


**InterAgency Institute**  
BEYOND INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES

**REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN  
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE  
GROWING GAPS BETWEEN THE NORTH  
AND SOUTH GLOBAL ATLANTICS.**

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## Policy Statement

The topic of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is predominant in the countries of the Global North, and its development is a priority. Undoubtedly, such an effort accelerates the adaptability of large-scale economies while diminishing the opportunity for countries in the Global South to enter the supply chains associated with the technological attempt.

This policy brief is dedicated to detecting the framework of the expansion of interests regarding the theme of Artificial Intelligence and regulatory frameworks under construction and, at the same time, regarding their discrepant constraints and developments. With the focus on issues associated with artificial intelligence as diligent for the future of cooperation between the North and South Global Atlantic, it is observed that regional and national development mechanisms are dispersed, as well as the capacity of international organizations to promote regulation and cooperation.

Such a detection points to a progressive distancing between actors from the Global North and Global South in the West concerning the development programs associated with the advancement of artificial intelligence, combined with political distances that amplify tensions between the parties. On the other hand, the limitation of international efforts aimed at ethical issues, although relevant, only occurs in combination with technology transfer and development programs, without which the possibility of engagement and sensitization in an unproductive and growing circle is reduced. These discrepancies can be reduced with the progressive incorporation of actors from the Global South into development programs mobilized by agreements such as Mercosur-EU and by Portugal's leading role in this intersection.

## Background

The Global South's progressive participation and pooling of interests mobilize new ways of guiding supply chains. The involvement of countries in the Global South in the supply of commodities remains significant, a picture that will not potentially change, especially concerning critical minerals and food (Pereira & Origuéla, 2021). In terms of the distribution of the international participation of each group, to a large extent, the availability of primary resources belonging to the group of countries of the South seems to be the only space for the international participation of these actors in

greater dimension and effect.

Otherwise, trade dynamics are politically associated with alternative collaboration axes from the West and the Global North. This includes the distancing of this group from diplomatic behavior in the face of the War in Ukraine or Israel's War against Hamas in Gaza, especially regarding the issue of the hierarchy of victims (McCloskey, 2022). The call for the humanization of debates in the international regime environment is marked by hierarchies and overlaps of interest that dissociate themselves from the explicitly human content of the terms of development.

In addition, alternative collaboration axes, such as the Atlantic technical cooperation frameworks, have been mobilized and empowered by regional cooperative regimes but still need more interest from Global North regimes. The leverage of technical cooperation takes place in an essential group of agreements that have significantly qualified the axes of regional collaboration and distanced countries from the Global North, whose commitment to local solutions was manifestly diminished.

During the last decade, it has been possible to witness a lack of interest in foreign investments in the axis of South Atlantic countries, of actors such as the US and the European Union and their members. This situation is inverse to China's interests, for example. This scenario reinforces the trend of distancing the West Global North from the Atlantic Global South or South Atlantic, accentuating imbalances in the international system visible from the different positions within the UN environment agencies and international organizations.

Along with the processes recognized as stagnation of globalization or, at the limit, "deglobalization" (Amorim Neto, 2017), national regimes and entities have configured programs to accelerate development through the theme of artificial intelligence. Multilateral regulatory efforts have focused on ethics, the only component of international dialogues and cooperation regimes.

Regarding Artificial Intelligence, there are two fields of participation in the international system. The first of these is the one that touches on the technological development of a civilian nature. At the same time, the second is the one that has primarily military or dual-use characteristics. Both fields are far from the axis of the Global South, either because of the need for more capacity for participation and investment or because of the interest in limiting development in this area in countries whose political systems

differ from the predominant systems in the Western Global North.

The initiatives that are willing to regulate artificial intelligence are also positioned in two environments: the first of them, (1) international regimes of a traditional or hybrid nature (which include civil society); the second of these, those whose committees are notably (2) associative or private.

For this analysis, traditional hybrid diplomatic regimes are limited to those discussions of a regulatory nature whose agreed commitment has value (binding commitment) or those aimed at the exchange between national or regional good practices, discussions for the solution of common problems, or broad participation of civil society. On the other hand, in the second group, associative or private initiatives, civil society is not necessarily a source of regulatory pressure. Still, it appears as a client of the processes, especially within the private environment.

## Findings

Among the two cooperative axes and looking at the initiatives that shelter the artificial intelligence international regimes and its uses in the defense environment are, in the last ten years, the discussions of the GGE (Group of Experts) within the CCW – the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UNODA, 2023), and the First Committee of the United Nations Assembly, which agenda is more recent and integrated with imminent risks (Medeiros & Poty, 2023). In the First Committee of the General Assembly in November 2023, the first resolution on Autonomous Weapons (UN Press, 2023) was approved, which provides for the need for humans and not an algorithmic control when targeting humans. Despite being historical, it had the objection or abstention of central actors in the production and use of drones in armed conflicts; Belarus and Russia were among the objections, and China, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were among the abstentions.

