

Growth in environmental footprints and environmental impacts embodied in trade: Resource efficiency indicators from EXIOBASE3

Abstract

Most countries show a relative decoupling of economic growth from domestic resource use, implying increased resource efficiency. However, international trade facilitates the exchange of products between regions with disparate resource productivity. Hence, for an understanding of resource efficiency from a consumption perspective that takes into account the impacts in the upstream supply chains, there is a need to assess the environmental pressures embodied in trade. We use EXIOBASE3, a new multi-regional input-output database, to examine the rate of increase in resource efficiency, and investigate the ways in which international trade contributes to the displacement of pressures on the environment from the consumption of a population. We look at the environmental pressures of energy use, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, material use, water use and land use. Material use stands out as the only indicator growing in both absolute and relative terms to population and gross domestic product (GDP), whilst land use is the only indicator showing absolute decoupling from both references. Energy, GHG and water use show relative decoupling. As a percentage of total global environmental pressure, we calculate the net impact displaced through trade rising from 23% to 32% for material use (1995-2011), 23% to 26% for water use, 20% to 29% for energy use, 20% to 26% for land use, and 19% to 24% for GHG emissions. The results show a substantial disparity between trade related impacts for OECD and non-OECD countries. At the product group level, we observe the most rapid growth in environmental footprints in clothing and footwear. The analysis points to implications for future policies aiming to achieve environmental targets, while fully considering potential displacement effects through international trade.

<heading level 1>Introduction

Considering the current rate of economic growth, improving resource efficiency requires a strong decoupling between development and environmental impact. The United Nations Environment Program highlights the scale of the challenge (UNEP 2011) along with the urgency and potential of resource efficiency measures in achieving decoupling (UNEP 2014). However, the growing international flow of goods and services makes the relationship between trade and the environment increasingly important to understand (Liu et al. 2015). Knowledge about international spillovers of resources burdens or environmental impact will help in assessing progress towards national environmental targets and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) (e.g. Peters et al 2011 for climate policy).

The rapid growth in trade prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, the subsequent stagnation, and the more recent push to re-liberalise global trade relationships in order to help economies recover from recession has put the trade agenda back in the spotlight. Over 50% of goods and over 70% of services traded are used as intermediate inputs to produce other goods and services (Lanz 2009). The average number of borders that an exported good crosses before final consumption is approximately 1.7 (Muradov 2016). This implies that most exported goods are not consumed within the country of import but are processed further. Previous research has shown that such trade flows have significant effects on the environment. Around one quarter of the global land use is embodied in trade (Weinzettel et al. 2013), as well as over 40% of materials (Wiedmann et al. 2013), 20-30% of global water use (Lenzen et al. 2013b), and over 20% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Peters and Hertwich 2008).

43 Recently, with the development of time series of global economic models for environmental analysis,
 44 studies have started to uncover the dynamics of consumption, trade and environmental impacts over
 45 time, as well as the role of outsourcing in the growth of emissions (Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014;
 46 Peters et al. 2011) and materials (Wiedmann et al. 2013). EXIOBASE3 (Stadler et al. 2017) is a global
 47 multi-regional input-output model that has been developed to analyse the change in the relationships
 48 between consumption, trade, and environmental impacts over time. The database has been developed
 49 to assess the major growth in trade since the mid-1990's, a time when most statistical offices around
 50 the world adopted the System of National Accounts (SNA) (United Nations Statistics Division 1993) in
 51 order to make international data current and comparable. EXIOBASE3 focuses on economic and
 52 associated environmental data from 1995 onwards (until 2011 for all indicators, but economic
 53 accounts and some environmental accounts are updated to later years) under the SNA and the
 54 associated System of Environmental and Economic Accounting (United Nations et al. 2014; Wood et
 55 al. 2015). EXIOBASE3 captures economic, environmental and trade data for all EU countries, 16 other
 56 major economies, and 5 rest of the world regions. With data on input-output transactions, labour
 57 inputs, energy supply and use, greenhouse gas emissions, material extraction, land and water use, as
 58 well as emissions to air, water and soil, it provides a comprehensive up-to-date coverage of the global
 59 economy. EXIOBASE3 provides the first time series with adequate disaggregation of the agricultural,
 60 forestry and mining sectors for proper consideration of the land, water and material pressures related
 61 to these sectors, as well as a detailed division of energy extraction and transformation industries. This
 62 puts EXIOBASE3 in a unique position compared to other existing MRIO databases, such as Eora or WIOD
 63 (for a comparison of MRIO databases see Tukker and Dietzenbacher (2013), or updated results on
 64 www.environmentalfootprints.org).

