

Language Production

Part 1 of 2 Parts Series

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ABSTRACT

There are two parts to this work. In this Part I, we will analyze various aspects that condition the production of conventional language. For this purpose, we will describe the biological elements that intervene the production of the word and then stop at the psychological aspects of production, something that we will do through an approach to one of the most critical pragma-linguistic manifestations: ‘(dis)politeness.’ Finally, in a Part II, we will analyze one of the most known production models of those proposed by Psycholinguistics, which, that considers the processes involved in the production of language are of the psychological/cognitive type, something that also supports Cognitive Psychology. We will conclude this study with the proposal of a model of conventional language production from their ‘junction’ with natural language, that is, how one ‘transforms’ into the other; a transformation that is possible given series of bio-psyche processes and mechanisms.

Keyword: Conventional language, natural language, models of language production, Psycholinguistics, Transcursive Logic.

CITATION:

Salatino, D. R. (2017). “Language production – First part” *Inter. J. Res. Methodol. Soc. Sci.*, Vol., 3, No. 4: pp. 5-21. (Oct. – Dec. 2017); ISSN: 2415-0371.
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1322643>

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In this work, we will unravel aspects that deal with the production of ‘conventional language.’ We do not include here the ‘natural language’ (See Appendix) since there is no production of, but only acquisition and understanding, aspects that will be the object of study in another work. The above has a tremendous importance since it is suggesting that all methods of production that are currently used to try to elucidate how our language has no basis.

The lack of fundamentals is not synonymous with uselessness. It is more than proven that there are many practical methods to correct and improve the use of our everyday language and that the speculations made on the mechanisms of linguistic production, are useful for evaluating the progress made.

It can be questionable, about the meaning of trying to investigate the possible biological and psychic mechanisms involved in the production, when in practice and this is what production is about, what we have is enough.

This article would not make any sense if both psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics and even neurosciences in general, will not pose the language as the engine of brain change. Try from this perspective, achieve the location of brain functions that affect the mechanisms of speech or specify the biological aspects of the communicative process and not projected to the acquisition of language and even beyond, trying to explain the aphasia. But as it is not what happens, on the contrary, we are authorized to propose a different and fundamental vision, which although it does not change anything achieved so far. It would give the scientific aspect that is proclaimed so much today, but not shown on these issues.

2.0 BIOLOGY AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE WORD

The phonic apparatus will not be treated here, because strictly speaking, it is not part of the human sensory system; I mean, that is not why we differ from the rest of the animals, but by the fact of being able to emit words and not just screams, grunts or moans.

Having discarded the instrument of phonation from the analysis, we should also dispense with phonological aspects because they do not provide elements that allow us to know how the word is produced, which, without hesitation, is not only because we can skillfully move our tongue. Once cleared the field of study of the physiological part of the speech process, we will begin to consider how and where is the generation of the connection with the ‘natural language,’ which is the basis of projection from which the ‘conventional language’ that allows communication as a social phenomenon.

In a previous work where we talked about the acquisition of ‘natural language’ (Salatino, 2012, p.127). We reviewed some aspects that told us about the mechanism that explains the suggestive acquisition speed of language, and we also said that the ‘conventional language’ arose when it began to ‘fill in’ this bio-psychic disposition acquired during the first 18 months of life.

With the above, it gives the impression that we have relegated the ‘conventional language’ to a mere epiphenomenon, as some cognitivists do with thinking concerning brain activity. Here ‘fill’ does not refer to a passive or secondary process whereby the words are thrown into a box so that they ‘fit’ into some predetermined ‘cell.’ But to an active process that allows that the ‘psychic word’ (Salatino, 2014, p. 182) acquired in the initial phases of early childhood and connected with the everyday word, the ‘code.’

The previous process is similar to what happens with protein in biology. The protein is a chain of amino acids manufactured according to what the DNA dictates, and which in our case corresponds to the ‘psychic word.’ However this newly produced protein does not fulfill any practical function for the organism, that is, it is a structure without evident purpose, although this feature is implicit in its construction. The use of this protein depends on of its folding. A particular spatial arrangement allows it to perform the function for which it was manufactured (to be an active part of a muscle, to be an enzyme, to be a hormone, etc.).

In our case, the ‘ordinary word’ fulfills the ‘enabling function,’ the folding that makes manifest the phenotypic of the language, for calling it consistently. That is, how the words that the child is acquiring by imitation are seen and used, which gives him the definitive characteristics that linguists observe in each ‘conventional mother tongue,’ which is what we learn from our parents.

The ‘subjectivon’ (See Appendix) psychically inherited from the mother dictates which functions will be fulfilled by each kind of word, for example, that the nouns of Spanish, are verbs in Hopi, or that there are only verbs or words that can fulfill any function according to the context. That is to say, what constituted the three groups of languages defined by Hengeveld (1992, p. 68): flexible, specialized and rigid, as a product of a conjunction of the hereditary derived from tradition and the acquired culture. They conform to socio-cultural norms causing the establishment of the everyday language.

So far the ‘biological’ that derives from the psychic. Now we will see the biological that derives from the brain. Because of the limitation imposed by us from the beginning, we will not deal here with the cortical areas assigned to the production of language, but with the configuration of PAFs that make speech possible.

The ‘fixed action patterns’ (FAP) are the automated routines that give foundation to the habits and the fundamental stones that structure the ‘operative memory.’ (Salatino, 2014, p. 114)

This type of specialized reflexes originate in the same moment in which the child suckles for the first time, and they are formed and differentiated one by one in response to each stimulus that reaches the baby and constitutes the first operational psycho-biological structure.


