

CREATING DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS ON COMMERCIAL FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAYS

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we discuss the method of creating a circuit identifier, or digital fingerprint, for field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). The proposed digital fingerprint is a function of the natural variations in the semiconductor manufacturing process that cannot be duplicated or forged. The proposed digital fingerprint allows the use of any arbitrary of nodes internal to the circuit or the circuit outputs as monitoring locations. Changes in the signal on a selected node or output can be quantified digitally over a period of time or at a specific instance of time. Two monitoring methods are proposed, one using cumulative observation of the nodes and the other samples the nodes based on a signal transition. Two monitoring methods were validated on a small sample of twenty Xilinx[®] Virtex-II Pro FPGAs, where both methods successfully created unique identifiers for each FPGA. In addition, the effects of temperature and voltage fluctuations are also discussed.

1. INTRODUCTION

Current industry trends in FPGA design creation mirror standard practices in software programming, namely the use and reuse of small modules of functionality. Thus, there has been an increase in the need to prevent unauthorized use of intellectual property (IP). A method is needed to identify a piece of hardware through the use of a unique signature that would tie functionality to the physical silicon on which it resides without modifying the internal architecture to allow usage of current commercial designs. This method can prevent the theft of the protected IP by not allowing it to be run on any other silicon. The first step in signature creation is identifying a methodology for differentiating multi-

ple functionally and structurally identical circuits from the same vendor.

Recent research [1, 2] created physical uncloneable functions (PUFs) which are stand-alone structures specifically designed to create an ID via variations in internal delay of the PUF function due to manufacturing process variations. However, PUFs and other ID method [3] rely on finalized stable output values to characterize the circuit and often requires specialized physical hardware to generate IDs. In this paper, we proposed novel methods that monitor any selected nodes for their cumulative and transitional behaviors to determine the circuit's unique digital identification or fingerprint.

2. THE DIGITAL FINGERPRINT

The digital fingerprint creates a unique identifier based on the characterization of signals that are unique to a particular physical implementation of a functionality. Although the same circuit design and fabricated in the same way should be exactly identical, but in reality this is not the case. The semiconductor fabrication process is not perfect and variations exist in each chip. These variations can, for example, occur in the doping profile, mask alignment, metal deposition, oxide growth, or transistor gate width and length and have been proven to have a statistically significant effect on some circuit attributes [4, 5].

Naturally, this approach assumes an ideal environment where temperature and supply voltage of the circuit are carefully monitored and controlled. In reality, there exists a range of temperatures and supply voltages that the circuit will operate at. The digital fingerprint must be robust enough to provide a consistent output over this operational range. In this paper, we also present the effects of various operating temperatures and supply voltages on the proposed digital fingerprinting methods.

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


Fig. 1. Block structure of NCS fingerprint method.

3. TRANSITION BASED FINGERPRINTS

Our fingerprint method is targeting commercial FPGAs without any internal modification. Thus, instead of using a stand-alone structure to create a digital fingerprint, we use only the existing structure to monitor the transitions between ‘0’ and ‘1’. We propose two methods, nodal cumulative sampling method and transitional sampling method to create a unique ID of FPGA.

3.1. Nodal Cumulative Sampling

The nodal cumulative sampling (NCS) method summarizes transitions, either $0 \rightarrow 1$ or $1 \rightarrow 0$, over multiple signal lines to create a digital fingerprint. These lines are from various places in a circuit and are connected to the clock input of one-hot-encoded shift register, as shown in Figure 1. The register has a ‘1’ value on the LSB and as transitions are detected on a signal line, ‘0’s are shifted in causing the ‘1’ to shift towards the MSB. The bit that the ‘1’ ends on after all transitions are counted is the fingerprint value for that line. Performing this process over multiple lines results in a base- n digital fingerprint, where n is the maximum number of transitions seen for the signal set. Variations in the signals and the setup/hold times of the one-hot shift register will result different fingerprint values across multiple circuit implementations.