65 In this paper, we use EXIOBASE3 to investigate the role of international trade and consumption in
 66 relation to increased resource efficiency. We seek to understand the role of different global regions in
 67 the rapid growth of traded goods, and point towards the areas where consumption has seen the
 68 greatest growth in environmental impact, and reliance on traded goods. We present key results in the
 69 paper, and fully elucidated supporting information for additional country and regional analysis.

70

71 <heading level 1>Methods

72 Analyses of environmental impacts embodied in trade and consumption are based on the following
 73 elements: for a given country r we take trends in production-based accounts D_r^{prod} and consumption-
 74 based accounts D_r^{cons} . A detailed explanation on how to calculate production and consumption-based
 75 accounts can be found in Wood et al. (2015), and is summarized below.

76 The production-based account D_r^{prod} , also called footprint, is available directly as a sum of the direct
 77 inputs/emissions in each sector, whilst the consumption-based account D_r^{cons} is calculated through
 78 the Leontief model with environmental extensions (Miller and Blair 2009):

$$79 \quad \mathbf{D}_r^{cons} = \mathbf{S}\mathbf{L}\mathbf{Y} + \mathbf{F}\mathbf{h}$$

80 where \mathbf{S} is the environmental intensity matrix showing environmental pressure per unit output of
 81 intermediate producers (industry); \mathbf{L} is the Leontief Inverse or “total requirements matrix” showing
 82 intermediate inputs required per unit of final product; \mathbf{Y} is the matrix of final demand by consuming
 83 country (source – or region of production – by consumer), and $\mathbf{F}\mathbf{h}$ is the direct environmental pressures
 84 by final consumers (for example, resource consumption in households). We use the EXIOBASE3

85 database, with time-series data from 1995 to 2011¹. A full description of the database, methods to
86 obtain the database, product and country coverage is available in a publication in this special issue
87 (Stadler et al. 2017). This paper presents results from version 3.4 as of September 2017, a minor update
88 to the v3.3 release at the end of the European funded DESIRE project (see www.fp7desire.eu).

89 We quantify five environmental pressures in this study: GHG emissions, energy use, material use,
90 water consumption, and land use. For GHG emissions, we included emissions from fuel combustion,
91 industrial emissions (including cement, chemicals, and other non-combustion processes), agriculture,
92 and waste (IPCC categories 1 to 5 and 7). The aggregation of different well-mixed GHG (CO₂, CH₄, N₂O
93 and SF₆) was performed using the GWP100 metric (Myhre 2013), which is widely applied in climate
94 assessments and has been used extensively in life-cycle analysis to calculate the carbon footprints of
95 product flows (Goedkoop et al. 1998; Heijungs et al. 2010). Energy consumption was quantified as
96 emission relevant energy use – i.e. energy use at point of combustion or point of final production in
97 the case of hydro, solar, etc. This excludes energy products used for non-energy purposes (e.g.
98 lubricants or plastics). The energy accounts on EXIOBASE3 were constructed using statistics on energy
99 consumption from the International Energy Agency. Material use comprises the domestic material
100 extraction used, which is compiled based on the various available international data sources, including
101 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the International Energy Agency
102 and the British and US Geological Surveys, and following the Eurostat material flow guidelines
103 (EUROSTAT 2013). Water consumption covers the total blue water consumption in agriculture and
104 livestock production, by industries and businesses, as well as direct consumption by final consumers,
105 and corresponds to the amount of water extracted from nature minus the amount of water returned
106 to nature. This indicator is used to account for anthropogenic water appropriation (Lutter et al. 2016),
107 but does not account for its contribution to water stress (Yang et al. 2013). Land use was quantified by
108 adding the total surface area of land occupied by agricultural production and permanent pasture, to
109 that by forestry activities (for production of roundwood and industrial firewood) to that by
110 infrastructure such as urban areas, dams and roads. This indicator does not differentiate between the
111 productivity in different land areas (Haberl et al. 2007). However, because of the uncertainty
112 surrounding impact metrics of land use (such as the impact on biodiversity of land use for forestry
113 versus land use for farming), it is still useful to quantify the total land pressure as a resource constraint.
114 Full details of the data used to construct these extensions is available in Stadler et al (2017).

