFEDER		Nowo	PO; PSL	SLD; Wiosnia	Lewica Razem		Kukiz





Table I. Covariates of PFRP support: Models with disaggregated attitudinal indexes (ActEU 2024)

	Model 5
migration_attitudes_1	-0.110***
	(0.022)
migration_attitudes_2	-0.066
	(0.040)
migration_attitudes_3	-0.088***
	(0.014)
gender_attitudes_1	0.021
	(0.029)
gender_attitudes_2	-0.008
	(0.021)
gender_attitudes_3	-0.024
	(0.028)
gender_attitudes_4	-0.011
	(0.027)
gender_attitudes_5	0.034
	(0.020)
gender_attitudes_6	-0.033
	(0.033)
environment_attitudes_1	-0.088**
	(0.023)
environment_attitudes_2	0.032
	(0.025)
environment_attitudes_3	0.047+
	(0.022)
environment_attitudes_4	-0.042+
	(0.021)
environment_attitudes_5	-0.158***
	(0.015)
EU support	-0.107***
	(0.019)
Left-right self-placement	0.503***
	(0.072)





GAL-TAN placement	0.044
	(0.034)
Social trust	0.048***
	(0.010)
Trust in parliament	0.026
	(0.045)
Trust in government	0.022
	(0.031)
Trust in government parties	0.003
	(0.083)
Trust in opposition parties	0.014+
	(0.007)
Political interest	0.296**
	(0.062)
Sex (=women)	-0.084
	(0.135)
Age	-0.014
	(0.017)
Age ²	-0.000
	(0.000)
Medium education	-0.417*
	(0.138)
High education	-0.617**
	(0.179)
Income level	-0.051*
	(0.021)
Native-born	-0.029
	(0.178)
_cons	4.495**
	(1.066)
N	8514
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.371
r2_p	
chi2	



Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ p < 0.1, ^{*} p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001

	Logit (Model 5)	Probit (Model 6)	LPM (Model 7)
migration_attitudes_1	0.917**	0.959**	0.994+
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.003)
migration_attitudes_2	0.912+	0.949+	0.990*
	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.004)
migration_attitudes_3	0.962	0.978	0.994
	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.005)
migration_attitudes_4	0.904*	0.951+	0.993
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.005)
migration_attitudes_5	0.989	0.988	1.001
	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.002)
migration_attitudes_6	0.938***	0.964***	0.995+
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.002)
environment_attitudes_1	0.964	0.983	0.996+
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.002)
environment_attitudes_2	1.032	1.022	1.006
	(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.005)
environment_attitudes_3	0.971	0.973	0.997
	(0.071)	(0.038)	(0.008)
environment_attitudes_4	1.013	1.008	1.004
	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.004)
environment_attitudes_5	0.859**	0.917**	0.988*
	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.005)
environment_attitudes_6	1.019	1.013	1.002
	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.003)
ender_attitudes_1	0.911	0.957	0.991
	(0.082)	(0.053)	(0.010)
gender_attitudes_2	0.931	0.953	0.994
	(0.118)	(0.065)	(0.011)





gender_attitudes_3	0.987	0.993	1.008
	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.005)
gender_attitudes_4	0.963	0.978	0.988
	(0.122)	(0.071)	(0.016)
gender_attitudes_5	1.209	1.113	1.026
	(0.142)	(0.073)	(0.015)
gender_attitudes_6	0.907	0.934+	0.997
	(0.073)	(0.038)	(0.008)
gender_attitudes_7	0.815*	0.900*	0.982*
	(0.076)	(0.043)	(0.006)
gender_attitudes_8	1.141	1.078	1.011
	(0.109)	(0.057)	(0.012)
EU confidence	0.654***	0.787***	0.949*
	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.018)
Left-right self-placement	1.467***	1.233***	1.043**
	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.010)
Economic left-right index	1.011	1.008	0.990
	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.008)
Medium income	1.107	1.053*	1.010
	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.007)
High income	1.298	1.133	1.020
	(0.251)	(0.108)	(0.018)
Sex (=women)	1.037	1.007	1.001
	(0.061)	(0.038)	(0.006)
Native-born	1.785**	1.336**	1.025*
	(0.347)	(0.134)	(0.009)
Medium education	0.955	0.976	0.985
	(0.231)	(0.129)	(0.030)
High education	0.551*	0.717*	0.949
	(0.140)	(0.105)	(0.039)
Age	1.076**	1.036**	1.006*
	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.002)
Age ²	0.999***	1.000***	1.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)