The automation that manages to make the processes independent of biological needs is the key to life because it is the way in which the brain prepares in advance responses to different stimuli. This sort of ‘prediction of the future,’ far from being an esoteric rhetorical contraption, is what allows the bio-psycho-social development and adaptation shown by man.

The first FAP is a psychic structure projected to the biological and arises from the conjunction between a desire and a need. Which from here are linked by a complicated relationship; they are opposite since the first by the memory of a satisfying or pleasurable experience and the second due to dissatisfaction. They are complementary since the first one contributes the non-inherited voluntary imposition that moves to live and the latter represented the instinct or involuntary impulse and inherited to preserve life, and in short, they are concurrent or simultaneous.

In Figure 1, we can see the conjugation of the different aspects that arise from the evolution of the ‘germinal change’ since, in subjective reality, everything begins with a change (Salatino, 2009, p. 96). These manifestations appear when an ‘undifferentiated change’ becomes irreducible in some aspects, such as a ‘somatic change’ that generates a vital urgency perceived as dissatisfaction (V_1). An ‘external change’ that contributes to correct the previous imbalance (V_2).

Figure 1: PRIMITIVE FAP

References: V_0 : Irreducible change - V_1 : Unpleased / Pleasure - V_2 : External change V_3 : Specific action (response)



The two previous changes are interrelated by a specific action such as the activation of the suction reflex, crying and later, more complex acts (V_3). All the changes characterized so far are readily observable in appearance; they are superficial or obvious. Their interrelations are only possible due to the rest of the primordial change that underlies the mere presence and that far from becoming irreducible in some sense, it remains intact, hidden and active without loss, completely conserving its entity even though the whole has changed, struggling between oppositions and complementarities. We will characterize this particular change, not because we can put it directly in evidence, but because of its apparent manifestations, those that determine on the surface, the alternation between the other changes or the predominance of one over another.

In this way, emerge a ‘dialectical universe’ (In the Hegelian sense) that is affected by the permanent change that represents the transformation that leads each of the superficial aspects to become its opposite, without ceasing to be him. The mutation that is mediated by some aspects of the same change and supported by the change that remains unchanged (V_0), the only constant and responsible for maintaining the vitality of this primitive system. It should be clear that the fundamental thing, from the structural point of view, is the relationships and not the related elements, which are nothing more than the results of the relational confluence. In this nascent system and henceforth, ‘things’ are not represented, but ‘functions’ and in this way, have structured the psyche and the ‘natural language simultaneously.’ (Salatino, 2012)

Once completed the previous process, the biological FAP arises at the level of the neuronal circuits of the cortex, the one that it will execute and from there on it will automate the responses. This process is the same for any behavior that man manifests as behavior. The learning process includes everything you need to do to pronounce from an isolated letter to a whole word, that is, coordinate the different muscle groups, both those that govern the vocal cords and those that handle the oral cavity, to associate it with the word that the child hears from his elders. When it succeeds in imitating the word in question more or less correctly it is fixed in the entire coordinated mechanism in the ‘operative memory.’ Which will trigger when a future stimulus is structured as a fact with apparently the same characteristics as the one that gave rise to FAP, and require the pronunciation of this word. As said, then, the speech that conveys everyday language, derived from the common mother tongue, arises from a behavior that triggers a specific conduct. In other words, an unconscious process, such as the generation of FAP derives into a conscious activity, such as talking, whose substrate is not in consciousness.

The child, imitating his elders, begins after 18 months to link his natural language, already acquired, and what will be in the future, his everyday maternal language. If everything goes well, at approximately four years of age, he will have learned enough to be able to express correctly organized what is dictated by the ‘universal language’ that his mother gave him. From 5 years on, he only has to acquire more vocabulary to express with ease what he thinks, his guesses and the products of his imagination.

3.0 PSYCHIC ASPECTS OF PRODUCTION

Production relates to the word. This obvious statement, expressed in this study, is more than it seems. Since the ‘everyday word’ with which related the production is possible thanks to the ‘psychic word.’ That is that the origin of what we are talking about is in the psyche, but the final product is not there, nor is it directly related to any psychological process. The language in use is the place of confluence of the three subjective elements of natural language: the biological, by behavior; the psychological by the knowledge and the social, by the tradition.

3.1 Psychic characterization of the word

The thought is the evidence of the interrelationship between sense and facts, something real that is impossible to retain in the conventional language; the unsayable, precisely because its origin is the experience or something that integrates complexly, desire and belief through an idea.

To think is to make transparent the ambiguity of the meaning conveyed by the everyday language; thinking is to make sense of reality; think is ultimately display the flag of our truth when it has fulfilled a desire own; that is, when in our feeling a belief arises.

As a counterpart the conventional language is not a direct transmission of our thoughts or our experiences, that is strictly subjective; instead, it is one of the several possibilities to make credible to others the presumed true that this contains.

The principle of identity operating in everyday life depends on both the linguistic subject, as the ontological subject, going on through the psychic subject. The linguistic subject tied to a predicate, the psychic subject to the specific actions, and the ontological subject to the object properties. Thus, the appearance invades this reality.

