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THE EFFECT OF TAX AMNESTY ON TAX AVOIDANCE WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A MODERATING VARIABLE

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Abstract

This study aims to examine the effect of tax amnesty program on tax avoidance with corporate governance proxied by independent board of commissioners, board of directors, and institutional ownership as moderating variables. This type of research uses quantitative methods. Using secondary data from www.idx.co.ic and related company websites. The sampling technique used purposive sampling method based on predetermined criteria, obtained 65 data samples from 13 samples of property and real estate companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2017-2021. Based on the results of this study, it shows that the tax amnesty variable has a positive effect on tax avoidance and the independent board of commissioners, the board of directors and institutional ownership cannot moderate the tax amnesty relationship on tax avoidance.

Key Words: *Tax Amnesty, Tax Avoidance, Corporate Governance*

Introduction

Taxes are the main instrument in raising funds for the development of a country and maintaining the balance of public finances. According to Law No. 28 of 2007 concerning General Provisions and Procedures for Taxation Article 1 paragraph (1), it is stated that taxes are mandatory contributions to the state owed by individuals or entities that are compelling based on law, with no direct reward and are used for state purposes for the greatest prosperity of the people. Taxes that are coercive and the results of paying taxes that are not felt directly by the community after paying taxes result in a low level of public awareness in complying with these tax provisions. Taxpayers hesitate to follow the current tax regulations, because taxpayers do not feel the direct benefits of tax payments (counter operations), paying taxes becomes a challenge. In addition, the lack of financial compensation for tax payments encourages taxpayers to carry out tax avoidance (Mujiyati et al., 2022). Tax avoidance is one of the variables that cause low tax revenue. No taxpayer is willing to pay taxes, but there is no other way but to comply (Allingham and Sandmo in Simanjuntak & Imam (2012)).

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The company is one of the taxpayers, taxes for companies are a burden that will affect net income so that companies always want to pay as little tax as possible (Kholis, 2021). Companies certainly take into account the complexity of tax regulations and fiscal policies, so some companies may be interested in finding legal loopholes or using improper schemes to reduce their tax obligations. Corporate tax planning depends on the dynamics of corporate governance in providing action decisions to carry out taxation orders within a company (Wibowo, 2020). Tax avoidance is usually done through policies taken by the leadership of a company (Adeyani Tandean, 2016). The high opportunity for companies to take advantage of tax avoidance practices, so good corporate governance is needed by companies.

To overcome this problem, the Indonesian government implemented the Tax amnesty program as an effort to reduce tax evasion as stipulated in Law Number 11 of 2016 concerning taxation (Pattiasina et al., 2019). Tax amnesty is the elimination of tax payable by disclosing and paying off assets in accordance with statutory regulations, without incurring administrative costs or criminal sanctions in the field of taxation. The purpose of tax amnesty is to accelerate economic growth and restructuring, encourage tax reform towards a more equitable tax system, expand a more valid, comprehensive, and integrated tax database, and aim to increase tax revenue for development financing. (Pajakku, 2021).

Research conducted by Mujiyati et al. (2022), concluded that the higher the level of tax avoidance, the more tax amnesty is disclosed. Companies that participate in the tax amnesty program have a greater possibility of tax avoidance. However, in the research of Hajawiyah et al. (2021) explain that the tax amnesty program increases tax revenue in the short term, increases the tax base, and tax compliance. So this research wants to examine more deeply the effect of companies that participate and do not participate in the tax amnesty program on tax avoidance. In addition, good corporate governance is needed to optimize these existing situations and conditions. Therefore, this study will also explore the extent to which corporate governance as proxied by the board of commissioners, board of directors, and institutional ownership moderates the influence between tax amnesty and tax avoidance in property and real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2017-2021 period.

Theory Review

Agency Theory

This study uses the basic theory, namely the agency theory which is that the agency relationship is a contract in the form of delegation of authority in decision making has been given by the owner (principal) to the company or organization (agent). In the context of the company, the owner (shareholder) is the party who gives the mandate to the agent to act on behalf of the principal, while the management (agent) acts as the party entrusted by the principal to run the company. This relationship has the consequence that management is obliged to be accountable for what has been entrusted by the principal (Kholmi, 2011).

