

1 Engineering data equity: the LISTEN principles

2

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7

8 **Abstract:** Several existing and proposed international legal agreements include an “access and
9 benefit-sharing” (ABS) mechanism that attaches obligations to the use of genetic sequence
10 data. These agreements are frequently subject to critique on the grounds that ABS is either (1)
11 fundamentally incompatible with the principles of open science, or (2) technically challenging to
12 implement in open scientific databases. Here, we argue that these critiques arise from a
13 misinterpretation of the principles of open science, and that both considerations can be
14 addressed by a set of simple principles that mesh database engineering and governance. We
15 introduce a checklist of six design considerations (LISTEN: Licensed, Identified, Supervised,
16 Transparent, Enforced, and Non-exclusive), which can be readily implemented by both new and
17 existing platforms participating in benefit-sharing systems. Throughout, we highlight how these
18 principles can act in concert with familiar principles of open science (e.g., “FAIR” data).

19 Introduction

20 For as long as colonialism has existed, it has been part and parcel with the theft of both living
21 organisms and scientific knowledge. International law now recognizes that nations have a
22 sovereign right to their biological resources – a right that has been violated throughout history,
23 not just by governments but also by scientists – and should therefore be able to set the terms on
24 when and how these resources are used by the rest of the world.

25
26 This is the core idea behind “access and benefit-sharing,” a shorthand for a type of policy that
27 links access to biological samples or data (also called genetic resources in some contexts) to a
28 system that reallocates some of the benefits derived from their use [1, 2]. This approach has
29 been taken by several international agreements related to both biodiversity (the Convention on
30 Biological Diversity [CBD, 1992], the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
31 and Agriculture [2001], and the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD [2010]) and human health (the
32 World Health Organization [WHO] Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework [2011]).

33
34 Genetic sequence data – digital resources derived from physical samples – have so far been a
35 notable gap in these agreements, though some individual countries do regulate sequence data
36 in their Nagoya Protocol implementing legislation [3]. At the time of writing, CBD parties are
37 currently working to develop a multilateral benefit-sharing system for “digital sequence
38 information”; meanwhile, WHO Member States are more than two years into negotiating a treaty
39 that could establish a new Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) System, which would
40 create obligations to share a small percentage of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tools
41 developed from pandemic pathogen sequences and samples.

42
43 Proposed benefit-sharing systems for genetic sequence data are subject to two major critiques
44 [4–8]: first, that any restrictions on data access or use are incompatible with the ethos of open
45 science, and would represent a step back for the scientific community; and second, that existing
46 databases will struggle to implement new governance requirements (particularly the need to
47 track data use), creating significant burdens for both database managers and end users. But in
48 reality, open science is about dismantling barriers, not deregulation, and the space between the
49 two already includes substantial nuance about issues like data privacy and misuse. Moreover,
50 the tools through which open science is already achieved – such as data use licenses, open-
51 source software, and democratic governance – are the same ones that are needed to support
52 benefit sharing.

53
54 Here, we introduce a set of six principles for data engineering and platform governance, aimed
55 at facilitating participation in benefit-sharing systems. To contextualize these principles, we first
56 present a brief primer on the objectives of the open science movement, as well as the widely-
57 accepted FAIR principles for scientific databases and open-source software. We then describe
58 the specific steps by which databases can be designed or retrofitted for compatibility with
59 benefit-sharing obligations – and, where applicable, highlight ways that these are “solved
60 problems” for database engineering, with minimal technical barriers to implementation. Our
61 recommendations are primarily aimed at database managers, and focus on database design

62 and governance. Throughout, we assume that databases are a distinct entity from what we refer
63 to as *benefit-sharing systems*, which are the bespoke institutions that manage the
64 implementation of benefit-sharing agreements. These systems could contain the relevant
65 databases (e.g., if CBD or WHO decide to launch their own multilaterally-coordinated sequence
66 databases); alternatively, independent databases could opt into participating in a multilateral
67 system. In either case, we assume that the responsibilities of database managers are limited to
68 database design, maintenance, and user management, and that benefit-sharing systems are
69 responsible for handling other issues, such as the logistics of receiving and distributing benefit
70 materials, or any enforcement beyond database policies.