115 We define environmental pressures displaced through trade (Ghertner and Fripp 2007), as the
116 difference between the production-based account and the consumption-based account (cf. Peters et
117 al. 2011):

$$118 \quad \mathbf{T}_r = \mathbf{D}_r^{\text{prod}} - \mathbf{D}_r^{\text{cons}}$$

119 where \mathbf{T}_r is positive for those countries which are net exporters of environmental pressure, and
120 negative for those countries which are net importers of environmental pressure. In order to illustrate
121 the impacts of globalisation on the patterns of displacement of environmental pressure, we focus in
122 particular on the analysis of changes over time.

123 We calculate the percentage of imported environmental pressure by setting up a bilateral calculation
124 of producer to consumer $\mathbf{D}_{r,s}$, such that:

¹ EXIOBASE 3 additionally contains a now-casted time series from 2012 to 2016. This data is non-homogenous across the environmental pressures, and is not included in the results presented here. Contact the authors for further info.

125

$$\mathbf{D}_{r,s} = \mathbf{G}\hat{\mathbf{S}}\mathbf{L}\mathbf{Y}$$

126 where \mathbf{Y} is the matrix of final demand by consuming country of dimensions $(p * n, n)$, where p is the
 127 number of production sectors in each country (200) and n is the number of countries (49), $\hat{\mathbf{S}}$ is each
 128 individual environmental pressure per unit output diagonalised, \mathbf{L} is the Leontief Inverse, and \mathbf{G} is an
 129 aggregation matrix that collapses the product-by-country dimension (p, n) to just countries (n). The
 130 percentage of imported emissions is then $\mathbf{D}_s^{imp} = \sum_{r \neq s} \mathbf{D}_{r,s} / \sum_r \mathbf{D}_{r,s}$. Globally it becomes $\mathbf{D}^{imp} =$
 131 $\sum_{r \neq s} \mathbf{D}_{r,s} / \sum_{r,s} \mathbf{D}_{r,s}$. Note that we are calculating net transfer or displacement here, and not all
 132 impacts embodied in gross trade flows (Peters 2008).

133 Resource efficiency indicators are calculated by dividing the consumption account \mathbf{D}_f^{cons} by population
 134 statistics (World Bank 2015a) or gross domestic product in 2011 international dollars (corrected for
 135 purchasing power parity) (World Bank 2015b).

136

137 <heading level 1>Results

138 1.1. Growth in global environmental impacts

139 On a global scale, achievements in resource efficiency, which are characterized by either absolute or
 140 strong relative decoupling from gross domestic product (GDP), have been limited. Table 1 illustrates
 141 the development of various indicators in the period 1995 to 2011. Material use has shown the
 142 strongest increase, from 8.3 to 11.3 tonnes/capita (+36%), outstripping growth in GDP. We also see an
 143 equal growth of GHG emissions to emissions-relevant energy use, which implies that we have not
 144 achieved a global decarbonisation of the energy supply. Land and water resources, which are more
 145 directly subject to natural constraints, have increased the least, with blue water consumption rising
 146 from 190 to 200 m³/capita for water consumption, and the total surface area of land used for
 147 productive purposes showing a reduction of 0.3 ha/capita. Land use area has slightly decreased on an
 148 absolute level, principally due to slight reductions in area of permanent meadows and pasture and
 149 non-planted forestland. It is the only indicator that presented (small) absolute decoupling from GDP.