For operating socio-culturally, or what is the same, the subject to become an individual (or social subject) and then in person (or social actor), necessarily must be cleaved in an objective subject and a subjective subject and distributed at different levels or contextures in their subjective reality. No regular expression can transmit the subjective so constituted. In other words, the truth so understood gives meaning to the facts, only if the achieved knowledge that will lead to their interpretation and thence to comprehension. That validates a lifetime experience, something that mere linguistic description can’t convey, as it responds to an outright convention that is not related to the origin of what is transmitted.

Talking, in where reigns the urgency to recount our experiences, constructs the need for our explanations must be credible; what transforms us into accomplices of the intentions, of our own affective life which only appears from time to time when we allow ourselves to be ironic, or we relate a dream. We usually, studied the word from different approaches: phonological, formal or morphological, functional, semantic. In any case it is always a linguistic approach, which although complex and extensive is limited by superficial.

The limitation from the linguistic perspective is given mainly because the word is considered a symbol with the extra-linguistic referent, acquires the status of a particular type of ‘cognitive representation’ of such reference. Thus, in the relationship between a word (phonological form) and the external world are traditionally involved three aspects: 1) the expression, 2) the concept with which it is associated or meaning, and 3) the thing to which it refers or referent.

With multiple references and unique but ambiguous meanings, the word, for the language determines the ‘mental representation’ that we have of an infinity of referents. It works, through the

meaning as a composite conceptual entity, that is, indicates the concept that has the word and tells us about their properties.

There are different semantic theories, and, therefore there are different definitions of meaning. Ranging from a kind of abstraction, a set of referents evoked by a word, to those that included in a set, where it is possible to observe a gradation of semantic features, aggregates to a prototypical central meaning.

The meaning of a word, for being a complexity a unified that participates as much in the 'mental process' as in a social exchange, is seen as a privileged element to address the study of thought and language in full. Because, it allows a real analysis of causal-genetic relationships between the growth of the child's thinking ability and their subsequent social development.

The linguistic limitation, arises when considering the word embodied in the meaning whether in semantic form (literal) or pragmatic (of the speaker), that is, in the superficial of language. Therefore, there is no possibility to provide, from its focus, anything of value that is used to characterize any cognitive process.

The reader will undoubtedly be thinking that I have not been exhaustive in my views as to what 'cognitive,' as there are others proposals. Such as neural theory of language of Feldman (2006) and the Neurocognitive Linguistics of Lamb (2011). That supposedly, to invoke the brain as a substrate of language (its point of 'biolinguistic' view, rejecting by something hard cognitivist), as somehow, that of Chomsky (2007) or that of Givón (2005), attempting to be more than wishful, constitutes a possible explanation of mental phenomena. These, now, from this cognitive stance and whimsical way are evidenced by language as the word instead of being regarded as a symbol that depends on a conventional meaning. Merges with the brain and thought becomes 'physical,' that is, the ideas and concepts contained in it are physically 'calculated' by brain structures. The reasoning now, in this approach, it becomes a game of activation/inhibition of specific neuronal groups which can form right networks where the word, in the best case, is scattered in a myriad of nodes that in itself does not represent anything.

What do we mean when we talk about characterizing the word psychically? Human experience communicated as a foundational aspect of subjectivity through language being in the use of the word where some fundamental elements of subjectivity are evident.

Since the language shows superficially, through their meanings, the socio-cultural aspects of man, the apparent constancy of some expressive categories, beyond any cultural or social setting, makes us fall into the error of considering that all subjective experience is posed and locates in and for the common word.

We will discuss only two of these expressive categories that we usually handle when we talk and say but, not in our thinking. They are the person and the time, because in them lies the livelihood of all subjective: the self as subject and time as the motor of psychic functioning.

It is essential to see how language addresses these two elements when interpreting the speech and communication. I'm not referring to the 'meaning' of which addresses the semantics, nor the 'intention' or what is assumed pragmatically through argumentation, but the 'meaning' as emergent which is what should be addressed by Psychology and the Psycholinguistics.

From the perspective of language relating to individuality in every subject, as the evocation of the Ego, in an instinctive way, explicitly or not, the pronoun *You* together to oppose to *He*, which determines the very possibility of discourse, being all this independent of culture. Furthermore, this way of transmitting the individual experience is inherent in the way that generates and transmits the person in discourse, as an individual who speaks. This Ego, in the communication, alternately switches status; who that hears links it to another, that it is he, and when this speaks assumes the Ego by own account. From the Linguistic of discourse, this dialectic is considered one of the mainsprings of subjectivity and the substrate on which is built a poorly understood intersubjectivity.

We should note that the above presents an unclear picture and as such, a misinterpretation inductor. Such confusion is between subject and individual that under any point of view are the same. Individuality is not the same as subjectivity. An individual is that which maintains a life in

relation to the other; regulated by rules and that which gives meaning to the existence of conventional language and, therefore, speech occurs. In this situation, all pronouns (I, you, he, etc.) is nothing more than empty forms, who wear the ‘conceptual fancy dress’ that lends the discursive activity. All this tells us very little about the subject that underlying, and much less, of the origin and sense of these exteriorizations. Subjectivity is not made manifest of nor in the structure nor the functions of conventional language.

Among the linguistic forms that reveal the individual experience, and not the subjective one, perhaps the most notable are those which express time. The conventional language operates over time in a very different way to the psyche. A vulgarized conception of the relationship between the temporal and the word assigns to the verb exclusive ownership of time management, which leads to the general belief that some languages do not have items for time management, by not having verbs. The above is an error because the expression of time is compatible with any linguistic structure since it is the substrate, which when emerging to the surface, allows from our thought, the act of talking.