71 Open science: operationalizing the right(s) to science

72 Science is not only a global public good, but both an explicit facet of, and tool for, the
73 advancement of human rights. A “right to science” is explicitly recognized under the United
74 Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights (Art. 27) and the International Covenant on
75 Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Art. 15), with three major components: the ability to
76 access science, to participate in its process, and to enjoy the benefits. These constitute the
77 “ABCs” of open science: the right to (A) **access** scientific products, (B) **benefit** from scientific
78 advances, and (C) **contribute** to the scientific process, without discrimination or undue barriers.

79
80 Historically, the open science movement has worked to advance these principles by dismantling
81 financial, technological, legal, and cultural barriers to a free and global scientific process and its
82 products. This has included a wide array of practices, including open access and pre-peer
83 review (preprint) publications, free and open source scientific software, online data repositories
84 and rescue projects, and permissive intellectual property licensing for data and other research
85 outputs. These solutions, and the movement more broadly, have historically focused on access
86 as the most important facet of what should be “open” about science. However, the open science
87 movement has gradually recognized the value of inclusivity, and has begun to address the
88 structural barriers that prevent participation in the scientific process. For example, ensuring that
89 data sharing is free for data producers, who already bore the cost of generating the data, is one
90 of the simplest yet most efficient mechanisms to enable global participation in open science.

91
92 Unfortunately, improvements in access and contributions do not inherently solve the problem of
93 benefits: even when scientists everywhere have equal access to a global data commons, some
94 populations still see more of the benefits derived from its use. Vaccine inequity exemplifies this
95 problem: the first Covid-19 vaccines were developed, and boosters continue to be updated,
96 thanks to global genetic sequence databases. Investments in sequencing and surveillance
97 capacity in low-resource settings have improved global representation in these databases, and
98 led to faster detection and reporting of novel variants of concern [9]. But as more data has been
99 shared by scientists in low- and middle-income countries, the disparities between contributions
100 and benefits have become more, not less, pronounced: countries in the Global South are
101 inevitably given less and later access to vaccines, while intellectual property restrictions prevent
102 them from manufacturing their own products. These disparities highlight a tension between the

103 widely-celebrated ideals and the material reality of access-focused “open” science: just as you
104 cannot vaccinate with pledges [10], you cannot vaccinate with open sequence data [11].

105
106 In some fields (e.g., theoretical physics), open science may be as simple as scientists being
107 able to freely enter data into, and extract data from, an open repository. But for research with
108 immediate real-world applications – especially those that relate to public health emergencies
109 and planetary crises – the open science movement needs to develop strategies to address
110 benefits alongside access and contribution. More explicitly, frameworks are needed that ensure
111 that everyone can benefit not just from the existence of a global data commons, but also its use.
112 Without this guarantee, some contributors may not be incentivized to share data – and pressure
113 to do so anyway on the grounds of “open science” may be (or at least, be perceived as)
114 dogmatic, extractive, or colonial. No inherent tension exists between open access platforms and
115 benefit-sharing systems: in a healthy system, the latter makes the case for the former [12].

116 The FAIR principles: operationalizing access and contribution

117 The FAIR (**findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable**) principles were developed to
118 standardize scientific data sharing obligations and the corresponding development of data
119 sharing infrastructure [13]. The fifteen component principles provide a framework for the
120 preparation, archival, reuse, and long-term stewardship of research data. These principles are
121 now widely accepted across nearly all scientific fields, including in biomedical R&D [14]. In many
122 cases, the FAIR principles represent a starting point more than a comprehensive governance
123 system, particularly given their focus on general-purpose data repositories [15]. In any given use
124 case, platform development must proceed jointly with the conception and publication of basic
125 policies, tailored to the domain-specific questions and practices that a database covers [16].

126
127 The FAIR principles can also be applied to research software (FAIR4RS) [17], addressing the
128 ability of humans to examine and understand the software, as well as the ability of software to
129 interact with other software. Going beyond the general recommendation to use free and open-
130 source software, FAIR4RS recommends the use of open protocols that are reliably
131 documented, with documentation provided in machine-readable and human-readable form. The
132 FAIR4RS principles are just as relevant to data sharing platforms as the FAIR principles are to
133 the data that they host: deploying any database requires a significant amount of software
134 development, and the software itself limits what users can do with the data, and how they can
135 interact with them. Ensuring that FAIR compliant data is stored in FAIR4RS compliant data
136 platforms is a necessity to guarantee full transparency across the pipeline.