150

151 *Table 1 Growth of absolute, per-capita and per-GDP environmental pressures, GDP (PPP) and population between 1995-2011.*

	UNITS	1995 (PER-CAPITA)	2011 (PER-CAPITA)	ABSOLUTE GROWTH	PER CAP GROWTH	PER GDP GROWTH
GHG emissions	t CO2 eq.	5.5	6.3	1.42	1.16	0.88
Energy use	GJ	56.0	64.4	1.41	1.15	0.87
Material use	tonnes	8.3	11.3	1.67	1.36	1.03
Blue water consumption	m3	190.6	200.1	1.28	1.05	0.80
Land use	ha	1.3	1.0	0.99	0.81	0.61
GDP (PPP)	2011int\$	7,331	9,660	1.61	1.32	1.00
Population	billion	5.7	6.9	1.22	1.00	0.76

152

153 The strong growth in material use, as well as the strong link between material use and GHG emissions
 154 in capital intensive low-carbon technologies (Hertwich et al. 2014) and in infrastructure building due
 155 to the use of carbon-intensive materials such as cement and steel (Müller et al. 2013; Sodersten et al.

156 2017) provide a cause for concern for future growth. Likewise, the International Resource Panel (IRP)
157 of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has recently shown that an increase in resource
158 efficiency is key for meeting climate change targets in a cost-effective manner (Ekins et al. 2016).

159 On a regional scale, we observe substantial differences in growth rates. Figure 1 presents the growth
160 in consumption-based footprints per capita and per GDP-PPP between 1995 and 2011 by region. GHG
161 emissions per capita has grown slightly more slowly than energy use for all regions, except China, Africa
162 and the Middle East. In Europe, the growth of the energy footprint per capita has been accompanied
163 by a decline in emissions. North America has succeeded in reducing both energy and emission
164 footprints per capita over the period under consideration. Most of the developing countries have been
165 characterized by growing energy footprints per capita, which has helped fuel their rapid economic
166 development, but relative decoupling between energy and emissions can also be observed. This
167 decoupling, however, is not visible for China, where the increase in GHG emissions has outpaced the
168 growth of emission relevant energy use. This implies the adoption of more carbon-intensive energy
169 sources with the commissioning of a large number of coal-fired power plants during that period, (Lin
170 et al. 2014; Feng et al. 2012). This fact is corroborated by the breakdown of Chinese emissions in the
171 underlying data: from 1995 to 2011, the share of emissions from energy processes (production and
172 combustion of fossil fuels) in total GHG emissions have grown from 75% to 82% for production-based
173 accounts (D^{prod}), and from 75% to 79% for consumption-based accounts (footprints, D^{cons}). China was
174 also an exceptional case regarding the growth of material footprints per capita, with footprints almost
175 tripling, growing much faster compared to all other regions. This is related in particular to the building
176 up of transport, housing and energy infrastructure, which is highly material intensive; for example,
177 regarding the use of construction minerals, such as cement, sand and gravel (Giljum et al. 2016).
178 Growth in land footprint per capita by 30% also separates China from other regions, as the land
179 footprint per capita decreased between 9 and 38% for all other regions during the period.





Figure 1 Growth in consumption-based footprints per capita and per GDP between 1995 and 2011 for 11 world regions (1995=1).


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183 When we shift the analysis to account for resource efficiency, (environmental footprints per unit GDP)
184 we notice a change in the narrative. In terms of resource efficiency, China and India have achieved the
185 highest relative decoupling between environmental pressure and GDP growth. For every 1% of GDP
186 growth, China increased its GHG emissions by 0.56%, while the OECD countries increased their
187 emissions by 0.8%. The global average was 0.88% per percentage GDP growth. Again, land and water

188 indicators show faster decoupling than material and energy indicators in general, and only India, South
189 America and Africa are showing faster material decoupling than energy decoupling.