Social trust	0.653***	0.810***	0.977+
	(0.074)	(0.040)	(0.012)
Trust in parliament	1.035	1.011	1.006
	(0.165)	(0.085)	(0.016)
Trust in parties	0.987	1.000	0.998
	(0.090)	(0.052)	(0.011)
Trust in government	1.059	1.030	1.014
	(0.252)	(0.145)	(0.034)
Political interest	1.005	0.998	1.012
	(0.103)	(0.056)	(0.009)
_cons	0.114	0.357	1.186
	(0.220)	(0.381)	(0.244)
N	7930	7930	7930
adj. <i>R</i> ²			0.278
r2_p	0.342	0.343	

Table N. Description of the independent variables (ActEU 2024) I

Variable	Question number	Туре	Question
Migration_attitudes_1	Q18	Interval, 0-10	Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?
Migration_attitudes_2	Q19	Interval, 0-10	Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Migration_attitudes_3	Q20	Interval, 1-4	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people to come and live here?
Gender_attitudes_1	Q21_1	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures that ensure equal pay for men and women





Gender_attitudes_2	Q21_2	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures against sexual harassment in the workplace
Gender_attitudes_3	Q21_3	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures to ensure parity between men and women in politics
Gender_attitudes_4	Q21_4	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures that target gender-based violence
Gender_attitudes_5	Q21_5	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures that target the distribution of household chores and childcare (e.g. paternal leave)
Gender_attitudes_6	Q21_6	Interval, 0-10	Do you think that each of the following measures has gone too far or not far enough in your country? Measures that ensure access to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy
Environment attitudes_1	Q22_1	Interval, 0-10	Opinions on climate change and environmental protection differ widely. Please tell us how much you personally agree or disagree with the following statements. Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated.
Environment attitudes_2	Q22_2	Interval, 0-10	Opinions on climate change and environmental protection differ widely. Please tell us how much you personally agree or disagree with the following statements. I would be willing to decrease my personal level of consumption to actively fight climate change.
Environment attitudes_3	Q22_3	Interval, 0-10	Opinions on climate change and environmental protection differ widely. Please tell us how much you personally agree or disagree with the following statements. Climate





protection measures need to be implemented, regardless of cost.

Environment attitudes_4	Q22_4	Interval, 0-10	Opinions on climate change and environmental protection differ widely. Please tell us how much you personally agree or disagree with the following statements. There are other, more pressing issues in [country] than environmental protection.
Environment attitudes_5	Q22_5	Interval, 0-10	Opinions on climate change and environmental protection differ widely. Please tell us how much you personally agree or disagree with the following statements. Climate change is just an excuse for politicians to further restrict our freedom.
EU_attitudes	Q_23	Interval, 0-10	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should
			go further. Others say it has already gone too far. What number in this scale best
			describes your position?
Social_trust	Q_26	Interval, 0-10	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
Political interest	Q_28	Interval, 1-4	How interested would you say you are in politics
Trust_in_parliament	Q_38_3	Interval, 0-10	How much do you trust the following institutions and actors? Your country's parliament
Trust_in_government	Q_38_4	Interval, 0-10	How much do you trust the following institutions and actors? Your country's government
Trust_in_government_parties	Q_38_8	Interval, 0-10	How much do you trust the following institutions and actors? Political parties currently in government (national level)
Trust_in_opposition_parties	Q_38_9	Interval, 0-10	How much do you trust the following institutions and actors?





			Political parties currently in opposition (national level)
Age	Q_1	Continuous	Please provide your date of birth
Education	Q_3	Categorical, 1-3	What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?
Income_group	Q_4	Interval, 1-10	Country specific income questions.
Native	Q_13	Dichotomous, 0/1	Were both of your parents citizens of [country] since birth?
Left_right_placement	Q_16	Interval, 0-10	In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place
			yourself on this scale?
GAL_TAN_placement	Q_17_1 Q_17_2		To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
	Q_17_3		1. The government should increase taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal
			to reduce climate change.
			2. Gay male and lesbian couples should have the same rights to adopt children as
			straight couples.
			3. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children
			should learn.
Sex	Q_10_2	Dichotomous, 0/1	And what was the sex assigned to you at birth?