137
138 The FAIR principles respect the rights of data producers, as well as the need to protect society
139 as a whole against adverse consequences of irresponsible data use, or adverse practices of
140 data stewardship. As such, these principles can be followed even when the production,
141 analysis, and stewardship of data is subjected to strong regulations. For example, research data
142 that are subject to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can be
143 shared in FAIR formats that are “as open as possible, as closed as necessary” [18]. That the
144 FAIR principles are compatible with strong regulations on data access is a reminder that “open”

145 and “unrestricted” are profoundly different concepts, and that it is possible to meet the highest
146 possible standards of open science while regulating how data are shared and used.

147 The LISTEN principles: operationalizing benefits

148 Over the last decade, the FAIR principles have been the organizing framework for efforts to
149 improve scientific data sharing and access. However, they provide limited guidance on how to
150 ensure equitable benefits from scientific data, or how to design platforms for interoperability with
151 legal agreements that create benefit-sharing obligations. To close this gap, we introduce the
152 LISTEN principles for data equity (**Box 1**). These principles are designed to be aligned with the
153 broader mission of open science, to serve as an explicit complement to the FAIR principles, and
154 to facilitate participation in benefit-sharing systems with minimal to no hindrance to research.
155

Box 1. The LISTEN principles

Licensed: data cannot be accessed without accepting the terms of use; agreements about data use are binding and entered voluntarily, with standardized but differentiated responsibilities for particular types of users, uses, or data.

Identified: access to data is conditional on registration and authentication.

Supervised: data access is tracked comprehensively, and information on access patterns is made available to third parties as necessary.

Transparent: platforms share essential information and build trust with users and third parties.

Enforced: consequences for violating agreements are specified, enacted, and applied equally, and can include temporary or permanent loss of access to data.

Non-exclusive: data sharing on multiple platforms is not mutually exclusive or restricted.

156
157 The LISTEN principles are not meant to be a comprehensive technical blueprint for the design
158 of a data sharing platform. Instead, they provide a framework to guide the development of such
159 platforms, and suggest modes of governance and communication, supported by design and
160 engineering choices, to regulate the use of data. These principles are meant to be compatible
161 with and supplementary to the FAIR principles, and so presume an existing set of FAIR-oriented
162 priorities (e.g., databases should follow data standards that make their data interoperable with
163 other sources, and prefer non-proprietary software, tools, and protocols to distribute data).
164

165 **Licensed.** The most common critique of benefit-sharing agreements is that they create
166 restrictions on access that are incompatible with open science. This is untrue: these agreements
167 create obligations attached to data *use*, not data access. Participating platforms need only
168 distribute data under a license that articulates those obligations. Any user can accept those
169 terms, and – depending on whether and how they use the data they access – they are only
170 expected to uphold their end of the agreement. ***This is already how nearly all open access
171 scientific databases already work.*** For example, users who access data through GBIF
172 (www.gbif.org) agree to cite the digital object identifier (DOI) that is generated for their data
173 download; users who access data through GISAID (www.gisaid.org) agree to “make best efforts

174 to collaborate with representatives of the Originating Laboratory responsible for obtaining the
175 specimen(s) and involve them in such analyses and further research using such Data.” Users
176 who fail to meet their obligations are regularly subject to penalties, including loss of access. In
177 stark contrast to calls for a “decoupled multilateral mechanism [that] decouples access and use
178 of individual sequences from benefit-sharing requirements and instead requires benefits further
179 downstream in the value chain” [19], licenses confer the greatest protections to data producers,
180 as they do not hinge upon the good faith of data users to ensure the redistribution of benefits.
181