In the European Union, the regulation of Artificial Intelligence will happen through the AI Act, which was proposed by the European Commission in 2021 and which, as part of the Digitalization Strategy, will observe the challenges in layers of restriction according to the risks that artificial intelligence systems generate for users. The term "users" reveals a vacuum in the language associated with "use" when the risks are not from the "users" but from those affected by the "users." In addition, risks deemed

unacceptable to people will be banned, but whether it includes the discussion of the Lethal Autonomous Weapons System is unclear. The European Parliament reached a conclusion with the European Council on a draft law (AI Act) in December 2023. However, it will still be officially voted on by Members of Parliament in 2024.

In the case of associative or private environments, institutions such as ISO (International Organization for Standardization) guarantee trust and acceptance based on expertise and reputational market mechanisms. The institution has several thematically and technically established committees, such as the standards group linked to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42. A relationship between these standards related to Artificial Intelligence and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is presented by ISO and the Technical Committee. One of its main unfinished products is the Guide for the Application of Artificial Intelligence, which is still under development and scheduled for January 2024. It is already in the publication stage in December 2023.

Despite the initiatives highlighted above, there needs to be more breadth between the regimes of their commitments. Campani (2023) pointed out that the discussions of the Luxembourg Conference on Autonomous Weapons embodied the concern of dehumanization. On the other hand, it also recognized that some of the documents made with a broader purpose, such as UNESCO's draft of the ethical recommendations associated with artificial intelligence, could be applied to Autonomous Weapons when banning anti-human autonomous systems. As highlighted earlier by Medeiros and Poty (2023), the sources of rapprochement between the Global South and the Global North may be associated with discussions on ethics if humanization can be the central agenda for reconciling interests.

## Recommendations

Among the recommendations, we highlight the need to reposition cooperative instruments between the North and South of the Global Atlantic. The instruments mobilized through the European Union and the United States in development are potentially scarce due to the demands of incorporating actors in a scenario of common interests.

The topic of Artificial Intelligence requires an integrative approach, even if economic and social discrepancies cause a decrease in interest in the Global South, given the

minimal risks associated with its technology-intensive use. Such an approach involves the recommendation already presented by Marie-Therese Png (2022) to expand multistakeholder participation and make visible the historical-political challenges of these actors. In addition, it should include the possibility of integration into financing and development axes that reduce such discrepancies. Without the associated resources and involvement of these actors from the Global Atlantic South in partnerships, it will not be possible to integrate them harmoniously into regulatory processes. Such diminished interest can be expressed in the European Union's small group of HORIZON 2020-type calls for proposals aimed at integrating partners from the Global South Atlantic or the participation of its civil society in relevant forums already mentioned and widely disseminated among civil societies in the Global North.

As in the front between the European Union and Mercosur for the trade agreement expected for more than five years, Portugal has been a potential interlocutor between the Global Atlantic South and the North, a position that has been efficient recently (Portugal, 2023). Despite the colonial history that includes Portugal and recent ex-colonization, this country's dialogue with the South Atlantic axis is potentially better than that of other former colonial powers. This is also revealed in the initiative with less visibility and a vast proportion for technical cooperation, that is, the Atlantic Centre, an initiative of the Defense of Portugal that brings together collaborative efforts from the institutions and entities of the maritime power of Atlantic countries.

## Conclusions

The most evident conclusion of this analysis is that the expansion of AI programs in countries of the West Global North has happened in parallel with the political tensions and political distances between the Global South and the Global North. Such a trend may accelerate differences, reducing the capacity to defuse crises and disputes of interests. Thus, the dynamics reinforce the differences in participation in the international system, diminishing the opportunities between the Global North and the Global South.

It should be noted that the interests associated with the development of artificial intelligence require a significant contribution of technology, the elements of which are highly dependent on obtaining inputs such as critical minerals. At the same time, international trade in goods by sea depends on stable policy instruments on any



continent. Finally, food security is precious for the economic stability of the North-to-South axis.

Based on these elements, it is possible to qualify the importance of working for the realignment between the Global South and the Global North, especially in ensuring the critical minerals accessibility, the stability of Atlantic relations, the production and circulation of essential goods that qualify economic stability, and food security.

The Global South's replacement of cooperative mechanisms with regional cooperation and investments from China leverages its economies from other axes of critical dependence. Therefore, the interests in aligning the future between the Atlantic or Western Global North and South are affected, which characterizes the divisions present in International Organizations and cooperation and regulatory regimes, including when it comes to artificial intelligence regulatory developments.

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
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