Table O. Descriptive statistics of independent variables (ActEU 2024) ${\rm II}$

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Min	Max
migration_index	11,391	5.157	.0229518	0	10
environment_index	12,022	5.345	.0202522	0	10
gender_index	10,990	6.626	.018138	0	10





eu_support	11,939	5.438	.0259555	0	10
left_right_self	11,689	5.186	.022877	0	10
trust_in_parliament	12,325	4.369	.0249329	0	10
trust_in_government	12,381	4.057	.0268943	0	10
political_interest	12,798	2.669	.0079145	1	4
age	13,000	45.324	.1314592	18	75
gal_tan_placement	12,101	5.838	.0201623	0	10
trust_in_opoparties	12,293	6.582	.135998	0	98
trust_in_govparties	12,293	3.905	.0267812	0	10
social_trust	12,698	4.760	.0238961	0	10
income_level	12,001	5.051	.0239073	1	10
sex	12,950			0	1
Male	6,267	48.4%			
Female	6,683	51.6%			
education	13,000			1	3
Low	1,377	10.6%			
Medium	6,917	53.2%			
High	4,706	36.2%			
native_born	12,884			0	1
Foreign	1,465	11.4%			
Native	11,419	88.6%			

Table P. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (ActEU 2024)

	Country									
	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain
N	1,300 (10.0%)									
0	460 (37.3%)	408 (33.1%)	469 (38.8%)	522 (42.3%)	444 (37.0%)	731 (59.0%)	588 (47.2%)	487 (40.8%)	605 (48.9%)	652 (53.1%)
1	69 (5.6%)	106 (8.6%)	108 (8.9%)	91 (7.4%)	60 (5.0%)	67 (5.4%)	123 (9.9%)	78 (6.5%)	98 (7.9%)	87 (7.1%)
2	46 (3.7%)	89 (7.2%)	88 (7.3%)	72 (5.8%)	40 (3.3%)	34 (2.7%)	99 (7.9%)	71 (6.0%)	55 (4.4%)	51 (4.2%)
3	52 (4.2%)	88 (7.1%)	86 (7.1%)	47 (3.8%)	53 (4.4%)	40 (3.2%)	76 (6.1%)	42 (3.5%)	39 (3.2%)	52 (4.2%)



					36		44		30	
4	58 (4.7%)	90 (7.3%)	73 (6.0%)	67 (5.4%)	(3.0%)	40 (3.2%)	(3.5%)	35 (2.9%)	(2.4%)	45 (3.7%)
		146		109				84		
5	88 (7.1%)	(11.9%)	99 (8.2%)	(8.8%)	95 (7.9%)	47 (3.8%)	89 (7.1%)	(7.0%)	62 (5.0%)	86 (7.0%)
									49	
6	80 (6.5%)	63 (5.1%)	72 (6.0%)	59 (4.8%)	62 (5.2%)	47 (3.8%)	56 (4.5%)	71 (6.0%)	(4.0%)	47 (3.8%)
					74		44			
7	66 (5.4%)	67 (5.4%)	68 (5.6%)	72 (5.8%)	(6.2%)	39 (3.1%)	(3.5%)	68 (5.7%)	53 (4.3%)	62 (5.0%)
					96					
8	82 (6.7%)	53 (4.3%)	59 (4.9%)	53 (4.3%)	(8.0%)	57 (4.6%)	41 (3.3%)	91 (7.6%)	53 (4.3%)	50 (4.1%)
									60	
9	51 (4.1%)	40 (3.2%)	34 (2.8%)	55 (4.5%)	73 (6.1%)	32 (2.6%)	35 (2.8%)	70 (5.9%)	(4.8%)	29 (2.4%)
	180			86	168			96	134	
10	(14.6%)	81 (6.6%)	54 (4.5%)	(7.0%)	(14.0%)	106 (8.5%)	52 (4.2%)	(8.0%)	(10.8%)	67 (5.5%)