Agency problems can occur when there are differences in agent interests and when the principal has aggressive tax avoidance behavior. This condition occurs because management wants to increase compensation through higher profits, while other shareholders want to reduce tax costs through lower profits. This will create a potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers known as agency theory.

Tax Avoidance

Tax avoidance is an effort that remains within the context of applicable tax regulations by utilizing legal loopholes to reduce the amount of tax payable from the current year to future years so that it can help increase the company's cash flow (Karimah & Taufiq, 2014). Tax avoidance is commonly defined as an effort made by companies to reduce taxes owed legally to increase cash flow. Examples include placing assets in jurisdictions with lower tax rates or utilizing available tax incentives. Although legal, tax avoidance is often the subject of controversy as it can reduce tax revenues that would otherwise be used for public services. The purpose of tax avoidance is to engineer the taxpayer's business so that the tax burden can be reduced as low as possible by utilizing existing tax regulation loopholes to maximize profit after tax, because tax is an element of tax reduction (Prastiyanti & Samudra Mahardhika, n.d.). Using CETR as a measure for tax avoidance is in accordance with the research of Fadhila & Handayani (2019).

$$CETR = \frac{\textbf{Payment of taxes}}{\textbf{Earning before tax}}$$

Tax Amnesty

Based on Regulation No. 11 of 2016 concerning tax amnesty, the tax amnesty program is the elimination of taxes that should be owed. In this tax, no tax administrative sanctions or criminal sanctions are imposed on persons or entities owed taxes, as long as they disclose their assets and pay a penetration fee set at 0.5% to 10% of the tax value (Hajawiyah et al., 2021).

The implementation of tax amnesty volume I has been conducted on July 1, 2016-31 March 2017. The subjects of the program are personal taxpayers, corporate taxpayers, taxpayers engaged in micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and individuals or entities that have not become taxpayers. The government again issued a new program in 2022, namely Voluntary Disclosure (PPS) known as tax amnesty volume II which is also part of the tax amnesty volume I policy in accordance with Law No. 7 of 2021 concerning Harmonization of Tax Regulations (HPP).

The objectives of tax amnesty are (1) to accelerate economic growth and restructuring through assets which, among others, will have an impact on increasing domestic liquidity, improving the rupiah exchange rate, reducing interest rates, and increasing investment. (2) to encourage tax reform towards a more authentic and valid tax system, expansion of a comprehensive and integrated tax database, and (3) to increase tax revenues that will be used for development financing. This study uses a dummy variable as a measure of tax amnesty. Score 0 for companies that do not participate in the tax amnesty program and score 1 for companies that participate in the tax amnesty.

Corporate Governance

According to the Forum Corporate Governance Indonesia (FCGI), corporate governance is a set of rules that regulate the relationship between shareholders, company management, creditors, government, employees, and other internal and external stakeholders relating to their rights and obligations or in other words a system that controls the company. (effendi, 2016). The term corporate governance arises because of agency theory, where the management of a company consists of ownership.

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Regulation of the Minister of SOEs No. PER-01/MBU/2011 article 3 shows five basic principles in good company management, namely:

a. Transparency, namely openness in carrying out the decision-making process and openness in disclosing material and relevant information about the company.
b. Accountability, namely the clarity of functions, implementation and accountability of organs so that the management of the company is carried out effectively.
c. Responsibility, namely conformity in the management of the company to laws and regulations and sound corporate principles.
d. Independency, which is a situation where the company is managed professionally without conflict of interest and influence / pressure from any party that is not in accordance with laws and regulations and sound corporate principles.
e. Fairness, which is fairness and equality in fulfilling the rights of stakeholders that arise based on agreements and laws and regulations.