190 With regard to the net trade balance for 2011 (Figure 2), we confirm previous results showing that
191 Europe has a resource deficit across the categories of greenhouse gas emissions, material use, water
192 consumption, land use (Tukker et al. 2016) as well as for energy use. The pattern of net trade balance
193 did not change much for Europe from 1995 to 2011, with some indicators slightly decreasing (land)
194 and others increasing (material use). North America increased their resources deficit during the period,
195 with the increase in net import of energy and materials being more pronounced over time. The region
196 also became a net exporter of embodied land in 2011. China changed from being a small net exporter
197 in 1995 to a large net importer in 2011, and by 2011 shifted to a larger trade surplus of material and
198 energy embodied in Chinese products. By 2011, China was the largest single-country net exporter of
199 embodied emissions and material. Russia remained, throughout the period, a large net exporter of
200 embodied energy, amounting to the equivalent of 2.6% of global energy use in 2011. By 2011, Russia
201 was also the country that had the highest exports of embodied land, alongside South America and
202 Australia. All these regions are exporters of mineral, agricultural, and energy commodities, which are
203 land-intensive. The remainder of Asian countries (Other Asia) is also significant in that it had a large
204 net export of water while having a large net import of material and land use. The region was also a net
205 importer of embodied energy and emissions in 1995, but in 2011 the production- and consumption-
206 based indicators were almost in balance. All Asian regions (China, India, and Other Asia regions) were
207 net exporters of water, which shows a large water intensity in goods produced in the region. This was
208 due to the relatively water-intensive crops in the region. Africa and the Middle East region were net
209 exporters of all environmental pressures assessed.

210 Looking at the development of the footprint balance between OECD and non-OECD countries over
211 time, two things become apparent. First, there was a displacement, through international trade, of all
212 environmental pressures from OECD to non-OECD countries both in 1995 and in 2011. Second,
213 between 1995 and 2011, the imbalance between the two regions became more pronounced for
214 material use (from 7.5% to 9.5%), energy use (from 3.9% to 4.6%), and GHG emissions (from 6.1% to
215 6.3%), while the difference in the net trade of water (from 8.1% to 7.2%) and land footprints (from
216 7.2% to 5.3%) decreased.




217
 218 *Figure 2 Net trade of environmental pressures (consumption - production) relative to global pressure in different regions for*
 219 *1995 (top) and 2011 (bottom)*

220
 221 **1.2. Increasing role of international trade**

222 International trade can promote more efficient access to natural resources and is thus an important
 223 driver of economic growth (WTO 2010). However, there is concern for potentially unequal ecological
 224 exchange in trade (Moran et al. 2013) and for having consonant environmental protection embodied
 225 in traded goods (Copeland and Taylor 2004).

226 Figure 3 shows the percentage of global pressures displaced through trade – that is, the amount of
 227 pressure that occurs in the upstream supply chain of a country different from that where the final
 228 consumption occurs. This share grew from 24% to 33% for material use, 25% to 28% for water use,
 229 20% to 26% for land use, 20% to 24% for GHG emissions, and 16% to 21% for energy use. Material use

230 is the pressure with the highest displacement through international trade. One of the reasons for that
 231 might be that materials such as biomass, fossil fuels, minerals and metals are commonly exported
 232 products, both as raw materials and further processed and embodied in exported goods.




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 234 *Figure 3 Percentage of impacts displaced through international trade, relative to total global footprints*

235
 236 Whilst the magnitude of these results is affected by the aggregation of the Rest of the World regions
 237 (we only look at trade between regions, not trade within a region), the growth rates are generally
 238 insensitive to this aggregation. All indicators show a clear pattern of growth between 1995 and 2007.
 239 The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a decline in 2009, lowering the import share of embodied
 240 environmental indicators in the total footprints, as well as reducing the footprint itself. Economic
 241 recovery from 2010 brought back the imports to the pre-crisis levels.

