

# To optimize or not to optimize one's h-index...

$$N_{c,tot} = ah^2$$

by Bertil F. Dorch, Daniella Deutz, Evgenios Vlachos, Charlotte Wien, and Dorte Henriksen





Bertil F. Dorch 20 June 2018

Dr. Bertil

Prof. Charlotte

Dr. Evgenios

Dr. Daniella

Dr. Dorte



# A note on: Quantum mechanics

# Incentives for "gaming"?

- General question: Does the current scholarly communication system work for research integrity and responsible conduct?
- Potential issues: Retractions, failure of peer review, citation cartels, ghost authorships, potential gaming of reward mechanisms ...
- Evidence: Studies indicate that co-authored scholarly journal articles attract more citations than single author articles: even more so for cross-institution and industrial collaborations.
- Ansatz: Non-citation based research assessment (and altmetrics) present alternative incentives to citations
- Case: The Nordic BFI model includes a reward for collaboration (co-authoring).

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# Contradicting incentives for research collaboration

Charlotte Wien<sup>1</sup> · Bertil F. Dorch<sup>1</sup> · Asger Væring Larsen<sup>1</sup>

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Abstract This study describes the Danish publication award system (BFI), investigates whether its built-in incentives have had an effect on publication behavior at the University of Southern Denmark, and discusses the possible future implications on researcher incentives should universities wish to measure BFI on the individual level. We analyzed publication data from the university CRIS system (Pure) and from SciVal. Several studies indicate that co-authored scholarly journal articles attract more citations than single author articles. The reason for this are not clear, however, research collaboration across institutions and countries is commonly accepted in the research community and among university managements as one way of increasing the researcher's and institution's reputation and impact. The BFI system is designed to award scholarly publication activity at Danish universities, especially publication in international journals of high status. However, we find that the built-in incentives leave the researcher and his or her institution with a dilemma: If the researchers optimize their performance by forming author groups with external collaborators, the optimal way of doing so for the researchers is not the optimal way seen from the perspective of the university. Our analysis shows that the typical article has 6.5 authors, two of which are internal, and that this has remained stable since the introduction of the BFI. However, there is variation across the disciplines. While 'the Arts and Humanities' and 'the Social Sciences' seem to compose author groups in a way which does not optimize the performance of the institution, both 'Health' and 'the Natural Sciences' seem to optimize according to criteria other than those specified in the BFI.

Keywords Reward systems · Denmark · Incentives effects · Case study







# Incentives for "gaming"?

- General question: Does the current scholarly communication system work for research integrity and responsible conduct?
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- <u>Evidence</u>: Studies indicate that co-authored scholarly journal articles attract more citations than single author articles: even more so for cross-institution and industrial collaborations.
- Ansatz: Non-citation based research assessment (and altmetrics) present alternative incentives to citations
- <u>Case</u>: The Nordic BFI model includes a reward for collaboration (co-authoring) of 25%

No. of internal authors	No. of external authors										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
1	3.00	1.88	1.25	0.94	0.75	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.42	0.38	
2	3.00	2.50	1.88	1.50	1.25	1.07	0.94	0.83	0.75	0.68	
3	3.00	2.81	2.25	1.88	1.61	1.41	1.25	1.13	1.02	0.94	
4	3.00	3.00	2.50	2.14	1.88	1.67	1.50	1.36	1.25	1.15	
5	3.00	3.13	2,68	2.34	2.08	1.88	1.70	1.56	1.44	1.34	
6	3.00	3.21	2.81	2.50	2.25	2.05	1.88	1.73	1.61	1.50	
7	3.00	3.28	2.92	2.63	2.39	2.19	2.02	1.88	1.75	1.64	
8	3.00	3.33	3.00	2.73	2.50	2.31	2.14	2.00	1.88	1.76	
9	3.00	3.38	3.07	2.81	2.60	2.41	2.25	2.11	1.99	1.88	
10	3.00	3.41	3.13	2.88	2.68	2.50	2.34	2.21	2.08	1.97	

Table 1 No. of BFI credits awarded the institution for a level 2 article with multiple authors from different

Table 2 No. of BFI credits awarded the individual researcher for a level 2 article with multiple authors from different institutions

No. of internal authors	No. of external authors									
	0		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	3.00	1.88	1.25	0.94	0.75	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38
2	1.50	1.25	0.94	0.75	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34
3	1.00	0.94	0.75	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31
4	0.75	0.75	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29
5	0.60	0.63	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27
6	0.50	0.54	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25
7	0.45	0.47	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.23
8	0.38	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.22
9	0.33	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.21
10	0.30	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.2





#### Incentives: No optimization for institution





Fig. 6 Optimal and actual distribution of authors from the four main areas





## Incentives: No (recent) gaming evident



**Fig. 1** Mean number of authors and distribution of internal and external authors University of Southern Denmark (2011–2014, journal articles)







# Current project: What about the h-index?


## Gaming the h-index?

#### The h-index is easy and popular

- The h-index is an author-level metric that attempts to measure the productivity AND citation impact of an individual.
- When proposing the h-index Hirsh stressed that it could

never give more than a rough approximation to an individual's multifaceted profile.