Another common mistake is to consider that a language reproduces the ‘objective time’ (*Krónos*) and, therefore, what happens in reality. The above occurs primarily in the languages belonging to the Indo-European family, those who speak about 50% of the world’s, and from where it derives the temporal conception that has Western Science.

Is necessary to distinguish at least three different notions of time to comprehend how it manifests in the language, which are those that deal with the previously characterized subjects:

- (a) External or chronological time (*Krónos*)
- (b) Linguistic time
- (c) Internal or psychical time (*Aión*) (Salatino, 2009)

The external time (*Krónos*), physical, objective, chronological or date of an event, is the addressed by science, and has following main features:

- (1) Discrete
- (2) Quantitative
- (3) Linear
- (4) Unidirectional: because it goes from a “before” to an “after,” and therefore is ...
- (5) Irreversible, and
- (6) Superficial

The linguistic time is one that is organically linked to the common word and, thus, constitutes a function of discourse, centered in the ‘present.’ By the latter resembles the previous one, since apparently, our life does not flow, but develops into an ‘eternal present,’ implied in everyday language. This present is ‘reinvented’ whenever someone speaks, something similar to what the science does with differential equations that invent or create a new world every time you evaluate a given period by highlighting about what has just passed, but without saying nothing while everything happens.

The other two temporal references that handle language: the past and the future, show the present as a line that separates what is gone, of what will be, but without representing any time, but a kind of temporal projection, going backward or forwards from the present time. While there are three times, all three are present, as Plotinus said: the present when I speak, the present of the past that is called memory, and the present of hope, which is called future. It is important not to confuse the name of a verb tense, with the way we use it to talk about time, nor with the time.

The shape of the past is not missing in any language, and sometimes is double or triple. However, a specific form for the future can often be absent, replaced in these cases by a combination of the shape of the present with some other grammatical particle.

The verb is the only lexical category (Word with its meaning and reference.) that besides of the time’s morpheme (Minimal fragment of a word that can express a meaning.), has the modality

and the aspect; the latter being a temporary complement so to speak because it tells us whether is finished or not the action.

The psychic or internal time (*Aión*) is the subjective time and is characterized by being:

- (1) Continuous;
- (2) Qualitative;
- (3) Periodic;
- (4) Recurrent: going by the past, present, and future, and
- (5) Deep

The importance of management of temporality in language lies in how this affects the communication process.

The speech act is necessarily individual, and if I count today, something happened to me yesterday the past is referred; in this regard, to this speech act, so this ‘time’ relates only to my personal experience. However, in all this, something curious happens and seemingly impossible: the interlocutor assumed my temporality as their own. The same will happen to me, when he talks to me.

This ‘synchronization’ is nothing but a practical manifestation of resonance in which enter the internal times, something that promotes *Kairós*. That is a detail that can guide the interpretation of the ‘cognitive’ in the use of the word, that is, a firm foundation of the phenomenon of comprehension of the language, a mechanism that operates as a factor of intersubjectivity. When the unipersonal it becomes omnipresent and is establishes the difficulty of working from the psychic function, we will face the ghost that haunts linguistics in all its cognitive branches. For this reason, acquires various names: meaning, intentionality, conceptualization, epistemic modality, argumentation, category, prototype, etc. This last condition is the only one that allows communication when considered as strictly linguistic, that is, which results in dialogue. The psyche does not have dialogue! Therefore, it cannot be approached from the conventional language.

The proper linguistic articulation, the necessary interpretation apprehended from the discourse, the sensitive, memory itself, should not be considered as part of the higher mental processes, but instead, as its minor aspect which is possible by the merely volitional. All these dependent lower forms of knowledge are born with the external time and for this reason have become virtually autonomous patterns, and end as we have seen, mere operational processes. Language annihilates the intuitive, in its logical spatiotemporal analysis of utterances and inferences contained therein, that to be equated with thought. That is, degrading it, falsifying it, and corrupting it, stepping between the psyche and the intuition which by definition is ineffable.

As we see, characterize the word from the psychic point of view requires consideration of the subject and not of the individual. To the internal time that giving it the dynamic that distinguishes his psyche, and not to the time of allocution; and also, to a series of different impressions that are subjective. Originating from the visual, the auditory and the kinesthetic, that is, in the three sources of the apprehend and of the learning.

The linguistic consideration of the word, assigned it a meaning derived from association with the ‘idea’ or ‘concept’ of the object to which it refers. For example, when we use a word that is a noun, and in this case, such ‘concept’ in turn a complex associative visual impression, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, etc. So, the ‘idea’ of an object contains nothing other than the appearance and a series of ‘properties’ that cannot be transmitted by our senses.

Linguistics teaches us what the language is, but it does so from a pragmatic, that is, from its use and from there extrapolates their findings indiscriminately to alleged ‘mental structures and functions,’ to finish telling us how to acquire, understand and produce our language.

Acquire the natural language presumes an underlying universal language that unifies all subjective estates (biological, psychical and social) to enable learning, on the surface, of conventional lexical categories that are related with the only ones linguistic universals, the substantive and time (Salatino, 2012, pp. 222-244).

Through Transcursive Logic, in the same work mentioned above, we show the place occupied in the subjective reality, natural language, and its relation to the acquisition of code of everyday speech.