These principles are needed to achieve the sustainability of the company's business by taking into account the interests of stakeholders. So that every company must ensure that the principles of good corporate governance are applied to every aspect of the business and at all levels of the company. Corporate Governance in this study includes the board of commissioners, board of directors, and institutional ownership.

a. Independent Board of Commissioners

According to Law No. 40 of 2007 article 1 concerning limited liability companies, the board of commissioners is a corporate organ whose task is to carry out general and / or special supervision in accordance with the articles of association and provide advice to the board of directors. The board of commissioners has the duty to supervise the management policy, the general management, both regarding the limited liability company and the Limited Liability Company business, and provide advice to the board of directors, must be in good faith, prudent, and responsible in carrying out their supervisory and advisory duties to the board of directors. (Sondak, 2016)

In this study using an independent board of commissioners who is someone who is not affiliated in any way with the controlling shareholder, board of directors, or board of commissioners and does not serve as a director in a company that has a relationship with the company owner. One of the controls and supervision carried out by the board of commissioners is to be more careful about the policies and practices of tax avoidance carried out by the company (Handoyo et al., 2022). The study uses a measurement indicator, namely the number of independent commissioners from the entire total board of commissioners according to research by Muljadi et al. (2022) and Adeyani Tandean (2016).

$$DKI = \frac{Number\ of\ independent\ commissioners}{Total\ board\ of\ commissioners}$$

b. Board of Directors

According to Effendi (2016: 26) The board of directors is a group of directors led by a president director. In Indonesia, the functions, duties, and obligations of the board of directors are regulated in Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies. In general, the board's responsibility is to maintain and ensure that the company's internal control system is running properly. The board of directors is also responsible for interests related to external parties such as suppliers, legal parties, consumers so that as the company's management and agent of the company, the board of directors cannot act at will. Because the actions in the interests of the company that will be taken will affect the profits for the company. The study used a measurement indicator, namely the number of members of the board of directors Egbunike et al. (2017).

$$DD = \sum Total\ members\ of\ the\ board\ of\ directors$$

c. Institutional Ownership

Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares in the company by large financial institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds, investment companies, and large asset managers. Institutional share ownership is the ratio between shares owned by institutions and blockholder ownership, namely individual ownership above five percent, but not included in the managerial ownership group (Handoyo et al., 2022).

Institutional ownership relates to the large number of shares owned by financial institutions. Often shareholders want company managers to behave to maximize their wealth, while managers may have incentives to pursue their personal goals. So that in the context of agency theory institutional ownership becomes one of the important control and monitoring mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and company managers. Because according to agency theory, each individual will act in their own interests, agency theory explains the difference in interests between principals and agents. (Pattiasina et al., 2019). The study uses the following measurement indicators:

$$KI = \frac{Number\ of\ institutionally\ owned\ shares}{Number\ of\ shares\ outstanding}$$

Hypothesis Development

The Effect of Tax Amnesty on Tax Avoidance

The tax amnesty regulation was issued as a form of government effort to increase public compliance in paying taxes and reduce tax evasion. Supported by the results of the research of Hajawiyah et al. (2021) which shows the results that tax amnesty has a positive effect on tax compliance. Research by Bayer, Oberhofer, & Winner (2015) shows a significant positive effect of tax amnesty on American corporate tax compliance. However, the existence of tax amnesty increases the company's efforts in tax avoidance (Mujiyati et al., 2022). In line with the results of research from Fadhila & Handayani (2019) which shows the results of research that tax amnesty affects tax avoidance. So that the following hypothesis can be taken:

H1: Tax Amnesty has a positive effect on tax avoidance.

Independent Board of Commissioners affects the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

The independent board of commissioners does not have any relationship with shareholders, directors, board of commissioners and does not have a position as a director in a company that has a relationship with the company owner. Independent boards of commissioners tend to be more concerned with the company's reputation and stakeholder trust than the short-term benefits of tax avoidance. Therefore, they may be more likely to refrain from unethical tax avoidance practices, even if there is an opportunity to participate in tax amnesty. According to Feranika (2016) and Handoyo et al. (2022) concluded that there is an influence between

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the independent board of commissioners on tax avoidance. This means that if the company has many independent commissioners, the level of independence will also be higher, so that the company can reduce the level of tax avoidance practices. Likewise vice versa. If the fewer companies that have independent commissioners, the lower the level of independence and the higher the level of tax avoidance practices. Based on the results of the explanation above, the following hypothesis can be formulated.