182 Access to LISTEN-adherent databases must be subject to a user agreement and data license
183 that (1) formalizes any obligations as they relate to benefit-sharing, and (2) formalizes other
184 expectations for data access, submission, and other use of the platform (including those we
185 discuss below). The agreement of users to adhere to the principles is implied by continuous use
186 of the data, and cannot be rescinded. For compatibility with the FAIR principles, there should be
187 no restriction of who can access data beyond their ability to accept the user agreement, and
188 individual researcher access to data must always be free (distinct from any financing obligations
189 that organizations have to participate in benefit-sharing systems). Consent to the user
190 agreements must be explicit, and informed by a plain-language summary of the terms in
191 addition to a reference version. Platforms may also consider socializing their terms of use
192 through educational resources about why and how they participate in benefit-sharing systems,
193 including the purpose of these systems and their impact, and why user cooperation is important.
194 These practices have notably been used by the Creative Commons organization (e.g.
195 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en>).
196

197 Data should be distributed under a global license: the same license should apply to all data
198 shared on the platform, but the license may create different obligations for different categories of
199 user, or different kinds of data. Other specific points to address might include:
200

201 *Data versus metadata:* Depending on how “data” is defined in benefit-sharing agreements,
202 databases should consider making unregulated metadata publicly available, so that users can
203 evaluate whether databases contain the data they need before they agree to the terms of use.
204 This point would allow the rapid adoption of the LISTEN principles by existing databases that
205 may elect to keep access to metadata (species sequenced, date and location of observation,
206 etc.) public with no restriction, but require authentication to access the actual sequence data.
207

208 *Dual publication:* If users can access the data they want from a platform without benefit-sharing
209 obligations, they may be able to circumvent these systems. To some extent, this is unavoidable,
210 particularly given that scientists must be free to share data on multiple platforms (see the
211 section ‘Non-exclusive’ below). However, terms of use should be inseparable from data after the
212 point of publication, meaning that users should be forbidden from republishing the data they
213 have accessed (and did not submit) onto other platforms.
214

215 *Academic versus commercial use:* Widely used licenses – not only for scientific data, but also
216 creative work – already regularly distinguish between types of users; for example, the Creative
217 Commons licenses include options that limit commercial use (e.g., ‘CC-BY-NC’). User

218 agreements can make the same distinctions, particularly given that most proposed benefit-
219 sharing agreements are likely to do the same. In some cases, use will supersede user: for
220 example, commercial applications of academic research may be subject to the same principles
221 – if not the same specific obligations – as other commercial applications. Licenses may also
222 establish other concurrent obligations on specific uses and users that go beyond compliance
223 with benefit-sharing agreements: for example, obligations for use in academic research can be
224 designed following the Joint Declaration of Data Citation Principles [20], or more explicitly
225 decolonial principles about collaboration [21].

226
227 *Specific categories of data:* Legal agreements may create specific obligations for particular
228 kinds of data, meaning that databases will need to track these distinctions. For example,
229 benefit-sharing obligations may be different for sequences of pathogens with pandemic
230 potential, or those that are involved in ongoing public health emergencies. Similarly, distinct use
231 restrictions or obligations may be developed that reflect and respect Indigenous data
232 sovereignty. The LISTEN principles are, by design, extensible: they do not specify what the
233 terms of the license should be, only the minimum points the license should address.

234
235 **Identified.** Despite the occasional claim to the contrary, anonymity has never been a central
236 tenet of open science, and in many cases, would only subvert accountability within the scientific
237 community. Authentication is a reasonable and nearly trivial step at the scale of individual
238 access to data, particularly compared to the benefits it brings even in the absence of a formal
239 benefit-sharing system: protections on the rights of data producers, including proper attribution
240 of provenance and intellectual credit, and the associated incentive to share data.

241
242 In LISTEN-adherent databases, access to data must require authentication, and users must be
243 required to share sufficient information for the platform to identify their obligations under the
244 data license (e.g., country of origin; whether they are an academic or commercial user).
245 Requiring users to share this information does not create an inherent risk for confidential,
246 competitive, or commercially sensitive work (e.g., development of medical countermeasures).
247 However, platforms must be accountable for keeping user identity and activity data secure.

248
249 Technical barriers to authentication are low, even for existing databases. In some cases, this
250 process can be streamlined by allowing login through platforms such as the Open Researcher
251 and Contributor ID (ORCID; www.orcid.org) [22]. ORCID serves primarily as a system for name
252 disambiguation, but can also be used to authenticate users when querying data through a web
253 API. ORCID identifiers are lifelong [23], and contain information about employment history [24],
254 meaning that identifiers can be automatically matched to different categories of data use
255 obligations. The ORCID system also tracks publications, which directly enables tracking of
256 compliance with data use policies [25]. ORCID is already a default provider for the
257 overwhelming majority of publishers and a growing number of funding agencies.