The logic which supports the acquisition of the conventional mother tongue represents the constant and automatic use of its Aristotelian-Kantian categories to create perceptual habits, which divide the apparent reality differently according to different populations. The above is something that which then is expressed in the grammar of their everyday languages. As defined by Chomsky (1992, p. 278), grammar is a system of rules that generate an infinite class of ‘potential percepts,’ each with phonetic, semantic and syntactic aspects. It’s the kind of structures that constitute an everyday language in question; and we would add, facilitated by social inheritance supported in the tradition of the people.

The reproductive thought governs the final stage of language acquisition, which allows impact on the socio-cultural real system through the selection of appropriate PAFs, according to the setting made since the universal language, by the semiotic unit. (Salatino, 2014, p. 173) These PAFs put into operation the activity that serves to respond to a perceived fact, triggering operative processes or specific actions (speak, read, write) that serve as communicative vehicles and of influence on the socio-cultural environment.

3.2 The (dis)politeness as an evolutionary strategy

We propose a somewhat different view for the study of the everyday language. An eminently practical aspect is analyzed, as is (dis)politeness and through its research, it is intended to reaffirm the already elaborated on the critical relationship that “natural language” keeps with behavior and with the behavioral aspect. It attempts to consolidate the previously suggested concept that, just as behavior is, language also constitutes an evolutionary achievement that reveals in all its manifestations, among them, (dis)courtesy.

Beyond the implications that biology has in the origin of natural human language, something that we have already analyzed (Salatino, 2009), its daily use in any place on earth makes evident its profound social and cultural roots. Such extension makes difficult any attempt at analysis of particular aspects that, being strongly tied to the cultural context, are diluted in the social plot in spite of being the emergence of a universal phenomenon. We could clarify this discrepancy if we recognized the ‘conventional language’ in use as a superficial manifestation.

What should we understand as superficial? We take as a comparison some physical phenomenon that, like culture, has a regional distribution without precise limits and whose behavior is not predictable with accuracy, for example, climate. In it, we locate something, which like language, serves as an intra and intercultural communicative element, for example, the ocean. Finally, we specify an item that, as the society, serves as the primary substrate for its action and conditioning, for example, the continental land.

Accepting for a moment the metaphorical license and maybe analyzing the climatic conditions very briefly, we can glimpse why we characterize the language in use, as a superficial phenomenon of the culture.

Climate is a complex system that is difficult to determine with only two variables as we have proposed. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider just two relevant and apparent factors, which have a marked influence on the climate.

Water interconnects all places in the world. Therefore, the ocean currents move water throughout our planet. Since the ocean absorbs heat and releases it more slowly than the earth, it can heat or cool the environment thanks to the circulation of sea breezes. The differential heating of the earth’s surface and the oceanic masses with the corresponding pressure variations cause winds. In the continent, these winds condition the appearance of precipitations, with necessary changes of temperature and humidity. In the ocean, among other things, they form waves that initiate surface traction currents that travel great distances, from the warmer to the colder regions of the globe and vice versa.

With such a modest description, we have tried to record most of the perceptions we have of climatic phenomena, depending on where we are, with a very crude explanation of the physical foundations of these events but that is enough to understand reasonably, the vital role played by the ocean.

We are in the same situation regarding the critical role played by ‘conventional language’ in culture. We have come to establish a gross similarity and in both cases, observing only the ‘obvious’ aspects of each element.

We would be wrong if we concluded that by the mere fact of observing the surface of the ocean, with its irregularities and displacements, we could ‘understand’ the climate of other regions and even that of our place. If this were all about the weather, the equatorial regions would burst into flames, and the regions near the poles would freeze. None of this happens, yet, so there must be something else. Effectively, the mass of surface water mobilized represents only 10% of the total oceanic water. The remaining 90% also moves but does so in the depths; a phenomenon not observable at a glance. This deep activity is essential to maintain the balance that allows life on earth. With all this, we try to show that in the ‘everyday language,’ as well as in the ocean, there must be an important ‘deep activity’ that explains its characteristics. This underlying activity, because it is not obvious, allows the analysis of the ‘visible’ to account for its importance as a communicative medium and its socio-cultural impact. At the same time, it also generates great chasms when it is intended to explain how a phenomenon of a universal nature sometimes differs so much even in relatively close regions. The superficial 10% of language is represented by ‘conventional language’ of verbal nature, while the underlying 90% is represented by ‘natural language’ (Mehrabian, 1971, p. 44).

Having made a slight approximation to what we propose as a possible real framework in which human ‘conventional language’ could assume its leading role, we will try to sketch a model that allows some explanation from (dis) politeness.

As a guide for the analysis, we will make of the (un) courtesy we have taken the excellent book by Richard J. Watts “Politeness” (2003), where, besides making a detail and criticism of the different existing models to explain this phenomenon, it presents, his model in particular.

According to the author, we can say that both the behavior and the polite language, which as we propose to have their origin in the same behavior, are acquired. It is not something we are born with, but it must be learned and socialized. Going even further, we will consider these elements as part of a strategy that must be learned to coexist or survive socially, and that is in tune with the behaviors that are also the subject of an education required to maintain life or psychic equilibrium.

As Watts (2003, p. 23) says, and reaffirming the inappropriateness of the investigation of the courtesy based exclusively on the ‘superficial,’ there are four major problems faced by the attempt to locate the (un) courtesy that occurs in natural discourse:

“1. It is impossible to evaluate (im)polite behavior out of the context of real, ongoing verbal interaction. Often the amount of contextual information needed can be considerable. 2. A theory of (im)polite behavior needs to take the perspectives of the speakers and the hearers adequately into consideration, firstly, because speakers are also hearers, and vice versa, and secondly, because social interaction is negotiated online. This latter point implies that what may have been originally interpreted as ‘(im)polite’ behavior is always open to evaluative remodification as the interaction progresses. 3. As a direct corollary of the previous two points, it will never [Underlining is own] be possible to develop a predictive model of linguistic (im)politeness. 4. Consequently, there can be no [Underlining is own] idealized, universal scientific concept of (im)politeness (i.e. (im)politeness) which can be applied to instances of social interaction across cultures, subcultures, and languages.”