H2: The independent board of commissioners moderates the positive influence between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

The Board of Directors affects the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

The board of directors is responsible for making strategic corporate decisions, including tax-related decisions such as issuing the necessary policies to regulate tax guardianship. Tax amnesty is a government policy that allows taxpayers to collect unpaid taxes at a lower cost than the cost that would have to be paid if the tax was not paid within the specified time. The board of directors has an important role in issuing effective tax amnesty policies that have a positive impact on tax compliance. It can reduce unnecessary expenditures as a result of unpaid tax obligations, as well as help reduce tax revenue shortfalls. Therefore, the role of the board of directors in tax decision making and tax compliance can moderate the effect of tax amnesty on tax avoidance behavior. Based on the results of the explanation above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H3: The board of directors moderates the positive influence between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

Institutional Ownership affects the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares in the company by large financial institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds, investment companies, and large asset managers. Institutional ownership shows the involvement of institutional investors in making company policies. (Irawan et al., 2017.) According to Diantari and Ulupui (2011) in institutional ownership, share ownership is a source of power for management to support or not, so that with institutional ownership in a company, increased supervision of management performance is expected to be more optimal.

Based on agency theory which discusses the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Institutional ownership has an important role to oversee the performance of managers to be more careful in making decisions for the company. From this explanation, it shows that institutional ownership has a relationship in the decision making of a company in following government regulations in participating in tax amnesty so that it affects tax avoidance. Based on the results of the exposure above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H5: Institutional ownership moderates the positive influence between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

RESEARCH METHOD

This type of research is quantitative research that uses data sources in the form of secondary data. Secondary data is obtained from financial reports on the company's website and the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) website https://www.idx.co.id/. Data comes from documents that are already available by downloading the annual financial statements of the companies needed. In addition, the data is quantitative data, which means that the data is in the form of numeric or numbers. The data analysis technique used in this research is multiple linear regression analysis.

The population is all property and real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2017-2021 with a total of 92 companies. The data collection method in this study is the documentation method by using the required data, recording, and analyzing those that have a relationship with the object. The sampling technique is to use purposive sampling method, namely the selection of samples in accordance with the specified sample selection criteria and not randomly selected. The total sample after making adjustments to the purposive sampling criteria, obtained a total sample of 54 data in property and real estate sector companies listed on the IDX for the period 2017-2021.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Research Results

Based on the research criteria set previously, there were 13 companies that met the criteria during the research period, with a total data sample of 65 and oulier was carried out so that a sample of 54 data was obtained. The following table contains parameters for the dependent variable, independent variable and moderation variable.

Table 1. Descriptive Analysis Results

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Tax Avoidance	54	0,0002	0,7418	0,1878	0,1556
Tax Amnesty	54	0	1	0,63	0,487
Independent Board of Commissioners	54	0,2500	0,6667	0,3919	0,0704
Board of Directors	54	3	12	5,81	2,047
Institutional Ownership	54	0,1136	0,9662	0,7005	0,1959
Valid N (listwise)	54				

Source: Processed data, 2024

In Table 1 above, shows an overview of each variable with a total data (N) of 54 samples within five years in 2017-2021. Tax Avoidance has a minimum value of 0.0002, a maximum value of 0.7418, an average value of 0.1878 and a standard deviation value of 0.1556. Tax Amnesty has a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 1, an average value (mean) of 0.63 and a standard deviation value of 0.487. The Independent Board of Commissioners (DKI) has a minimum value of 0.2500, a maximum value of 0.6667, an average value (mean) of 0.3919 and a standard deviation value of 0.0704. The Board of Directors has a minimum value of 3, a maximum value of 12, an average value (mean) of 5.81 and a standard deviation value of 2.047. Institutional Ownership has a minimum value of 0.1136, a

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maximum value of 1.9662, an average value (mean) of 0.7005 and a standard deviation value of 0.1959.