As an example, Figure 2 shows the basic concept by performing the summation of the $0 \rightarrow 1$ transitions for two signal lines. The fast $0 \rightarrow 1$ transition in the bottom signal may or may not be captured by the shift register depending on its setup/hold times resulting in two unique identifiers.

3.2. Transitional Sampling

Transitional sampling involves capturing the current value on multiple signal lines through the use of a shift register, as shown in Figure 3. The trigger to sample the signals is a transition, either $0 \rightarrow 1$ or $1 \rightarrow 0$. Figure 4 shows three different fingerprints created using the sample six signals with




Fig. 2. Arbitrary signals with transitions.




Fig. 3. Block structure of the transitional sampling fingerprint method with sig. 2 acting as a clock.

the sampling happening at different transitions on different signals. As with the NCS method, variations in the signals will result in different digital fingerprints.

4. RESULTS

4.1. Nodal Cumulative Sampling Digital Fingerprint

Both the NCS and transitional sampling metric were tested using a 32-bit combinational multiplier and examining its outputs. While more complex circuit could have been used and an internal node examined, the multiplier provided easy access to the FPGA LUTs. In [6], we show that using NCS we are able to uniquely identify all 10 FPGAs tested. Using transitional sampling, we were able to uniquely identify all 20 FPGAs tested.

4.2. Effects of Temperature on Digital Fingerprints

Silicon circuit performance is dependent on the temperature of the environment in which it is operating. A transistor turns ‘on’ when it conducts current from the source to the drain. The transistor is said to be in saturation mode when the voltage difference between the source and drain is greater the threshold voltage, V_t . The current conducted through the transistor from source to drain is denoted by




Fig. 4. Transitional sampling performed on six signals.

I_{ds} . The saturation current is dependent on the temperature because the carrier mobility of the electrons that pass between the source and drain is reduced at higher temperatures. Thus, the current at the drain during saturation, I_{dsat} reduces as temperature increases. Also, the magnitude of the threshold voltage V_t decreases with rising temperatures, which increases the transistor's noise sensitivity. This is shown by the equation

$$V_t = V(T_r) - k_{vt}(T - T_r) \quad (1)$$

where T is the absolute temperature in Kelvin, T_r is the room temperature in Kelvin, and k_{vt} is a constant that ranges from 0.5 to 3.0 mV/K . Overall, a circuit will function at a lower frequency at higher temperatures. So, it is expected that the multiplier in the digital fingerprint will function slower, producing longer glitches. Glitches that were too short to meet the setup and hold times of the output shift register flip-flops at room temperature would now be able to be captured. Thus the glitch count could increase. In addition, the unstable bits could become more stable. Suppose bit X was an unstable bit producing between 3 and 4 glitches. It is assumed that this was because the fourth glitch was sometimes too short to be captured by the shift register. However, with an increase in temperature, the fourth glitch would be longer and there would be a greater chance of it getting captured.

However, in addition to the multiplier slowing down, the output shift register transistors will also slow down at higher temperatures. Thus, the setup and hold times of the shift registers would increase as well. So the actual effect of temperature on the digital fingerprint circuit would be a race

Table 1. Effects of Elevated Temperature on Fingerprint

Glitch Count			
Bit No.	Room Temp.	Max. Temp (85°C)	Bit Diff.
24	3,4	3	0, +1
25	4	4	0
26	4	4	0
27	2	2	0
28	5	4,5	-1, 0
29	5	5	0
30	5	4	-1
31	6,7,8	6	0, -1, -2
32	4	4	0
33	4,5	4,5	0,0
34	3,4	3,4	0,0
35	5	5	0

between which component slows the most at higher temperatures - the multiplier or the output shift registers.