258
259 **Supervised.** Debates about the traceability of sequence data have primarily focused on data
260 forensics: namely, whether data provenance can be reconstructed from stand-alone data after
261 they have been used (e.g., by a commercial entity), and plausibly, after they have been

262 manipulated to conceal their origin. This will often be difficult or impossible, especially if the data
263 in question have been shared on multiple platforms, some of which allow unauthenticated
264 access. To minimize ambiguity after the fact, databases should focus on documenting data
265 access as a precursor to use. Each instance of access must be logged, timestamped, and
266 attributed to an identified user, and attached to a full account of which data were queried and
267 whether they were downloaded. This information should be accessible by data submitters upon
268 request. Some platforms go even further, like GBIF, which openly publicizes all citations and
269 uses of the data it curates in a way that can be searched automatically, programmatically, and
270 anonymously (<https://techdocs.gbif.org/en/openapi/v1/literature>).

271
272 Data should only be accessible through supervised methods. To this end, platforms should
273 minimize cases where raw data are exposed on the front-end (e.g., where raw sequences are
274 visible alongside metadata, even in built-in data visualization or analysis tools). Platforms should
275 implement features that minimize the use of web-scraping tools, and use automated safeguards
276 to detect and block these or other attempts to bypass supervised access.

277
278 The need for supervised access does not prevent programmatic access to data. Data requests
279 using an API can be done by an individually identified user, through protocols like OAuth2,
280 bearer tokens, etc. Many platforms that are already widely used in biodiversity management
281 (e.g., the GBIF and IUCN platforms) and public health (e.g., GISAID) already enforce the use of
282 logins for data access, but their treatment as open databases is undisputed.

283
284 **Transparent.** Transparency is essential to build trust between data generators, data users, and
285 the platform, and to ensure that legal issues arising from the use of data can be adjudicated.
286 LISTEN-adherent platforms need to consider several facets of transparency.

287
288 *Technology:* Platforms may simply share their source code, or may use existing open source
289 and FAIR4RS-adherent software (e.g., Loculus; <https://github.com/loculus-project/loculus>). This
290 is particularly important as a complement to strong enforcement: users and third parties must be
291 able to see how the platform works, even if they have had their access to data limited.

292
293 *Governance:* Decision-making protocols should be publicly available, with public authorship,
294 and a comprehensive and permanently-available version history. Changes in platform terms of
295 use should be announced well in advance, and only impact future submissions or access.
296 Documentation must include policies related to enforcement and disclosure of confidential data.

297
298 *Security:* In the event of data breaches, platforms must clearly communicate with users to
299 identify who was affected, and take the necessary steps to mitigate impacts, e.g., publicly
300 requesting that other databases remove data that have been duplicated without permission.

301
302 *Impact:* Many data platforms already track and share information on the scientific research that
303 cites a given dataset (a process that is facilitated by publication of a unique dataset DOI), or
304 publish periodic reports on trends in data use and the associated impact on various scientific
305 fields [26]. In addition to showcasing how scientific research benefits from open data sharing,

306 editorial exercises of this nature are essential to demonstrate the long-term value proposition of
307 a platform. In the same spirit, databases should consider publicly tracking benefit sharing, or
308 connect to external platforms that serve a similar purpose (e.g., the CBD ABS Clearinghouse:
309 <https://www.cbd.int/abs/theabsch.shtml>). Benefits should be clearly linked back to specific
310 datasets and contributors, and whenever possible, this information should be shared publicly
311 without restriction. This will help communicate the incentives for scientists to share data with the
312 global community – and, as applicable, for governments to allow them to do so.