Classical Assumption Test

1. Normality Test

Normality testing in this study uses the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) test. If the total observations (n> 30) the normality assumption is ignored (Gujarati, 2020). The total sample size of 54 is greater than 30, so the research data can be said to be normally distributed.

2. Multicollinearity Test

Table 2. Muliticollinearity Test Results

Variable	Tolerance	VIF	Information
Tax Amnesty	0,933	1,072	There is no multicollinearity
Independent Board of Commissioners	0,832	1,201	There is no multicollinearity
Board of Directors	0,816	1,226	There is no multicollinearity
Institutional Ownership	0,740	1,352	There is no multicollinearity

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the multicollinearity test in the table shows that each variable has a tolerance value of more than 0.1 and a VIF value of less than 10, so it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity.

Autocorrelation Test

Table 3. Autocorrelation Test Results

Durbin – Watson	
Equation 1	Equation 2
1,804	2,028

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the autocorrelation test in the table shows that equation 1 produces a Durbin-Watson value of 1.804 and equation 2 produces a Durbin-Watson value of 2.028. This value meets the assumptions because it is between the values of -2 to +2 (-2<DW<+2), so it can be concluded that there is no autocorrelation.

1. Heterocedaticity Test

Table 4. Heteroscedasticity Test Results

Variable	Equation 1	Equation 2	Information
	Sig	Sig	
Tax Amnesty	0,096	0,089	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Independent Board of Commissioners		0,754	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Board of Directors		0,807	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Institutional Ownership		0,738	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Tax Amnesty* Independent Board of Commissioners		0,132	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Tax Amnesty* Board of Directors		0,173	Heteroscedasticity does not occur
Tax Amnesty* Institutional Ownership		0,214	Heteroscedasticity does not occur

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the heteroscedasticity test in the table shows that in equation 1 and equation 2 all variables are more than 0.05 or 5%, so it can be concluded that there are no symptoms of heteroscedasticity.

Model Feasibility Test

1. F test

Table 5. F Statistical Test Results

Equation 1					
	Sum of Squemes	Df	*Mean Square*	F	Sig.
Regression	0,099	1	0,099	4,337	0,042
Residual	1,184	52	0,23		
Total	1,282	53			

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the results of the F statistical test in table 4.8, it shows that the value of F in equation 1 is 4.337 with a significance value of 0.042. This shows that tax amnesty simultaneously affects tax avoidance.

Table 6. F Statistical Test Results

Equation 2					
	Sum of Squemes	Df	*Mean Square*	F	Sig.
Regression	0,427	7	0,61	3,286	0,006
Residual	0,855	46	0,019		
Total	1,282	53			

Source: Processed data, 2024

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Based on the results of the F statistical test in table 4.8, it shows that the value produces an F value of 3.286 with a significant value of 0.006. This can be explained that tax amnesty, moderation between the independent board of commissioners and tax amnesty, moderation between the board of directors and tax amnesty, and moderation between institutional ownership and tax amnesty show that together (simultaneously) have an effect on tax avoidance.

2. Test Coefficient of Determination (R^2)

Table 7. Test Results of the Coefficient of Determination (R^2)

Equation 1			
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0,277	0,077	0,059	0,1509

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the adjusted R2 test results in table 4.9, it shows that the adjusted R2 value in equation 1 is 0.059, which means that the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable by 5.9%. This shows that 5.9% of the amount of tax avoidance is explained by tax amnesty, while the remaining 94.1% is influenced by other variables not examined in this study.

Table 8. Test Results of the Coefficient of Determination (R^2)

Equation 2			
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0,577	0,333	0,232	0,1363

Source: Processed data, 2024

In equation 2 after adding the moderation variable in the table shows the amount of adjusted R2 of 0.232, which means that the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable by 23.2%. This shows that 23.2% of the amount of tax avoidance is explained by tax amnesty; TAM*DKI; TAM*DD; TAM*KI, while the remaining 76.8% is influenced by other variables not examined in this study.