Beyond the cutting academic discourtesy shown by these denials, they give support to some of the difficulties, quite evident by the way, which implies the approach of (dis) politeness from the ‘appearance’ of social interaction where, in fact, it is unlikely that can be found a universal pattern.

The model proposed by Watts promises to provide some solutions to these problems, but ultimately ends up being a proposal conditioned by the relativism inherent in the language considered. In other words, in each language, in each culture, in each social situation, the (un)courtesy has different faces. Now, given the exclusionary sociological approach it carries out, using the same terms as Bourdieu’s sociological theory, it is not possible to fulfill the promise. Watts cannot take off, for example, through the concept of ‘habitus,’ its subjectivity as a researcher of the formal or polite characteristic of the statements analyzed in the abundant cases that it gives us and this to consider only one of among many other aspects.

The author tells us (op.cit., p. 49):

“Firstly, if we wanted to set up a theoretical model of (im)politeness, the first thing we would have to do is to find ways of isolating across cultures all those strategies, verbal as well as nonverbal, that construct, regulate and reproduce forms of cooperative social interaction -- an obviously impossible task. [- and useless, I would add, since he part of a prejudice: the cooperative social attitude -] Secondly, a theory of (im)politeness, or linguistic politeness, would be one in which it could be explained [- here’s the detail, otherwise it’s not a theory!-] as a universal facet of human social interaction across cultures. It would be one in which forms of human interaction could be interpreted and described as instances of politeness and in which forms of linguistic usage in any language community could be observed and analyzed as helping to construct and reproduce politeness. No theory of this kind at present.”

The reason why there is not yet a theory like that suggested by Watts may be found in that all the theoretical proposals made belong to the same superficial aspect: social interaction. Therefore they are transformed in an attempt to explain the courtesy as a universal facet of this interaction.

Of the many definitions of courtesy that Watts gives in his book (op.cit., pp. 50-53), we will only extract details of those that contribute to our vision, with some element of value:

- Brown and Levinson (1978, p. 61): a complex system to buffer the FTA or acts that threaten the image. From which we rescue the concept of THREAT.
- Kasper (1990): based on the previous one, he sees communication as a fundamentally dangerous and antagonistic effort. Therefore, courtesy is a term to refer to the strategies that the interlocutors have available to ‘dilute’ the danger and minimize the antagonism. We extract from here the concept of STRATEGY.
- Fraser and Nolen (1981): see the courtesy as a ‘property associated with a voluntary action.’ If by voluntary we can understand INTENTIONAL we agree, and we take it.

Only by way of advance, we try an approximation saying that courtesy represents by a series of intentional behaviors and ‘linguistic expressions’ that capitalize such behaviors manifesting with the sole purpose of maintaining one’s ‘steady state’ or the state of ‘stable imbalance’ that allows the social life. That is, coexisting or surviving in society. With all this we try to establish that the courtesy, in our understanding, has nothing to do with the consideration, nor with the business, nor with the balance of the relationships, but it would be the manifestation of the real sociocultural system (Salatino, 2009) of what the individual does, as a living being, to stay alive.

This position, although it seems tinged with evolutionism, has no relation to the ‘fittest,’ but rather to adaptation, development, and growth. There is no struggle for power in this dynamic. The

struggle for power occurs when the individual in question realizes that with more power it is easier to survive, at least temporarily. With what unleashes a stark and cruel struggle to climb the supposed 'top and thus reach 'eternity,' misinterpreting the innate drive to keep 'the head out of the water.' A detail to help so that the courtesy is used, for example, as a lie or a simulation. Here, evidently, there is no cooperation whatsoever but quite the opposite, a pathological selfishness very common of these times that nevertheless can seem an excessive courtesy.

There is no doubt that courtesy always has as a practical goal to survive. In other words: "Is the ability to adapt to the context achieved by acquired strategies transformed into habits that are expressed linguistically to obtain a specific effect." There is pragmatic that justifies the actions suggested by Austin (2003) for the 'acts of speech' and not the equality of meanings between logical and linguistic connectives as proposed by Grice (1989, p. 24), which made them dependent on the conditions in which given a conversation.

In a general way, we could say that the courtesy is equated to the 'sense,' so it is possible to assimilate it to a set of measures that I take for the 'other' to find meaning to what I express, which is a form to impose an intention: to survive. An attempt of imposition from which I can emerge dominating, subdued (dominated), or remain indifferent to demonstrate an equivalent 'persuasive power'.

Since we consider courtesy as a strategy, a paragraph of the book by Escandell Vidal, "Introduction to Pragmatics" (1993), which in chapter 8 says:

"Therefore, the explanation of the operation of strategic comity presupposes, on the one hand, a classification of the types of discourse and the acts that can be performed. On the other, a description of the types of social relationships that are relevant; and, finally, a detailed characterization of the different strategies (especially in their linguistic repercussions) and of the conditions that govern their adaptation to the context and situation. This task has been approached from somewhat different perspectives, but all have in common to consider that the fundamental role of courtesy is to serve social relations."