Table O Description	of the independent	variables (EVS 2017)
I ADIE Q. DESCI IDUIOI	or the muchanitient	Valiadies (EVJZUI/)

Variable	Question number	Туре	Question
Migration_attitudes_1	Q26 V80	1-5 (interval)	For each of the following statements I
	5=pro-ir		read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? <i>When jobs are</i> <i>scarce, employers should give priority</i> <i>to the [native] people over immigrants.</i>
Migration_attitudes_2	Q51 V184	1-5 (interval)	Now we would like to know your
		5=pro-immigration	opinion about the people from other countries who come to live in [your country] - the immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of these people on the development of [your country]?
Migration_attitudes_3	Q52 V185	1-10 (interval)	Please look at the following statements
		10=pro-immigration	and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? / 'Immigrants take jobs away from the [native] / Immigrants do not take jobs away from the [native]'
Migration_attitudes_4	Q52 V186	1-10 (interval)	Please look at the following statements
		10=pro-immigration	and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? 'Immigrants make crime problems worse / Immigrants do not make crime problems worse.'





Migration_attitudes_5	Q52 V187	1-10 (interval) 10=pro-immigration	Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place
			your views on this scale? 'Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system / Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system.'
Migration_attitudes_6	Q52 V188	1-10 (interval) 10=pro-immigration	Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? 'It is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions / It is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions.'
Environment_attitudes_1	Q56 V199	1-5 (interval)	How much do you agree or disagree
		5=pro-environ	with each of these statements? I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution.
Environment_attitudes_2	Q56 V200	1-5 (interval)	How much do you agree or disagree
		5=pro-environ	with each of these statements? It is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment.
Environment_attitudes_3	Q56 V201	1-5 (interval)	How much do you agree or disagree
		5=pro-environ	with each of these statements? There are more important things to
			do in life than protect the environment.
Environment_attitudes_4	Q56 V202	1-5 (interval)	How much do you agree or disagree
		5=pro-environ	with each of these statements? There is no point in doing what I can for the environment unless others do the same.
Environment_attitudes_5	Q56 V203	1-5 (interval)	How much do you agree or disagree
		5=pro-environ	with each of the statement? 'Many of the claims about environmental threats are exaggerated.'
Environment_attitudes_6	Q56 V204	0/1 (dichotomous)	Here are two statements people
		1=pro-environ	sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? '1/ Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.' '2/ Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.'





Gender attitudes_1	Q25a V72	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.
Gender attitudes_2	Q25b V73	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children.
Gender attitudes_3	Q25c V 74	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? 'All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full- time job.'
Gender attitudes_4	Q25d V75	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? ' A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job
Gender attitudes_5	Q25e V76	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	is to look after the home and family.' Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.'
Gender attitudes_6	Q25f V77	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
Gender attitudes_7	Q25g V78	1-4 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.
Gender attitudes_8	Q26 V81	1-5 (interval) 1=gender stereotyping	For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.
Left Right self-placement	Q31 V102	1-10 (interval) 1=left	In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
EU confidence	Q38 V124	1-4 (interval) 4=confidence in EU	For each item listed, how much confidence you have in them? A great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? - European Union.
Education	Q81 V243	1-3 (interval) 3=high	Highest level of diploma attained





Social Trust	Q7 V31	0/1 (dichotomous) 1=can be trusted	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
Trust in Parties	Q38 V130	1-4 (interval) 4=distrust	Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? Political Parties
Trust in Parliament	Q38 V121	1-4 (interval) 4=distrust	Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? Parliament
Trust in Government	Q38 V131	1-4 (interval) 4=distrust	Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? Government
Income level	Q98 V261	1-3 (interval) 3=high	Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.
Political Interest	Q29 V97	1-4 (interval) 4=very interested	How interested would you say you are in politics?
Economic Left-Right_1	Q32A V103	1-10 (interval) 10=individual responsibility	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves VS The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.
Economic Left-Right_2	Q32B V104	1-10 (interval) 10=have to take any job	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits VS People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want