Hypothesis Testing

1. Multiple Linear Regression Test

Table 9. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results

Variable	Equation 1			Equation 2		
	B	*T*	*Sig*	*B*	*T*	*Sig*
Constant	0,132	3,915	0,000	0,255	0,499	0,620
Tax Amnesty	0,089	2,083	0,042	0,737	1,284	0,206
Independent Board of Commissioners				-0,102	-0,262	0,795
Board of Directors				0,037	1,060	0,295
Institutional Ownership				-0.392	-0,907	0,369
Tax Amnesty* Independent Board of Commissioners				-0,884	-1.380	0,174
Tax Amnesty* Board of Directors				-0,051	-1,422	0,162
Tax Amnesty* Institutional Ownership				-0,042	-0,093	0,926

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the multiple regression test results in the table above, the regression equation model can be illustrated as follows:

Equation 1. Without Moderation Variables

TAV = 0.132 + 0.089 TAM + ε

Equation 2. With Moderation Variables

TAV = 0.255 + 0.737TAM - 0.102DKI + 0.037DD - 0.392KI – 0.884TAM*DKI - 0.051TAM*DD - 0.042TAM*KI + ε

2. T-Statistical Test

Table 10. T-Statistical Test Results

Variabel	*Coefisien*	t hitung	t table	Sig.
Tax Amnesty	0,089	2,083	1,674	0,042

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Tax Amnesty* Independent Board of Commissioners	-0,884	-1,380	1,674	0,174
Tax Amnesty* Board of Directors	-0,051	-1,442	1,674	0,162
Tax Amnesty* Institutional Ownership	-0,042	-0,093	1,674	0,926

Source: Processed data, 2024

Based on the results of the statistical t test in table 4.7, it can be concluded that the tax amnesty coefficient value of 0.089 is positive. The statistical t test results show a value of 2.083> 1.674 or a significance value of 0.042 <0.05, so it can be concluded that hypothesis 1 which states that tax amnesty has a positive effect on tax avoidance is accepted. These results indicate that the higher the tax amnesty, the higher the tax avoidance.

The coefficient value of tax amnesty moderated by the independent board of commissioners of -0.884 is negative. The statistical t test results show a value of -1.380 < 1.674 or a significance value of 0.174> 0.05, so the second hypothesis which states that the independent board of commissioners moderates the positive effect between tax amnesty and tax avoidance is rejected. These results indicate that the independent board of commissioners does not affect the relationship between the higher tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

The coefficient value of tax amnesty moderated by the board of directors of -0.051 is negative. The statistical t test results show a value of -1.442 < 1.674 or a significance value of 0.162> 0.05, so the third hypothesis which states that the board of directors moderates the positive effect between tax amnesty and tax avoidance is rejected. These results indicate that the board of directors does not affect the positive effect between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

The coefficient value of tax amnesty moderated by institutional ownership of -0.042 is negative. The statistical t test results show a value of -0.093 < 1.674 or a significance value of 0.926 > 0.05, so the fourth hypothesis which states that institutional ownership moderates the positive effect between tax amnesty and tax avoidance is rejected. These results indicate that institutional ownership does not affect the relationship between higher tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

Discussion

H1 The Effect of Tax Amnesty on Tax Avoidance

In this study, tax amnesty has a positive effect on tax avoidance. The coefficient value of tax amnesty (TAM) of 0.737 shows a positive influence. The t test result of tax amnesty statistics has a t count of 0.089 with a significance level of 0.042, which is smaller than 0.05. Therefore, hypothesis one (H1) is accepted, indicating that tax amnesty has a significant effect on tax avoidance.