By the last quoted statement, one can guess why a large part of the models and practically all the analyses of them are 'separated' from their main actors: speaker/listener, subject/object; as alternating roles. The analysis is addressed by the inadequate part, from the appearance, from the purely phenomenological and we already know that not everything is what it seems to be. For that reason, the supposed utilitarian purpose of the courtesy of 'serving social relations,' does not tell us anything if we do not know what these relationships are. These relationships have a single purpose: to coexist; ergo, courtesy can be proposed as a strategy, yes, but as a strategy to 'stay alive socially.'

We will risk a somewhat more precise definition that we will try to ground later: (Dis) politeness is a set of psycho-bio-socio-cultural, adaptive-evolutionary strategies, whose sole purpose is survival.

3.3 Social courtesy and social tact

This title, which refers directly to the work in which Janney and Arndt (1992) it provides a different approach, will serve as a guide to pose the basis of our definition of (dis) politeness.

The authors speak of tact as well as courtesy and discuss some psychological and biological roots of tact. Highlighting that, while conflicts are similarly in all large animals by innate 'feelings' of aggression, attraction, commitment, etc., tact is only human and represents a possible solution, not instinctive, but culturally acquired to face the problem of the rejection of a conflict. A conflict that, as we have stated, is represented by the fact of survival.

Refusing outright the definition of courtesy as 'proper behavior,' authors suggest that we pay more attention to how people express their feelings to each other, in everyday conversation.

They suggest that the change should be made from a logical approach to a socio-psychological approach. Something that we share, although for us the approach that is psycho-bio-socio-cultural has a strictly logical basis, of course not that of the binary logic that the authors reject, but that of a polycontextural logic, the transcursive logic (Salatino, 2017). They add that, from the socio-psychological point of view, courtesy is not a static logical concept - hence the relevance of our tetravalent logical approach - but an interpersonal activity that can be observed, described and explained regarding a functional interaction.

Within a culture, they point out, any average adult can be ‘courteous in a discourteous manner’ or be ‘discourteous in a courteous manner.’ The first situation would configure the social courtesy and the second the interpersonal courtesy. They also specify that both are culturally acquired and are interrelated with discourse.

They define below the social courtesy as based on the need of people to maintain a flexible and manageable interaction with other members of their group, a requirement that we have focused on the use of strategies to be ‘polite,’ to be able to coexist.

The interpersonal courtesy, which they call tact, defines it as the need that individuals have to maintain the image; a demand that oscillates between the fear of losing it and the reluctance to deprive the other of it. They emphasize that, as partners in social interaction, people are more or less dependent on each other to cooperate to maintain the fragile balance of respect and consideration necessary for the preservation of the image, something that we do not share at all.

Our position is clear and based on the handling of hypocrisy, rather than courtesy; Or does this not come out of the definition that the authors give tact? Tact for us is a hypocritical strategy to defend not the image but the psycho-bio-socio-cultural ‘life,’ and it is bio-psychic.

Next (op.cit., p. 24) the authors show a comparative table between social courtesy and tact, on which we have taken the license to project our approach.

Table 1: Social Courtesy and Tact

	SOCIAL COURTESY	TACT
OBJECTIVE	<i>Group</i>	<i>Individual</i>
FRAMEWORK	<i>International</i>	<i>Interpersonal</i>
FUNCTION	<i>Define Social Role</i>	<i>Define Personal Role</i>

The table above shows that courtesy should be distinguished from social tact because it has another objective, another frame of reference and another function, that is, courtesy point to the group. While tact does it to the individual and fundamentally, to the subject who underlying social courtesy is a projected expression of social tact for participatory purposes, the only way to belong or be accepted within a specific group. The social tact instead regulates contact with the other, face to face, so that the psychic aspects that sustain it become relevant.

3.4 Psychological bases of social tact

Continuing with some titles proposed by the authors mentioned above, we now comment on what they say regarding the psychological basis of touch. Although the notions of tact vary from culture to culture - they point out - the impulse to seek a confrontation or to avoid it is based on human biology. In biology without more, we would add. From the evolutionary point of view, they point out, tact is as an adaptive (mainly human) response to specific biologically pre-programmed universal conflicts that arise when members of the same species interact.

We have to clarify some concepts of the previous paragraph that do not conform to the biological and evolutionary reality, and that will also serve as a solid basis for our point of view.

Rodolfo Llinás in his book "I of the vortex" (2001), where he proposes his vision on the role of neurons in human thinking and behavior, makes a detailed analysis of behavior patterns in animals and the man. It elaborates the concept of FAP (fixed action patterns), (2001, p.133) and defines it as an automatic module of discrete motor function. In short, it would be a more elaborate

reflex, by integrating lower reflexes in certain synergies or a group of reflexes capable of more complex behavior. This FAP would be driven by the so-called central generators of specific patterns or neural networks that determine stereotyped, rhythmic and relatively fixed movements. This relative fixity occurs not only on an individual level but in a whole species.

The FAP^s are modules of motor activity that frees the individual from unnecessary time and attention. They reside in different areas of the brain, but there is significant evidence that the basal ganglia (nuclei of gray matter located at the base of the brain) represent the neuronal circuits of these motor sequences. Llinás tells us that the FAP^s has two main components: (1) Strategic: (e.g.) Move away from danger; and (2) Tactical: (e.g.) Run as fast as possible.