313
314 **Enforced.** No software or user agreement can fully prevent misuse. Databases should be
315 designed with the expectation that some users will eventually engage in accidental or deliberate
316 violation of policies, and may try to actively subvert the terms of use. Examples that have been
317 raised in the course of CBD Conference of Parties and WHO Member State negotiations
318 include: academic users might share data with commercial entities “off the books”; data may be
319 re-published without permission in non-adherent databases with the “serial numbers scratched
320 off”; or users might use synonymous mutations to mask data provenance. These violations are
321 technically possible, but they are not an argument against the existence of benefit-sharing
322 systems, just as the continued possibility of a criminal act does not argue against the existence
323 of a law. Users are also strongly disincentivized from these behaviors at several points: data
324 licenses and user agreements should be legally-enforceable contracts; academics can face
325 lifelong loss of career prospects, and even criminal penalties, for data manipulation or other
326 academic dishonesty; and commercial entities who are caught in the act of dishonesty will
327 surely face severe blowback from regulators and in the court of public opinion (particularly if, for
328 example, they have misled the public or the government about what went into a vaccine).

329
330 Nevertheless, accidental or deliberate violations of data use agreements (of any size) should be
331 expected. Data platforms should have an accountable body that can proactively identify and
332 address these violations in a timely manner; this process can be partially automated (e.g., using
333 web scrapers to track peer-reviewed papers), but will almost always require human
334 involvement. User agreements must include tiered consequences for violations of different
335 magnitudes, including temporary or permanent suspension from access to the platform.
336 Depending on the circumstances, platforms could share documentation about alleged violations
337 with data producers and relevant third parties (organizations coordinating benefits sharing,
338 universities, etc.); they may also wish to keep public records of banned users or specific
339 violations.

340
341 Enforcement will often require cooperation with third parties: most obviously, databases may
342 need to work with other organizations to identify users who are failing to meet benefit-sharing
343 obligations and respond appropriately. Similarly, different data platforms can collaborate about
344 violations, and work together to exclude bad-faith users. Scientific journals can also work with
345 LISTEN-adherent databases to prevent re-archival of data used in publications (and to avoid
346 confusion when scientists are otherwise required to share their data).

347
348 **Non-exclusive.** The ability to freely participate in the scientific process – to share data without
349 restriction – is essential, not just as a principle of open science, but as a protection on scientists

350 from state censorship. Some recent proposals for access and benefit-sharing have suggested
351 that governments should require scientists to share data only on compliant platforms. This
352 would weaken an important norm, and in doing so, opens the door for the opposite problem:
353 government restriction of scientists' participation in platforms that support benefit-sharing. Given
354 the financial interests aligned against benefit-sharing, this risk must be taken seriously.
355

356 LISTEN-adherent databases must allow scientists to both access and contribute data to as
357 many platforms as they see fit – including platforms that do not participate in benefit-sharing
358 systems or adhere to the LISTEN principles. To prevent possible license violations from being
359 flagged unnecessarily, platforms should require submitters to disclose other platforms where
360 data have been shared, both at the point of submission and on an ongoing basis. Linkage
361 across databases should be facilitated by fields for both project-level identifiers (e.g., NCBI
362 BioProject identifiers) and record-level identifiers (e.g., GenBank accession numbers). Scientists
363 may still elect to share their data exclusively on platforms that participate in benefit-sharing
364 systems, and in doing so, can use their “vote” to support a particular model of scientific equity.
365

366 More broadly, data platforms have an obligation to advocate for governments, funding agencies,
367 and international organizations to adhere to the LISTEN principles, including minimizing any
368 restrictions on where scientists can share data. Doing so will prevent any apparent (and
369 avoidable) tension between the “benefit” and “contribute” pillars of open science.

370 Conclusion

371 The LISTEN principles articulate a framework that can ensure the rights of data producers and
372 operationalize systems for broader societal benefits, all while maintaining open access in
373 accordance with the FAIR principles. The technical barriers to implementation are low,
374 *especially* for existing databases that already follow best practices for open science (e.g.,
375 ensuring that data are cited). As such, these principles are not only recommendations to
376 database managers, but a potential template for the requirements that benefit-sharing
377 agreements impose on participating databases.
378

379 The question of how to operationalize access and benefit-sharing is therefore all but a solved
380 problem in terms of data engineering. Some databases, such as the new Pathoplexus database
381 for pathogen genetic sequence data [27], are even on standby, waiting for pending international
382 agreements to settle on terms so they can begin to operationalize them. The problem, then, is
383 political willpower and consensus-building: negotiators should be confident in the fact that,
384 whatever gauntlet they throw down, the open science movement will easily rise to the challenge.

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