The positive and significant coefficient value indicates that the tax amnesty program provides an opportunity for companies to be more active in tax avoidance strategies, the more the number of companies that participate in tax amnesty, the more companies that do tax avoidance. The existence of tax amnesty signals to companies that tax non-compliance is something that can be negotiated or forgiven, thus reducing the deterrence effect of tax law and encouraging tax avoidance behavior. This is in line with the research of Ngelo et al. (2022) which states that companies take advantage of tax amnesty to optimize their tax burden. The results of the study are in line with the initial hypothesis of the study and are consistent with the results of previous studies conducted by Mujiyati et al. (2022), and (Fadhila & Handayani, 2019) that tax amnesty has an effect on tax revenue.

H2 The influence of the Board of Independent Commissioners on the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

In this study, the results of the analysis show that the coefficient value of tax amnesty after being moderated by the independent board of commissioners is -0.884, indicating a negative effect. The statistical t test result is -1.380 with a significance level of 0.174, which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the second hypothesis (H2) is rejected, which means that the independent board of commissioners has no significant effect on the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

The independent board of commissioners is unable to significantly moderate the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance. This shows that the proportion of independent commissioners does not affect the company's high and low efforts in tax avoidance. The number of members of the board of commissioners may not have an effect even though there are many, this can be influenced by the performance of each member of the independent board of commissioners. This is in line with the research of Handoyo et al. (2022) which says that members of the board of commissioners do not carry out their functions and supervision properly, thus influencing management's actions in making decisions regarding tax avoidance. The results of this study are not in line with the researcher's initial hypothesis, but the results of this study support the research results of previous studies conducted by Handoyo et al. (2022), and Adeyani Tandean (2016) which state that the proportion of independent commissioners has no effect on tax avoidance.

H3 The influence of the Board of Directors on the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

In this study, the results of the analysis show that the coefficient value of tax amnesty moderated by the board of directors is -0.051, indicating a negative effect. The statistical t test result is -1.422 with a significance level of 0.162 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the second hypothesis (H2) is rejected, which means that the board of directors has no significant effect on the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

The board of directors is unable to significantly moderate the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance. This shows that the proportion of the board of directors does not affect the high and low efforts of the company in conducting tax avoidance. The board of directors has characteristics that do not always have a significant effect on company decisions related to tax policy. Tax amnesty is designed to increase tax compliance and asset repatriation. However, the effectiveness of the policy is highly dependent on the specific context and implementation at the company level. In line with research conducted by Armstrong et al. (2015) state that the effect of corporate governance, including the role of the board of directors on tax avoidance can vary depending on the specific context of the company.

H4 Effect of Institutional Ownership on the relationship between Tax Amnesty and Tax Avoidance

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Based on the results of hypothesis testing, the coefficient value of tax amnesty moderated by institutional ownership of -0.042 shows a negative effect. The coefficient test results produce a t count of -0.093 with a significance level of 0.926, which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis (H4) is rejected, meaning that institutional ownership has no significant effect on the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance.

Institutional ownership is unable to significantly moderate the relationship between tax amnesty and tax avoidance. This means that institutional ownership does not affect the high and low efforts of companies in tax avoidance. The absence of influence is due to the lack of institutional supervision and control in company management. In addition, institutional owners are concerned with the benefits obtained. In line with Adeyani Tandean's research (2016) which states that institutional owners are more concerned with their welfare in maximizing future profits so that the percentage of institutional ownership does not affect tax avoidance.

Conclusion

Based on the research results, it can be concluded that tax amnesty has a significant effect on increasing tax avoidance among companies. However, supervisory mechanisms and corporate governance through the independent board of commissioners, board of directors, and institutional ownership are unable to significantly moderate this relationship. This suggests that corporate tax avoidance strategies are more influenced by direct incentives from the tax amnesty policy than by the existing corporate governance structure.

Based on the analysis, the researcher suggests that future research should replace the sample of other sector companies and replace the data using the latest taxation policies such as the Voluntary Disclosure Program (PPS) and is expected to add or replace the factors that influence tax avoidance by using other moderating variables or adding control variables to find out variables that can strengthen or weaken the relationship to tax avoidance such as audit committees, managerial ownership, probability and others.

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