AI as an "Object": A critique of Graham Harman's ideas on the AI

This article tackles the question of artificial intelligence from an object-oriented ontological perspective, arguing that if we want to take seriously the uniqueness of non-human entities—a nod back to Grimes—we mustn’t too hastily cast aside generative artificial intelligence as Graham Harman has recently done in, seemingly, an odd return to anthropocentrism. Nia pushes back on Harman to argue that if one is to take object-oriented ontology seriously in the context of generative artificial intelligence—especially following Harman’s own account of objects in his Luther esque “Seventy-Six Theses on Object-Oriented Philosophy”—one must admit that there seems to be no reason to privilege the human as some entity with unique access to two features which now seem
key for Harman’s ontology qua aesthetics: ‘spectatorship’ and ‘curatorship.’ While there is much to be done, Nia sets the foundations for a unique understanding of artificial intelligence.