242
 243 **1.3. Product level drivers**

244 The analysis at product level can help understand which of the final products consumed are driving the
 245 change in overall footprints, and can thus inform policy. Figure 4 shows the growth of absolute
 246 footprints by six consumption categories (see SI for aggregation of detailed products to product
 247 category): shelter (i.e. housing), food, clothing and footwear, mobility, manufactured products, and
 248 services. For the OECD, we see the most rapid growth in footprints in the apparel product category,

249 with the material footprint doubling from 1995 values, the water footprint increasing by 50%, and GHG
 250 emissions by 20%. Likewise, material use has increased by close to 100% for manufactured products.
 251 This could be the result of the shift in products consumed, from higher-priced clothes and footwear to
 252 a higher volume of cheaper goods produced in sweatshops (cf. Steen-Olsen et al. 2016) and higher
 253 availability and lower prices of goods, such as electronics. This creates a higher volume of consumption
 254 at similar price levels, which will have lower effects on value-added than on environmental impacts
 255 associated with the production of these goods. For some of the most polluting product groups (e.g.
 256 shelter and mobility), on the other hand, growth is low in the OECD. For the Non-OECD, we see the
 257 same strong growth in apparel and manufactured products, but also strong growth in shelter and
 258 services.




259
 260 *Figure 4. Growth in environmental footprints by consumption category, 1995-2011, OECD and Non-OECD.*

261

262 When looking at the effect of trade on footprints of different products, we see that it depends on the
 263 product category and on the environmental indicator. Figure 5 shows the growth in the footprints of
 264 GHG emissions, material use, water consumption, and land use for the six product categories. We
 265 excluded energy use, because of a similar trend observed in GHG emissions and energy use. The upper
 266 parts of the figures show the total global environmental pressure driven by each of the product
 267 categories, while the lower parts of the figures show the share of pressures displaced through
 268 international trade in relation to the total footprint of the final products. Shelter is the largest driver
 269 of GHG and material use and second largest driver of land use, though most impacts occur
 270 domestically. This is likely due to the construction of infrastructure, which is emission- and material-
 271 intensive, and mostly relies on domestically sourced goods (such as gravel and cement). Food is
 272 responsible for the majority of the impacts on water consumption, and has a significantly higher share

273 of impacts on land use than all other products. As for material use, most environmental impacts
 274 happen domestically.



275
 276 *Figure 5. Environmental footprints by consumption category, global footprints, absolute quantity (left axis), percentage of*
 277 *imports (right axis).*

278
 279 Globally, imports are responsible for at least 50-70% of the environmental pressures associated with
 280 clothing and footwear, while for manufactured products they account for about 40-60%. Whilst
 281 clothing and footwear represent a low share of the total absolute environmental impacts,
 282 manufactured products' GHG emissions and material use have risen rapidly since the first half of the
 283 2000s. When looking at specific regions, however (see SI), we see that imports are important for OECD
 284 countries and have increased considerably since the 2000s, and especially so for Europe, where up to
 285 80% of environmental pressures occurred outside the country where the final goods are being
 286 consumed in 2011.

287

288

289 <heading level 1>Discussion

290 **Distance to environmental targets** In Tukker et al. (2016), four of the environmental indicators on
291 carbon, water, land and materials were assessed in comparison to an indicative target. These were
292 defined as: a carbon footprint of 2-2.5 tonnes of CO₂ per capita to stay within a 2° target; a material
293 footprint of 5-10 tonnes per capita (see Bringezu 2015); a water footprint of circa 150m³ per capita
294 (with ranges of 100-600m³); a land use footprint of 10ha per capita (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014).
295 In light of these indicative targets, we see that already since the work of Tukker et al. (2016) based on
296 2007 data, the global economy further exceeded these limits for material extractions, water use and
297 greenhouse gas emissions. It was only in the case of land use that a slowdown in growth could be
298 observed. However, besides global per-capita averages, one should pay attention to the unequal
299 distribution of the footprints per inhabitant. High per-capita footprint levels in industrialised countries,
300 in combination with the increasing pressure through open trade, drove the global economy further
301 away from achieving these targets. With the increasing growth of developing nations, this again poses
302 questions related to the limits of achieving the required decoupling of global and regional
303 environmental pressures from economic growth, in order to keep socio-economic activities within the
304 planetary boundaries (Steffen et al. 2015). While international trade can improve the efficiency in
305 resource use for production worldwide (Cole 2004), a decrease of environmental pressures at the
306 global level could not be observed, and the net transfer of environmental pressures from non-OECD
307 to OECD countries has not decreased. Further investigation of the role of international trade in the
308 relative decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressures is needed to assess whether
309 international trade is contributing to linking resource availability with production, without leading to
310 socio-economic losses or increasing non-regulated and/or non-financial environmental impacts.