Where the strategy is automatic, and the tactic is voluntary. The FAP as a whole is a dependent context. Is this the biological basis of the social courtesy and tact proposed by Janney and Arndt? In our opinion, indeed, here are the bio-psychic bases of the language in use, which we are analyzing through courtesy. In other words, the automatic strategy, represented by social tact, configures the bio-psychic solution to anticipate, as much as possible, the response to any stimulus, for example, the emission of a sentence as a verbal action, and voluntary tactics represented by the courtesy is the product of the previous action. These concepts will be more precise in the second part of this article when we analyze the production model proposed in this study.

Another important aspect of a FAP is that it can be modified, learned, remembered and perfected; in a word, it can condition the appearance of a habit.

Finally, and no less significant, it is the possibility of seeing emotions as FAP. Llinás proposes to us saying that in this case, the execution would not be motor but pre-motor. In this way, just as muscle tone is the essential platform for executing movements, emotions represent the pre-motor platform that drives or restrains most of our actions. It is the hypothalamus (Set of nuclei of gray substance located below the thalamus, at the base of the brain.) the neurological center of vegetative and emotional events.

Returning to the psychological bases of touch, the authors try to make a distinction between two alternatives of communication of emotions to justify the bio-psychological basis of tact. Unfortunately, they are based on a naive idea of evolution. Stating that ‘before,’ as Darwin (1872) said, emotions represented a visible manifestation of the actions of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) through muscular, visible and audible actions, what, as the ANS was the same in all people, emotions were the same in all cultures. Today, in a way that is not clear, people make strategic use of these affective samples, so that not always the visible signs of emotion represent an internal state. Frequently, the authors say, they are produced intentionally to project a particular definition of the situation and thus influence the behavior of others. In all honesty, it has to be said that nothing has changed since Darwin described the mechanism and even from a long time before. The emotional aspect was used, is used and will continue to be used for acquisitive purposes, intentionally. It is one of the primary tools for the struggle for survival.

Based on the previous (ambiguous) definition, the authors distinguish two distinct but interrelated communicative phenomena: a) Emotional Communication and b) Emotional Communication. Following the idea but setting aside a bit, we are going to say that in reality, we can distinguish three types of affective communication:

(a) Instinctive: manifested in primitive and specific trends whose purpose is the conservation and immediate protection of life and the continuity of the species. Its biological support would be a pure FAP. (Simple beings and plants.);

(b) Emotional: shows the internal affective states, unconscious and without elaboration. Its biological support would be a FAP modifiable by experience. (Animals with central nervous system.); and

(c) Emotive: unlike the previous one, it is not always a manifestation of internal states. It conforms to a socio-cultural convention and is conscious and elaborate. Your biological support would be an acquired FAP. (Man)

When talking about types of communication, we necessarily involve a language, and in this specific case, we are referring to natural language, based on a universal language, which handles each of the three types of living beings already characterized. As shown in another work (Salatino, 2009), these languages are:

(1) Tactic: managed by simple animals and plants, which can only ‘perceive’ the change (V). They approach what enables them to feed, and they move away from what hurts them;

(2) Signic: driven by animals that can perceive a relationship between two objects (O) through a change (V). Although it presupposes the existence of a proto-psyche, it does not require any elaboration; and

(3) Symbolic: handled by the man who can perceive the relationship between a subject (S) and an object (O) through a change (V). It presupposes the existence of a psyche that allows the elaboration, interpretation, and understanding. It has two aspects: a deep one that lies in thought and a superficial one that manifests itself in the misnamed (for this reason) natural language. The external manifestation appears as arbitrary and subject to conventional norms, and for that reason, the correct denomination is traditional language.

Man, as we suggested in the same work mentioned above, integrates all biological levels (FAP) and, therefore, the different languages that derive from them. This does not mean anything else that man shows signs of all levels of language and thus of communication.

4. PARTIAL CONCLUSION

If all the above is accepted, we can conclude that the framework in which is given the communication and in which we applied the strategies, is psycho-bio-socio-cultural. In this sense, the communicative strategies are universal, and adaptive-evolutionary and their sole purpose is to preserve life in the different dimensions within said framework. *In the second part of this article, we will present a model of language production that incorporates all the concepts expressed in this first part.*

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

Conventional Maternal Tongue (CMT): is the socio-cultural support of the language that is acquired by imitation, after 18 months of life (everyday language). Represents ‘how is the subjective reality’ from the social point of view.

Natural Maternal Tongue (NMT): is the biological support of language acquired in the first 18 months of life (natural human language). Represents ‘how is seen the subjective reality’ from the biological point of view.

Subjectivon (universal linguistic pattern): is in each of the domains in which is structured the subjective reality and represents the basis of the different ways of ‘seeing reality.’ His biological equivalent is in the mitochondria, and like it, has as we saw a circular double-stranded DNA structure on two complementary strands or chains, a heavy or external (the nucleoid) and one lightweight or internal (the gamete). It also has some organelles that are designed to ‘sustain’ aspects of the universal language, and of the future natural language, screened in the conventional language, once acquired. The possible nucleoids of a subjectivon are just 6, and represent all combinations without repetition of the subject (S), the object (O), and the change (V). That is dextrorotatory variants: SVO, OSV, VOS; and the levorotatory variants: OVS, VSO, SOV.

Universal Maternal Tongue (UMT): is the mode of behavior of a given subjectivon. The tendency to externalize a specific form becomes manifest in the order of the elements in its nucleus. Represents ‘how is seen the subjective reality’ from the psychical point of view.

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