 Despite this the h-index is a very popular and relatively simple measure.







## Gaming the h-index?


#### Ongoing study on researcher behaviour

 Assumption: Reasons for gaming the h-index are the same as for gaming citations, e.g.

boosting one's CV and increasing the chances of funding and promotion...

- <u>Dilemma</u>: We are critical towards h being used as an impact indicator for individuals, but we investigate how researchers (can) optimize their publishing strategies. Research can be misused.
- Question: What are the strategies of a "high h-index achiever" vs. "a low h-index achiever"?





Bjorn Lomborg was said to have a low H-index and thus many questioned his appointment.

AAP/Alan Porritt

Spicer (2015), *The Conversation*, May 21.



#### h-index basics

#### The Hirsch h-index is the number h of publications that have been cited h times

- In an author's complete publication list sorted by decreasing number of citations, the h-index equals the number of citations of the publication that matches that index number on the list.
- The h-index for an individual author can never exceed the number of his or her citable objects. E.g. if an author has published Np publications, then h is at most equal to Np.
- This means that however often an author is cited, h remains bound by Np.
- A naive but necessary strategy is then to increase the number of publications N<sub>p</sub>.




FIG. 1: The intersection of the 45 degree line with the curve giving the number of citations versus the paper number gives h. The total number of citations is the area under the curve. Assuming the second derivative is non-negative everywhere, the minimum area is given by the distribution indicated by the dotted line, yielding a=2 in Eq. 1.


Hirsch (2005), arXiv:physics/0508025.





#### Efficiency $\equiv$ a bounds

- The h-index is limited by the total number of citations Nc,tot through Hirsch's first equation, where a ≥ 1.
- The squared *h* cannot be greater than *Nc* / **a**.
- a = 1 corresponds to the most "efficient" distribution, i.e. a step function resulting from all citated papers being cited h times, while the rest of the papers are not cited at all. a = 2 is a straight line.
- Hirsch empirally finds **a** is = 3-5.
- The lower your **a**, the higher your *h* for a given citations record or a given citation impact.



$$N_{c,tot} = ah^2$$






## Focusing on a

- Quantitative data:

   Citations and publications for 75
   researchers from the Dept. of Clin.
   Res. (SDU).
- Visually representation:
   Scatter plots of various parameters distinguish high achievers from low achievers.
- ✓ Most researchers have an a between 3–5, as noted by Hirsch 2005 (for physicists).
- ✓ The value of the h-index may not be comparable from one author to another.



**Figure 1.** Publication data of 75 researchers affiliated with the Department of Clinical Research at SDU. (a) Number of citations, Nc, versus the number of papers, Np, of each researcher. (b) Np plotted against the h-index, h, of each researcher. The line represents the Np equal to h. (c) Nc versus h. Each line represents the curve for the degree of efficiency, a. (d) The derived 'a' value of each researcher versus h. The highlighted grey square represents the expected spread of a from 3 to 5, as described in (Hirsch 2005).





# Data: Low and high h-index "performers"




Figure 2. h-index curves for two outlier researchers. (a) Low a, low h. (b) High a, med h.





## Interviews, ongoing

#### • Qualitative data:


18 researchers with high h-index from Clinical Research (SDU) invited to a recorded interview on their publication strategy (10 researchers with low-a and 8 with high-a).

- Data so far:
   Conducted 9 interviews
   (5 with low a, and 4 with high a researchers).
- Method: Each semi-structured interview lasts approx. 10 minutes and are conducted at the office of the interviewees. Interviewees gave oral consent for being recorded.
- Interviews take outset in our concept Research Footprint, generated individually for each researcher.




#### RESEARCH FOOTPRINT


RESEARCHER: KIRSTEN O. KYVIK



#### NUMBER OF CITATIONS



#### TIMES CITED PER YEAR







0000-0003-2981-0245, Coupled to PURE?






K-5680-2016



#### Preliminary results summarized

#### FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS







#### **Discussion & The End**

#### **Questions**

- 1. <u>Academic</u>: Could we derive a practice for optimizing the h-index by considering the corresponding publication behavior in more detail?
- 2. Ansatz: Is there a practice of focusing at the *h*+1'th paper?
- 3. Conflicting incentives: If one tries to optimize one's h-index, does this conflict with possible incentives resulting from other kinds of optimizing in other words, are there opposing strategies at work?
- > Remains to be answered cf. forthcomming ...

#### **Note on biases**

- On the one hand, our proposed measure of efficiency focus on achieving as high an h as possible given the total number of citations, i.e. it indirectly favors lower total citation counts.
- Also, it does not favor high citation counts to individual papers.
- On the other hand, the efficiency measure is blind towards other non-citation based bibliometric indicators such as impact factors, altmetrics and research evaluation exercises.
- When the focus is on the individual paper, i.e. how to increase its citation impact, it is a process that must be very subject specific and content oriented.