311 **Environmental leakage.** In the trade discourse, there has been strong concern that environmental
312 regulation will cause the relocation of industry to other regions with lax environmental standards (e.g.
313 under globally disparate carbon taxes). In the literature, this has been discussed as the Pollution Haven
314 Hypothesis (Copeland and Taylor 2004). This is clearly an issue for the governance of global
315 environmental impacts, but whilst we cannot directly test this hypothesis (there are many
316 methodological challenges in empirically testing using MRIO analysis (Zhang et al. 2017)) our results
317 do not suggest a strong case for this happening thus far. In the period analysed, clearly a great deal of
318 “environmental leakage” occurred, in that impacts displaced through trade generally grew in the order
319 of 50%. However, we saw the greatest growth in *unregulated* environmental pressures, rather than in
320 greenhouse gas emissions that have come under climate regulation in Europe. Material use and gross
321 energy use showed the greatest increase over time – two pressures that relate to the increasing
322 secondary and tertiary nature of our economies. The growth of materials and energy embodied in
323 internationally traded products was thus more a result of other drivers, such as restructuring in the
324 international division of labour, than of the implementation of specific climate policies (compare (Liu
325 et al. 2016)). At the regional level, the industrialization and increasing role of China and other Asian
326 countries in international supply chains contributed to an increase of environmental pressures
327 displaced through trade (Dietzenbacher et al. 2012). Their highly carbonized energy mix resulted in
328 increased emissions embodied in exported products, while for material indicators, there is an even
329 more significant increase (doubling) of material use embodied in clothing and footwear and in
330 electronics.

331 **The role of infrastructure in shaping global developments.** Both at the global level and notably for
332 many emerging economies, such as China, a huge increase in material use and related footprints could
333 be observed over the past 20 years (Table 1, Figure 1), leading to an increasing material intensity of
334 the global economy over our period of analysis. The main underlying driver for this huge increase is

335 the significant investment in infrastructure, which emerging economies such as China are currently
336 undertaking (Wang et al. 2014; Giljum et al. 2015; UNEP 2016; Minx et al. 2011). This infrastructure,
337 serving both domestic and foreign consumption, relates to housing and manufacturing infrastructure
338 (buildings, factories), transport infrastructure (roads, railways, harbors, etc.) as well as energy
339 infrastructure (such as power plants). On the one hand, these infrastructure-related activities slow
340 down the reduction in pollution intensity in emerging countries, such as China (Guan et al. 2014) (Guan
341 et al., 2014). On the other hand, the fast growth in material consumption due to infrastructure
342 activities in emerging economies is consequently transferred to developed regions, such as the EU, via
343 rapidly increasing levels of materials and emissions embodied in imports (see Giljum et al., 2016). This
344 infrastructure not only determines the material patterns of today but will also influence other
345 environmental performances heavily in the future, e.g. regarding energy use and GHG emissions (Feng
346 et al. 2012). Infrastructure thus should receive priority attention when designing strategies to achieve
347 a sustainable economy and sustainable production and consumption patterns (Clarke et al. 2014) as
348 indicated in the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2015).

349 **Footprint trends at the product level.** Manufactured goods are the product group with the highest
350 growth rate in environmental impacts. As such, the focus on manufactured goods is becoming
351 increasingly important for European resource efficiency policy, where the consumption of clothing and
352 footwear, mobility (including vehicles) and other manufactured goods represented the greatest
353 growth in environmental pressures. In general, material use is the indicator with the highest growth
354 rates, which is related to the metabolic transition that many emerging economies are currently
355 undergoing (UNEP 2016).