Economic Left-Right_3	Q32D V106	1-10 (interval) 10=incentive to individual effort	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? Incomes should be made more equal VS There should be greater incentives for individual effort.
Economic Left-Right_4	Q32E V107	1-10 (interval) 10=private ownership	On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? Private ownership of business and industry should be increased VS Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.
Income level	Q98 V261_r	1-3 Trichotomous 1=low	Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.
Native-born	Q65 V227	0/1 (dichotomous) 0=born in the country	Were you born in [COUNTRY]?
Sex	Q36 V225	0/1 dichotomous 0=male	Sex of respondent
Age	Q64 V226	continuous	Age of respondent (constructed)

Table R. Descriptive statistics of independent variables

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Min	Max
migration_index	15,274	4.326	.017503	0	10
environment_index	13,914	6.246	.0177299	0	10
gender_index	14,842	7.053	.0164728	0	10
eu_confidence	16,144	2.330	.0064348	1	4
left_right_self_placement	14,522	5.353	.0182055	1	10
economic_LR_index	15,179	5.558	.0139844	0	10
trust_in_parliament	16,358	2.222	.0063002	1	4
trust_in_parties	16,276	1.921	.0055054	1	4
trust_in_government	16,379	2.130	.0062814	1	4
political_interest	16,833	2.541	.0073835	1	4





age	16,771	51.342	.1368323	18	82
income_category	14,402			1	3
Low	4,972	34.5%			
Middle	4,591	31.9%			
High	4,839	33.6%			
sex	16,884			0	1
Male	7,891	46.7%			
Female	8,993	53.3%			
native_born	16,874			0	1
Foreign	1,283	7.6%			
Native	15,591	92.4%			
education	16,727			1	3
lower	3,910	23.4%			
medium	7,651	45.7%			
higher	5,166	30.9%			
social_trust	16,484			0	1
Can't be trusted	8,975	54.4%			
Can be trusted	7,509	45.6%			

Table S. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (EVS 2017)

	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain
Number of respondents									
	1,644 (9.7%)	1,811 (10.7%)	3,362 (19.9%)	1,199 (7.1%)	1,870 (11.1%)	2,170 (12.8%)	2,277 (13.5%)	1,352 (8.0%)	1,209 (7.2%)
FRP support									
0	1,235 (82.2%)	1,268 (92.4%)	2,722 (86.8%)	997 (91.7%)	1,463 (89.7%)	1,637 (93.8%)	1,567 (83.0%)	414 (48.5%)	765 (100.0%)
1	268 (17.8%)	104 (7.6%)	413 (13.2%)	90 (8.3%)	168 (10.3%)	108 (6.2%)	322 (17.0%)	439 (51.5%)	0 (0.0%)





Figure N. Predicted probabilities of radical right party support for control variables (based on Model 4) - EVS 2017 $\,$





Figure P. Adjusted means of radical right voting intention for control variables (based on Model 4) - ActEU 2024







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About ActEU

How can we conceptualize and empirically measure political trust and legitimacy beyond the usual survey question 'How much trust do you have in the parliament?'? Does the multi-level nature of European representative democracies require an identical level of citizen support at the regional, national and EU levels? How does social polarization on key policy issues of our times immigration, climate change, and gender inequality - challenge the political trust in, and legitimacy of, democratic political systems? And what can policymakers and civil society do to master these challenges? ActEU aims at finding answers to these questions pursuing two overarching goals: In phase 1, we map and investigate persistent problems of declining trust, legitimacy and representation in Europe with a particular attention to the polarization of societies and the EU's multi-level structures. Providing an innovative conceptual framework on political attitudes, behavior and representation across Europe, we establish an original empirical infrastructure based on an innovative combination of methods and newly collected quantitative and qualitative empirical data (focus groups, experimental surveys, web scraping). In phase 2, these results will flow directly into the creation of a toolbox of remedial actions to enhance political trust in and legitimacy of European representative democracies. In cooperation with a newly created Civil Society Network, Youth Democracy Labs across 13 European cities and in exchange with political cartoonists 'Cartooning for democracy', we will develop context-sensitive solutions for all polity levels and some of the most polarizing policy areas, and craft tailor-made toolkits for both policymakers and civil society and the educational sector. Finally, we deploy a differentiated dissemination strategy to maximize ActEU's scientific, policy and societal impact in activating European citizens' trust and working towards a new era of representative democracy.

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