4.3. Results of Temperature on Digital Fingerprints

The Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGA was heated to the specified maximum operating temperature of 85 degrees C [7]. Measurements were then done using a Agilent 16902A logic analyzer to read the glitch count. The center multiplier output bits were recorded in table 1 as these were the bits that showed the maximum variation among the different FPGAs in previous testing. Results showed that the majority of the glitch counts remained the same for the bits that were tested. Bits 24, 28, 30 and 31 showed different results under heat than at room temperature. These results do not show a definite pattern in the bit shifts that occur when the FPGA is operating under high heat. In the case of bits 24 and 31, the glitch counts were unstable at room temperature but became stable under heat. The reverse was true for bit 28 where the glitch count was stable at room temperature and unstable when heated. Also, in the case of bit 30, glitch counts were stable but different for room temperature and under heat. However, the fact that the majority of the bits stayed the same under heat shows promise. It may be possible to allow for certain bit flips by inserting an error correction component to the Digital Fingerprint circuit. This could be done by using a strategy such as error detection and error correction codes using Hamming distance.

4.4. Effects of Supply Voltage

A transistor conducts current when the voltage difference between its source and drain, V_{ds} becomes equal or greater than the threshold voltage, V_t . When $V_{ds} > V_t$, the transistor is in saturation mode. As V_{ds} increases, the mobility of the electrons going from drain to source begins to level off. At some V_{ds} the electron mobility becomes fully saturated and

Table 2. Effects of Voltage Fluctuations on Fingerprint

Bit No.	Glitch Count		
	5V	5.5V	4.5V
24	3,4	3,4	3,4
25	4	4	4
26	4	4	4,5,6
27	2	2	2
28	5	5	4,5
29	5	5	5
30	5	5	5
31	6,7,8	6,7,8	6,7,8
32	4	4	4
33	4,5	4,5	4,5
34	3,4	3,4	3,4
35	5	5	5

raising V_{ds} will not effect the carrier mobility. For 180nm technology used in Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGAs, this voltage is 0.36V [8]. For testing purposes, we assume that the supply voltage V_{DD} is the same as V_{ds} . The Xilinx power supply operating voltage range is $5V \pm 0.5V$ [9]. This is much higher than 0.36V and so the glitch count is not expected to change much due to supply voltage fluctuations.

4.5. Results of Supply Voltage on Digital Fingerprints

The Agilent E3631A output power supply was used to vary the supply voltage to the FPGA board. Voltage was confirmed using a multimeter. Glitch counts for various input bits were recorded for 4.5V, 5V and 5.5V and are shown in Table 2. On the whole, most of the glitch counts remained the same. For bits 26 and 28, applying 4.5V to the supply increased their instability. However as the majority of the bits remained the same, this too can be accounted for by using an error correction circuit.

4.6. Statistical Sampling on FPGAs

With both digital fingerprinting circuits, all FPGAs can be identified, 10/10 for the glitch count and 20/20 for the asynchronous capture. These numbers represent a fairly small number compared to the total population of Virtex-II Pro FPGAs currently available. In order to relate this success to the larger population, use of statistical sampling theory is required. If ε is the sampling error and n is the sample size, then we have

$$1/\varepsilon^2 \approx n \quad (2)$$

Thus, for a sample size of 10, we have the statistical sampling error is $\pm 31.62\%$ and for a sample size of 20, it is $\pm 22.36\%$.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper proposed that variations in semiconductor fabrication have a measurable effect and can be used in conjunction with circuit functionality to create a natural serial number, or digital fingerprint, that is unique to each FPGA. Two methods of creating this digital fingerprint were proposed, nodal cumulative sampling, and transitional sampling, of which the latter two were able to be implemented on an FPGA. Test circuit functionality was implemented on the FPGA to gain access to the LUTs directly in order to properly test the digital fingerprint methods.

The resulting data shows variations in the number of transitions of the output bits across multiple FPGAs. The variations are for the most part consistent and provide a good foundation to allow the creation of a digital fingerprint. The two fingerprint methods implemented, using the number of transitions directly as a fingerprint and using the transitions to sample signals asynchronously, both resulted in successful identification of all FPGAs. In addition, experimental results show that the extreme supply voltage and elevated temperature have a minor influence on the fingerprint.

6. REFERENCES

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