356 **Trade levels.** Intensified international trade over the last 20 years has made regions more
357 interdependent on each other's supply of resources. The value chains have become more global (OECD
358 2013), and an increasing number of products are traded in order to be processed further and exported
359 to the country of final consumption. Whilst the global financial crisis had a significant impact on global
360 trade relations, leading to a sharp drop of the role of imports determining regional footprints, in our
361 results we saw a catch-up of all accounts to levels before the crisis, confirming similar previous reports,
362 specifically for GHG (Peters et al. 2012).

363 **Uncertainty & Variability.** Results presented in this paper are based on EXIOBASE3, a top-down model
364 of the global economy with disaggregated agricultural, food, mining and manufacturing sectors.
365 EXIOBASE is the highest resolution global MRIO with harmonised product classifications (compare
366 Eora, with variable product resolution from 25 to over 400 commodities in different countries).
367 However, there is still significant aggregation compared to individual product flows, or compared, to
368 for example the most detailed trade classification of roughly 4000 goods. A significant amount of work
369 has been done to understand the relative variability and uncertainty caused by the use of MRIO
370 approaches, including 1) variability due to choice of model, 2) product level aggregation uncertainty,
371 3) regional aggregation uncertainty 4) stochastic uncertainty. We do not go into these sources of
372 variability and uncertainty here. For understanding of variability between MRIO results, we refer to
373 the website www.environmentalfootprints.org, where all MRIO results are available in a common
374 classification. This follows up earlier work by Owen and others (Owen et al. 2014; Owen et al. 2016;
375 Wieland et al. 2017) who analyse the sources of differences in MRIO models, and Moran and Wood
376 (2014) who quantify the level of convergence in MRIO results for carbon footprints. The question of
377 aggregation error has been investigated through the work of Steen-Olsen et al. (2014) across multiple
378 models, and in the case of EXIOBASE (de Koning et al. 2015; Wood et al. 2014; Bouwmeester and
379 Oosterhaven 2013; Stadler et al. 2014). Much less work has been done on stochastic uncertainty,
380 although some authors (Lenzen et al. 2010; Lenzen 2011; Lenzen et al. 2013a; Moran and Wood 2014;

381 Karstensen et al. 2015) address the issue, finding significant cancellation of stochastic errors (assuming
382 no correlation) at the country level, resulting in stochastic errors of carbon footprints in line with
383 stochastic error of production based accounts (roughly 5-15%). A final area of research to point at is
384 showing the differences in using sub-regional production-side models, for example, in the
385 regionalisation of IO tables, or the significant impact on embodied exports with the separation of
386 production-side impacts for processing exports (Dietzenbacher et al. 2012; Su et al. 2013). The
387 summation of this work points to the importance of having high product and regional resolution,
388 particularly for environmental analysis. More work needs to be done in this area, but at the same time,
389 the institutionalisation of MRIO and footprint-based approaches in for example, the OECD (Yamano
390 2015), will allow for the research frontier to move in this direction (Tukker et al. 2017).

391 <heading level 1> Conclusion

392 Achieving absolute decoupling of environmental pressure from economic growth will require strong
393 improvements in resource efficiency. In this paper, we used EXIOBASE3 to look at a range of
394 environmental pressures, the rate of decoupling as well as the impact that growth in international
395 trade has had. We find strongest growth in material use indicators, relatively to population and
396 income. Energy and greenhouse gas emission indicators follow similar but less pronounced trends.
397 Material goods are responsible for a significant portion of the growth, both in absolute levels and as a
398 percentage of traded impacts. Impacts embodied in trade are growing for all indicators, and we
399 confirm the impact that global trade has in the displacement of environmental impacts to developing
400 regions. The results have implications for the realisation of Sustainable Development Goals, and the
401 fact that assessments must take into account the inter-regional displacement of impacts, and the need
402 for proactively addressing the growing material metabolism of our economies.

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405 <heading level 1>References

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